International Affairs

VOLUME 65   **NUMBER 2, 2019**

CONTENTS

"Russian Diplomacy Is Working Hard in All Areas"

S. Lavrov

COLLEAGUES,

Every year when we gather in this hall we recall our veterans and other comrades who have passed away in the last 12 months. This past year was no exception. Let us honor their memory with a minute of silence.

Colleagues and friends,

I am pleased to see many familiar faces in this hall – our veterans and colleagues from the Presidential Executive Office, the Government Executive Office, the Security Council, the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, ministries and departments. We are sincerely grateful to you for your support and cooperation, and for a professional solidarity that helps us successfully fulfill the important tasks set by the country's leaders.

First of all, I would like to read a message of greetings from President of Russia Vladimir Putin.

***

DEAR FRIENDS,

Please accept my sincere congratulations on the occasion of your professional day, Diplomats' Day.

The foreign policy service of our country is proud of its rich history and glorious traditions, as it should be. Russian diplomats of many generations have served the Motherland with honor and have remained faithful to their professional duty.

Today, our diplomacy is making a significant contribution to strengthening peace, resolving important regional and global

issues, and promoting cooperation with our foreign partners. In today's challenging circumstances, when international security and the rule of law are subjected to serious tests, you, the diplomats, face important and major tasks. In particular, it is imperative to tirelessly uphold the basic principles of international law and the universal role of the UN and to strive to rally the international community in fighting the terrorist threat. Maintaining strategic stability needs much attention, especially now that the arms control and non-proliferation regime has been challenged.

Much remains to be done to further advance the peace process in Syria, as well as to find solution to other crises by political and diplomatic means.

Of course, efforts should be stepped up to promote Eurasian integration processes and to expand the external relations of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with an eye to forming the Greater Eurasian Partnership.

I am confident that the staff of the Foreign Ministry's central office and overseas missions will continue to work proactively, with full dedication and creativity in the interest of ensuring Russia's dynamic development and further strengthening of its standing and influence on the international stage.

I sincerely wish you every success in your work. I wish good health and all the best to our esteemed veterans who have dedicated their lives to serving the Fatherland in the diplomatic field.

Vladimir Putin

* * *

WE HAVE also received several other greetings. In his message, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev noted the contribution of our diplomacy to promoting national interests in the international arena. Messages of greetings have been sent from speakers of the Federation Council and the State Duma, heads of parliamentary committees, executive government bodies, regions of the Russian Federation, and the business community.

The high appreciation of the ministry's work is borne out by the fact that in the past year alone 67 of our colleagues have received state awards, certificates of merit or thank-you letters from the President. We have recently done much to enhance the social protection of our employees and veterans. We are aware of the remaining problems in the pension

system and measures to improve medical and health resort treatment. We will work persistently to resolve these and other problems.

This attention to our activities enhances our commitments to ensuring favorable external conditions for Russia's sustainable development, the consolidation of its scientific and technical potential and upgrading the living standards of our citizens.

Russia is one of the main obstacles in the way of world hegemony of a small U.S.-led group of Western states.

We realize that we have to resolve these tasks in conditions where the situation in the world continues to deteriorate. We are seeing persistent efforts to break the system of international security, the foundations of which were based on the results of World War II and recorded in the UN Charter. Key strategic stability agreements – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear program and the INF Treaty are falling apart.

Threats and pressure, disinformation and crude methods of dishonest competition in diverse areas – from the economy to sports – are being used. This often amounts to brazen interference in domestic affairs of other countries. The developments in Venezuela are a graphic example and far from the only one. Stubborn attempts are being made to replace international law with some "order based on rules." These rules are invented according to the principle of political expediency and are being used to justify aggressive actions against those who cherish their sovereignty, try to pursue independent foreign policy and uphold collective ways of resolving international issues based on consensus and a balance of interests.

Russia is one of the main obstacles in the way of world hegemony of a small U.S.-led group of Western states. This explains why we are subjected to verbal attacks and unfriendly actions and attempts to impede our domestic progress and push us to the outskirts of world policy.

This is not the first time that the West has become obsessed with the syndrome of its superiority and anything-goes policy. However, it is worth remembering the lessons of history. There should be no doubt. Attempts to dictate foreign policy decisions to Moscow are doomed to failure. As Yevgeny Primakov noted in October 2014, "Russia has positioned itself as a country that is defending its national interests in a multipolar world. The United States and its European allies do not like this, but such is the objective course of history."

Our confidence is enhanced by the fact that our views on building inter-state relations based on international law and the UN Charter, the principles of mutual respect and consideration for each other's interests are shared by the overwhelming majority of the members of the international community that are tired of zero-sum games, sanctions and blackmail, and like us, are interested in improving the situation and promoting large-scale and equitable international cooperation.

Consistently implementing the multi-vector foreign policy course approved by President Vladimir Putin, Russian diplomacy is working hard in all areas. Our priorities include the consolidation of neighborly relations along the entire perimeter of our borders, and promotion of the idea of broad Eurasian integration with the participation of the Asian and European countries.

We are productively working in key global organizations, primarily the UN and the G20. We are enhancing cooperation in various formats with our allies and like-minded partners in the EAEU, the CSTO, the CIS, BRICS, the SCO, the RIC, and other Asian, African and Latin American countries. We contribute to consolidating the efforts of the world community to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combat terrorism and drug trafficking.

We continue contributing to the peaceful settlement of numerous crises and conflicts, including Syria where the main terrorist hotbeds have been routed and the statehood preserved largely owing to Russia. Now Syria has the following items on its agenda: to reach a stable political settlement based on the decisions of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress that was convened in Sochi about a year ago; rebuild the country; and create conditions for the return of refugees. Naturally, we will seek the full and consistent implementation of the UN Security Council resolution that unanimously endorsed the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements. We will demand that the current Ukrainian authorities fulfill their international commitments on language, education and religious rights and freedoms.

As for relations with the U.S., the EU and the West as a whole, we do not lack interest in cooperating on any issue but only based on equitable and mutually respectful dialogue rather than ultimatums. Our proposals in this regard are well known, but as they say, "love cannot be forced." Accordingly, we are always open to those who are ready to search for solutions to any global challenges on the basis of equality, mutual respect and a balance of interests.

Friends,

The Russian foreign policy service has always been distinguished by its traditions and careful attitude to the glorious pages of the past. Today too, the wealth of the intellectual heritage of our predecessors is a major factor in our work. This year, we will observe the dates that are linked with the lives of outstanding diplomats: one hundred ten years since the birth of Andrey Gromyko and Georgy Pushkin, the centenary of Anatoly Dobrynin and Oleg Troyanovsky; and 90 years since the birth of Yevgeny Primakov and Yuly Vorontsov. The ministry's departments and the Veterans Council will provide fitting observances of these memorable dates.

I hope the staff at our central office, territorial representatives and foreign missions will continue to work proactively, creatively, productively and devote all their efforts and energy to serving the homeland. I wish good health and all the best to you and your families.

Happy Diplomats' Day to you once again!

A Frank Conversation About War and Peace

S. Ryabkov

Q: Sergey Alekseyevich, we are seeing the deterioration of Russian-U.S. relations in all conceivable areas. Without a doubt, it is the U.S. that has brought about this situation. What is the outlook?

A: I wouldn't be telling the truth if I said that we believe these prospects are bright. There are few reasons for optimism. Rather, from all indications, the period of uncertainty will drag on. If we worked within a different system of foreign policy coordinates, we could say that we are involved in crisis management or damage control, but this is not our lexicon. Still, despite the current trends in our relations, we are seeking a foundation, a fulcrum, based on which we could gradually begin to move upward. So far, this has not panned out.

It has to be acknowledged that for a number of reasons, domestic political struggles are continuing in the U.S. Russia has become a tool in these struggles – a tool for settling domestic political scores. As a result, it has proved impossible to stabilize our relations. However, there are other reasons as well, including the current U.S. administration's trend toward unilateral actions, steps that do not take into account the legitimate interests of other parties, in this case Russia. For instance, what is going on in arms control clearly shows that this attitude is part of the Trump administration's style. We understand this and are in dialogue with the U.S., which we have no intention to scale down. I still hope that by the end of this year we will be able to identify several areas where the process will continue in a constructive way, even if there is not a significant improvement.

Q: Perhaps the most acute and sensitive issue in our present-day rela-

Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, sryabkov@mid.ru
The interview was conducted by **Armen Oganesyan,** Editor-in-Chief, *International Affairs*

tions is the U.S.'s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF). We have done a lot to prevent this from happening. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has described the U.S.'s actions as the dismantlement of strategic stability in the world. What is Russia's position on this issue?

A: Indeed, it is a very sensitive issue. The 60-day deadline that the U.S. unilaterally set for Russia to destroy a missile that allegedly violates the treaty has expired. It goes without saying that the arrogant nature, tone

> It may not be possible to create a positive atmosphere right away, but we should try to create at least little islands of predictability and stability.

and essence of this demand were unacceptable for us – primarily because Russia has not committed any violations. The missile in question does not violate the INF Treaty and has never been tested to a range prohibited by the treaty. It was not developed for that purpose. The American allegations to the contrary only go to show that the U.S. is looking for excuses to get rid of the limitations imposed under the INF Treaty. This is what is called the subtext, the backdrop, while our position is that it would be very important to save the treaty.

We have sought solutions at the negotiating table. This was the purpose of our participation in the January 15 series of interagency consultations in Geneva. We also worked toward this end in the course of our subsequent contacts with the Americans and other NATO member countries, including via the Russia-NATO Council. We held private briefings for our CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] allies, our BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa] partners and our counterparts at the European Union. We had another meeting with U.S. Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson in late January in Beijing.

We were ready to show unprecedented openness with regard to the 9M729 missile that the Americans are so concerned about. We proposed a demonstration and a briefing on the missile, which is not required under the treaty. The INF Treaty does not contain any provisions for either a demonstration or a briefing.

At the same time, however, we insisted that the Americans take practical steps to address our concerns about MK-41 launchers as part of the Aegis Ashore system deployed in Romania and slated also for deployment in Poland, as well as about target missiles, whose characteristics and

parameters are identical to those prohibited under the treaty, and drones, which clearly fit the definition of cruise missiles if the INF Treaty is interpreted in an appropriate and legally unbiased way.

The Americans are not ready for any of these steps. They took an extremely tough stance with regard to our 9M729 missile demonstration and briefing proposal, effectively rejecting it. What's more, they "persuaded" many of their allies to boycott the event that our Defense Ministry and our Foreign Ministry held in the Patriot park.

The international community should be seriously concerned about what is going on. This was the focus of our efforts at the UN General Assembly in October through December 2018. We will continue to deal with the crisis situation in arms control in all relevant formats, be it the First Committee of the UN General Assembly this coming fall, the preparatory session for the NPT Review Conference this spring or something else. We presented our approach in detail at the Beijing conference of the five nuclear weapon states in late January. We will use any venue to rally people around the idea of preserving the system of arms control agreements that the U.S. is persistently destroying.

Q: What is our allies' position? After all, they should be concerned about this.

A: Regarding Russia's CSTO allies, we are closely working with them. We are conducting an intensive dialogue at all levels. The CSTO has issued an important statement in support of the INF Treaty. We are expressing our concern, and our allies that are parties to the treaty are doing their utmost to help resolve the current crisis. We are in constant contact and consultations with them, and our positions are very close. We are energetically searching for a constructive solution to the problem. The problem must not be swept under the rug; it is necessary to find a way forward.

As for the Americans, they have undoubtedly managed to spread a distorted and malicious version of what is happening among the leadership and political elites of almost all their allies. And they are insolently and hypocritically trying to convince them that Russia has violated the treaty. In other words, we are being accused of doing what we did not do, and our attempts to explain the current situation are being dismissed out of hand.

During the discussion, the Americans failed to provide any evidence to substantiate their allegations: The U.S. only provided certain names,

designations and references, on the assumption that Russia should draw its own conclusions and that Washington's position is final and not subject to review. This is a vulgar, boorish style of the "You are at fault that I am famished" kind.

However, we are dealing with serious matters and are not prepared to work according to such an unacceptable algorithm. The treaty was concluded by two equal partners, so the dialogue could be conducted only on an equal basis, in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

Q: What could be a new strategic arms configuration in this situation and is there a chance to avoid a new arms race?

A: Washington made the decision to pull out of the treaty after suspending the corresponding obligations. We were informed about this.

As a result, there will be even more questions about the future of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as the New START Treaty of 2010, which expires on February 5, 2021.

Unfortunately, the counterproductive and essentially dangerous idea of linking the future of the INF Treaty to prospects for the New START treaty is supported not only by anti-Russian forces in the U.S. Congress, but also by the executive branch of government. Many of our opponents in the U.S. are saying in no uncertain terms that if the INF Treaty collapses, then there will be no point in preserving the New START treaty. They are offering different explanations for their logic.

My explanation of this position is very simple: The Americans, at least an influential part of their political elite, do not need any arms control treaties that impose a web of constraints and obligations on the U.S., confine the country to a limited space and make it difficult to implement the concept of global military domination in all spheres. From all indications, members of this elite have come to the conclusion that at present there is an opportunity (considering the U.S.'s economic and technological capability) to make a decisive breakthrough in various areas to ensure military hegemony for the long term. This is evidenced by the provisions of numerous doctrinal documents in the U.S., including the most recent one entitled The US Missile Defense Review.

As far as we are concerned, this means only one thing: We need to consistently explain the harmful, detrimental nature of this course to everyone in the world. It is necessary to mobilize world public opinion

and the international community to oppose these approaches. We will focus our efforts on providing a constructive alternative, putting forward new (or not entirely new) ideas that, in our opinion, could be used to increase the stability of the multilateral and bilateral arms control system and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

It is a little premature to talk about this right now. Not because there are no such ideas: These ideas are being put forward, for instance, in these pages, at special events, political science conferences, and so on. We hear different ideas – reasonable and not very reasonable, but active work is ongoing along these lines. The U.S. policy of rejecting the principles and norms of international law and abandoning the existing arms control and nonproliferation agreements is a very disturbing trend. This is a reminder that we all should not and cannot sit idly by or just go with the flow. We must counter the U.S.'s destructive approach with a reasonable, balanced alternative and vigorous efforts to impede such dangerous plans.

Q: The U.S. foreign policy priority could be described as zero control. Could it be that this applies not only to nuclear weapons, but also to offensive cyber weapons and outer space?

A: Absolutely, zero control if related to the U.S., but maximum control by the U.S. over all others. This is probably the meaning of the "rules-based international system" that the Americans and their allies are trying hard to bring into international discourse. Unfortunately, this disingenuous term is already finding its way into some important official documents. It is our job to expose its essence. Our Western partners may interpret the new cliché to mean whatever they need or want it to mean. However, all of this is false, deceptive and contrived. We must not fall for such ploys, listening to resounding, high-flown formulas without thinking about the damaging, destructive and dangerous charge they carry.

Q: In December, we published an article by well-known Russian analyst Sergey Karaganov. It reads, in part: "The current administration has once again acted in the role of Herostratus, announcing the withdrawal from the INF Treaty…. No secret is being made of the intention to draw Russia and China into an arms race, which is beneficial for the rich in the U.S. I am sure there is an expectation that by provoking Russia and China into creating a new generation of medium-range systems the U.S. will strengthen their mutual suspicions." Do you agree with this view?

A: Conceptually, this could be accepted – as a theory, as an idea. However, I have several substantive comments on what Sergey Aleksandrovich Karaganov committed to paper and we all read with great interest in the December issue of your wonderful journal, which, in my opinion, is getting better every month.

First, I do not think Herostratus glory is something that can be applied to the U.S. administration's actions. They are not seeking glory but are viewing everything that does not suit them and that they want to get rid of in an extremely selfish, self-centered way. It seems that the people who are now calling the shots in formulating U.S. foreign and defense policies are profoundly indifferent to what others think about them. This is yet another component of the U.S.'s fundamental arrogance of power, the belief in its own exceptionalism. They could not care less about others. We will do what we want, as we see fit – this is the U.S. creed.

Secondly, in his very interesting article, S.A. Karaganov writes that with Russian President Vladimir Putin's announcement about the creation of new strategic weapons systems we have shown that we can still neutralize the U.S.'s attempts to get Russia involved in a costly arms race in missile defense. In other words, the author acknowledges that people responsible for Russia's foreign and military policy can find ways to effectively respond to U.S. challenges and threats without becoming involved in a ruinously expensive arms race. So, what can prevent us from finding a compact but effective and not very costly response to possible appearance of U.S. systems that are currently banned under the INF Treaty?

Q: Karaganov draws the following conclusion: "So far, Russia is winning the arms race without becoming involved in it." Do you think it was part of the U.S.'s plan to cause mutual suspicion between Russia and China by pulling out of the INF Treaty, provoking them to take reciprocal measures? Or should this just be ignored?

A: No, this is very important. In general, relations in this global "triangle" have a significant impact on all kinds of processes. No one will be able to set us against China. Certain elements in Washington are inclined to play the Russian card with China, but I am convinced that our Chinese friends understand this game perfectly well. Of course, we cannot and will not play up to the Americans in their current course toward countering the rise of China. Here the situation is pretty clear.

The U.S.'s explanations of the rationale for withdrawing from the INF Treaty contain references to the fact that since the treaty was signed, several countries, including China, have acquired assets and capabilities in this area that the Americans did not have due to the prohibitions under the INF Treaty.

In the past, we sought to get some other countries involved in making the INF Treaty a multilateral treaty – ideally, a universal one. These attempts, which in the early to mid-2000s assumed various forms, have produced no results. We realized that for many countries their missile capabilities are extremely important. After all, each country is responsible for its national security policy. In this regard, the ball is not in Russia's court.

Q: A question about the situation in the Arctic. U.S. Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer said that in the summer Washington will send warships to the Arctic to test their operation in high latitudes. Later, the admiral added that the purpose of the mission is to ensure freedom of sea passage. Does this mean that there could be new provocations, such as the guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbel sailing near the Russian Pacific Fleet base in the Peter the Great Bay? The U.S. Navy said at the time that this was done to "challenge Russia's excessive maritime claims."

A: I believe would be more correct and appropriate to talk not about freedom of passage, but freedom of navigation. The U.S. Navy traditionally upholds at the doctrinal level the absolute freedom of its operations anywhere in the world's oceans, adjusted for the standard applicable rules of the Law of the Sea, even though the U.S. has not joined the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In a situation where Washington, in its military policy documents, has officially declared Russia and China its adversaries, practical steps are being taken by the U.S. to test the capabilities and potential of the Russian (as well as Chinese) Armed Forces, including at an interagency level, to respond to all sorts of actions near our borders. We are seeing more U.S. and allied navy ships and assets sailing in the Black Sea, as well as in the Pacific.

You are talking about the Arctic. From time immemorial, operations, including with the participation of U.S. submarines, have been carried out there. I can assure you that our military not just follow these operations very closely but take them into account in developing its planning and response procedures on a practical level. Importantly, let me put it this way: The nature of these countermeasures is not always for everybody to see.

Naturally, as a diplomat who deals with arms control issues and who is proud of our Navy and the Armed Forces as a whole, I am wondering whether the Americans will halt their actions, which are sometimes rather provocative, or will continue to test our patience and capabilities near our borders, thereby demonstrating their attitude toward Russia as an adversary.

To secure against the outbreak of dangerous crises, we believe it would be important to update the 1972 bilateral agreement with U.S. on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas. Some time ago, such proposals were put forward, and the two sides had

> There are areas that could be described as dead ends, virtual or actual. Regrettably, in my opinion, our relations with the U.S. belong to this category.

initial contacts on this matter. Then, due to the general deterioration of bilateral relations, we ended up in a situation where this work was suspended through the fault of the U.S. side. There is another disturbing trend. We are trying to explain to them that there is no question of their concessions, steps to meet Russia halfway or any "unjustified flexibilities." We are telling them in no uncertain terms that the U.S.'s own security interests would be best served by somewhat more serious and effective steps to prevent dangerous incidents on and over the high seas.

Furthermore, we believe it is necessary to jointly develop and take certain deescalation measures on the line of contact between Russia and NATO in Europe. We would like this matter to be addressed, in particular, as part of the OSCE Structured Dialogue. In other words, we do not limit ourselves to the confines of our own position but are looking for a pragmatic way forward. It may not be possible to create a positive atmosphere right away, but we should try to create at least little islands of predictability and stability. Unfortunately, there has been no response to this from the other side. The policy of containment of Russia still prevails in Washington these days. Nevertheless, we will not abandon our efforts to explain why it is necessary to return to normalcy and, naturally, will continue to watch very closely what the Americans are doing to build up their capabilities, including in the Arctic region.

Q: How likely is it that the Russian and U.S. presidents will have a new meeting? In your opinion, why has the U.S. side evaded top-level meet-

ings since the Helsinki summit? How independent is President Trump in making such decisions?

A: The two presidents met in Paris while attending ceremonies to mark the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I and in Buenos Aires on the sidelines of the G-20 summit. It is another matter that these meetings were not in the format of delegations. There was not a fixed agenda with a subsequent joint press conference.

The fact that there have not been any new full-scale contacts since Helsinki has to do with Washington's current domestic political chaos, when certain forces are trying to portray any contacts with the Russian side as something reprehensible. Our opponents find excuses to disrupt planned events. How was the incident in the Kerch Strait played out? What statements were made in that situation? What conditions were made for a full-scale meeting? Everyone remembers this. Now all questions about new top-level meetings should be addressed to Washington. From all indications, it adheres to its position regarding the parameters of such contacts.

At present, we have a certain calendar of international events that the Russian president is expected to attend and where the U.S. president could show up, but nothing more than that. Such calendars can be collated and compared, but it would be extremely irresponsible of me to speculate on prospects for such a meeting. All questions should be addressed to Washington. It needs to understand that all kinds of linkages and attempts to dictate conditions are counterproductive.

Q: Since the end of last year, we have witnessed a U.S. government shutdown, with the activities of some federal agencies and services closed or suspended. Has it affected contacts with the U.S. foreign policy agency? What does it symbolize? What consequences could it have for the U.S.'s domestic policy?

A: By demonstrating its tough approach to dealing with the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives and the Democratic minority in the Senate, the U.S. administration is trying to stress that a series of important elements in Donald Trump's election agenda will remain a priority. This is a mandatory set of goals, as it were. It is almost never reviewed or adjusted depending on the political situation of the moment, as is evidenced by the ongoing discussion about building a wall along the

U.S.-Mexico border. I believe that the confrontation will continue on other issues as well.

As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump announced far-reaching plans for large-scale investment in U.S. infrastructure. Of course, this is none of my business, since I am just an outside observer, but I believe that there will be issues (apart from the wall construction project that led to a record-breaking shutdown) where the U.S. executive and legislative branches of government are in stiff opposition to each other.

As far we are concerned, from a practical perspective, this means a serious limitation of Washington's room to maneuver on foreign policy issues. Lawmakers cannot even get around to certain issues. For instance, nominees for many key positions (be it U.S. ambassadors or the State Department or other agencies) have yet to be confirmed. Needless to say, this is affecting our dialogue. Clearly, with the shutdown in place, the wheels and cogs of the U.S. government machine moved slower than usual.

The U.S. side sluggishly reacted to many of our proposals, including, unfortunately, with regard to the INF Treaty. However, let's hope that the situation will eventually normalize, and we will be able to maintain regular contacts, as is possible under current circumstances, working without any artificial constraints.

Q: To quote another passage from S.A. Karaganov's article: "The propaganda bacchanalia is strongly reminiscent of psychological preparations for war, although maybe it has other root causes – primarily domestic. This is especially evident in the U.S." Do you agree with these conclusions?

A: Both yes and no. No, we are not in a prewar state. Yes, the propaganda campaign is part of the ongoing psychological war against us, which is creating a certain mood and, among other things, expanding the boundaries of the permissible – at least, a segment of U.S. society has a different view of what is possible and permissible right now compared to what it was before. This is a new disturbing trend. I believe it reflects the overall decline in the quality of the U.S. government apparatus and domestic politicians in general. Incidentally, Sergey Aleksandrovich Karaganov writes that computer game and smart phone generations are moving closer to the ruling establishment and taking a lighter view of the very concept of the use of force than those who passed through the crucible of the

great war three quarters of a century ago. This is correct. This cannot be ignored.

I believe that under current circumstances it is necessary to expand public and media activities, holding more conferences and developing the so-called second track – that is to say, bringing on board all those who care about the security situation. After all, it is not a foregone conclusion that the existing security and stability system (which took decades to create) will survive. It is already in a shaky state and will soon be at risk if the U.S. continues to "play with fire": If, for instance, the practice of delivering unlawful strikes against sovereign states does not come to an end. Last year, we saw the U.S. and its allies twice use force in Syria in violation of fundamental norms and principles of international law.

If concepts of the 1950s and the 1960s, such as the idea of creating a nuclear battlefield (the U.S. has already launched the production of low-yield miniature nuclear devices purportedly to prevent the escalation of nuclear war), continue to infiltrate U.S. doctrinal documents, then we will inevitably see a return to the ideology and practice of acute confrontation, which is fraught with real conflict. It seems that those who are promoting such ideas are not just playing a dangerous game: This is more like playing the Russian roulette.

The same applies to the Missile Defense Review that was recently released in the U.S. When we see the concept of preemptive strikes against nuclear deterrence facilities being played around with in the interests of missile defense, we cannot treat this as anything other than an attempt to provide a verbal frame for the transition to a direct and aggressive form of escalating the military threat. This is an extremely destabilizing and destructive idea, which, unfortunately, is spreading and finding its way to the pages and websites of official institutions in the world's largest power that has unique capabilities in various areas. This is highly disturbing. The situation is not near a prewar state yet, but it is important for those who understand what is going on to redouble their efforts to expose such plans.

Q: Here is another quote from this article: "In recent years, Russian foreign policy (except for its important, purely military and Middle Eastern components) is clearly losing traction. It has lost momentum and drive. Russia has failed to put forward a concept of a world order that it would like to create with its partners that would be attractive to itself and the rest of the world. The concepts of multipolarity or opposition to U.S.

attempts to regain dominant positions are basically correct but they look to the past, do not lead forward and have no appeal anymore." Do you share this opinion?

A: If anything, we have plenty of drive and enthusiasm. It has to be acknowledged that we do lose traction sometimes and there is a little bit of running in place. However, I would avoid negative generalizations and scathing epithets with regard to multipolarity or our alleged lack of a concept of a world order. Whatever area we take, we do have ideas and results. There is documentary evidence of that. It is enough to read our leaders' speeches and other official materials. We have a diversity of formats and channels of activity. Finally, we have achievements across the entire spectrum – from the EaEU [Eurasian Economic Union] and the CSTO to space cooperation or scientific cooperation in the Antarctic. There is progress.

But, of course, there are areas that could be described as dead ends, virtual or actual. Regrettably, in my opinion, our relations with the U.S. belong to this category. However, this does not mean that we are not developing our own position, fleshing it out and putting forward proposals that could allow us to overcome the current crisis.

Last year and since the start this year, we have presented to the Americans many specific ideas and proposals about what we believe could and should be done, and how.

There is another aspect here. Some people believe that the more often and the more actively we turn to Washington, the more convinced the U.S. side is that Russia is interested in the normalization and development of bilateral relations to a much greater extent than the U.S. is. This view is shared by Sergey Karaganov, as well as by some other analysts.

Nevertheless, we at the Foreign Ministry believe that foreign policy should not be reactive, but proactive. We cannot and will not devalue our own set of approaches, priorities and initiatives. However, balance is of paramount importance here. We believe that even in areas and segments where there is less progress than we would like to see, we have a reasonable balance, as well as a well-chosen action and a clear responsibility. We will not underprice our own approach. We still believe in its creative potential and its significant intellectual contribution to the search for what could be done in the current situation.

Q: Let's consider the concept of a world order. Does it make sense for Russia to engage in formulating this concept amid the ongoing global political chaos?

A: Russia, as a very important factor in modern international relations, is sending everyone a very serious signal, a very important message, not only with its actions, but also with its policies and its ability to position itself in the world.

We uphold values that are being questioned or directly rejected by some countries. We stand guard over a system where international law reigns supreme. This is the foundation. International law may change in an evolutionary way, but in any case there is a need for a process, procedure, and it cannot change at the whim or will of any state or even a group of states. Consensus is mandatory. If there is no consensus, the existing rules must not change.

Finally, we proceed from the absolute equality of states simply because these are entities subject to international law. Granted, country potentials may be different, but the "one country, one vote" principle is irrevocable. If we abandon it, then we will return to the law of the jungle. We have seen this before and, in a sense, are still seeing this. Yet, humanity has to learn from its own experience. Russia is proposing a constructive alternative. When we talk about the world order, we remind all those who do not share our position and who want to engage in predatory practices that it would be reasonable to think and weigh all the "pros" and "cons" of the Russian approach. Without this, they will be the worse off.

Q: In your opinion, what possible areas of cooperation are there? In this context, can we talk about space exploration?

A: Absolutely. This is a mutually beneficial and useful area. We should continue our cooperation on the ISS. We need eventually to overcome the situation where, because of its policy principles, the U.S. is unwilling to recognize the importance of outlawing an arms race in outer space and is seeking to formulate its own rules of responsible conduct in outer space, preventing Russia and other countries from promoting a series of ideas and proposals that would help to regulate the peaceful use of outer space in a balanced way.

The recent cancellation of the scheduled visit by the Roskosmos [Federal Space Agency] chief to the U.S. and the decision to postpone his

visit indefinitely – unfortunately, this is a tribute to the political situation of the moment, nothing more. I am sure that NASA experts realize that they do need contacts with us. We are ready for such contacts.

Counterterrorism is another area of practical cooperation. After a long hiatus, this work is being resumed: An appropriate format has been launched at the level of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister O.V. Syromolotov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan with the participation of representatives from government agencies. Work is also continuing on some joint projects in the nuclear sector. We have a good head start in Arctic cooperation. Let's hope to God that it moves forward and does not fall victim to a political "icy wind" that might start blowing over the Arctic as well. Syria is still an area of intensive ongoing contacts with the U.S.

The list is not very large, and it needs expanding. We have worked throughout the past year and will continue to work this year to show the Americans – not just in verbal but in quite specific, concrete terms – what can and should be done in this respect. I hope the realization that it is better to cooperate with Russia than to argue endlessly, pressing on regardless and coming into conflict will eventually prevail.

Q: As is known, the U.S. ambassador to Germany has warned German companies involved in the Nord Stream 2 construction project that they could be subjected to U.S. sanctions. What does this mean?

A: This is not about the U.S. ambassador to Berlin. Unfortunately, Washington's current policy provides for wide-ranging, comprehensive actions against Russia, its "containment" and encroachment on its interests in various areas, even at the expense of U.S. allies. Washington's policy is purely self-centered. It contains several components, including unfair competition, as the Russian leadership has repeatedly stressed. In particular, with regard to Nord Stream 2, this involves endless attempts to impose expensive American liquefied natural gas on EU countries and, naturally, weaken our position as an exporter. U.S. representatives in European capitals are following their instructions, steadily and often recklessly carrying out head-on attacks against Russia's interests, among other things, as they try to obstruct our cooperation with certain countries in the defense and technology sector and impose their approaches (as a general rule, destructive approaches) to the ideas and proposals put forward by Russia at the UN, the OPCW [Organization for the Prohibition

of Chemical Weapons], the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] or anywhere else, using blackmail, pressure and sometimes direct bribery.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this style, this kind of behavior has always been characteristic of the Americans in one way or another. It is simply that now it has acquired a hyper-inflated scale. I would describe such defiant behavior as political exhibitionism, where the brazenness of U.S. politics has reached the point where they are already boasting about how smartly and openly they are working not only against Russia, but even against their European allies just because they believe this is right. As a matter of fact, in the past, they were doing exactly the same, but in a self-conscious way, sinning, but trying to hide their sins. By contrast, now everything is for show, and they are actually enjoying this. This is a new phenomenon that needs looking into. It seems that at present, Washington's foreign policy is running wild, as it were.

Q: Granted, this also applies to the West as a whole.

A: Absolutely. This is not politics but pornography.

Q: It is the foreign policy Wild West style. Do you believe Gazprom will be able to finish the second stage of the natural gas pipeline on its own in the worst-case scenario, if Russia's partners pull out of the project?

A: This is a question for Gazprom. However, I assume that it possesses the capability to do that. Eventually, a project that is mutually beneficial for the Europeans and for Russia will be carried out.

However, the U.S. will continue to make constant threats and engage in ceaseless blackmail with sanctions. It will seek to suspend everything, so that no one would know what all this could be fraught with as far as the U.S. is concerned and would succumb to fear, preferring to act according to the "you can never be too careful" principle, assuming that it is best to think not twice but 10 times before cooperating with the Russians: After all, that could incur U.S. sanctions. This is precisely what Washington wants to achieve. Such is one component of U.S. policy, a conscious, very cynical and I would say, rotten part of the U.S. policy toward Russia.

Q: You said recently that you do not believe in the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria. What is the reason for your skepticism?

A: I believe this has to do with the fact that I have been dealing with this "business," as they say across the ocean, for quite a long time and have seen a lot. In general, any significant foreign policy issue in Washington – especially one that is so serious – is always subject to a colossal impact of multidirectional factors. There are endless discussions, hearings, debates, articles, and letters, both public and private; allies call the White House, send telegrams, and organize demarches; ambassadors knock on doors, trying to explain something or understand what is going on.

I for one cannot imagine that in this situation President Trump's directive in regard to Syria will be implemented just like that. I would be very happy if U.S. troops left Syria, because they are there unlawfully. They have no invitation from the Damascus government. There has been no and there can be no resolution by the UN Security Council in favor of the U.S. presence in Syria. They came there to impede the complete liberation of Syria from terrorist cells and enclaves. No matter how they might try to hide behind slogans about antiterrorism operations or the success of their antiterrorism coalition, their goal was different – namely, to cause as many problems for the Damascus government as possible. What has changed? Why should they suddenly change their minds? I can see no reason for a change in the U.S. course. Still, to reiterate: Their withdrawal would be welcome.

Q: What if the actual goal is somewhat different? Withdrawing partially and clearing a certain space to pit Russia and Turkey against each other?

A: I admit that something like that has already emerged or is about to emerge in their domestic "arrangements." However, in general, I do not think that we should get too deeply involved in analyzing various hypothetical scenarios. It is far more important to think through and calculate all aspects of what is actually going on. It is impossible to draw any conclusions or make assumptions without analyzing objective data. Simply put, it is necessary to judge by actions, not by words, especially in the case of the U.S. and especially in today's U.S. However, we, as well as our partners in Ankara and elsewhere, understand that the aspect you have mentioned may well be present here. This is also part of the equation.

Q: The Wall Street Journal *recently reported that there is a plan to deliver a series of strikes on Iran. How real is this threat?*

A: I believe there are plans to carry out strikes against all countries that are not on the list of U.S. allies, associates or partners. It is another matter how functional and well-developed these plans are. Are these just rough sketches or a specific calculation of assets and resources required for an operation? Are there specific timetables? Are there the main and backup plans for an operation, i.e., Plan A and Plan B? Needless to say, it is not my job to discuss such topics: There are specialists who do this professionally.

However, it is part of American political tradition, political culture always to present to the president (after all, he is commander in chief of the Armed Forces) all possible options regarding the use of military force and sanctions, and intensifying other forms of pressure, or on the contrary, recommend dialogue. The main thing is that after conferring with his national security team, the president should have an opportunity to make a decision with a wide range of options. I understand that this is precisely how it works for them. So, there is nothing dramatic or sensational about the publication you have mentioned. It is just one element of general political and psychological pressure on Iran, nothing more.

Q: Nevertheless, this is real, isn't it?

A: If the Americans need excuses for a strike, they will find them. If no excuses are needed because there are no plans for an actual strike, then they will not be found. We are dealing with a rather complex matter in terms of forecasting. I believe the U.S. policy priority in this context is what could be described as the consolidation of the anti-Iranian front. The goal is to weaken Iran's position in the Middle East. All kinds of conferences and other events are being organized, and there is an intensive search for new anti-Iranian formats. Time will tell what will happen, for instance, with regard to the Europeans' ability to ensure a relatively normal, positive development of economic ties with Iran, something to which we have also contributed. The reference points here are the Warsaw conference in mid-February and the launch of the well-known mechanism to facilitate trade with Iran bypassing U.S. sanctions that was announced by the EU troika.

Of course, the sum total of factors suggests that the situation around Iran will most likely aggravate, but I still hope that the grain of common sense will sprout and that there will not be any new reckless military misadventures.

Iran has long lived and will continue to live under sanctions. We are standing shoulder to shoulder with Iran in opposition to the U.S. policy of diktat and we are effectively interacting with it as a guarantor on Syria.

In our estimate, U.S. sanctions have been used at various stages against individuals and legal entities in about 70 countries. In other words, this is an integral part of modern international relations. It is believed that because of its special position, especially in the banking and financial areas, and considering the unique role of the dollar as a means of servicing international trade, the U.S. actually uses sanctions against undesirable regimes and individuals. That is to say, unilateral restrictions and sanctions are quite an effective low-cost tool in the U.S.'s foreign policy arsenal. This may be so, but Washington ignores the fact that countries have various methodologies of resisting U.S. sanctions. It would be a good idea for those in Washington to understand that far from everyone in the world is ready to carry out U.S. orders under the threat of being whipped on the back.

> We are standing shoulder to shoulder with Iran in opposition to the U.S. policy of diktat and we are effectively interacting with it as a guarantor on Syria.

Q: Here is a quote from S.A. Karaganov's article: "The wish to continue political dialogue with NATO is just amazing. Have we not had enough peacemaking by now? With our past consent to maintain empty dialogues we legitimized the alliance that has outlived its usefulness, and helped it endure and expand." Do you agree with this?

A: If there is no dialogue, then they will never be able to understand today's Russia or understand the essence of Russian policy. Do we or do we not need this? I am not sure that this is the right way.

Q: More on this topic: "If political dialogue with NATO is to continue, it must include the issue of reparations and compensation to victims of the alliance's aggression, not only and not so much Crimea or the Donbass. Military dialogue is necessary, and it should be far more active than now. There should be dialogue with the NATO Military Committee and with the defense ministries of key member countries. If Russia still has its perma-

nent representative to NATO, he should be a general with a team of civilian advisers." Would you like to comment?

A: I respect S.A. Karaganov's opinion. Let me remind you that Russia has its military representative working in Brussels. It is another matter that NATO continues to evade resuming full-scale military contacts under contrived pretexts. The U.S. is setting the tone for this unseemly course of action, even though there are meetings and telephone conversations, for instance, between the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is another channel – namely, the chief of the General Staff on the Russian side and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

It is not reparations that we should discuss, especially since Russia cannot work on somebody else's behalf here, but ways of preventing the further escalation of tensions and military confrontation between Russia and NATO. This is a serious issue that concerns everyone, not only those that NATO members call "frontline states." Do you realize what the alliance has come to insofar as its vocabulary is concerned? We must steadily and consistently strengthen the power of the Russian Armed Forces. It seems that our counterparts simply do not understand a different language.

At the same time, it is necessary to conduct a meaningful and serious conversation on this issue, without any clichés or ideology. It is vital to talk, not keep silent.

Q: *Here is another quote from S.A. Karaganov's article: "The best line to take is mocking detachment. This is the best our partners deserve so far." Do you agree with this?*

A: To begin with, the Americans are not our partners. They were the ones who used the term "strategic patience" that seems to be an appropriate description for the course that I believe should be followed in our relations with Washington in the foreseeable future.

As for irony, it is necessary sometimes, but everything is good in moderation. Serious issues should not be made into a cause for jokes. Serious matters should be discussed seriously, although sometimes a little spice would not hurt.

Q: *Let's move to Latin America. Recently, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno*

Rodriguez Parrilla described the Organization of American States (OAS) as the "U.S. Ministry of Colonies." He did this after the organization, under pressure from Washington, adopted a resolution declaring Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro as illegitimate leader. Is there a trend toward Latin America's return to Washington's control?

A: I could talk about a vector toward a deep political split among countries in the region. Against the backdrop of the dramatic development of the situation in Venezuela, there is an unmistakable desire within a U.S.-led group of countries to use various venues and platforms, including the OAS, to intensify pressure on our friend Venezuela under various pretexts. The upcoming period will inevitably involve new attempts to smear Caracas's policy, add fuel to the fire of the extremely complex domestic processes there, obstruct intra-Venezuelan dialogue, and prevent constructive forces from facilitating political dialogue. What is going on there will escalate regional tensions. The cynicism and arrogance of U.S. foreign policy toward Venezuela have been especially pronounced in the last several weeks. Unfortunately, the OAS has been actively involved in this.

Nevertheless, we have supported and will continue to support brotherly Venezuela, our strategic partner. We will stand shoulder to shoulder with that country, safeguarding its sovereignty and rejecting any encroachment on the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. Substantive, practical cooperation between Russia and Venezuela is continuing in various areas. There is no reason to scale it down.

Q: Is U.S. military intervention possible?

A: We are cautioning it against that. We believe this would be a catastrophic scenario that could undermine the foundations of the development model that we are seeing in Latin America, where unity in diversity is an important conceptual element.

Q: Let's go to Korea. In the context of South Korean-U.S. relations, South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha believes that talks between Washington and Pyongyang on the nuclear disarmament issue will continue in the very near future. If the U.S.-North Korean summit takes place, then, according to the minister, the U.S. and North Korea will hold full-scale discussions on nuclear disarmament, based on an appropriate

strategy finalized by Seoul and Washington. How do these talks correlate with the Russian-Chinese road map for a Korean settlement?

A: First of all, I would like to reiterate what has been stated many times on the Russian side: We wish these efforts every success and are working to make a substantial contribution to them – both practical and conceptual – through contacts with all the parties involved. Such contacts are not always publicized; this delicate matter requires caution. We believe that the principles underlying the Russian-Chinese road map are still highly relevant.

If we do not adhere to these principles, then there will be considerable difficulties in reaching a sustainable solution to the issue of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps the process needs new dynamics. It is also necessary to provide an impetus to multilateral efforts to ensure security in Northeast Asia as a whole.

Q: Last summer, Washington announced its withdrawal from the United Nations Human Rights Council, which was followed by its withdrawal from UNESCO, and in early January, a bill to end U.S. membership of the UN was submitted to the U.S. Congress. This is the initiative of Michael Rogers, a U.S. representative for Alabama and member of the Republican Party, who believes that the UN is a "disaster" for Washington. Why do you think the U.S. is purposefully withdrawing from international organizations and what consequences could the U.S.'s hypothetical withdrawal from the UN have?

A: Let's leave the UN issue for now. The U.S. has pulled out or is pulling out of several treaties and agreements. This reflects the Donald Trump administration's commitment to a unilateral approach, to one-sided solutions to complex problems. This also reflects the desire to create alternative formats, where groups of allies and supporters consolidate around the U.S. and make further efforts to "punish" those who are opposed to certain decisions made by such groups. This is leading to nothing but new dividing lines.

International relations are becoming increasingly fragmented, and the U.S. is responsible for this. I do not think that right now we can seriously talk about the prospect of the U.S. exiting the UN, but a certain trend is in evidence. There is no question about that. The ideas and concepts that are floating through the air, so to speak, in today's Washington are

being brought to their logical conclusion in certain segments of the U.S. political spectrum.

Q: The U.S. is seeking rapprochement with Brazil, which now has a new president. In your opinion, how could this factor impact cooperation among the BRICS countries?

A: I am not prepared to comment on which countries are seeking rapprochement with Brazil or on what scale since President Jair Bolsonaro came to power there. I would not say that there are any impediments to normal, productive cooperation within the BRICS format in this case. I am sure that during the 10 years of its existence, the BRICS association has acquired a degree of internal stability and dynamics in many areas that seem beneficial and attractive for Brazil, among others. I hope that the year of Brazil's BRICS presidency will be a success.

We are willing to provide every possible assistance to our Brazilian partners to ensure a constructive summit, as well as other events on the presidency's agenda. There is nothing here that could give rise to jealousy or misunderstanding in the international community. BRICS' activities are extremely transparent, aimed at addressing specific tasks; everything is publicly available and can be read in official documents or heard in speeches; everything is being done to help the BRICS countries solve their problems more effectively and efficiently. I am convinced that President Jair Bolsonaro's coming to power will give a fresh impetus to Russian-Brazilian relations, including political dialogue, as well as the work in the BRICS format.

Q: In closing, here is yet another quotation from S.A. Karaganov's article: "The struggle for peace is not nostalgia for the good old days. I am absolutely disgusted by the lies and enmity of the Cold War. However, I am also ashamed of our stupidity, our naivety and our tendency to count on a miracle that followed the Cold War period. I am also disturbed by our relative passivity against the backdrop of what, in my opinion, is a very dangerous situation." This is quite a critical passage.

A: I believe it is probably incorrect, to put it mildly, to suggest that Russia's current foreign policy is passive. And there is ample evidence to that effect. Different countries, including many of our partners, are telling us that without Russia's proactive and consistent policy on a particular

issue, the situation could have been very different. Russia is a fundamental factor in international relations. It clearly understands its national interests and stands guard on these interests, working to promote and enshrine them in international documents, as well as on a practical level. Russia is offering everyone (and doing this quite successfully) a constructive alternative to the dangerous trend toward dismantling the existing arms control system and international institutions that, unfortunately, was especially pronounced in policies followed by Washington and its close allies in 2018 and early 2019. Therefore, I do not think that we can reproach ourselves or accept the reproach that was made in the passage you just quoted.

Q: The keynote of S.A. Karaganov's article is that we should resume the struggle for peace, as was the case in Europe in the 1970s and in the 1980s.

A: Under current circumstances, we need other methods to bring home to the "broad masses" (as they used to say it in the past) the message that an irresponsible approach toward issues of war and peace is unacceptable and impossible. I believe that consistent efforts and frank dialogue, such as the one we had today, will help solve this problem. We need to alert at least the thinking segment of the Western public as to what is happening right now and make our counterparts think about the consequences. The most important thing in this context is to ensure that those involved in political decision-making understand that the language of diktat does not work with Russia and that it is only possible to come to terms with Russia through negotiations. This is what our efforts as diplomats are aimed at. We hope for full support from political experts and the media, for our joint efforts.

Strategic Stability in the Early 21st Century

A. Orlov,
V. Mizin

ONE HUNDRED YEARS AGO, mankind entered the 20th century as the "golden age" of realized ideals of freedom and humanism. Reality proved to be different: this was the cruelest and the bloodiest period in the history of modern civilization.

The new generation of political dreamers, with Anglo-Saxon roots in the first place, expected the 21st century to become a period of a more or less stable development of the world led by the United States with the help of its closest satellites. In his *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership,* Zbigniew Brzezinski (who together with Henry Kissinger can be described as a "classic" of the contemporary geopolitical thought) wrote that since the end of the Cold War the United States "assumed the unique global security role" and "America's global socio-cultural celebrity makes it the world's center of attention."[1] He arrived here at a fairly debatable (as later developments showed) conclusion that "America's role in ensuring the security of its allies … justifies it in seeking more security for itself than is predictably attainable by other states."[2]

This trend of military-political thinking that dominated across the ocean in the 1990s and early 2000s has not changed in fifteen years that elapsed since the time when the maître of American political science wrote the lines quoted above. Formally a Democrat and President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor in the latter half of the 1970s, he nurtured the ideas that differ but little from those of the present master of the White House, a conservative Republican determined to "make America great again," that is, to restore its role of the unquestioned world leader in all trends and in all hypostases. Nothing what President Trump has said

Alexander Orlov, Director, Center for the Studies of the UN and Other International Organizations, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; al.or-2012@yandex.ru

Viktor Mizin, leading research associate, Institute for International Studies, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, vmizin56@gmail.com

so far clarifies when, in his opinion, America lost its greatness. It seems that he piles the accusations on Democrat Obama whom he called a "softy" and who allegedly allowed the adversaries to push America into a tight corner from which the country is scrambling out under his guidance.

Let's go several decades back.

The end of the Cold War, the victory in which Washington arrogantly "appropriated" and its rise, at least in its own eyes, became a watershed of sorts in American understanding of the contemporary realities and of certain basic postulates that for a long time remained the cornerstone of the perception of the world by Washington and Moscow. This relates, first and foremost, to the strategic security concept.

Brzezinski admitted: "It was until the late 1950s and perhaps not even until the Cuban Missile Crisis that America was jarred into recognition that modern technology has made vulnerable a thing of the past."[3] "The intense national debate on these issues [in the United States] eventually led to a consensus that a relationship of stable deterrence with the Soviet Union was attainable only through mutual restraint."[4]

Henry Kissinger fully agrees with the above. In his *World Order*, he has written: "Strategic stability was defined as a balance in which neither side would use its weapons of mass destruction because the adversary was always able to inflict an unacceptable level of destruction in retaliation."[5]

This adds special importance to what Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., had to say in his book *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents* about his talk to Robert McNamara, United States Secretary of Defense, in April 1967:

"McNamara explained that U.S. nuclear doctrine was grounded in the idea that the United States should be ready to absorb a surprise nuclear-missile strike while preserving its capability to hit back and cause irreparable damage to the enemy. As far as he could understand, McNamara said, the Soviet military doctrine was based on the same principle. He was convinced that both sides possessed such capability. It was precisely this factor that in a peculiar way provided the stability and adequately guaranteed that neither of the two great powers would attack the other, because each well knew that an attack on the other meant suicide."[6]

Colonel-General Yury Baluyevsky, a prominent Soviet and Russian military theoretician who served as Chief of the General Staff of the

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, has pointed out the following:

"[The] term strategic stability has been used for a fairly long time to assess the situation in the world. At first it was limited to the relations between the two superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States – and described them as the mutually assured destruction of the sides and the rest of the world in a global nuclear war…. This stability is a product of nuclear arms race that resulted in the parity of strategic offensive armaments of the USSR and the U.S. and the situation of the so-called nuclear stalemate."[7]

> Russia interprets strategic stability as a desired and predictable state of the international system and the interaction between all subjects of international relations that would keep big international conflicts within certain limits when no big military confrontation is possible.

***

THE END of the Cold War coincided with the Soviet Union's disintegration. Certain American political scientists had predicted this scenario in their futures studies which looked too fantastic to be accepted as a possibility. Few in the US military and political upper crust believed that this might happen.

What looked unthinkable and unrealistic did happen in real life mainly due to the erosion of the Soviet regime rather than under geopolitical pressure of its adversaries, the United States in the first place. The formidable enemy disappeared leaving the void promptly filled by fifteen states that looked at the United States as a kind teacher who would teach them the basics of "correct lifestyle" and help with money. Russia, the first in the ranks of pupils, looked as a country that for ever lost its military and political ambitions and the resources of a world power.

Brzezinski wrote in this respect: "The Soviet nuclear arsenal's transformation into a beneficiary of U.S. protection testifies to the degree to which the Soviet threat has waned."[8] The West was obviously delighted with Moscow's new and much weaker positions in the world even if many Western politicians exercised in demagoguery by saying that they

would like to see Russia a strong and democratic state that belong to the family of other democracies and share their values. Today, the West sometimes admits, albeit half-heartedly, that ignoring the vital interests of Moscow was a bad mistake.

The United States and allies followed in practice the theoretical deliberations of "bronzed Zbigniew." NATO's unbridled expansion to the East; the United States' unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of unlimited duration and its replacement with a program of regional ABM systems that in future might form a unified ABM system of the "free world"; aggression of the Western alliance (in which the U.S. played the main role) under the slogan of "democratic expansion" in certain "hot spots" (in the Middle East in the first place); and the rapidly accelerating arms race as an apotheosis of this process (encouraged by the astronomically big military budget of the United States) were the outcome of the quasi-theoretical postulate that the United States and its allies were free to act in the world as they saw it fit and that Russia and other states should accept all this without a murmur.

This destroyed the strategic stability system that for several decades ensured relative security of entire mankind and not only of the United States and Russia (the legal heir of the Soviet Union) as the main beneficiaries. In other words, the world is skating on thin ice. A catastrophe is inevitable if mankind fails to find new factors and new means of ensuring strategic stability, the significance of which in these conditions is not diminishing but is becoming more and more fateful.

***

HERE are certain theoretical and practical arguments related to strategic stability that will help us probe deeper into the subject.

The strategic stability concept of our days differs, in certain ways, from its predecessor of the Cold War period when it was understood as a sustainable system of mutual checks and balances as part of the key nuclear balance between two antagonistic military-political blocs and opposing military-strategic potentials. In other words, this system excluded the first strike in case of unpredictable developments in crises or due to intensified nuclear arms race.

Today, Russian and foreign "political science of security" still frequently reduces the strategic stability concept to its much narrower interpretation as "nuclear stability," that is, nuclear deterrence. The Military

Doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted on December 25, 2014 defines one of its key tasks as "to maintain global and regional stability and the nuclear deterrence potential at a sufficient level"[9] and the attempts to undermine it as one of the main threats.

The Russian Federation's National Security Strategy (approved by the Presidential Decree No. 683 of December 31, 2015) refers to the strategic stability concept in the National Interests and Strategic National Priorities section which identifies one of the main tasks as "consolidating the Russian Federation's status as a leading world power, whose actions are aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in a polycentric world."[10]

There is an earlier classical, so to speak, definition found in the Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability of June 1, 1990. Today, strategic stability remains one of the priorities of the Russian-American dialogue due to the key role of nuclear weapons in the security agenda irrespective of the "seasonal ups and downs" in their bilateral relations strongly susceptible lately to the changing moods of the American political elite.

Today, strategic stability is no longer attached or, rather, no longer reduced to the nuclear confrontation concept. Its interpretation is no longer reduced to an absence of a stimulus to deliver the first strike in the context of continued nuclear confrontation even if new strategic factors, new nuclear powers and the threat of the WMD proliferation (interpreted in its narrow meaning) are taken into account. The contemporary understanding of the multipolar world is much more comprehensive: it includes avoidance of varied threats and challenges to national security of a state and its allies; greater ability of the country to successfully oppose all attempts at infringing on its vital interests; and, finally, bringing the system of international relations into a state of dynamic equilibrium while neutralizing the unbalancing repercussions of crises and conflicts.

Thus, strategic stability is understood as a world order that can protect regions (Russia and Eurasia in our context) and the world as a whole against large-scale armed conflicts and strategic challenges that will threaten the interests of all countries in case of a political crisis. Russia interprets strategic stability as a desired and predictable state of the international system and the interaction between all subjects of international relations that would keep big international conflicts within certain limits when no big military confrontation is possible.

This means that strategic stability should embrace not only the entire spectrum of nuclear weapons but also the new strategic power instruments: space and high-precision conventional weapons, potentials of all big powers and resources of information and cyber weapons.

The concept of the so-called hybrid wars has cropped up as one of the most prominent trends of American strategy. It relies on all means and methods available to put pressure on the opponent: the non-military instruments of what is called soft power; information and psychological diversion, subversion, color revolutions, fake news, etc. to achieve strategic geopolitical aims.

Seen from Russia, America and NATO's actions in the Balkans, Southeast Ukraine and Syria are hybrid wars pure and simple. On the other side of the Atlantic, Russians are accused of either inventing the concept or, at least, being its most active users. It is said that Moscow is seeking regime change in Kiev, putting pressure on the Baltic countries to capitalize on the Russian speakers' dissatisfaction with state policies, stirring up conflicts and instability across the post-Soviet space allegedly to achieve complete domination and so on and so forth.

The West refers to what it calls Gerasimov's Doctrine allegedly formulated by General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, in his report about the hybrid war (of the West!) delivered at the Academy of Military Sciences in February 2013. The report presented as a set of theses in the Military Review journal caused an avalanche of quotes in the Western media that tried to present the concept as a recent Russian invention. In fact, General Gerasimov's postulates and assessments were nothing more than Russia's response to the color revolutions strategy that in the last two decades had become the favorite Western instrument of destabilization of states.

Hybrid wars are gaining consequence together with the attention to the information technologies (even if hybrid wars rely on a much wider set of instruments), as well as high-tech weapons, network and cyber weapons in the first place. Today, they have in fact become instruments of a real war.

It has been recognized that the U.S. and NATO look at cyberspace as one of the important strategic spheres which means that the struggle against this threat, the latest among the contemporary threats, deserves more attention. In recent years, Russia, the U.S. and the biggest European countries have survived the biggest number of cyber-attacks. The United

States and the NATO countries were repeatedly accused of hostile (yet not military) use of cyberspace.

We should keep in mind the present worsened relations between Russia and NATO. The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation indicates that the "buildup of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of international law, the galvanization of the bloc countries' military activity, the further expansion of the alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders are creating a threat to national security."[11] Due to the traditions of military and geopolitical confrontation, Russia looks at the U.S. and NATO and their military potentials as the de facto main military security threat, a mirror image of the American-NATO military conceptual attitudes to Russia.

Nuclear weapons per se cannot be described as deterrence. For many reasons, the United States and Russia have not moved (and will hardly move in the foreseeable future due to the current state of bilateral relations) toward the confidence and cooperation level typical of the relations between allies (Washington and Paris, for example) that traditionally do not share all approaches and opinions of each other. Collective West and Russia remain on the opposite sides of the "civilizational barricades" on many issues of world politics. Russia believes that the roads to mutual understanding should be sought for and found even if there are profound disagreements related to the philosophical foundations of the contemporary world. The disagreements of this sort belong to classical democracy as the rivalry of different systems of views and approaches. Ideological struggle should remain within certain limits; the disagreements over international relations should be resolved within international law. Any attempts to impose their own ideas on the opponent by force typical of the West headed by NATO cannot be accepted.

Regrettably, the negative trends of chaotization that undermine strategic stability and, by the same token, the prospects of nuclear disarmament, are gaining momentum in the world.

***

TO SUM UP. Late in 2016, we wrote: "The United States, Western Europe, and NATO need a new Eastern policy no less than Russia needs to normalize its relations with the West. Détente 2.0 should be based on

mutual determination to try to defuse current high tensions, which essentially are an unnatural state of international relations in the 21st century."[12]

This was written on the heels of Donald Trump's victory at the presidential elections in the United States that stirred up hopes that the international climate would improve. Regrettably, this did not happen. The situation in the world and the relations between Moscow and Washington, in the first place, slid down into even worse conflicts. It should be said that we have not yet left the "peak of tension" behind; the future looks dim.

In this article, we discuss strategic stability as the cornerstone of world, global security. How strategic stability can and should be defined today? Which components can be added to the "balance of nuclear fear" or the "thermonuclear Zugzwang" that served the cornerstone of strategic stability in the Cold War years?

It seems that the Sword of Damocles of universal guaranteed destruction in the third thermonuclear world war is still hanging. Illusions are counterproductive if not dangerous. Only a madman can contemplate the first strike in a hope that no retaliation will follow. Nevertheless, it seems that the United States that is working on the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) concept combined with a global ABM system while trying to achieve strategic invincibility is moving in this direction. The inertia of the postwar American doctrines of delivering a massive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union is still alive: a certain part of the American military-political segment is still toying with this idea in a fresh wrapping.

Preservation and development of the system of treaties in the sphere of armaments and disarmament control is an immutable condition and a guarantee of strategic stability. It was a short while ago that this formula looked unassailable and was accepted by the key subjects of the world military-political pool, Russia and the United States among them. It turned out that an opposite process is unfolding: The Unites States spares no effort to deliberately destroy this system.

Withdrawal from the INF Treaty will destroy the strategic stability system. In an interview to the Serbian newspapers *Politika* and *Večernje novosti* on the eve of his visit to Serbia, President Putin had the following to say on the subject: "Indeed, the United States is basically pursuing a course towards dismantling the system of international agreements on arms control that prevent it from bolstering its military capabilities, or trying to adhere to the agreements selectively, i.e., only insofar as they

serve its interests. The declaration of the intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty has become just another step in a sequence of similar actions. It is obvious that such a course will have the gravest consequences. Naturally, we are not going to turn a blind eye to the deployment of American missiles, which present a direct threat to our security. We will have to take effective countermeasures."[13]

At the working meeting with Foreign Minister S. Lavrov and Defense Minister S. Shoigu, the president specified that "our answer will be symmetrical" and "I would like to draw your attention to the fact that we must not and will not let ourselves be drawn into an expensive arms race."[14]

The statement issued by the Foreign Ministry of Russia in connection with the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty said, in particular: "Russia has done its best to preserve the treaty. We tried many times to engage the Americans in a professional discussion and proposed practical initiatives that could help settle mutual complaints. Showing goodwill, we adopted unprecedented transparency measures that went beyond the framework of the treaty obligations. However, all our attempts were disregarded or blocked by the United States, which has long opted for destroying the INF Treaty so as to remove any restrictions that hindered the buildup of its missile potential."[15]

At the press conference dedicated to the results of Russian diplomacy in 2018 held on January 16, 2019, Sergey Lavrov minced no words: "It's clear that this is the demonstration of a course towards breaking all agreements on strategic stability. After the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the INF Treaty is another victim, and in regard to the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) many countries have concerns that its dismantling is part of the U.S. Administration's plans."[16]

As Sergey Lavrov has apply pit it, the West tries to turn Russia into an "object" that will serve its interests, not only outside the country but also inside it due to the unprecedented and still mounting confrontation between the elites. To sum up our discussion of the INF subject, we can say that Washington is waging a very dangerous game that threatens global stability. Let us hope that in their bellicose zeal it will not cross the "red line" and will not fall into a "black hole" from which even light cannot escape.

In the last decades, the world learned about new factors of aggression, a new philosophy of war so to speak, that a contemporary strategic stability concept should take into account. They are new types and systems of WMD, cyber threat, arms race in space, economic wars, and the notorious hybrid war.

The economic war waged against Russia by the United States and the EU in the form of sanctions for practically five years now is absolutely illegal from the point of view of international law. Time has come to calculate how much it costs Russia, its citizens and the population of Western states, whose rulers started the war. The figures will be astronomical.

The military budget of the United States that in 2018 reached the figure of $707 billion is nearly 12 time bigger than Russia's defense budget; it is comparable with the military budgets of all countries of the world taken together. It is expected that this year it will reach the record $725.5 billion.[17] This means that the West and NATO politicians and generals point to Russia as an aggressor to keep the fear at the desired level while it will spend on armaments in the next twelve years the same amount of money that the Unites States will spend in one year. Impressive, isn't it?! The American hawks do not bother to conceal their intention to move the arms race to space; as the first step, they are building up the space force as a new type of armed forces. This brings us closer to the "Star Wars," the Hollywood dream of President Reagan and a new fundamental planetary-space element of strategic stability.

And, finally, cyber threat, a silent and practically undetectable threat of which the West accuses Russia. In his *World Order*, Kissinger has written: "The Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command has predicted that 'the next war will begin in cyberspace.'"[18] There is not much sense in any attempt to object to the American general who knows better. His words, however, prompted the following: "It will not be possible to conceive of international order when the region through which states' survival and progress [that is, cyberspace] are taking place remain without any international standards of conduct and is left to unilateral decisions."[19]

This is reasonable enough. The main question is: Who is against bringing law and order into cyberspace? Russia has already put several very specific suggestions on the table of our Western partners and spoken of the same at the UN. It seems that in the heat of numerous accusations of Russia that allegedly interfered in the U.S. presidential elections and was guilty of similar misdeeds, Americans forgot what Snowden and Assange had told the world community. It was not idle talk or speculations: they offered very specific and reliable information about the United States engaged in total cyber monitoring of the world space, from which even the heads of its allied states are not exempt. Washington responded with a wide-scale propaganda campaign to shift responsibility from the

real "cyber-herder" (that is, itself) to an imaginary one, the role ascribed to Russia. This makes it absolutely clear which country, Russia or the U.S., is interested in bringing international legal standards into cyberspace.

Russia never spared and does not spare efforts to ensure international information security and struggle against cybercrimes. In December 2018, the UN General Assembly approved two resolutions initiated by Russia.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

WE HOPE that despite the complexities and contradictions of our time and complete absence of mutual trust, the biggest world powers, on which the future of mankind depends, still share the common aim of its ensured survival. A new concept of strategic stability for the 21st century has become an existential task. In June 2018, at the Helsinki Russian-American Summit, the Russian side transferred to its partners very specific and comprehensive suggestions related to the long-overripe profound discussions of strategic stability and arms control. Regrettably, Americans are still avoiding the dialogue probably to remain free in their policies.

There is a more or less widely shared opinion in the West that confrontation with Russia has become too protracted and assumed threatening dimensions and that time has come to start a positive process of meeting each other halfway. So far, our partners prefer talking about this in a low voice behind the scenes; so far public statements are not in fashion or even dangerous.

Those political circles in the United States that made Russophobia their brand and a "political feeding trough" refuse to retreat: they demonstrate miracles of ingenuity to feed the fire of anti-Russian sentiments. Accused of being a Russian agent, U.S. President Donald Trump fell victim to unbridled spy mania that brings to mind the never-to-be-forgotten McCarthyism. The accusations heaped on Trump are unprecedented since he fills the highest post to which he was democratically elected by American citizens (as distinct from those who try to put him on trial).

Much was said about interrogating the interpreters present at the meetings of Trump and Putin at which the American president had allegedly disclosed to the "strategic adversary" the deepest American secrets. It seems that spy mania in the United States has reached the next

and more dangerous stage of spy schizophrenia while American policy is growing increasingly less predictable, which is unacceptable for the country with a huge military potential that imposes its will on scores of states in all corners of the world.

Russia is absolutely open to a straightforward and constructive dialogue with the United States on all fateful issues because "despite their different positions, Russia and Western states jointly bear tremendous responsibility for the future of the entire human race and for finding effective responses to the numerous challenges and threats of our time."[20] We remain convinced that the "hotheads" in the West will finally see reason and that common sense would triumph over militarist stupor.

Time has come for the countries of Europe to more actively insist on their desire to preserve strategic stability on the continent. This refers, first and foremost, to the leading EU countries that for the last few decades have developed a habit of holing up under a big American, not only nuclear, umbrella. In fact, Europeans will be the first and worst victims of a possible escalation on the continent if and when the INF Treaty is liquidated. They should say whether they want this perspective for themselves. The negative answer means that the Old World should force their trans-ocean boss to take their interests into account.

Russia is ready to act to prevent the final destruction of the INF Treaty as an important element of strategic stability at the bilateral level with the United States, as well as at the multilateral level if the United States is concerned that some countries that have intermediate- and shorter-range missiles remain outside the corresponding treaty. On December 18, 2018, speaking at an expanded meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, President Putin said: "Yes, indeed, this treaty comes with certain complexities since other countries with medium- and short-range missiles are not part of it. But why not discuss their accession to this treaty? Or discuss the parameters of a new treaty?"

On February 2, 2019, at the meeting with Sergey Lavrov and Sergey Shoigu mentioned above, the president said: "All our proposals in this area remain on the table just as before. We are open to negotiations. At the same time, I ask both ministries not to initiate talks on these matters in the future. I suggest that we wait until our partners are ready to engage in equal and meaningful dialogue on this subject that is essential for us, as well as for our partners and the entire world."[21] He deemed it necessary to add: "We proceed from the premise that Russia will not deploy intermediate-range or shorter-range weapons either in Europe or any-

where else until U.S. weapons of this kind are deployed to the corresponding regions of the world."

This is another goodwill gesture which means that Russia is always ready to make specific steps and that it rejects the idle and dangerous rhetoric in which the American political establishment indulges itself. It seems that the world (Europe, in the first place) should learn to discern the difference between the unbridled and complacent American bragging amply illustrated by Donald Trump's latest State of the Union address, in which he was holding forth about the Americans as the greatest, smartest and strongest nation and about their country as the center of the world, and the balanced, constructive, responsible, and reserved policy of Russia determined to prevent the slide of the current phase of conflict from aggravation to protracted and deep-cutting confrontation.

At all times, goodwill and a real desire to resolve in a constructive way the most challenging issues helped surmount the barriers that at first glance looked insurmountable. Mankind has found itself at one of the most critical moments of its history when no progressive development of our civilization is possible without strategic stability as a set of military-political factors of security and the norms of responsible civilized behavior of the great powers.

―――――――――――

NOTES

[1] Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Vybor. Strategichesky vzglyad.* Moscow: AST, 2018, p. 32.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 22.

[4] Ibid., p. 23.

[5] Kissinger, Henry. *Mirovoy poryadok.* Moscow: AST, 2015, p. 433.

[6] Dobrynin A.F. *Sugubo doveritelno. Posol v Washingtone pri shesti prezidentakh SShA (1962-1986 gg.).* Moscow: Avtor, 1997, p. 143.

[7] Baluyevsky Yu.N. *Strategicheskaya stabilnost v epokhu globalizatsii: obshchaya povestka dnya dlya Rossii i SShA//* https://flot.com/publications/books/shelf/safety/4.htm

[8] Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Op. cit., p. 24.

[9] Voennaya doktrina RF // http://www.rg.ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html

[10] Strategiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii // https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html

[11] Ibid.

[12] Orlov A., Mizin V. "Russia and the West: Time for Détente 2.0," *International Affairs.* 2017, No. 1.

[13] Interview Putina serbskim izdaniyam *Politika* i *Večernje novosti* // http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59680

[14] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59763

[15] http://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/-/asset_publisher

t2GCdmD8RNIr/content/id/3495846

[16] Vystuplenie i otvety na voprosy SMI ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova v khode press-konferentsii po itogam deyatelnosti rossiyskoy diplomatii v 2018 g. Moskva, 16 yanvarya 2019 g. // http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/ cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3476729

[17] Tezisy doklada ministra oborony Rossiiskoy Federatsii generala armii S.K. Shoigu na rasshirennom zasedanii Kollegii Minoborony Rossii// http://mil.ru/files/Doklad%20 Ministra.pdf

[18] Kissinger, Henry. Op. cit., p. 450.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Iz interview S.V. Lavrova mezhdunarodnomu informatsionnomu agenstvu Rossiya segodnya. 24 dekabrya 2018 g. // http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_pub-lisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3459466

[21] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59763

Russian-Chinese Relations
at Their All-Time Best

A. Denisov

International Affairs: *Andrei Ivanovich, our Western partners are doing all they can to portray Russia as a rogue nation around which the noose of isolation is tightening. However, it seems that relations between Russia and China testify to the opposite. How is Russian-Chinese cooperation developing today?*

A. Denisov: You are right: Against the backdrop of difficult relations with certain Western countries, Russian-Chinese strategic partnership is developing steadily and progressively and can serve as a model of interstate relations. Current Russian-Chinese relations are at their all-time best; importantly, the parties are convinced that their development potential is huge.

Russia and China are the largest neighboring powers; we have a common border that is more than 4,000 kilometers long and are objectively interested in that it remains an area of good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation. The proximity and coincidence of foreign policy interests make for close cooperation in the international arena.

A sound legal framework has been established in our bilateral relations and there is an extremely diversified, high-level and comprehensive mechanism for interstate and intergovernmental dialogue.

Based on an overall assessment of the state of bilateral relations and taking into account China's aggregate power, there is every reason to say that China is Russia's main international partner among the countries with which we do not have allied relations. Incidentally, the absence of allied relations or bloc to bloc logic is a main principle of Russian-Chinese cooperation. At the same time, the Russian-Chinese tandem goes much further and works more successfully than many formal unions and organizations in the world.

Andrei Denisov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the People's Republic of China

Q: This tandem is also actively involved in settling complex regional situations. What is the Russian-Chinese road map for resolving problems on the Korean peninsula and how is it being implemented? What is China's role in the inter-Korean settlement amid the U.S.'s high activity there?

A: The Russian-Chinese road map for Korean settlement was laid down in the July 4, 2017 joint statement by the two countries' foreign ministries on the problem on the Korean peninsula. It highlights the complex and interconnected nature of subregional issues and the need for their step-by-step resolution.

In accordance with the road map, North Korea should first stop nuclear missile tests and the U.S. and South Korea should refrain from conducting joint large-scale exercises. At the same time, the opposing sides start negotiations and approve general principles of relations, including the nonuse of force, nonaggression, peaceful coexistence, and the intention to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. All parties involved will also promote the creation of a peace and security mechanism on the peninsula, as well as in Northeast Asia.

As we can see, the development of the situation in the region and dialogue between the key players are proceeding according to the logic of our road map. Let's hope that the parties involved will meet each other halfway to make the peace process sustainable and irreversible.

Russia and China have played a significant role in the dramatic transition from confrontation to dialogue on the peninsula over the past year, working hard with all parties involved. Beijing has repeatedly said that the main disagreement in the subregion is between North Korea and the U.S., and so it is primarily Washington and Pyongyang that should reach a compromise.

At the same time, naturally, it is impossible to build principles of relations in Northeast Asia and establish peace and security mechanisms without Moscow's and Beijing's participation. We have great respect for the constructive role that the Chinese side is playing in a Korean settlement. We are confident that China takes a similar view of our approach to the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula.

Q: What is China's reaction to the increasing dynamics of Russian-Japanese relations?

A: Without a doubt, our Chinese partners are closely watching Russian-

Japanese relations and analyzing the efforts Moscow and Tokyo are making to solve existing problems.

At the same time, the Chinese are drawing parallels with their own difficult dialogue with the Japanese that has intensified in the past two years. In October 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited China and met with Xi Jinping in Beijing. This was the first visit by a Japanese leader to China in a long time. It seems that the visit has enabled the two parties to give an impetus to their interaction with an emphasis on economic and practical cooperation. This year, new contacts between Beijing and Tokyo are expected, in particular, Xi Jinping's visit to the Land of the Rising Sun, which has a good chance of becoming historic.

> Current Russian-Chinese relations are at their all-time best; importantly, the parties are convinced that their development potential is huge.

At the same time, China realizes that a lot of diplomatic and other efforts have yet to be made to overcome the difficulties that have accumulated in Chinese-Japanese relations. I believe the Chinese take a similar view of our dialogue with Tokyo. Many more Russian-Japanese meetings and a lot of hard work lie ahead.

Q: How do you assess the prospects for bilateral trade and economic cooperation? In particular, considering the possibility of the "New Silk Road – the One Belt One Road" project running across Russian territory, including the Northern Sea Route? Is $200 billion trade turnover a realistic prospect?

A: In 2018, Russian-Chinese trade crossed $100 billion, reaching $107 billion, up 27% year on year. This is not a bad result. Our trade surplus exceeded $11 billion, with Russian exports going up by more than 40%.

The main contribution to the increase in trade has traditionally come from the energy sector: Last year, Russian oil exports to China increased by almost 20%, hitting a record 71 million tons. Russia has strengthened its positions as the main supplier of "black gold" to the Chinese market. At the same time, we recorded a 55% increase in agricultural exports, which crossed $3 billion.

Our trade and economic cooperation are wide-ranging and developing dynamically. However, we can see that its potential has not been fully

used and there is plenty of room for growth, including in energy, agriculture, science, technology, manufacturing, logistics and many other sectors. We are also well aware of the fact that modern trade and economic relations are not just about the exchange of goods, but a wide range of ties, including the implementation of investment projects, as well as close financial integration. Increasing the share of national currencies in foreign trade payments is a priority on our agenda.

Seventy key projects worth a total of around $120 billion have been approved under the auspices of the bilateral intergovernmental investment commission, a significant part of which are already at the stage of coordination or implementation. Thirty-two projects worth $4.2 billion are being carried out in the Russian Far East as part of the priority development areas program and in the free port of Vladivostok with the help of Chinese capital. The Russian-Chinese wide-body aircraft project is moving forward. Last year, a breakthrough in the nuclear energy sector was made, and there is progress in transport cooperation. There are good prospects for development of cross-border e-commerce, as well as in the financial sector. A significant increase in bilateral trade value can be expected in the foreseeable future when a Russian-Chinese gas pipeline along an eastern route is put into operation. There are plans for natural gas deliveries to China from Russia's Far East, as well as for increasing Arctic LNG exports.

The existing potential for practical cooperation suggests that the $200 billion target can be reached in the very near future. However, we will need to work hard to achieve this. It is important to understand that the qualitative growth of trade requires modernization of infrastructure and a favorable environment. There are still many problems here, for instance, in mutual settlements and trade banking services.

As far as the Silk Road initiative is concerned, speaking at the One Belt One Road international forum in May 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the infrastructure projects announced within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) and the One Belt One Road initiatives in conjunction with the Northern Sea Route could create a fundamentally new transport configuration on the Eurasian continent as key to developing the territory and invigorating economic and investment activity there.

This is our approach in synchronizing the EaEU and the One Belt One Road initiative, paying close attention to providing favorable conditions for trade, and implementing joint infrastructural, industrial and manufac-

turing projects. In 2018, we took an important step in this area: In May, an agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the EaEU and China was signed in Astana. At the same time, work is underway to draft an agreement on Eurasian economic partnership. I am confident that cooperation on this track will make a positive contribution to our countries' socioeconomic development and strengthening the entire range of bilateral relations.

Q: How important is bilateral military-technical cooperation and how is it developing?

A: Bilateral military-technical cooperation is an integral and natural component of Russian-Chinese comprehensive partnership relations and strategic cooperation. Beijing has traditionally been a major buyer of Russian military products, and its share in Russian military exports remains quite high.

There are several major ongoing contracts, including for the delivery of various types of advanced air defense systems and aircraft engines to China. Delivery of Su-35 multipurpose fighter jets has been completed. At the same time, the Chinese defense sector has acquired considerable capability, and so we also have something to borrow from our partners.

The participation of Chinese representatives in major military-technical events, such as the Army International Forum, gives an additional impetus to Russian-Chinese cooperation in the defense and technology sector. On the other hand, representatives of Russian defense industry enterprises take part in similar events held in China. Communication between specialists at such professional venues brings considerable "added value" to bilateral exchanges in this highly important, promising and comprehensive area of cooperation.

Q: There are reports of somewhat unusual cooperation projects, for instance, the Chinese buying water from Lake Baikal. Is this true? Are there many such surprising projects on the agenda and in what other areas do we still need to establish cooperation?

A: I do not see anything unusual about Baikal water supplies to China, and this can only be welcomed. Bottled water from Lake Baikal is already available on the Chinese market, which is very promising due to its huge volume and growing demand. I believe we have quite a few advantages

over other producers – namely, the geographic proximity and popularity of Lake Baikal, plus the high quality of water coming from the depths of the lake.

Regarding the idea of building a water pipeline to China, it is still a chimera. If water is cheaper than oil, building a water pipeline is economically unviable. Besides, preserving the ecology and biodiversity of Lake Baikal is an overriding priority.

It should be noted that in recent years, Chinese tourists have been increasingly interested in exotic places in Russia. One of these is the Arctic, where one can admire northern lights, go dog sledding and see polar bears. Delicacies such as live Kamchatka crabs are available even in Beijing. Russian companies are increasing deliveries of wild plants, berries and mushrooms, in particular chaga [Inonotus obliquus], to China. There is growing demand for such products on the Chinese market, and the outlook is good. Generally, there are quite a few such ideas, and it seems that their number will continue to grow. I do not think there is anything wrong about that. The more cooperation areas there are, the more wide-ranging our bilateral trade will be. Time will show which of these projects are viable.

Q: Andrei Ivanovich, more Russian people than ever before want to learn Chinese and are learning it. This is mainly due to business opportunities. How popular is Russian in China?

A: According to the Chinese Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature, degree courses in Russian are available at 159 Chinese universities, where 26,000 future specialists are currently being trained. More than 20,000 people are studying Russian as a second foreign language at 120 universities. Russian is taught at 120 secondary schools, with 23,000 students. In 2018, about 70,000 school and university students were studying Russian. The positive dynamics of our cultural cooperation are also evidenced by the spread of Russian language studies in China.

According to some reports, professional translators from and to Russian are already among the best paid in this sector. Students who master Russian in addition to natural sciences, engineering or economics will have the most attractive prospects, since they will be able to use their knowledge and expertise within the framework of Russian-Chinese infrastructure, energy, railway, and aircraft building projects. Chinese and

Russian specialists fluent in both languages will be in demand not only in the business sector, but also in joint scientific research projects, for example, materials studies, nano- and biotechnology, applied mathematics and computer science, ecology and medicine. These opportunities are available for students and young scientists as part of joint educational programs, in particular at Russian-Chinese University, co-founded by Moscow State University and Shenzhen Polytechnic.

Q: In general, Russian society is quite interested in all things Chinese – cuisine, art, folk traditions, martial arts, etc., and you, as a sinologist, probably could confirm that the traditions of Russian Oriental studies have not been lost. How much interest in Russia is there among ordinary Chinese people, scientists and the creative elite?

A: China has traditional interest in Russia. There are many reasons for this. First of all, we are neighbors. As the Chinese proverb goes, "Close neighbors are better than distant relatives." The older generation of Chinese people has always been interested in Russian culture, cinema and literature.

There are many common pages in our countries' history, especially in the 20th century. The creation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 (this year we are celebrating a double anniversary, i.e., the 70th anniversary of the PRC and the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and China) laid the foundation for close ties, including between ordinary people, experts in various fields and members of intelligentsia in the two countries. Since then, China has significantly changed, but the traditions of friendship and mutual respect that were established at that time not only have been preserved but multiplied.

Here is a case in point. These days, in China, you can easily buy online almost any works of classical Russian literature in Chinese. These include both prose and poetry. Last year, the Anhui University publishing house published a major collection of works by Russian classics translated by Li Gang (1926-1997), a renowned translator and expert in Russian philology. Just recently, Liu Wenfei, a well-known Chinese author, gave me a copy of his new translation of Leo Tolstoy's *Resurrection*. This novel has already been translated into Chinese, but, according to Professor Liu, he decided to update that translation, making it more accessible and understandable to the young reader.

China's modern "creative class," creative young people highly appraise the traditions of Russian art and the school of Russian painting, as evidenced by the annual competition for training at major art colleges in Russia and the traditionally keen interest in Russian art exhibitions at local art galleries.

Last year, Meng Jinghui, a prominent Chinese stage director known for his production of plays by Anton Chekhov and Vladimir Mayakovsky, was awarded a Pushkin Medal for his contribution to the promotion and development of Russian culture abroad. Our dramatic art stars are among regular guests at the annual theater festival in Wuzhen.

Music deserves special attention. Tours by national philharmonic and symphony orchestras, ballet shows and folk art performances are invariably sold out. A song by Chinese pop singer Li Jian, entitled *On the Shores of Lake Baikal,* has become a real hit over here – I would even say an anthem of the Chinese traveler across Russia. Just recently, at the height of the holidays, during the Spring Festival (the Lunar New Year), Russian signer Polina Gagarina caused a sensation on local social media by singing Viktor Tsoi's *Cuckoo* in the Voice TV show. Russian songs of any genre to suit any taste are available on QQ Music, a popular music application.

There is also great media interest in Russia. Russia stories appear in the local press almost every day. For instance, Chinese correspondents at the World Cup in Russia constituted the largest foreign press pool. It is very nice that Hu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of *Global Times,* one of the most influential Chinese newspapers, runs his video blog in Russian, commenting on major international events. In general, many media platforms in China have Russian versions. This means that producers, editors, presenters, hosts and other people involved in preparing such material have an opportunity to learn something new about Russia and tell a wide audience about it.

Interest in Russia is also evidenced by the growing tourist flow. For several years in a row, China has accounted for the largest number of tourists to Russia.

I would like to cite one example to explain the perception of Russia in China. Russian people are often referred to as *zhandou minzu*, which can be translated as a "warrior nation." This neologism has become a kind of meme among ordinary Chinese. It clearly reflects respect for Russia and the recognition of our historic military achievements, including our decisive contribution to the victory in World War II. This concept also

includes the idea that the Russian people are bold, courageous and ready to defend their interests to the end.

Interest in Russia within Chinese academic circles is evidenced by the increasing number of various centers for Russian studies established at major Chinese universities.

Q: How do you assess the implementation of Russian-Chinese Bilateral Year programs at the regional level and what is the outlook for the future?

A: Russia and China are large multiethnic states, and naturally, diverse, wide-ranging cooperation at the regional level is an important part of Russian-Chinese relations. Like 2018, this year is the Year of Russian-Chinese Interregional Cooperation. Last year, there were hundreds of visits by delegations at the regional level, and many agreements and memorandums of cooperation between Chinese provinces and Russian regions and territories were signed.

Strengthening interregional ties facilitates the development of trade, economic and cultural contacts. The geographical scope of interregional cooperation is expanding, and new cooperation mechanisms are emerging. Cooperation in the Volga-Yangtze format, spanning the Volga Federal District and the upper and middle reaches of the Yangtze River, as well as via the intergovernmental commission for cooperation and development of the Russian Far East and the Baikal region and northeast China, is successfully advancing.

Two new interregional cooperation mechanisms are in the works: between the Central Federal District and China's metropolitan macroregion, and between the Northwestern Federal District and Yangtze River delta regions, namely the city of Shanghai and neighboring provinces. It should be noted that there are almost no "blank spots" on the map of interregional cooperation and our embassy will do all it can to take it to a new level.

It is worth noting that on September 11, 2018, during Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Russia to attend the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping attended a roundtable on Russian-Chinese interregional cooperation. The Russian side was represented by 12 heads of regions and the Chinese side was represented by nine. Such a high level of participation and such a wide geographical scope of an interregional cooperation event had no precedent in the history of Russian-Chinese relations.

In 2019, it is planned to hold a series of presentations of Russian and Chinese regions, various interregional events at international venues (the One Belt One Road international cooperation forum, the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the Harbin International Trade and Economic Fair, and the Eastern Economic Forum), mutual visits, exhibitions, and performances by local arts groups. There is great potential for mutually beneficial cooperation at the level of cities and municipalities.

Q: Andrei Ivanovich, China marked the 40th anniversary of reforms. The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China reaffirmed the socialist path of the country's development with Chinese specifics and proclaimed the spirit of openness. You have an opportunity to compare the country as it was before to what it is now. What are the most striking changes that have taken place in China?

A: In December 2018, China's "reform and openness policy" turned 40. The date was marked in Beijing – without ostentation but rather with modest dignity and a sense of pride, which is quite appropriate in this case.

Forty years ago, I worked at the Soviet trade mission in China, among other things, keeping track of economic information – to put it simply, monitoring scanty reports on economic issues in two or three thin Chinese newspapers. On December 19, 1978, they ran a report on the third plenary session of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation that had ended the day before. Today, this is considered the starting point of the dizzying (judging by its results) 40-year marathon.

Conceptual preparations for reforms began earlier – with apparently boring articles to the effect that practice is the criterion of truth. At that time, even experienced sinologists did not immediately realize that this was not scholasticism, but a breath of fresh air, a departure from outdated dogmas, then a complete break with them, and a pivot to an assessment of economic activity on the basis of real, practical results.

Back then, in December 1978, another fateful event took place. A group of peasants in the Xiaogang village in central China decided to switch to the so-called family contract – in effect, they made a big leap from requisitioning of farm produce to the tax in kind. It led to an explosive growth in agricultural production and made it possible to provide enough food for the country within a historically short time – several years. That solved China's centuries-old problem – hunger. I should add

that during the reform period, 700 million people in China were lifted out of poverty. The starting point was the agreement reached by the peasants of the village of Xiaogan in the Fengyang county, Anhui Province, that was subsequently enshrined in party and state documents.

Since 1979, the "policy of openness in foreign economic relations" has made great progress. Joint ventures with foreign capital began to mushroom. The first four special economic zones were formed. Today, the main zone, Shenzhen, on the border with Hong Kong, has turned from a fishing village into a super-modern metropolis with a population of 20 million.

China's reform policy has turned 40. I will not cite any figures – they are well-known. The path has been far from smooth. There were setbacks, sometimes very painful ones. However, the end result is what matters: The entire country has changed – not just separate "points of growth" but the country as a whole. Importantly, people remained the same. As an eyewitness to these 40 years, I can testify (from my humble perspective, of course) to that society has remarkably fit into totally new, historically unprecedented conditions and it feels quite at home in this new environment.

According to the canons of traditional Chinese thinking, the end is always the beginning. Priorities on China's agenda these days include the continuation of reforms to build what is described here as "socialism with Chinese specifics in a new era." Reforms have a beginning, but there is no end in sight.

Q: Andrei Ivanovich, at the end of our discussion of Russian-Chinese relations, allow me to ask a general question. From the vantage point of your extensive professional experience – working in China, Egypt, the Foreign Ministry's central office and the UN – how do you assess the emerging new global political system? What centers of power will it rely on? What role will Russia and China have in the world?

A: Your question is not exactly for me. Besides, we sinologists believe that the more experience there is, the clearer it is how little you can understand the world around you with your mind. However, I will try to answer your question.

Unfortunately, at this point, it is more appropriate to talk about the destruction of the world's existing political system than about the formation of a new one. I am referring primarily to the erosion of the system of

international treaties and the rules of the game in arms control that is being imposed by our Western partners. Nevertheless, any philosophical system, including the Chinese one, posits that the new does not arise out of nowhere but grows within what preceded it. In this sense, Russia and China, as two major responsible powers, are building their relations so that they become a kind of a crystallization point in the current troubled world, giving it the much-needed element of stability and predictability.

Russia and Islam

A. Podtserob

IN 986-988 A.D., Grand Prince Vladimir decided the time had come to move away from worshipping many deities to choosing one God. Islam, religion of the Bulgars, who came first with their presentation, was rejected with the words: "Drinking is the joy of Rus." The embassy from Rome, likewise, failed; Khazars offered Judaism but it was also rejected for the simple reason that Russians and Khazars were locked in a life and death struggle. Vladimir chose Eastern Christianity presented by the embassy from Constantinople, which arrived when all others had already failed.

It was at the same time that Rus was establishing trade contacts, the earliest of them dated by the 870s and mentioned in *The Book of Roads and Kingdoms* by Arab scholar Ibn Khordadbeh. Two centuries later, another Arab geographer, Muhammad al-Idrisi wrote that Muslim merchants went as far as Kiev.[1] In the same century, Jewish traveler Benjamin of Tudela met Russian merchants in Alexandria.[2] In the 13th century, certain authors described the flourishing cities on the Black Sea shores that Russia and the Muslim East used as trading centers and pointed to Soldaia (Surozh, today Sudak) as one of them.

The practice of pilgrimage to Palestine and Sinai began approximately at the same time. The first written chronicle about pilgrimages – *Journey of Hegumen Daniel* – is dated by the early 12th century.

The Rostov-Suzdal Principality, that appeared when Rus moved up to the northeast, exchanged embassies with the Bulgars.

From the 12th century, the time of the catastrophic Mongol invasion, to the 15th century, Northeastern Rus remained a vassal of Tatar princes. Indeed, in the northeast people could flee to the forests while the population of the steppe of Southeast Rus was totally exterminated. Kiev, the third biggest city of Europe after Constantinople and Cordova, with the population of 100 thousand fell to the Mongol-Tatar troops.

Alexey Podtserob, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; podtserob@yandex.ru

Judging by the memoirs left by a member of the embassy of the Holy Land that travelled to Sarai Berke, Kiev was nothing more than a pile of rubble, a village amid total destruction. Heaps of skeletons made it impossible for the embassy to stay overnight in villages. Khan Uzbeg (1313-1341) executed more Russian princes than his predecessors. Meanwhile, Grand Prince of Muscovy Ivan Kalita finally got the right to collect the toll on his own without Tatar baskaks (tax gatherers). Part of the collected money was sent to the capital of the Golden Horde; extra money was used by the prince to gather strength to shake off the Tatar yoke. Trade contacts with the Arab world were revived in the latter half of the 14th century while the Russians of Surozh became one of the most active communities of the Black Sea coast.

Moscow liberated itself under Grand Prince Ivan the Great. By the mid-15th century, the Golden Horde had fallen apart into the Greater Horde and the Kasimov, Kazan, Astrakhan, Crimea, Nogai, and Siberian khanates. Under Ivan the Great, Rus stopped paying tribute to the Greater Horde that forced Ahmed Khan to start a military campaign against Moscow. In the fall of 1480, he brought his troops to the Ugra River where Moscow troops had been already waiting for him on the opposite bank. The question is: Why did Tatars make a roundabout maneuver to come to the Ugra River instead of trying to capture Moscow? Because, in expectation of military assistance from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ahmed Khan deemed it wise to move closer to the Lithuanian border. Moscow, meanwhile, did not waste time either: it had achieved under-standing with Kazan and Crimea. Crimean troops invaded Lithuania while the Russian and Kazan troops were ravaging the lands of the Great Horde. To avoid the total devastation of his state, Ahmed Khan had no choice but retreat from the River Ugra.

In the 15th century, the Ottoman Empire became one of the main eco-nomic partners of Russian principalities: Moscow, Tver, Yaroslavl, Novgorod, Kolomna, Vyazma, and Mozhaysk were actively involved in trade while Moscow and Istanbul established diplomatic relations. This is confirmed by the fact that the sides exchanged embassies in 1514-1516 and 1522-1524. This went on till the 1550s: in 1552, Moscow captured Kazan; Astrakhan fell in 1556 while Kabarda joined Moscow on its own free will. This created a new situation: in 1569, Turkey responded with a march across the Don to the Volga yet failed to dig a canal. That's when the so-called Oriental Question appeared on the agenda. From that time on, Russia was confronted by the Ottoman Empire and the

Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth that made its foreign policy situation very unstable.

In the 15th and 16th centuries, the Muscovy State spread to the Volga area and Siberia. This process was not smooth. Czar Ivan the Terrible and Emperor Peter the Great populated Kazan with Orthodox Christians. However, Catherine the Great stopped this practice: under

> Russia's involvement in the civil war in Syria greatly impressed the Muslim and Western states; it was interpreted as consolidation of Russia's presence in the Middle East and the world.

the Decree of 1784 "On the permission to the Tatar Princes and Murzas to enjoy all privileges of Russian nobility," the Muslims acquired autonomy. In 1785, the Charter of the Cities allowed Muslims (merchants, big entrepreneurs, bankers, wholesale traders, scholars, and artisans) to join "city society." The newly established Muslim assembly of Orenburg was a weighty confirmation of state support of Islam.

On the whole, the Muslims of the Russian Empire never experienced the cruel treatment of Muslims in Western Europe, from which they were banished. Russia was a religiously stratified state in which the first place belonged to Orthodox Christians and Protestants; the second, to the Muslims; and the third, to Catholics. The Muslims of the Volga Area were actively involved in the uprising of Emelyan Pugachev on the side of a "good czar" rather than for separation from Russia. It is true that unification with the Northern Caucasus developed in parts into a cruel war, yet the czarist officials never tried to impose Orthodox Christianity on the local Muslims by force. This fully applies to the process of unification with Azerbaijan, Ossetia, Adjara, and the Central Asian states.

The relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire from the 16th to the 20th century are better described as a chain of wars waged for the domination in the Black Sea basin. In the 18th-19th centuries, the presence of the Russian squadrons in the Mediterranean constituted a serious problem for the Turkish Fleet. In the late 18th century, the Russian fleet dominated the Mediterranean. In May 1772, the squadron under lieutenant Georgy Rizo, who fought side by side with the Egyptian separatist troops under Sultan Ali Bey al-Kabir, played an important role in the defeat of the Ottoman army at Al-Ghaziye. In June-September 1773, another squadron, under M. Kozhukhov and M. Voynovich, sieged Beirut

the garrison of which commanded by Ahmad al-Jazzar had to surrender. In 1774, when the Russo-Turkish war ended, Russian troops left Beirut.

Acting together, Russia, France and Great Britain helped Greece to reach independence. In 1814, Greek nationalists set up in Odessa a clandestine "Filiki Eteria" (Society of Friends) organization headed by Russian General Alexander Ypsilanti; Ioannis Kapodistrias, Greek statesman who filled the post of Foreign Minister of Russia, also had ties with the Greek movement.

In his article that appeared in *The New-York Daily Tribune* on April 19, 1853 under the title "The Turkish Question," Friedrich Engels wrote: "The Serbian insurrection of 1804, the Greek uprising in 1821 were more or less directly urged on by Russian gold and Russian influence."[3] Finally, the Greeks rebelled against the Turkish yoke. In 1825, the new Russian government headed by Emperor Nicholas I decided that Russia should be more actively involved in Greek affairs. Britain, dead set against Russia's one-sided interference, hastened to discuss joint actions. On April 4, 1826, Foreign Minister of Russia Karl Nesselrode and Arthur Wellington who represented Britain signed in St. Petersburg the Protocol on joint involvement in Greek affairs. It, however, remained unrealized.

In Greece, Egyptian troops were winning the war, and Sultan Mahmud II rejected all attempts of St. Petersburg and London to interfere. In April, the Greek National Assembly elected Ioannis Kapodistrias as President. Before it, he was Russia's foreign minister. To prevent strengthening of Russia's positions in Greece, London started talking once again about concerted actions. On June 6, France, Russia and Britain signed in London a convention supporting Greece's separation from the Ottoman Empire. The Porte again declined the demands of three powers.

On October 20, 1827, the united fleet of Britain, France and Russia (26 ships in all) entered the Bay of Navarino where 94 Turkish-Egyptian ships were stationed. In the battle in which the allies lost one ship, the defeated enemy lost all but one warship and 15 small auxiliary vessels. The battle of Navarino was the prologue to a great Russo-Turkish war that began in earnest in spring 1828 and ended eighteen months later with Russia's victory. Under the Peace of Adrianople signed on September 14, 1829, Greece became independent. Following the demands of three powers, Khedive of Egypt Muhammad Ali evacuated Morea where the Egyptian army was in a difficult situation after the destruction of the Turkic-Egyptian fleet.

In 1877-1878, Russia, supported by Romania, Serbia, Montenegro

and Bulgarian volunteers and encouraged by the rise of the national-lib-
eration movement in the Balkans, waged a war against Turkey. The
Russian army defeated the enemy at Lovech, Pleven (Plevna), Shipka;
crossed in winter the Balkan mountain range; successfully fought at
Sheynovo, Philippopolis (Plovdiv) and Adrianople (Edirne). In
Transcaucasia, Russians occupied the fortresses of Bayazit
(Doğubayazıt), Ardahan, Kars, and Batum (Batumi) and ended the war in
February 1878 near Bosporus and Istanbul. The military victories of the
Russian army helped Serbia, Montenegro and Romania shake off their
dependence on the Ottoman Empire; Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina
became completely autonomous of Istanbul.

The Porte waged several wars against Russia with Egyptians,
Tunisians and Algerians (people from the countries that were vassals of
Istanbul) fighting in its ranks. For example, during the Crimean War,
Tunisian soldiers were sent to the peninsula and to Abkhazia. Half of
them never came back. There was a well-known legend that Sevastopol
fell because a cannon from the holy walls of Kairouan was brought to
Crimea.

The war-torn history of the relations between the Russian and the
Ottoman empires knows one exception: in 1833, Petersburg interfered
into the conflict between Istanbul and Khedive of Egypt Muhammad Ali
on the Turkish side. Having defeated Turks three times in a row, the van-
guard of the Egyptian army entered Brusa (Bursa) and threatened
Istanbul. Sultan Mahmud II turned to the great powers for assistance.
France openly sided with Cairo; Russia sided with the Turks while
Britain, being against Muhammad Ali, found itself in a tight corner. At the
same time, London was afraid that the conflict will result in Russia's
greater influence or possible division of Turkey into the northern part
supported by Russia and the southern part under Egyptian control that
might become a sphere of French influence. Consequently, London opted
for the wait-and-see policy.

The sultan had no choice but ask St. Petersburg for support.
According to Karl Nesselrode, Russia's interference was needed to pre-
vent a coup in Istanbul and downfall of the weak and friendly power.
Paris might have filled the void with a stronger power, a potential source
of troubles for Russia.4 On February 2, 1833, Egyptians occupied
Kütahya; on the next day Mahmud II asked Russia for help. On February
20, the Russian squadron entered the Bosporus; three days later, the
Russian expeditionary corps of 20 thousand troops under Nikolay

Muravyov landed on the Asian shore. The resolute move of the Russian emperor forced Muhammad Ali to order Ibrahim Pasha, commander of the Egyptian army, to abort the planned offensive at Istanbul.

Russia's positions became stronger which caused concerns in London and Paris: a hastily mediated peace between Cairo and Istanbul was an obvious answer. The treaty signed on May 4, 1933 in Kütahya was not a formal peace treaty: the sultan recognized the rights of Muhammad Ali to Egypt, Sudan and the territories on the Arabian Peninsula (Najd, Hejaz and Asir) and appointed him ruler of Palestine, Cilicia and Syria. At the same time, the Egyptians were expected to withdraw from Anatolia and recognize the supreme power of the sultan.

Russia used the conflict to consolidate its ties with Turkey. In 1833, St. Petersburg and Istanbul signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi on a military union under which Russia pledged to extend its military assistance to Turkey if needed. In a secret article, the Ottomans promised to close the Dardanelles to all foreign warships at Russia's demand. These agreements concluded for eight years made it very hard for Muhammad Ali to achieve his final aims.

The Ottoman Empire seized the opportunity to attack the Egyptians but was defeated in the first battle. Ibrahim, however, had no plans to move at Istanbul; he did not cross the Taurus Mountains and remained content with the occupation of Urfa and Maraş. In summer 1840, a conference of ambassadors in London worked out a treaty on the settlement of the Turkish-Egyptian crisis. On June 15, Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Turkey signed a convention which Muhammad Ali totally rejected. Then Britain, Austria and Turkey unleashed another war; they routed the Khedive of Egypt; he admitted his defeat and was left only with Egypt and Sudan.

Thus, the great powers got rid of the only person who could have headed the Ottoman Empire and ensure its security. On July 13, 1841, when the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi had expired, Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Turkey signed the London Straits Convention that closed the Bosporus and Dardanelles to all warships whatsoever in peacetime and said nothing about the regime of the Straits in case of war.

By the mid-19th century, part of the Arab political elite realized that its interests were somehow close to those of Russia. The Russian political parlance acquired the term "the Arab world"; the sides' mutual interest was gradually increasing.

There were Russian slaves in the Ottoman Empire: between 1463 and

1794, Crimean Tatars had captured over 3 million people in Russia, Ukraine and Southern Poland. Men were used as galley slaves or sold to the Mameluke corps.[5] During the second conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks in 1786-1787, the number of Russians in the ranks of Mamelukes was estimated as one thousand or 8-12% of the total number of slave warriors. Enslaved Russian women and children were used as household servants, whom their owners treated fairly well, in Turkish provinces.[6] Under Catherine the Great, the Russian diplomats appointed to Ottoman possessions were instructed to seek information about Russian slaves and insist on their liberation.[7]

Members of Christian sects persecuted in Russia sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire; in Turkey, they paid the jizya tax and were left alone to pursue their religions.

Finally, the Young Turks, the last rulers of the Ottoman Empire, turned to the ideas of pan-Turkism that affected the position of the Muslims in Russia. Journalist Ismail Gasprinski (1851-1914) was one of the first to appreciate the idea of a community of the Turkic-speaking peoples who lived under czarist power; at the same time, he called on them to consolidate their historical ties with Russia.[8] Those who replaced him – a Tatar from Simbirsk Yu. Akchurin, A. Agayev from Baku, D. Murad-bei born in the Caucasus – were talking about uniting all Turkic-speaking peoples under the aegis of Turkish sultans.

Development of Oriental studies in Russia helped Russians better understand the processes unfolding in the Islamic world. The first steps in this direction were made in the 18th century; early in the 19th century, Oriental studies were developing in Kazan and St. Petersburg. The Asian Museum set up in 1818 became one of the best depositories of Oriental manuscripts. Five years later, the Teaching Department of Oriental Languages was opened at the Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry of Russia, and it gradually developed into a school of Orientalists at the Ministry.

During the Civil War in Russia, the North Caucasian Muslims attempted to set up their own independent states yet the calls of Communists to the workers and peasants to take away factories and land from their owners sounded louder and were more attractive.

In the early 1920s, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, president of the newly founded Turkish Republic, established close contacts with Russia; despite his strong suspicions about the Bolshevik plans of a world revolution, this cooperation survived till his death in 1938.[9] No regular summits, diplo-

matic and cultural contacts and sport events could conceal that the sides wanted to keep their bilateral interaction within reasonable limits. Mutual mistrust increased during World War II and after it, when Turkey joined NATO.

At the turn of the 1930s, Islamic feelings brought up, in particular, a Caliphate movement in British India and Arab countries. When Turkey abandoned its claim to host the caliph (the spiritual leader of all Muslims), the new Muslim world needed a new caliph. London did not miss the chance to try to confer the title on an Arab leader depending on Britain; the official documents of the All-Russia Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Communist International criticized the ideas of pan-Islamism and the institute of the Caliphate. In its secret papers, however, the Comintern stated that it should compete with London for the control over the Caliphate.[10] Neither Russia nor Britain succeeded.

During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingushes, Circassians, and Kabardians were deported to Central Asia. In 1957, the North Caucasian peoples were allowed to return; the Crimean Tatars had to wait till perestroika to come back to the peninsula.

Through its active post-war military-technical and military coopera-tion with the Arab world and assistance in building hundreds of objects, the Soviet Union earned a high prestige among the Arabs. Professor M. at-Tawfik of the Mohammed V University in Rabat has written that the Soviet Union "was viewed in the region not only as an ally and friend, but also as a partner present in the region and involved in its affairs."[11] About 96% of the polled students spoke of our country as a militarily strong state with a rigid regime; 91% of the polled were greatly impressed by the scientific and space exploration achievements of the Soviet Union. Professor Anatoly Egorin has written that "a bright Russian meteor that saved the ancient land from many troubles and privations" appeared on the Egyptian sky: "Russians in Egyptian uniforms, Russians in work clothes, Russian weapons, Russian industrial equipment, and finally Russian charm impressed the Egyptians. This lasted for 15 years and was, indeed, a meteor – bright and short-lived."[11]

Late in the 20th and early in the 21st century, Russia was involved in two conflicts with Muslims.

The first took place in Afghanistan: after the 1978 revolution, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan asked the Soviet government to bring in its troops. In 1979, the Soviet Union responded with bringing in its limited contingent; the murder of President Amin that

Moscow organized at the same time was a bad mistake. The losses were not large – some 15 thousand but the troops didn't get any real fighting experience in contemporary combat while response across the world was extremely negative. Ten years later, in 1989, the limited contingent was withdrawn.

In the West and in our country, for that matter, this was wrongly perceived as the defeat of the Soviet Union. The troops were pulled out only when Afghanistan had acquired a government that could defend the achievements of the revolution. At the same time, an agreement with the Americans on non-delivery of weapons and fuel to both sides in the conflict was a mistake. Meanwhile, China, Western Europe, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt went on with their supplies of weapons and fuel to the bands fighting on the side of the opposition. The government of the DRA fell in 1992.

The second conflict took place in Chechnya. In September 1991, the All-National Congress of the Chechen People declared the republic a sovereign state, which the Russian Federation refused to accept. In 1992, by the decision of the Congress of the People's Deputies of Russian Federation, the Chechen-Ingush Republic was divided into two autonomies – Chechnya and Ingushetia. Meanwhile, the separatists won in the Chechen Republic; in December 1994, Russia moved its troops into Chechnya. Fighting continued till July 31, 1996, until the sides signed the Khasavyurt Agreements, according to which the Russian Federation pulled out its forces and Chechnya became de facto (but not de jure) independent. In September 1999, its fighters invaded Dagestan. This started the Second Chechen war that ended on April 15, 2009 when the regime of the counterterrorist operation was lifted. Today, the Chechen Republic is part of Russia.

In the 1990s, when the contacts between Russia and the Muslim world were considerably weaker, the Muslim world learned to look at new Russia as a victim of Western intrigues and a reluctant ally of the West. According to the poll organized by M. at-Tawfik among his students, 48% associated Russia with poverty, crime and alcoholism, 52% believed that it was a great power; and 53% highly appreciated Russian literature, theater and art.

Filling of the vacuum began when Yevgeny Primakov was appointed Foreign Minister of Russia; with Vladimir Putin as President of Russia the process gathered momentum. As the domestic situation in Russia was stabilizing and Russian diplomacy was demonstrating more attention to

the developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Palestinian-Israeli and, later, Syrian settlement, when Russia rejected the double standards policy and demonstrated resolution to strengthen the central role of the UN in international relations, the Muslim countries were gradually acquiring new ideas about new Russia.

The Muslim world believes that Russia, as well as China, can guarantee equality in the Islamic world and looks at it as a power friendly to all Muslim states. The religious factor, however, affected the relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia. During the first Chechen war, Riyadh supported the Ichkerian separatists while the Saudi officials called on Moscow not to use force against the Islamic people of Chechnya.[12] In the course of the second Chechen war, Saudi Arabia readjusted, to a certain extent, its position. It was agreed that Saudi Arabia and international funds would extend their assistance to Chechens through the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia.

Later, the relations between Russia and Turkey and Russia and Iran improved considerably: their leaders became convinced that mutually advantageous relations suited their interests. The advance in this direction was slowed down by the attempts at exporting the Islamic revolution discontinued, however, by the death of Ruhollah Khomeini. Russia was treading cautiously in its contacts with Turkey that was eager to restore its former greatness in the Middle East and establish closer relations with the Turkic-speaking peoples of Russia (in Tatarstan, Bashkiria and Yakutia) and with some of the post-Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). True, this had almost no impact on Russia's interaction with Turkey, and finally the two countries arrived at practically normal relations.

The Arab countries (Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in the first place) demonstrate their desire to move closer to Russia. They were prompted by their obvious intention to protect their place in the world challenged by the power centers. Riyadh paid special attention to what the Russian president said about the KSA as the leader of the Muslim and Arab world. The Saudi establishment welcomed Russia as an observer at the Organization of Islamic Conference. Despite the somewhat ambiguous nature of what Moscow is doing in the Middle East, we should say that Russia has partly restored its positions in the region and the Maghreb.

Russia's involvement in the civil war in Syria greatly impressed the Muslim and Western states; it was interpreted as consolidation of Russia's presence in the Middle East and the world.

—————————————

NOTES

[1] *Istoricheskiy vestnik. Rossia i islamskiy mir.* Vol. II. Moscow, March 2015, p. 13.

[2] Solovyov S.M. *Istoriya Rossii s drevneyshikh vremen.* Book II. Vol. 3. Moscow, 1960, p. 42.

[3] Marx K., Engels F. *Sochineniya.* Vol. 9. Moscow, 1975, p. 21.

[4] Lutsky B.V. *Novaya istoriya arabskikh stran.* Moscow, 1966, p. 93.

[5] *Voyages en Egypte pendant les annees 1678-1701.* Le Caire, 1981, p. 134.

[6] Bertrand Y. *L'Orient du XVIe siècle. Une société musulmane florissante.* Paris, 1981, p. 290.

[7] *Istoricheskiy vestnik …* p. 82.

[8] Ibragim T.K., Sultanov F.M., Yuzeev A.N. *Tatarskaya religiozno-filosofskaya mysl v obshchemusulmanskom kontekste.* Kazan, 2002, pp. 137-139.

[9] *Istoricheskiy vestnik...* p. 30.

[10] *Rossiyskaya konferentsiya "Arabskiy mir i Rossiya: izmenyayushchiesya paradigmy vzaimnogo vospriyatiya."* Moscow, 2008, p. 8.

[11] Egorin A.Z. *Egipet nashego vremeni.* Moscow, 1998, p. 159.

[12] *Rossiyskaya konferentsia "Arabskiy mir i Rossiya" …* p. 21.

Key words: Muslims, Rus, Ottoman Empire, Russia, Egypt, Turkey, Afghanistan.

The Regional Dimension of the Consequences of the Syrian Conflict

S. Ivanov

THE DYNAMICS of the hostilities in various parts of Syria over the past year suggest that large-scale armed fighting between the Syrian government – relying on its allies, especially Russia – and radical, extremist and openly terrorist groups with multinational personnel has by all appearances entered the final stage. However, clashes will presumably continue for some time after the military phase winds down, acquiring the character of a "guerrilla" war. In other words, Syria is still a long way from real peace.

Difficult and laborious political and diplomatic work lies ahead – and has already begun – to find a national consensus based on the drafting and adoption of a new Constitution, and the holding under it of nationwide elections whose results are accepted by at least the main military and political actors in the Syrian conflict (and it would be better if they were directly involved in those elections).

I think it is too early to summarize the results of the tragic events in Syria that began in March 2011, although some very preliminary conclusions can already be drawn, including with respect to how those events have influenced the situation in the region.

The most important result of these developments is that the war in Syria became a clear failure of the "bulldozer" strategy of the West (Washington in particular) aimed at undermining statehood and disseminating chaos in the countries of the Middle East, especially those who do not share so-called "Western values" and agree to unconditionally obey its dictates. Unbridled democratization of the region, vigorously inculcated by U.S. administrations in disregard of the unique sociocultural, ethnic and religious characteristics of the region's countries and the tradi-

Sergey Ivanov, Head of the Department of Diplomacy and Consular Service, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Professor, Candidate of Science (History); sergey.ivanov@dipacademy.ru

tionalism of the ruling elites, has resulted in the destabilization of the situation in the Middle East as a whole and the undermining of the prevailing order and in some cases the international agency of some countries, as happened in Libya and Yemen.

The notorious "Arab Spring" that the West pinned high hopes on became the main channel for exporting democracy to the countries of the region. It is clear now that its purpose was to reform, based on Western patterns, the supposedly archaic civil

> The political climate in the region must change with the restoration of the regional and international legal status of Damascus, which will inevitably lead to a new balance of forces in the Arab arena.

institutions and political structure of Middle Eastern countries that the collective West viewed as authoritarian. At the same time, all the monarchist regimes that are closer to the West economically and politically were largely left out of the process.*

Besides the collapse of the ruling regimes in several Arab countries and the economic degradation of much of the Arab world, the most notable outcome of the "Arab Spring" for the region was the change in the balance of power among regional players. The obvious beneficiaries of the "Arab Spring" proved to be the monarchist regimes of the Arabian Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. These countries were the least affected by the political and socioeconomic popular protests instigated by the West (its intelligence agencies and nongovernmental organizations, as well as global social networks). The change of leaders in the Arab world who had for decades maintained the overall political vector in the Middle East (the replacement of pseudo-socialist nationalists with conservative monarchists) quickly affected the determination of the priorities of the Arab region across the agenda of international issues, as well as intra-Arab differences and many other issues. Arab diplomacy therefore wound up hostage to Saudi-Qatar-UAE domination in the region despite often sharp differences and even conflicts among those countries.

After the "Arab Spring," countries that had set the tone in the Arab

---

* In most cases, they managed to persuade Washington to ease pressure on them in this regard and not conduct a "democratic sweep" in the spirit of "color revolutions" in their countries.

arena like Iraq, Syria, Libya, and to some extent Egypt and Algeria, were deprived of the right to play their original role, including with respect to shaping the mass sentiment of the Arab population in the Middle East.

The loss of positions of this group of countries led to a change of political discourse in the League of Arab States (LAS), other Arab forums and regional organizations. The new leaders of the conservative wing of the Arab world were able, using financial and economic levers, to impose their views on other countries – in particular, to force a decision on freezing the membership of Syria (and Libya) in the LAS and replacing them with representatives of the Syrian and Libyan opposition controlled by Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi. These processes have also affected other inter-Arab organizations – in particular, the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union. In general, Arab diplomacy became paralyzed because of these developments: For example, its capability to prevent the escalation of the intra-Syrian conflict was reduced to zero. The new leaders of the Arab world have actively provided funds, armaments and comprehensive organizational support to the Syrian opposition, encouraging its radicalization. Although each leader has pursued their own goals and relied on various detachments of the intransigent Syrian opposition, they have all acted in a concerted manner and are acting against the legitimate authorities of that country.

The failure of Arab diplomacy to resolve the backlog of regional problems that have piled high in recent years in the Middle East has played into the hands of forces from outside the region and facilitated their active intervention, direct or indirect, in Arab affairs, thus increasing the dependency of the region on influential players from the West.

After the activity of Syria, Libya and Yemen in the intra-Arab arena was paralyzed and these countries were left out of the decision-making process within the Arab community (Iraq was exceedingly weakened and fragmented with NATO assistance), the Arab world wound up extremely divided. Much of it lost the opportunity to protect its political interests through pan-Arab interstate structures.

The most devastating consequences for the region came from the attempts of Riyadh, in cooperation with Doha and Abu Dhabi, to change the confessional status quo in the region and provoke Sunni-Shiite differences that had until then lain dormant. This was most clearly evident in the "Arab Spring" events in Bahrain, where the Saudis managed through military force "to repel a Shiite offensive" (at least that is how the Saudi media portrayed it at the time). The incitement of Sunni-Shiite discord

became Riyadh's main ideologeme in its conflict with Damascus and Tehran.

In Syria, as is known, efforts to democratize the country were hindered by other factors. Here, the West and its regional allies could not implement the Libyan scenario – i.e., plunge the existing ethno-confessional and political forces into endless strife and a war of "all against all." And while the West has not abandoned its efforts to impose its will on the region as a result of the Syrian backfire, it seems to be starting to take lessons from the Syrian experience.*

The failure of efforts to achieve the atomization, or to use Russian President Vladimir Putin's figurative expression, "Somalization,"** of Syria provoked extreme irritation and rejection in Washington and some other Western capitals. Refusing to accept the failure of their plans in Syria, they are ready to support the most desperate radicals and terrorists, both Syrians and non-Syrians, who are capable of any provocation, including massive bloodshed, to turn current developments in Syria. One example is Western intelligence services helping evacuate the odious White Helmets, who can still be useful to the West, from Syria via Israel and Jordan. The objective of this organization includes supporting the American line in Syrian affairs and ensuring, through "soft power," a humanitarian cover for the firm anti-Assad course of the Americans and their Arab allies. An even more convincing example is the attempt at any price and under any pretext to preserve the military capabilities of the jihadist terrorist groups that have secured a toehold in the Syrian governorate of Idlib.

The West, particularly the U.S., is now seeking by any means to prevent regional geopolitical shifts in Russia's favor based on the results of Russia's participation in military activities on Syrian territory. Despite the view increasingly taking hold in the West that the strategy and tactics of the U.S. and its allies in Syria are unsuccessful and moreover flawed, the American administration remains intent on undermining the political system that was established there during the last half century and the role in it of the Alawite community. It is also seeking to fragment the country into ethnic religious cantons that will inherently be in endless conflict with each other. Washington apparently believes this is in America's interests.

---

* American media and political analysts are increasingly talking about the collapse of Washington's plans in Syria.
** Remarks at the Valdai Forum in Sochi, October 18, 2018.

Therefore, it is very likely that the U.S. and its regional allies will meddle in the political settlement process in Syria (at least not promote it) and not recognize Bashar Assad if he becomes the legitimately elected leader as a result of free and transparent elections in the country held on the basis of a new Constitution (his victory in future elections is now confirmed as very likely, according to various public opinion polls in the country).

The Syrian experience clearly shows that forcibly democratizing the region under the guise of the "Arab Spring" (supposedly a spontaneous expression of the will of the people) can be successfully resisted.

After the "Arab Spring" backfired in Syria, Washington decided to prevent Russia and its allies from enjoying the fruits of their victory in this country and rolled out the partially forgotten project of creating a military-political bloc like NATO in the region – under complete American control, of course. The idea of creating a U.S.-led military alliance in the Middle East is not new. It was actively discussed during Barack Obama's presidency and promoted in particular by Defense Secretary Ashton Carter. But due to a change at the time in U.S. military strategy, calling for a reduced military presence abroad, particularly in the greater Middle East, that idea was put on the back burner and replaced, in view of the interest in reducing American engagement in regional affairs, by a plan to form the American-Gulf defense council at the level of ministers of defense of the U.S. and countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC).

The idea of establishing a "Middle East NATO" is once again popular in Washington; its basic meaning – to pursue American interests through and, most importantly, at the expense of the U.S.'s regional partners – aligns with Donald Trump's campaign promises to reduce military spending and the number of U.S. personnel abroad.

American diplomats, including in the military, will therefore likely spare no effort to quickly prepare the ground for establishing such a bloc. Granted, Washington still has much to do in this regard: A significant obstacle is disagreement with the Saudis about the regional scope and membership of the bloc.* While Washington believes it is possible to limit participation in it to the six GCC member countries** in addition to

---

* The murder of *Washington Post* journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Consulate General in Ankara will probably delay, at least for a while, implementation of this plan, but not cancel it.
** Currently the GCC is composed of five countries: Qatar was excluded from the Council in July 2017 because of a bitter conflict between Riyadh and Doha.

the U.S. and possibly France and/or Great Britain. Riyadh considers the hypothetical bloc an opportunity to enhance Saudi Arabia's status and influence not only in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East region more broadly, but also as a real chance to stake its claim to leadership in the Sunni world (in contrast to the Shiite world) and challenge, with backing from Western allies, the chief opponent of the Saudis: Iran.

Hence Riyadh's plans to draw Pakistan and possibly other countries with predominantly Sunni populations into the bloc. Moreover, ruling circles in Saudi Arabia recently signaled willingness to give high-level positions in the planned alliance to Pakistanis (for example, giving the post of secretary-general to the former supreme commander of the Pakistani Armed Forces) and military officials of other Sunni countries.

On the other hand, informed sources close to the White House indicate that if the first phase of hammering together a "Middle East NATO" is successfully completed, the issue may be raised of including Israel in the bloc in one form or another based on the common Iranophobic positions of the main participants of the prospective alliance. Washington believes that differences between possible participants, their conflicting positions on relations with Tehran even within the GCC do not have fundamental significance in the face of a common existential threat from Iran for the U.S. and its regional allies.

An important consequence of the conflict in Syria, which should affect the balance of power in the region, will be the restoration of Damascus's status in the international arena and therefore its political influence in Arab affairs. Now, it is difficult to predict when that will happen because of uncertainty about the political reconciliation process in Syria and the success of dialogue between what were until recently irreconcilable enemies.

We can more or less confidently say that the military phase of the Syrian conflict will sooner or later be followed by the stage of political settlement of the contentious issues that led to this tragedy, which will be accompanied by Syria's reintegration into the Arab community it was essentially ousted from by the Saudis, Qataris and representatives of some other Gulf monarchies because of supposed "bloody crimes" of President Assad's regime.

The political climate in the region must change with the restoration of the regional and international legal status of Damascus (the conservative wing of the Arab world will not be able to indefinitely prevent this after the active phase of the war in Syria ends), which will inevitably lead to a

new balance of forces in the Arab arena. And Syria's full reintegration must presumably start with the economic sphere – for example, associating in one form or another with Eurasian structures and eventually with the SCO and other organizations, where Moscow could help the Syrians. This would greatly help Damascus rebuild its war-ravaged economy and facilitate regional adaptation.

It can be assumed that with time, Syria will align with Iraq (in turn supported by Iran) and also with Yemen (after the end of the civil war in that country). All this will lead to a new geopolitical situation in the region, which Riyadh and other Gulf Arab capitals fear and will seek by all means to prevent or at least to delay.

Syria's restoration of its geopolitical position in the region in cooperation with other states that are currently outcasts in the Arab community will inevitably lead to the need for it to adjust its approaches to regional and global issues – make them more balanced and less pro-Western.

Key words: "Arab Spring," regional implications of the Syrian conflict, new military-political bloc in the region, "Middle East NATO."

The Kurdish Question
One Hundred Years After:
Problems and Relevance
of the Outcomes of World War I

Mehmet Emin İkbal Dürre

ON NOVEMBER 11, 1918, the Armistice of Compiègne ended World War I in Europe; on October 30, 1918, the Armistice of Mudros ended the war between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. The talks that followed settled the Kurdish question and created a new postwar world order based on a system of treaties known as the Versailles system, of which the Treaty of Sèvres signed in France on August 10, 1920 by the main Entente powers and Turkey was part. It specified, among other things, the principles and conditions on which the Kurds could acquire statehood.

This brought the Kurds of the Ottoman Empire (there were about 5 million of them) very close to a national state of their own, yet not all agreements of the time, the Treaty of Sèvres being one of them, were enacted. During the one hundred years that have elapsed since that time, the region saw many important events, several generations, new political forces, and new regional players. Today, according to different sources, there are no fewer than 40 million Kurds, the biggest stateless nation, living in four states (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria).

Despite the fairly long historical period that separates us from these days, the results of World War I (including the Versailles system and the Treaty of Sèvres as its part) remain topical in certain respects. This is confirmed not only by the fact that many contemporary politicians (the Kurdish politicians in the first place) rely on it (much earlier historical arguments were revived in the political discourse and rhetoric on independent Kurdistan) and not by the 100th anniversary of the correspond-

Mehmet Emin İkbal Dürre, Assistant Professor, Department of Regional Studies, Moscow State Linguistic University, Candidate of Science (History); ikbal@mail.ru

ing agreements. The revived interest is explained by the highly specific and qualitatively novel approach to the problem which the victor-countries applied when adopting and later revising the principles; this means that we should go back to the results and their impacts on the processes unfolding at that time and later.

For a long time now, many Turkish officials, including the President of the republic, have been actively criticizing the Treaty of Lausanne that replaced the Treaty of Sèvres in 1923: "They persuaded us to sign the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. Some people tried to cheat us by talking about it as a victory. We all know, however, that in Lausanne the rights of Turkey were pushed aside."[1] This and similar statements suggest that the problem range remains in the focus of attention and that comprehensive analysis is still going on, the results of which have not yet been revealed. Today, the treaty cannot be revised let alone abolished; this cannot be assumed even hypothetically since that would have imminently required a return to the earlier Treaty of Sèvres.

Chronological and, to a great extent, practical side of the events and talks that predated the treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne have been described in great detail. The Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 between Turkey and the Allied and Associated Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan as well as Armenia, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, the Kingdom of Hejaz, and Czechoslovakia) dealt with the territorial division of the Ottoman Empire in favor of the victor-countries and their political, financial and economic preferences in their relations with the Turkish state that infringed, essentially, on its sovereignty.

The Ottoman Empire lost control over the Straits as well as its African and Asian possessions; Anatolia, the major part of its territory, was fragmented: autonomous Kurdistan might become independent, Smyrna might be detached after a referendum, international control was to be established over the Straits, Armenia got bits and pieces of Turkish territory, etc. The treaty envisaged the colonial status for the part of Turkey accepted as its historical possession. This draft was the result of two conferences of the Allied powers held in London between February 12 and April 10, 1920 and in San Remo on April 19-26, 1920. The government of the sultan that had practically lost its power had no choice but to sign the Treaty of Sèvres: the zone of the Straits, Smyrna and other parts of Anatolia were occupied by Allied armies while the Greeks launched a new offensive.

The government of Mustafa Kemal, elected President of the Republic by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on April 20, 1920, that was functioning in Ankara, refused to recognize the treaty being, although it was fully aware that this treaty could be dismissed as null and void only by the same method by which it was imposed on defeated Turkey, viz., on the battlefield. Russia was the only ally in the struggle against colonialists. In complete international isolation, the Soviet Republic, first, promptly responded to the request of the new Turkish government for help.

Turkey and Russia were the first countries that recog, who havenized the legitimacy of their corresponding regimes; second, amid the Civil War and foreign intervention, the Soviet leaders appreciated the buffer zone of sorts between Russia and the imperialist powers in the Caucasus; and, third, the Soviet leaders believed that the republican character of

> The Kurds, who have a rich history of statehood in the territories on which they have been living for several millennia and were recognized by all agents of international relations of corresponding epochs, still exist in a period preceding decolonization.

the new government that had replaced the sultan fitted the political and ideological concept of the world revolution. By the fall of 1922, armed forces of Turkish nationalists having defeated the French and Greek troops, reached the borders of the Armistice of Mudros. A new treaty that confirmed Turkey's new borders and removed the regime of preferences for foreigners (capitulation) and financial control over Turkey was signed at the Lausanne Conference that took place between November 20, 1922 and July 24, 1923. Turkey's sovereignty was restored; on October 29, 1923, the Republic of Turkey was officially proclaimed, and Mustafa Kemal was elected its first president.

An analysis of the way the Treaty of Sèvres was drafted and of its text allows us to say that when dealing with the issue of Kurdish autonomy (let alone independence) the colonialists were seeking answers to the following three questions: whether the Kurds could be called a nation; whether this nation had an experience of a statehood; and whether it wanted to become independent. The colonial powers usurped the right to answer these questions in the corresponding articles of the treaty. Let us discuss them one by one.

On Nations and Their Rights

DESPITE the fairly big number of the sides involved in the treaties mentioned above, they were authored mainly by Great Britain and France that divided the "legacy of the Ottoman Empire" even if they had to take the position of the United States, a mere observer at the conference, into account. Having replaced by that time Britain as "the workshop of the world" and having finally disentangled from financial dependence on Europe, America built up a huge financial, economic and military potential that allowed it to interfere in European and world affairs more actively. The colonial nature of international contacts of the empires and the majority of other countries did not allow the youngest and most efficient American capitalism to fully tap its potential. The downfall of empires, at least some of them, opened their markets very much in the interests of the United States.

Speaking at the Versailles Peace Conference, President of the United States Woodrow Wilson presented his so-called Fourteen Points, Point 12 of which said, in particular: "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."[2] By "the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule" Wilson meant Kurds and Armenians. The terms applied to them were the same as those applied to the European peoples that belonged to another empire. Point 10 said: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."[3] This stirred up hopes that similar policy would be applied to the Ottoman Empire.

Article 62, Part III of the Treaty of Sèvres can be described as the key one: "A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) and (3). If unanimity cannot be secured on any question, it will be referred by the members of the Commission to their respective Governments. The

scheme shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and with this object a Commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should be made in the Turkish frontier where, under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia."[4]

Significantly, the French text of the treaty[5] says *"régions, où domine l'élément kurde"* (the regions where the Kurdish element [population] dominate), while the English text reads: "predominantly Kurdish areas." Both languages used the word "domine"/"predominantly" to point to the quantitative majority while the definition "kurde"/"Kurdish" allows different interpretations. In any case, the word *"l'element"* in the French text means that it was not absolutely clear whether a people, nation, ethnicity or several peoples or nations were meant.

Kurds do not surface either in this or following paragraphs that mention minorities ("the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities"). The French version speaks of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other ethnic or religious minorities, while the English text defines them as "racial or religious" minorities. The Cambridge Dictionary defines "race" as "a group, especially of people, with particular similar physical characteristics, who are considered as belonging to the same type, or the fact of belonging to such a group"[6] and "a group of people who share the same language, history, characteristics, etc. The British are an island race."[7]

On the other hand, the Kurdish representatives are enumerated on the same footing as British, French, Italian, and Persian which means that the Kurds were treated as a state-forming nation. There is another equally important point related to the structure presupposed by the treaty. As distinct from the English "scheme" (at first "a scheme of local autonomy" followed by "the scheme"), the French text says *"autonomie locale"* followed by *"ce plan* (this plan).*"*[8]

The Versailles Conference and even the conferences, at which the treaty of Sèvres was being drafted, were significantly influenced by the Fourteen Points of the American president. The spirit and content of the final document were greatly influenced by the policy of annulment of all secret treaties proclaimed by the Soviet government and by the Fourteen Points. As distinct from the Sykes–Picot secret agreement used as the starting point, the delegation of the sultan government was informed

about the draft Treaty of Sèvres, the text of which was also published in newspapers.

The rhetoric about peoples and their rights could not conceal the spirit of the still very much alive colonial epoch. The American president who had already got the Nobel Peace Prize did not apply the allegedly declared right of nations to self-determination to American Indians. The Versailles Peace Treaty and the Statute of the League of Nations as its part[9] prepared under his influence presupposed that under Article 22 it was limited to "those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them" and "which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modem world," therefore "there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization" and that "the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations…. this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League."[10]

The Kurdish regions were among the "certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" that "have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."[11]

Together with the Statute of the League of Nations, the provisions of the Mandatory regime were included in the text of the Treaty of Sèvres (Part I). Article 63 (Part III) of the same treaty dealt with technical matters while Article 64 should be quoted in full: "If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey. If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that

part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul vilayet."[12]

Unlike the English version that used the term "the Kurdish peoples," the French version referred the areas specified in Article 27 to *"population kurde"* and *"cette population"* that could "address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations."[13] The last sentence of Article 63 for the first and only time refers to the Kurds rather than to the Kurdish element, population or people. Very much like in the case of Kurdish representatives mentioned above, this means that the Kurds were treated as a nation, a people able to form a state in the contemporary sense of the word.

The subject of national, ethnic definition of the participants in the political process was important in one more aspect. Article 72 (Section IV) dealing with Smyrna transferred under Greek control with a possible plebiscite on "definitive incorporation in the Kingdom of Greece" envisaged a local government with "proportional representation of all sections of the population, including racial, linguistic and religious minorities."[14] Section VII (Part III) "Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine" described in detail all possible variants of acquiring, losing or changing citizenship caused by these territories' withdrawal from the Ottoman Empire. Part IV "Protection of Minorities" said: "Turkey undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey…. All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief."[15] Article 145 said: "All Turkish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion" and spoke of a radical reform in Turkey: "Within a period of two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Turkish Government will submit to the Allied Powers a scheme for the organization of an electoral system based on the principle of proportional representation of racial minorities."[16]

Irrespective of the reasons for which the texts quoted above differ, it should be said that they reflected, to a great extent, the understanding of the problem and the attitude to it of those involved in drafting, discussing and approval of the final text of the treaty. I am convinced, in particular, that different formulas used in the English and French versions allow different interpretations that existed at that time and exist today. This fully applies not only to the term "autonomy" but also to the term "protection" that can be understood in the range between the narrow interpretation as

personal physical safety and the practically independent quasi-sovereign power (complete with taxes, power structures, education, and court proceedings in the languages of the minorities, etc.), the somewhat vague definition of the Kurdish people (an ethnicity, nation, race or confession?) is much more consequential up to and including rejection of the Kurds' national identity.

The very fact, however, that the issue of redivision of territories was accompanied with references to the rights of peoples and minorities pointed to the beginning of end of the colonial empires: new players – the United States and Soviet Russia – came to the world scene. They treated the colonies as well as the metropolitan countries as new fields of ideological, political and other battles.[17]

On the Experience of Statehood

THE DOUBTS of the colonial powers that the Kurds, and many other peoples for that matter, could govern themselves are far-fetched. The historiography of the Kurdish states is vast. Boris James who left Antiquity beyond the scope of his study has written that in the early 16th century the Ottoman Empire sought a military-political alliance with sixteen Kurdish emirates in its confrontation with Persia and recognized their relative autonomy.[18]

Michael Izady has offered a long list of Kurdish kingdoms and principalities that still existed in 1835.[19] The emirates, or tribal principalities, survived till the mid-19th century when they were liquidated (the last in 1847); nearly all of their dynastic leaders emigrated.

This was followed by a period of uprisings and riots of different intensities organized by those who wanted to restore Kurdish states. Istanbul, very much concerned by Russia's rising influence in the region and the Armenians who sought independence from the Porte, had no choice but to come to terms with the local Kurdish elite and promise them a certain form of autonomy. The British determined to capture Mosul sent their advisors to Southern Kurdistan that between 1918 and 1923 was a de-facto self-governing unit with the administrative center in Sulaymaniyah.[20]

This means that their "ability to stand alone" questioned by the colonialists had been repeatedly realized in the forms corresponding to the times.

An Independent State as a Cherished Aim

THE FACT that the Kurds repeatedly tried to recreate their emirates, principalities and states testifies that they wanted and had enough willpower to set up a state of their own or, at least, acquire a wide autonomy. The history speaks of numerous attempts of this kind. In 1880, Sheikh Ubeydullah, the first to demand an independent state, stirred up an uprising suppressed by the Porte. The small self-proclaimed states, or tribal principalities (in the al-Sulaymaniyah, Dersim, Urmia and other provinces), that fought for independence in 1919-1923, were suppressed by the Turkish army led by Mustafa Kemal. The "Kingdom of Kurdistan" proclaimed in 1922 by Iraqi Kurds on the mandate territory of Great Britain was liquidated two years later by the British army.[21]

In Europe, Kurds, albeit disunited, did not wait for the verdict of the Allies, let alone of the Turks; they were actively involved in the process. At the Versailles Conference and especially on the eve of the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, they contacted Western politicians and diplomats to present their memorandums on independent Kurdistan, including united Greater Kurdistan with Kirkuk as its part, maps and approximate calculations of the numerical strength and composition of the future independent states as their arguments (the data presented were not exact for the simple reason that there were no exact figures and information at that time).[22]

The content of the Treaty of Lausanne was determined not only by the fact that Turkey had consolidated its power on its lands and that the great powers had already spread their administration to the mandated Arab territories (their main aim from the very beginning), but also, and to great extent, by Mustafa Kemal's no mean negotiating skills. Amid the chaos of disintegration of the empire and foreign intervention, Kemal was confronted with the tasks very similar to those that challenged other nations: independence and national sovereignty for the new Republic of Turkey. At the hardest times of his war for independence, he promised the Kurds a State of Turks and Kurds on the lands liberated from foreign occupational forces. At the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish delegation led by İsmet İnönü (as a Kurd he persuaded the conference that he represented the Turks and the Kurds) stated that it was talking in the name of the Kurds and the Turks as two sister-nations. Inspired, Kurdish units played an important role in the war against the Entente.

When the Treaty of Lausanne, in which Kurds were not mentioned, had been adopted, Kemal started building up a unitary secular nationalist

Turkish state. He disbanded the first Grand National Assembly of Turkey (in which the Kurds had 72 seats) and gradually banned the Kurdish language and the terms Kurds and Kurdistan.[23] It should be said that even in Anatolia, where during the war and after population exchange with Greece under the Treaty of Lausanne, Muslims comprised 95% of the total, the Turks were not thinking of themselves as a united Turkish nation. Mustafa Kemal was, in fact, building it up from scratch.[24] He concentrated at unifying the laws, education, official history, etc. and the language that he correctly identified as the main factor. It was his language policy that served the core of the united Turkish nation: the minorities had to learn Turkish (that was presupposed by the Treaty of Lausanne) and abandon their own languages (while the treaty guaranteed the use of minority languages). This meant that the minorities had to choose between assimilation and emigration.

By that time, well-organized plebiscites were widely used to find out what people wanted or could accomplish. Point 9 of Wilson's Fourteen Points said for example, "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."[25] After the war, the King-Crane Commission was appointed, at the request of President Woodrow Wilson, to find out what the population of the Arab territories earlier controlled by Turkey wanted. The report said in part that "on the basis of their distribution… the Kurds claim a very large area" with a mixed population and that it was possible "to shift most of the comparatively small numbers of both Turks and Armenians out of this area by voluntary exchange of population and thus obtain a province containing about a million and a half people, nearly all Kurds."[26]

In 1920, the borders of Belgium, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany were changed after plebiscites; the Treaty of Sèvres envisaged a plebiscite for Smyrna. Under the Treaty of Lausanne a compulsory exchange of population between Turkey and Greece was organized to homogenize the population: 1.5 million Christians (the majority of them Greeks) left Turkey while about 0.5 million Muslims were moved from Greece to Turkey.

This suggests the following conclusions.

The victor-countries and Turkey pushed aside the Kurdish question and the fates of other minorities to concentrate on their own territorial, financial and economic interests in the biggest parts of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the decisions on the national issues registered by the treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne were highly important for the ways

national states appeared in the former colonial territories. Under certain historical circumstances, the Treaty of Sèvres drawn by the colonial powers played a great role in recognizing the equality of peoples and nations, albeit with typically colonialist-imperialist reservations, and in democratizing the entire system of international relations under the very different impacts of Soviet Russia and the United States. Americans, who wanted wider markets for their advanced capitalism and who feared that the ideas and practices of the Russian revolution might spread far and wide across the world, extracted written promises from the colonialist powers to grant statehood and sovereignty to a fairly big number of peoples.

The future of the Treaty of Sèvres, however, still depended on those who still relied on the use of force. Having snatched the initiative and having achieved several military victories, the new Turkish government changed the balance of power in its favor. The regional context created by the Treaty of Sèvres required a new treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne. It lost many of its previous clauses, including that of a Kurdish state, which meant that instead of pursuing a consistent policy of observing the rights of man and nations the powers preferred to act ad hoc. At first, independent Kurdistan and bigger Armenia were nothing more than the instruments of weakening the Ottoman Empire; later, they were seen as a buffer zone needed to contain Soviet Russia and assure British control of oil-rich Mosul. While these tasks were being resolved by the gradually changing methods, the promises earlier given to the Kurds were disavowed. Mustafa Kemal argued that "Bolshevization" of Anatolia might become inevitable if the Allied powers insisted on their variant of the postwar order.[27] The prospect looked probable: having concluded the Civil War in 1923 and having driven out foreign interventionists, Soviet power was stabilized. This meant that Turkey, not Kurdistan and Armenia, became the anti-Bolshevik buffer state and that what had been said about the rights of man and nations in the Sèvres and Lausanne treaties was meant to conceal the fierce struggle waged by the imperialist powers in the Mandate territories for their interests.

The Kurds, who have a rich history of statehood in the territories on which they have been living for several millennia and were recognized by all agents of international relations of corresponding epochs, still exist in a period preceding decolonization. In the context of international law, starting with the Treaty of Sèvres, their territories were ruled not only by Great Britain (in contemporary Iraq) and France (in contemporary Syria) but also by the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the British and then the

French had replaced the Ottoman administration and that later they had no choice but to give independence to several states points to dual standards in relation, at least, to the Arabs and the Kurds.

The Treaty of Sèvres has not lost its potential in the context of statements that the Treaty of Lausanne should be revised mainly in the parts related to the division of territories. The issues of the rights of peoples and minorities (education in native tongues, wide cultural autonomy, independent national states, etc.) have not lost their urgency in the context if not of political, then social-economic integration with contemporary Europe that has already realized the majority of these principles.

_____

NOTES

[1] Tarasov S. *Turtsiya khochet izmenit granitsy: Erdogan rugaet Ataturka i Lozanskiy dogovor. 30 September 2016* // https://regnum.ru/news/2186919.html

[2] C*hetyrnadtsat punktov Prezidenta SShA W. Wilsona ob usloviyakh mira iz ego poslaniya Kongressu ot 8 yanvarya 1918 g. Sistemnaya istorya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy:* In four volumes. 1918-2000. Vol. 2. *Dokumenty 1910-1940-kh godov.* Moscow, 2000, pp. 27-28.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Treaty of peace with Turkey. Signed at Sevres. August 10, 1920. London: H.M.S.O., 1920, p. 21.

[5] Traité de paix entre les Puissances alliées et associées et la Turquie (Sèvres, 10 août 1920) // http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/1920sevres.htm

[6] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/race

[7] Ibid.

[8] Traité de paix entre les Puissances alliées et associées et la Turquie

[9] Mirny dogovor mezhdu soyuznymi i ob'edinivshimisya derzhavami i Germaniey (Versalskiy Dogovor) vmeste so Statutom Ligi Natsiy, Ustavom Mezhdunarodnoy organiztsii truda i Protokolom podpisan v g. Versale 28 iyunya 1919 g. // http://law.edu.ru/norm/ norm.asp?normID=1167125&subID=100059709,100059710, 100060260#text

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Treaty of peace with Turkey.

[13] Traité de paix entre les Puissances alliées et associées et la Turquie

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Litvak N.V. "O nekotorykh aspektakh informatsionnoy borby na Blizhnem Vostoke," *Konfliktologiya.* 2012. No. 4, pp.125-133.

[18] James B. "Une ethnographie succincte de "l'entre-deux kurde" au Moyen-Âge," *Études rurales.* №186. 2011, pp. 21-42.

[19] Izady M. *Kurdish Kingdoms and Autonomous Principatilities circa 1835* // http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Kurdish_States_1835_sm.png

[20] Tejel J. "Urban mobilization in Iraqi Kurdistan during the British Mandate: Sulaimaniya, 1918-1930," *Middle Eastern Studies.* Vol. 44, №4. 2008, pp. 537-552.

[21] Biegala E. *Vers l'indépendance: le Kurdistan politique en 5 dates.* 25.09.2017 // https://www.franceculture.fr/geopolitique/vers-lindependance-le-kurdistan-politique-en-5-dates

[22] See, for example: Dündar F. "'Statisquo': British Use of Statistics in the Iraqi Kurdish Question (1919-1932)," Brandeis University, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, *Crown Paper* 7, juillet 2012, pp. 11-12 // https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/cp/CP7.pdf

[23] Guyon M. *Eléments d'analyse du conflit kurde en Turquie. L'identité culturelle comme facteur de paix et de conflit.* 2008 // http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-analyse-859_fr.html

[24] http://www.lhistoire.fr/atat%C3%BCrk-invente-la-turquie-moderne

[25] *Chetyrnadtsat punktov Prezidenta SShA W. Wilsona ob usloviyakh mira iz ego poslaniya Kongressu...*

[26] Meyssan T. *Les projets de Kurdistan.* 5 Septembre 2016 // http://www.voltairenet.org/article193082.html

[27] http://www.lhistoire.fr/atat%C3%BCrk-invente-la-turquie-moderne

Key words: Kurds, Kurdistan, Treaty of Sèvres, Treaty of Lausanne.

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Problems of Current International Legal Regulation and Prospects for Resolving Them

V. Kozyulin

IN THE PAST three or four years, a movement to ban "autonomous combat robots," which in Russia are called "lethal autonomous systems" (in Western literature, LAWS), has been gaining strength in the world but remains almost unnoticed in Russia. Their prohibition is being advocated by the nongovernmental organizations Stop Killer Robots, Article 36, the International Committee for Robot Arms Control; prominent business leaders like Elon Musk and Steve Wozniak; Nobel laureates; scientists and programmers working in the field of artificial intelligence; and even entire corporations. Some believe that fully autonomous weapons will not be able to comply with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and could create confusion when it comes to identifying individuals responsible for the illegal actions of robots. Others believe that even if "terminators" could one day perform "combat functions" more precisely and judiciously than human fighters, their autonomous use must still be prohibited in the interest of the highest values of human dignity.

Some governments agree. Today, 35 countries support a complete ban on autonomous weapons. Others have doubts, considering the topic farfetched or premature, since no one seems to have seen an autonomous combat robot capable of killing without input from an operator.

Meanwhile, the technology to create LAWS exists. It is still not advanced enough to create effective mobile ground-based LAWS, but stationary combat robots already exist. Examples include the robotic machine gun towers Katlanit in Israel, Samsung SGR-A1 in South Korea and the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station in the U.S.[1] These

Vadim Kozyulin, Director of the Emerging Technologies and Global Security Project at the PIR Center, Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, Candidate of Science (Political Science); kozyulin@pircenter.org

autonomous machine guns can destroy a target that matches a prepro-grammed image. Only moral principles restrict their use. All manufactur-ers offer assurances that robots seek confirmation from a commander before commencing an attack.

Another example is the Harpy autonomous patrol muni-tions platform manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries. The developer has given it the abili-ty to independently identify and destroy enemy armored vehi-cles.

We are fearful a priori of iron "brains" bent on destruction. But, ultimately, we should fear not robots but the humans behind them.

After the public grew indignant, IAI launched a "modified" version of the platform called Harpy 2 or Harop. The self-directed munitions delivery platform seeks instructions from an operator before launching an attack.

It is only a matter of time before the most complex systems are auto-mated: Some hypersonic and space craft in development today – in par-ticular, the Lockheed Martin SR-72, the Boeing X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle and the X-43A Hypersonic Experimental Vehicle – can also be considered LAWS.

Thanks largely to negative press, several systems capable of waging fully independently combat are now controlled remotely or by an opera-tor. But there can be no doubt that some governments are already devel-oping programs that in a critical situation could turn remotely controlled systems into autonomous attack robots.

And while the requirements for complying with the laws of war and the principles of IHL also apply to combat using LAWS, many experts and public figures believe LAWS should be preventively banned or spe-cial international regulations should be placed on such autonomous sys-tems.

For several reasons, creating regulations for LAWS is a diffi-cult task.

1. LAWS are very difficult to define:

- for example, there is still no universal, internationally accepted def-inition of "weapons";

- several combat systems that have been in service with the armies of the world for several decades (in particular, air defense systems, anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles, air-to-air missiles, armored vehicle active pro-

tection systems, bottom mines, torpedoes, etc.) could fall under the proposed definitions;

- it is also very difficult to legally distinguish between the concepts of autonomous and highly automated weapons.

2. The notion of "control" also has several interpretations with respect to LAWS.[2] Some countries like Japan believe that the behavioral algorithms that developers put in their products are a form of human control over the machine. So, it is possible to talk about two methods of control: when designing the weapons and when using them.

3. The task of ensuring effective control over LAWS software is complex technically and hardly feasible politically: Privacy and national security will be overriding considerations for each state.

4. It is commonly accepted in the expert community that full-fledged LAWS have not yet been created in the world. Some experts suggest waiting until specific prototypes appear and their associated threats understood.

It would also be wrong to think that the advent of LAWS has revealed a lapse in international law that must be immediately filled:

- IHL describes in detail the rules of war, and the militaries of all countries must strictly abide by them, even when using LAWS. International law allows for identifying those responsible for committing war crimes, including using autonomous robots, and this is a significant factor limiting the development of LAWS;

- although international law does not expressly ban the use of LAWS, world opinion has come to believe that using autonomous attack drones is inhuman and immoral. An unwritten taboo of sorts on using LAWS is becoming a specific limiter for the military and politicians;

- several international experts, particularly roboticist and Georgia Institute of Technology Prof. Ronald Arkin,[3] suggest that LAWS will be more effective than humans at complying with IHL and principles on the use of force, since they do not experience emotional and mental stress, their precision sensors often surpass human senses, and AI-based software allows restrictive parameters to be set on the use of weapons;

- modern control and oversight tools make it possible to document the entire process of using a combat robot. This could eventually simplify the issue of determining responsibility for possible violations;

- the development in recent years of blockchain technology potentially opens new possibilities for implementing reliable technical control over combat robots both during exercises and operational use.

The Issue of Meaningful Human Control

FORMALLY, the issue of meaningful human control has four components:

 1. Risks to civilians from LAWS;
 2. Risks of violating human rights and human dignity;
 3. The inability of LAWS to comply with the laws of war;
 4. Uncertainty about the legal liability for intentional and unintentional consequences of the use of such systems.[4]

However, regardless of what killer robots are invented in the future, it should be remembered that states and their citizens are obliged to observe the existing rules and principles of international law, which contains numerous rules and restrictions on the waging of war.

IHL was established to protect human values, and in the view of most experts, some of its documents directly relate to LAWS.

The Martens Clause, a rule articulated by Russian lawyer and diplomat Fyodor Martens in 1899, states that even if a provision is not expressly provided for in the articles of a law, in situations of armed conflict, the parties must above all be guided by the principles of humanity, humaneness and common sense.

Subsequently, the Martens Clause was included in the texts of several international instruments as recognition that the "principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience" are legitimate sources of IHL.

According to many international jurists, the principle of humanity implies human control over violence during war, and political and strategic decision-making, which implies meaningful human control over LAWS.

"Principles of humanity" emanate from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on new types of weapons stipulates that "In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party."[5]

Many people have interpreted this section to mean that if a new

weapon (e.g., LAWS) is not capable of selective and appropriate use, it must be considered prohibited.

Various documents form the law of armed conflicts and its main principles:

1. The distinction between civilians and combatants;

2. The principle of proportionality of the use of force[6];

3. The principle of military necessity[7];

4. Restrictions on the means and methods of warfare (prohibition on unnecessary destruction or causing unnecessary suffering).[8]

In other words, the obligation to comply with the rules of IHL in war are described in detail, and they apply to LAWS. But since existing international instruments put the responsibility for interpreting obligations on national governments, international experts fear that they would interpret them in their favor, ignoring the concepts of morality and human dignity. Therefore, activists conclude that there is a need for a more detailed statement of the rules of IHL with respect to LAWS.

On December 21, 2016, the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention on "Inhumane" Weapons (CCW) decided to establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with the mandate to "explore and agree on possible recommendations on options related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS."

Recent consultations on the future of LAWS, held August 27-31, 2018, in Geneva at the CCW, ended with an agreement on 10 principles that in the future could serve as the basis for the approach the international community takes to LAWS. Key principles include the consensus that all development in the field of artificial intelligence for military purposes must be conducted in accordance with international humanitarian law, and liability for the use of such systems in any case must be borne by humans.[9] According to observers, despite notable differences in terminology, conference participants generally agree that the use of force should always be under "meaningful human control."

Possible Options for the Legal Regulation of LAWS

THERE ARE TWO CAMPS in discussions about LAWS control. Activists in one camp propose legitimizing the principle of meaningful human control over LAWS and then discussing and agreeing on a definition of autonomy, control and LAWS itself. Those in the second camp propose starting with terms and definitions in order to approach principles "with a full understanding of the essence of the problem."

Competition between the two approaches could materialize in international instruments of varying degrees of force:

1. A political declaration;
2. A politically binding agreement;
3. Guidelines for controlling LAWS;
4. A code of good practice;
5. A complete ban on the development, testing, production, acquisition, and transfer of LAWS.

1. A political declaration

In a political declaration, states signatories express concern about an existing problem in the world and declare their determination to combat it.

With respect to LAWS such a declaration might contain:

- confirmation of the fact that the norms of existing international law apply to LAWS;
- recognition of the need for meaningful human control of LAWS;
- renunciation of the development of fully autonomous weapons and systems that could be used without real human control;
- an expression of willingness to implement intentions in national laws, military doctrines and international strategies;
- the obligation to ensure meaningful human control when designing, testing, manufacturing, adopting, storing, and training in the use and application of LAWS in national armed forces.

If the main high-tech arms-producing states were to sign such a declaration, it would have a significant impact in the world and could be a moral beacon for the international community.

A political declaration could be the most easily attainable document: the first step toward subsequent measures that detail obligations and possibly stipulate measures for the control and responsibility of the parties.

2. Politically binding agreement

If states find it possible to use stronger terminology, for example, using the word "obligation" instead of "intent," then this may be a politically binding agreement. In it, participants agree to respect certain requirements regarding LAS:

- ensure reliable human control at all stages of the life cycle of autonomous fighting systems (human-on-the-loop);

- respect certain transparency measures, such as publishing regular reviews of LAWS issues (weapons reviews);

- although the focus of such agreements are positive obligations, they may also include certain control measures.

Like the December 8, 2017, joint "Brexit" report by the EU and the UK, a politically binding agreement is not legally binding. However, from a political viewpoint, it is a done deal that must be implemented. Like in the case of Brexit, a politically binding agreement on LAWS may be followed by a more detailed legally binding agreement.

3. Guidelines for LAWS control (Good Practice Guidelines for Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Control)

Guidelines are a soft alternative to legally binding rules, they are accepted as recommendations for addressing certain problems: in our case, LAWS.

This corpus of recommendations has no force other than the force of example; however, it can serve as an expert guide for policymakers and the public, as well as a starting point for expert discussion.

The world does not have much experience with law-enforcement practice concerning LAWS, and perhaps it is still too early to make far-reaching generalizations about initial experience in this area. In the mean-time, two documents deserve mention: "Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 of the UK Defence Ministry's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre "[10] and "U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 3000.09."[11]

In the "Joint Doctrine Note," which deals with unmanned aerial vehicles, the UK Defence Ministry stresses that it does not develop weapons that could be classified as LAWS and does not intend to develop them in the future. Britain's Defence Ministry says that British arms will always be under human control.

U.S. Department of Defense Directive DoDD 3000.09 determines the order and responsibility for developing and using autonomous and semi-autonomous military systems, and also establishes measures to minimize the possibility of unintentional strikes. In particular, "before a decision to enter early development [of LAWS], DoD officials shall ensure the system design incorporates the necessary capabilities to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment in the use of force." Responsible authorities are required to confirm that "operators of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems have been trained in system capabilities, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures in

order to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment in the use of force and employ systems with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war."[12]

4. Code of good practice

Another possible way to regulate the problem of LAWS is a code of good practice. We will consider it based on the example of the Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. The Tallinn Manual, drafted with the active involvement of NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, is the most comprehensive academic study of how existing international law may be applicable to cyber conflicts and war. It in effect split the world into two camps on the issue of how to regulate cyberspace. But if we step back from the major political differences accompanying the Tallinn Manual, its formal content could serve as a model for a scrupulous academic and legal approach to the LAWS problem, too.

A code of good LAWS practice could analyze issues like the laws of war and combat robots; principles of morality and humanity, and respect for human rights when creating and using LAWS; the principle of meaningful human control; liability in LAWS development and use; transparency at various stages of the LAWS life cycle; reviews of new technologies; the rules of using LAWS in combat.

5. A complete ban on the development, testing, production, acquisition, and transfer of LAWS

A total preventive ban is the "traditional" way to solve problems within the CCW, which has over the years banned weapons that leave undetectable fragments, blinding weapons, incendiary weapons, landmines, and booby traps. These prohibitions are by nature inherently politically binding agreements.

Completely banning LAWS would be the easiest form of regulation – after all, none of the four existing protocols to the CCW stipulates a mechanism for monitoring compliance with the bans that have been instituted. There are bans but no monitoring mechanisms, and there is plenty of reason to worry about violations.

But the existing CCW protocols relate to obvious types of weaponry whose appearance would be immediately noticed. LAWS are another matter. The use of autonomous weapons can be concealed or disguised, and professional expertise is needed to identify them.

Trust but Verify

CONCEIVABLY, a LAWS verification mechanism will be created like the one that operates within the framework of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). An organization for controlling LAWS is likely to become even more sizeable, and it would require a large number of advanced technical means to document specific cases of the use of weapons systems that could one day number in the thousands and maybe even hundreds of thousands.

Establishing such a system would require complex organizational and technical solutions, major costs and the involvement of many international officials. At the same time, those wishing to circumvent the aforementioned monitoring tools will find inexpensive ways to do so.

In other words, a solution to the issue about the need for establishing an organization like the OPCW that would monitor the prohibition of LAWS does not look unequivocally positive. Chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They have repeatedly shown their indiscriminate nature in combat. Today, the indiscriminate nature of LAWS can be talked about only hypothetically. And, of course, there is currently no reason to consider LAWS weapons of mass destruction, although the situation could change in the future.

The publication of military doctrines, military charters, and reviews of emerging technologies and new weapons may be a good tool for eliminating suspicions and concerns. Perhaps transparency measures and information exchange will become a more effective means of controlling LAWS.

The Russian Factor

FOR A NUMBER of reasons, LAWS is a sensitive topic for Russia. Our country considers itself a leader in creating combat robotic systems. Since the Soviet era, the political and military leadership of the country has focused on maximizing the automation of processes in air defense and various missile systems. To ensure national security, the Soviet Union created a one-of-a-kind automated system, Perimetr, known in the West as "Dead Hand."

Existing Russian systems, including Perimetr, are highly automated; they cannot be classified as autonomous. However, there could be surprises. The lesson with the adoption on December 3, 2008, of the

Convention on Cluster Munitions is still fresh in the memory of Russia's diplomats and military leaders. Russia considers this document to be an example of diplomatic thimblerigging: The convention contains a long list of exceptions, allowing the production of cluster munitions by Western standards to continue. There were no exceptions for Russian standards, and Russia remains among the countries that have refused to join the Dublin Convention.

Since then, the arms control initiatives, including with respect to LAWS, are commonly viewed through an "anti-Russian" prism. Moscow's position gives Western media cause to unfairly call Russia the main "spoiler" in the process of autonomous weapons control.

Meanwhile, the Russian Federation "proceeds from the fact that work on developing an operational definition and basic functions [of LAWS] must largely be built on the basis of the ultimate objective of the debate on LAWS: examining possibilities for the most appropriate use of this type of weapon in the future, and maintaining an adequate level of human control over it."[13] Russia is insisting only that "specific forms and methods of such control remain at the discretion of the states."

Meanwhile, EU countries are not showing interest in banning autonomous weapons (for example, Germany and France are proposing nothing more than a political declaration), and the U.S. is directly advocating LAWS development. American reasoning outlined in the report "Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Field of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems"[14] include the statement that "weapons that do what commanders and operators intend can effectuate their intentions to conduct operations in compliance with the law of war and minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects."

The U.S. is the undisputed leader in LAWS research and development. The U.S.'s annual budget on military research and development is $80 billion, which is double the research budgets of Google, Microsoft and Apple combined.[15] The Pentagon spends $7.4 billion on unclassified research in the field of artificial intelligence alone.[16] China plans to become the global leader in the field of artificial intelligence by 2030, investing $150 billion in it. Russia hopes to compete for leadership with a modest annual budget of $12.5 million.[17]

Autonomous military robots will be fighting on tomorrow's battlefields. This could be the result of natural technical progress – for example, given that the currently popular swarm tactic by definition implies the autonomous operation of a group of drones without human interven-

tion. Automation on the battlefield could become necessary because the opponent has used electronic warfare (EW) and rendered communication with combat systems impossible. We are fearful a priori of iron "brains" bent on destruction. But, ultimately, we should fear not robots but the humans behind them. Humans can open this Pandora's box, but humans also have the common sense to find a preventive solution to this problem.

_____

NOTES

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentry_gun

[2] Asaro, Peter. *Jus nascendi, Robotic Weapons and the Martens Clause,* Edward Elgar Publishing in Robot Law, pp. 367-386// http://www.peterasaro.org/writing/Asaro%20Jus%20Nascendi%20PROOF.pdf

[3] Hambling (D). *Why the U.S. Is Backing Killer Robots.* September 14, 2018 // https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/a23133118/us-ai-robots-warfare

[4] Asaro P. Op. cit.

[5] Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts // http://www.conventions.ru/view_base.php?id=1107

[6] Principal of proportionality (proportionality) in international law // http://interlaws.ru/princip-proporcionalnosti-sorazmernosti-v-mezhdunarodnom-prave

[7] Rusinova V.N. *Printsip voyennoi neobkhodimosti v mezhdunarodnom gumanitarnom prave: opravdano li zabveniye?* // http://отрасли-права.рф/article/6360

[8] Yegorov S.A. *Vooruzhennyye konflikty i mezhdunarodnoye pravo.* M., 1999 // https://bfveteran.ru/pravo/703-osnovnye-princzipy-prava-vooruzhennyx-konfliktov.html

[9] Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. October 23, 2018 // https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/20092911F6495FA7C125830E003F9A5B/%24file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_3_final.pdf

[10] Joint Doctrine Note 2/11. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, UK Ministry of Defence // https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/644084/20110505-JDN_2-11_UAS_archived-U.pdf

[11] Directive DoDD/3000.09 // https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_09.pdf

[12] DoDD/3000.09 // https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_09.pdf

[13] On Russian approaches to formulating a working definition and basic functions of lethal autonomous weapons systems in the context of the goals and objectives of the Convention. Report of the delegation of the Russian Federation. Geneva, November 9-13, 2018.

[14] Humanitarian benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems. The report of the delegation of the United States. Geneva, April 9-13, 2018.

[15] Carter A. *Shaping Disruptive Technological Change for Public Good.* Aug. 2018 // https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/shaping-disruptive-technological-change-public-good?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=TAPP_Ash%20Carter_Shaping%20Disruptive%20Technological% 20Change% 20for% 20Public% 20Good% 20 (1) & utm_content = & spMailingID = 20227006 & spUserID =

NTE4NzgwNzI4MTAS1 & spJobID = 1340856526 & spReportId = MTM0MDg1Nj
UyNgS2

[16] Polyakova A. *Weapons of the weak: Russia and AI-driven asymmetric warfare.*
November 15, 2018 // https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote -5

[17] Ibid.

Key words: Russia, autonomous weapons, LAWS, IHL, artificial intelligence.

Madness or Enlightenment:
The Life or Death of Humankind

K. Dolgov

THE OBSERVABLE HISTORY of humankind shows that it has on many occasions, for intrinsic or extrinsic reasons, teetered on the brink of destruction – and the same holds true for all living things and the planet itself. Long before the advent of the Apocalypse, people have feared for their lives and the fate of the Earth. Scientists have identified several such periods in history (like the extinction of the dinosaurs) when there could have been universal catastrophe. Now scientists acknowledge that we have entered a sixth period (starting in 1945, when nuclear weapons appeared and were used, and the Anthropocene era began).

I recall the stories my grandfather Andrian Romanov told about his experiences as a soldier during the First World War. In his stories, he repeatedly talked about the horrors Russian soldiers and their enemies faced on the front lines: They feared that this war could destroy everyone and everything. However, after it ended, those fears went away somewhere and the countries that had fought in the war began to get ready to fight again, forgetting the bygone horrors. Everyone was convinced there would be no more world wars and only local armed conflicts would be possible.

I was in the hospital with pneumonia when the Great Patriotic War broke out. That morning, I saw doctors and nurses run out into the yard to the only loudspeaker to hear the Soviet government report Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. I ran after them along with the other children, and I remember seeing the faces of the men become grim and the women start to cry and then sob in despair, and for good reason: The adults, particularly medical personnel, understood what grief the war would bring not only to the peoples of the Soviet Union but also other

Konstantin Dolgov, senior research associate, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Honored Worker of Science of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Science (Philosophy)

nations. We all know at what cost fascism was defeated, and again we believed that the time had come for everlasting peace; there could no longer be another world war because humankind simply would not survive it. This became especially apparent after the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

But what is most curious is that the world very quickly forgot about the horrors of both world wars, not to mention all kinds of revolutions, armed conflicts and local wars. And almost all countries, particularly developed countries, again started spending exorbitant sums on new, even more destructive weapons. Hydrogen bombs were invented shortly after nuclear weapons, and humankind faced the threat of not just a third world war but the destruction of the planet.

> If the process of human madness is not stopped, the destruction of all life on Earth is inevitable.

Naturally, public organizations began to form in many countries to protect peace, to support international law and its strict observance. This led to the establishment of the United Nations and many other international organizations, since it had become clear that we could no longer believe in the impossibility of another world war; we could not naïvely assume that everything would sort itself out and we would all live in peace and friendship. Various political and public organizations quickly began scrambling to protect peace and vigorously advocate for cooperation among all nations. But the trouble was that there were people in each state who were not only dissatisfied with the peaceful situation but felt that it prevented them from pursuing their selfish ambitions and satisfying their excessive and ever-growing appetite for seizing foreign territory and wealth – and seeking world domination. So, humanity is now at a tipping point, a red line. Beyond it lies absolute and universal catastrophe: a real Apocalypse that even the most vivid imagination cannot picture.

This refers primarily to the most probable and imminent danger of a third world war involving thermonuclear weapons. Many scholars have commented that since the end of the World War II, the world has on various occasions and under various circumstances stood on the brink of a third world war, whether due to technical errors, deliberate provocative statements or the irresponsibility of the leaders of the political establishment. So far, thank God, we have managed to overcome all that, and yet

the Doomsday Clock, established by physicists, is ticking inexorably closer to the fateful midnight mark: universal devastation.

Two things suggest that this fateful moment may in fact come. First, several high-level contemporary politicians, expressing the interests of the owners of transnational corporations, oligarchs and the entire super-rich minority, are openly pursuing various armed conflicts and wars. This is unsurprising, since humanity has currently degraded to the point of establishing oligarchic political systems and regimes, when any talk of democracy and freedom is hollow chatter, when supreme human values – truth, goodness, beauty, love, mercy, etc. – are replaced by pseudo-values: money, wealth and power. Second, most of the world's population, especially in developed countries, is almost totally indifferent to what is happening in today's domestic and foreign policies.

And it is not just that people always naïvely believe that another world war is impossible; it is that people have stopped suppressing the misanthropic, adventurist and criminal policies of the current leaders of major countries who are openly threatening to unleash wars against other countries and peoples. This is especially evident when the leaders of the most economically and militarily powerful countries openly declare their right to world domination. Here we see a concentration of the most monstrously inhuman criminal trends and characteristics such as racism, chauvinism, genocide, extreme nationalism, cynicism, and arrogance, as well as the absolute denial of international law, the basic laws of human coexistence and all standards, rules, laws, and precepts that have been developed over history and have existed for millennia.

Worried by the growing danger of thermonuclear war, the United States and the United Kingdom once made a very valuable proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Unfortunately, since then, they have resisted the actual establishment of this and other such zones in other regions and are blocking all related proposals. Moreover, they are constantly seeking to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states, including through armed force.

It is no coincidence that prominent American scholar and public figure Noam Chomsky calls the United States a country of "state-sponsored terrorism" that persistently and cynically violates its own laws, as well as the norms and regulations of international law.[1] The primary goal of U.S. foreign policy is to eliminate all potential economic, political and military rivals by any means. Unfortunately, this policy is not fully comprehended and discussed by U.S. society.

It is absolutely clear that people should understand the mortal danger that awaits them every day, every minute, every moment. It is now imperative both in domestic and in foreign policy to curb the irresponsible behavior of high-level political leaders of all states, particularly the most developed ones. Otherwise, the Apocalypse may come at any moment. As Noam Chomsky comments, the nuclear era will hardly last long: Either we put an end to it or it puts an end to us.[2]

The next danger of our Anthropocene era that threatens the potential loss of all humankind, all life and the whole planet is the barbaric attitude of people themselves to nature, to the environment in general, the predatory use of resources and the growing pollution of the planet. Instead of switching from organic resources (oil, gas, coal, wood) to renewable energy sources, natural fuel production persistently continues to grow, causing irreparable environmental damage. This refers not only to global warming, the melting of polar ice caps and the consequent rising of ocean levels, but also already irreversible processes throughout nature that pose the threat of universal ruin.

Scientists predict that in the next century, we can expect 75% of all species of flora and fauna to disappear if drastic measures are not taken.[3] According to recent data, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere over the past 70 years is 150% higher than in the pre-industrial era. Such a concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases was observed approximately three to five million years ago, when the temperature was two to three degrees higher than now, and the average ocean level was 30 to 50 feet above the current level.

Scientists predict the temperature will rise soon by four to five degrees, which is fraught with disastrous consequences. Ice melt in the Arctic and Antarctic alone could lead to a sea level rise of more than 10 feet.[4] Unfortunately, not only are no positive developments evident, but a number of countries have even withdrawn from signed international conventions on environmental protection, while others have either not joined them or have put off doing so. Such an attitude to nature can only worsen its condition.

Some scientists and politicians have commented that another danger is human madness: When capital resources are directed not at improving the internal and external condition of individuals and of all humanity but at areas aimed at destroying all life. Instead of developing health care, education and culture, the powers that be are pursuing the development of new types of deadly weapons. Currently, the United States, Russia and

several other countries have amassed enough weapons of mass destruc-
tion to destroy life on Earth many times over.

Thus, if the process of human madness is not stopped, the destruction
of all life on Earth is inevitable.

Therefore, it is time for the political forces of the modern world to
develop a new, more advanced system of international law under UN aus-
pices that would exclude the possibility of a third world war, as well as
categorically prohibit any country from using any armed force in any
region without UN Security Council authorization. Public organizations
also need to be established in all countries to exercise civilian oversight
over politicians and political organizations regarding the use of armed
force.

It might also be necessary to establish a special international tribunal
(like the Bertrand Russell Tribunal) that would consider the activities of
political leaders who ignore all rules of international law and unleash
armed conflicts and wars as an egregious crime against humanity with no
statute of limitations and inevitably entailing a just punishment.

At the same time, particular attention should be paid to encouraging
countries that care about strengthening peace among nations, developing
humanistic spheres of life, advancing social welfare, and protecting, pre-
serving and improving the environment. All these measures are long
overdue, because humanity truly has approached a fateful dilemma: to be
or not to be – either death or salvation; there is no other option.

P.S. In a recent interview, Chomsky responded to a journalist who
asked what he thought of modern media by saying that they, unfortunate-
ly, do not pay attention to the truly complex, urgent and fundamental
problems that are relevant to all humanity and at the same time focus too
much time on totally insignificant matters, deliberately distracting
Americans and world public opinion from the most vital issues.

For example, for a long time now they have been constantly fanning
the issue of Russia and Russian hackers who allegedly meddled in the
domestic affairs of the United States, particularly during the 2016 presi-
dential election, while most of the world perceives this as all but a joke.
"If you're interested in foreign interference in our elections, whatever the
Russians may have done barely counts or weighs in the balance as com-
pared with what another state does, openly, brazenly and with enormous
support. Israeli intervention in U.S. elections vastly overwhelms anything
the Russians may have done. I mean, even to the point where the prime

minister of Israel, Netanyahu, goes directly to Congress, without even informing the president, and speaks to Congress, with overwhelming applause, to try to undermine the president's policies – what happened with Obama and Netanyahu in 2015. Did Putin come to give an address to a joint session of Congress trying to – calling on them to reverse U.S. policy, without even informing the president? And that's just a tiny bit of this overwhelming influence."[5] This fact alone makes the Russophobia fanned by the American and European media totally bogus.

At the same time, as Chomsky remarks, when it comes to real interference in U.S. domestic or foreign affairs, and indeed the development of domestic and foreign policies, we should be talking about meddling by the superrich minority (1%): "In massive ways, the concentrated private capital, corporate sector, super wealth, intervene in our elections, massively, overwhelmingly, to the extent that the most elementary principles of democracy are undermined."[6]

We should be discussing and addressing global problems that directly affect all humanity – for example, environmental problems, climate change: "I don't know what word in the language – I can't find one – that applies to people of that kind, who are willing to sacrifice the literal – the existence of organized human life, not in the distant future, so they can put a few more dollars in highly overstuffed pockets. The word 'evil' doesn't begin to approach it."[7]

Chomsky commented on the correctness of U.S. President Donald Trump's intentions to strengthen relations with Russia no matter what. Russia, too, should not give up on establishing relations with the United States, despite the many negative aspects of its foreign policy: "Russia shouldn't refuse to deal with the United States because the U.S. carried out the worst crime of the century in the invasion of Iraq, much worse than anything Russia has done."[8] Chomsky emphasizes: "We have to move towards better – right at the Russian border, there are very extreme tensions, that could blow up anytime and lead to what would in fact be a terminal nuclear war, terminal for the species and life on Earth. We're very close to that."[9]

NOTES

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch? v =-GCelq9hy5o
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch? v = H88S_tVLExo
[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch? v =-GCelq9hy5o
[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch? v = v4FZFldaFbg
[5] https://inosmi.ru/politic/20180821/243053929.html/original publication: Noam

Chomsky: *In Most of the World, the Media Obsession with Trump-Russia Interference Story Is "A Joke"*

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

Key words: "Apocalypse," World Wars I and II, Great Patriotic War, protecting peace.

How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS Approach International Information Security Issues

S. Boyko

BECAUSE of the suspension until 2009 of the meetings of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE), more work on information security began to be done at regional level, primarily by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The SCO as the First Regional Organization to Have Taken Up International Information Security Issues.

IN 2006, Russia and other SCO members launched a series of very important moves to lay foundations for a regional information security system.

A statement on international information security issued at an SCO summit in Shanghai on June 15, 2006, was a milestone document.[1]

It was the first instance of a regional organization stressing the role of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in society, their effects on global information space, and their significance for the political, military, social, cultural, and other components of national and global security and stability.

The heads of state of the SCO member countries expressed concern in the statement over forms of use of ICTs that threatened personal and public security, endangered human rights, and ran against the fundamental principles of equality, mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, peaceful settlement of conflicts, and non-use

Sergey Boyko, head of department at the Security Council of the Russian Federation, senior expert at the Center for International Information Security and Science and Technology Policy at the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Science (History); boiko_sm@gov.ru

of force. The SCO leaders warned about the "danger for [ICTs] to be used for criminal, terrorist, military or political purposes that run counter to the maintenance of international security" and about negative political, social and economic impacts on individual countries or regions or on the world in general, impacts that might result in instability.

The heads of state emphasized the similarity of their countries' positions on key information security issues and expressed determination to combine forces within the SCO framework to address information threats and challenges in compliance with international law, including the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The member states decided to set up an expert group "to formulate an action plan for international information security and define ways to solve relevant problems."[2] The new body was named the SCO Expert Group on International Information Security. Andrey Krutskikh of the Russian Foreign Ministry was elected its chairman. Later, Krutskikh became special coordinator for issues of political use of ICTs and, after that, the Russian president's special representative for international cooperation in information security.

The Expert Group drafted an accord that was entitled the Agreement among the Governments of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in the Field of Ensuring International Information Security and signed in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on June 16, 2009.[3]

The agreement made provisions for coordination of action and mutual assistance on key points of international information security.

The accord was unique in the sense that it was the first-ever international legal document to state the existence of specific threats to information security, characterize the nature of those threats, and set guidelines for cooperation in dealing with them.

Those guidelines included:

- joint measures to ensure international information security;
- setting up systems to monitor and respond to information security threats;
- putting forward joint initiatives for international legislation to limit the proliferation and use of information weapons;
- action to fend off threats of terrorist use of ICTs;
- combating cybercrime;
- measures to ensure the secure and stable functioning of the Internet and put it under international governance;
- measures to ensure information security for critical national facilities;

- confidence-building measures;

- interaction within frameworks of international organizations and forums;

- exchanges of experience, personnel training, working meetings, conferences, workshops, and other events.

After coming into force on June 2, 2011, the agreement became the first international accord to address the entire range of ICT-related military, political, terrorist, and criminal threats.

By that moment, it was also the only regional intergovernmental agreement on information security. However, it gave a boost to efforts in the UN format and through other channels to build a global information security system. It also served to impart a new quality to debates in the GGE that was convened after the accord took effect.

Russia and the other members of the SCO and BRICS have became the leaders in building a global information security system.

Importantly, the agreement is open for other states to join, which is in tune with the idea of creating a global information security system.

The SCO Expert Group has demonstrated the effectiveness of its regional format even more clearly as, quite soon after finishing work on that agreement, it came up with another draft document, one that would have been highly important for the entire international community and would have been entitled the International Code of Conduct for Information Security.

On September 12, 2011, the permanent representatives of China, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan at the United Nations submitted the draft code to the UN secretary general, after which the draft document was submitted to the 66th session of the UN General Assembly. Later Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan stated their support for the code, which meant that the proposed document could unreservedly be considered an SCO initiative. India and Pakistan joined the initiative after becoming SCO members.

The purpose of the proposed code was to formulate the rights and duties of states, stimulate them to behave constructively and responsibly, and encourage them to join forces in handling common threats and challenges. The document was to impose a pledge on its signatories not to use ICTs, including telecommunications networks, for any other purpose than

social or economic. It was to prohibit ICT use that could undermine international peace and security, a crucial point in view of growing cyber threats.

As the above-mentioned information security agreement, the code would have had the essential feature of being open for any state to join. Moreover, it was to be binding on its signatories. The code's main rules were:

- to comply with the UN Charter and "universally recognized norms governing international relations";

- not to use ICTs to carry out hostile activities or acts of aggression, create threats to international peace and security and proliferate cyber weapons or related technologies;

- to cooperate in combating criminal and terrorist activities that involve the use of ICTs;

- to seek to prevent states that are not code signatories from using their resources, critical infrastructures, core technologies and other advantages to threaten the political, economic and social security of other countries;

- to follow the principle that it is the right and duty of every state to protect their information space;

- to respect rights and freedoms in information space;

- to place the Internet under a transparent and democratic international governance system; to seek the stable and secure functioning of the Internet;

- "to lead all elements of society … to understand their roles and responsibilities with regard to information security, in order to facilitate the creation of a culture of information security";

- to help developing countries enhance capacity building in the area of information security and help them "close the digital divide";

- to bolster bilateral, regional and international cooperation in carrying out information security measures, and "enhance coordination among relevant international organizations";

- "to settle any dispute resulting from the application of the code through peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force."

The draft code represented the first statement of the coordinated position of Russia and the other SCO members on international information security.[4]

Since then, the SCO member states have been dynamically developing their information security principles and have repeatedly stated them in SCO summit documents.

Drafting information security sections in such documents is the task of the Expert Group, which holds annual meetings at the SCO Secretariat in Beijing.

The SCO's Dushanbe Declaration, passed on September 12, 2014, during an SCO summit, stressed that global challenges such as cyber threats could only be addressed "through close cooperation between all states, international organizations and forums."

The declaration said that the SCO member countries "are stepping up joint efforts to build a peaceful, safe, fair, and open information space based on the principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries."

The member states, the declaration said, "favor equal rights of all countries in respect of the Internet management and the sovereign right of states to control it nationally." Security is part of this sovereign right, according to the declaration. However, the main point in the declaration was the passage saying that the SCO member countries "support the elaboration of universal rules, principles and standards of responsible behavior by states in the information space."[5]

On January 9, 2015, SCO member states submitted a revised draft code of conduct to the 69th session of the UN General Assembly.

The revised version propounded essentially the same objectives as the original one.

The SCO member countries expected that, if approved, the draft code would create a peaceful, secure, transparent, and cooperation-based information environment, and that the secure use of ICTs and telecommunication networks would help promote social and economic development and enhance public well-being.[6]

The code of conduct initiative is reflected in the SCO's Astana Declaration, passed on June 9, 2017, at a summit of the organization in Astana, Kazakhstan.

The member states, the declaration said, "will step up joint efforts to counter common security challenges and threats, deepen dialogue and cooperation to ensure comprehensive security, primarily in fighting terrorism, including cyber-terrorism, separatism, extremism, cross-border organized crime, illicit drug trafficking, and to strengthen international information security and emergency response."

The member states pledged to "coordinate their efforts in order to resolve these tasks with the relevant countries, and regional and international organizations in bilateral and multilateral formats, including with the corresponding UN institutions."

"The member states support the idea of developing, within the UN framework, a universal code of rules, principles and norms of responsible behavior of states in the media and consider the revised version of the Rules of Conduct in the Sphere of International Information Security circulated on behalf of the SCO member states as an official UN document in January 2015 to be an important step in this direction," the declaration said.

"The member states will continue their in-depth cooperation in combating crimes in the information and communication sphere and call for developing a corresponding international legal instrument with the UN playing the central coordinating role."[7]

The Qingdao Declaration, passed at the SCO summit in Qingdao, China, on June 10, 2018, was inspired by a spirit of uniting forces in fighting information security threats and creating a "peaceful, secure, open and structured information space based on cooperation."

The declaration attributed a "special role" to the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure and called for its "further improvement … including considering the organization of a monitoring system of possible threats in the global information space, and counteracting them."

The member states made a pledge in the declaration to "strengthen their cooperation in combating the spread and propagation of terrorist ideology through the Internet, including publicly justifying terrorism, recruiting members to terrorist groups, inciting and financing terrorist attacks, and promoting online tutorials on methods of committing terrorist acts."

They insisted that the United Nations play the central role in "developing universal international rules and principles as well as norms for countries' responsible behavior in the information space." They proposed "the establishment of a working mechanism within the framework of the UN based on a just geographical distribution in order to develop standards, rules or principles for countries' responsible behavior in the information space and to formalize them by adopting the corresponding UN General Assembly resolution."

"All states should participate equally in Internet development and governance," the declaration said. "A governing organization established to manage key Internet resources must be international, more representative and democratic."

The member states vowed to "continue to promote practical cooperation in countering threats and challenges in the information space" under

the Yekaterinburg agreement of 2009, including cooperation in combating ICT abuse for terrorist, criminal and other purposes.

In backing a Russian initiative, SCO member states called for bringing out an international legal document under the auspices of the United Nations on measures against the criminal use of ICTs.[8]

Hence, the SCO member states have harmonized their policies on building an international information security system, and this enables them to coordinate their actions in various international frameworks.

BRICS as a New Platform for Cooperation
in the Area of Information Security Measures

BRICS is an association that was born at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2006 and initially brought together Brazil, Russia, India, and China and was known as BRIC but changed its name to BRICS after South Africa joined the group in February 2011.

Ever since, this association of five nations with developing economies has had international information security on its priority agenda.

According to the Concept of Participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS, approved by Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2013, the main security-related objectives of Russia's membership in the association are:

- "to cooperate in ensuring international information security, to make use of the BRICS potential for advancing initiatives in this regard within various international forums and organizations, first of all within the UN";

- to cooperate more closely with fellow member countries in combating military, military-related, terrorist, and criminal use of ICTs and any other forms of their use that "run counter to international peace, stability and security."[9]

These objectives are shared by all the BRICS member states and have been recorded in all final declarations of BRICS summits between 2013 and 2018.

In organizing the fifth BRICS summit, which was held in Durban, South Africa, on March 26-27, 2013, the member countries' high representatives for security proposed setting up an expert group on cybersecurity. The group was to propose forms of cooperation and ways of coordinating member states' positions at international forums.

The group, the BRICS Working Group on ICT Cooperation (BRICS WG), was formed in June 2015, during the Russian presidency of BRICS. Under the rules of WG, the latter is to be headed by a citizen of the state holding the current presidency of BRICS.

The Ufa Declaration issued on July 9, 2015, during the Seventh BRICS summit in Ufa, Russia, vested BRICS WG with the following tasks:

- "sharing of information and best practices relating to security in the use of ICTs";

- coordination of action against cybercrime;

- "intra-BRICS cooperation using the existing Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT)";

- "capacity building";

- development of international norms, principles and standards.

The Ufa Declaration stated the commonality of the member states' positions on ways of attaining the main goal of creating an international information security system. "We recognize the need for a universal regulatory binding instrument on combating the criminal use of ICTs under the UN auspices," the declaration said.

It emphasized "the central importance of the principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter, particularly the political independence, territorial integrity and sovereign equality of states, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."

"We encourage the international community to focus its efforts on confidence-building measures, capacity-building, the non-use of force, and the prevention of conflicts in the use of ICTs. We will seek to develop practical cooperation with each other in order to address common security challenges in the use of ICTs," the declaration said.

"We will continue to consider the adoption of the rules, norms and principles of responsible behavior of States in this sphere."[10]

Unanimity in BRICS WG (all the BRICS member states except South Africa are represented in the group) enabled the group to successfully defend its position in the UN GGE in 2016-2017, preventing the GGE from approving a final report that ran against the BRICS interests.

BRICS' Xiamen Declaration, which was issued on September 4, 2017, at a BRICS summit in Xiamen, China, reaffirmed the central role of the United Nations "in developing universally accepted norms of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs to ensure a peaceful, secure,

open, cooperative, stable, orderly, accessible and equitable ICT environment."[11]

The declaration emphasized "the paramount importance of the principles of international law enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the state sovereignty, the political independence, territorial integrity and sovereign equality of states, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."

The document called for stepping up "international cooperation against terrorist and criminal misuse of ICTs, reaffirm the general approach laid in the eThekwini, Fortaleza, Ufa, and Goa declarations in this regard, and recognize the need for a universal regulatory binding instrument on combating the criminal use of ICTs under the UN auspices as stated in the Ufa Declaration."

The declaration commended "progress" achieved by BRICS WG. "We decide to promote cooperation according to the BRICS Roadmap of Practical Cooperation on Ensuring Security in the Use of ICTs or any other mutually agreed mechanism," it said.

Tasks set by the roadmap include:

- more extensive sharing of views on political security aspects of the use of ICTs (assessment of international developments, discussions in the UN framework of norms, principles and rules to ensure a peaceful, open, secure, stable, and accessible ICT environment; hammering out a common BRICS position on key information security issues; and coordination of action in various international formats);

- creation of a network for cooperation among national cyber emergency centers;

- closer practical cooperation among authorities that oversee cybersecurity;

- joint research and development (R&D);

- development of a mechanism for R&D exchanges between BRICS member countries.

The declaration acknowledged a Russian initiative for a BRICS intergovernmental agreement on joint cybersecurity action.

BRICS launched expert-level work to carry out the above-listed tasks.

At a BRICS WG meeting in Cape Town on May 16-17, delegations from the five member countries discussed the cybersecurity-related section of a draft document that was later approved at the 10th BRICS summit, becoming the Johannesburg Declaration. The debate ended up with

the group urging the BRICS member states to unanimously support a Russian proposal for recording the BRICS intergovernmental agreement initiative in the declaration.

BRICS WG was praised at a BRICS foreign ministers' meeting in Pretoria on June 4, 2018, and at a meeting of the BRICS member countries' high representatives for national security in Durban on June 29. But most importantly, it was argued that joint efforts to build an international information security system needed to be put on a solid legal basis.

Support was expressed at both meetings for the proposed intergovernmental agreement.

At the behest of Russia, all the initiatives approved during those activities were recorded in the Johannesburg Declaration, which was passed on July 26, 2018.

The declaration called for the UN-overseen development of rules, norms and principles for the responsible behavior of states in information space and of "a universal regulatory binding instrument on combatting the criminal use of ICTs."

The declaration hailed "the undeniable benefits and new opportunities brought about by the advances in ICTs" but pointed out that "these advances also bring with them new challenges and threats resultant from the growing misuse of ICTs for criminal activities, the increasing malicious use of ICTs by state and non-state actors." The document called for international cooperation to prevent the terrorist and criminal use of ICTs.

The declaration also hailed "progress made in promoting cooperation according to the BRICS Roadmap of Practical Cooperation on Ensuring Security in the Use of ICTs or any other mutually agreed mechanism."

The declaration said the BRICS member states recognized "the critical and positive role the Internet plays globally in promoting economic, social and cultural development." The member countries pledged "to continue to work together through the existing mechanisms to contribute to the secure, open, peaceful, cooperative and orderly use of ICTs on the basis of participation by all states on an equal footing in the evolution and functioning of the Internet and its governance."

"Relevant stakeholders" should be involved in this work "in their respective roles and responsibilities."

While it admitted the great positive role of the Internet, BRICS urged the international community to take action against the "misuse of the Internet by terrorist entities."

It was the main cybersecurity-related achievement of the

Johannesburg summit that the BRICS leaders reaffirmed the significance of creating a legal framework for joint cybersecurity measures by BRICS member countries and made a pledge that their countries would "work towards consideration and elaboration of a BRICS intergovernmental agreement on cooperation" on this matter.[12]

The Johannesburg Declaration marked a logical conclusion of five-year multilevel work in a key field of national and global security. Experts can soon start working on key points for the proposed intergovernmental agreement.

The adoption by the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly of the Russia-drafted resolutions *Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security* and *Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes* reflected the similarity of the positions of the SCO and BRICS on building an international information security system.

These resolutions incorporate ideas stated earlier in SCO and BRICS summit documents and have ushered in a new period in debates in the main international format, the United Nations.

By co-authoring the two above-mentioned General Assembly resolutions, Russia and the other members of the SCO and BRICS have become the leaders in building a global information security system.

There remains a large amount of hard work to do, work that will demand joint efforts and close coordination on the part of the two organizations' member states in various international discussion frameworks.

The most important work would need to be done in the main framework, that of the United Nations, where an open-ended working group and a new GGE are due to meet in 2019 to ponder ways of putting the above-mentioned General Assembly resolutions into practice.

NOTES

[1] SCO members sign statement on international information security. Shanghai, June 15, 2006 // http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-06/15/content_311225.htm

[2] Ibid.

[3] Agreement among the Governments of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in the Field of Ensuring International Information Security // http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=INT;n= 51984

[4] International code of conduct for information security // https://undocs.org/A/66/359

[5] Dushanbe Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation // http://www. kremlin.ru/supplement/4750

[6] International code of conduct for information security // https://undocs.org/A/69/723

[7] The Astana declaration of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,

June 9, 2017 // http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5206

[8] Qingdao Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, June 10, 2018 // http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5315

[9] Concept of Participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS // http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/eng/files/41d452b13d9c2624d228.pdf

[10] VII BRICS Summit Ufa Declaration, Ufa, July 9, 2015 // https://brics2017.org/English/Documents/Summit/201701/t20170125_1409.html

[11] BRICS Xiamen Declaration, Xiamen, China, September 4, 2017 // http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/04/c_136583396_2.htm

[12] 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration, July 26, 2018 // https:// www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30190/10th_BRICS_Summit_Johannesburg_Declaration

Norilsk Nickel:
ICT as Key to Successful Development

D. Grigoryev

International Affairs: *Amid political and economic instability and the unpredictability of global markets, points and segments of cooperation where mutual understanding between countries and states remains at least at a staedy level are of special importance. Under these circumstances, cooperation is often driven by business corporations, whose operations are of strategic importance for national economies.*

In this context, one pressing issue is cyber security and the protection of information resources of state and commercial organizations against malicious attacks from the outside. At the 2018 OSCE-wide Conference on Cyber/ICT Security in Rome, Norilsk Nickel presented a draft charter on information security for critical industrial facilities, developed by specialists of this metals and mining giant.

Norilsk Nickel is a metals and mining company and ICT is not exactly its core business.

D. Grigoryev: ICT is certainly not part of Norilsk Nickel's business, but it is key to successful development. The security of corporate information resources and infrastructure is a major factor in the stable and continuous operation of our enterprises, where thousands of people are employed.

Q: So, it is "not only business."

A: Exactly. Modern entrepreneurship involves a considerable social component based on international practices and standards. In keeping with them, these days, a successful company is not only a business entity, but also a subject of social and cultural impact in regions of its presence.

While contributing to the country's economy, Norilsk Nickel is

Dmitry Grigoryev, Head of the Information Security and ICT Infrastructure Department at Norilsk Nickel

implementing large-scale projects of social importance, such as the construction of a 1,000-kilometer high-speed optical telecommunication line beyond the Arctic Circle. Now all residents of the Norilsk industrial region can enjoy broadband access to information and diverse online services. Therefore, issues related to the information security of corporate entities involved in both business processes and social projects are acquiring new urgency. Meanwhile, experts point not only to an increase in the number of cyber attacks, but also the rise of hackers' skills. There is reason to believe that attackers will target not only specific enterprises, but also entire industry segments.

Q: It may be a naïve question, but what can these attackers aim to achieve by hacking, for instance, a mine or a plant?

A: Indeed, a cyber hacker is primarily motivated by financial gain, and from this perspective, a bank is a more preferable target than a factory. However, international experience shows that hacking attacks are beginning to be used for entirely different purposes – for example, causing large-scale, but at the same time nonlethal damage to a country's economy. In attempting to breach corporate systems, hackers thoroughly study their specifics and ICT organization, and use elements of so-called destructive social engineering.

This is why it is so important for information security services in both the public and private sector to study and understand the "anatomy" of an attack, its genesis and source of origin – in short, to build a "motivational model of a cyber threat," which will help demotivate an attacker or reduce the value of his possible gain in relation to the risk of being detected, thus making him abort his plans at the preparation stage.

Q: So, you decided to take Norilsk Nickel's ICT experience and achievements to the international level?

A: This is not only about Norilsk Nickel's experience, but also that of Russian companies, as presented in a document entitled "Charter on Information Security for Critical Industrial Facilities." I would like to stress that the idea and draft of the charter were initially discussed at the expert level, specifically by heads of cyber security departments at major Russian corporations. To that end, the Information Security in Industry Club (ISI Club) was formed on our initiative. It received the approval of

the International Forum on Information Security in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, in April 2018, and then there was the OSCE conference in Rome. We are consistent in promoting our initiatives.

Q: Let's go back to the Rome conference. Why the OSCE?

A: This is one of the few international platforms that provide an opportunity for a consolidated and possibly nonpolitical discussion of prospects for responding to cyber threats. It is particularly encouraging that our discussion took place as part of hearings on the formation of new models of public-private partnerships in cyber security. This means that there are points of mutual consolidation in the face of global challenges, including cyber threats.

Q: What prospects are there for the charter?

A: Norilsk Nickel's initiative received the approval conference participants, and the text of the charter was submitted to the OSCE Secretariat for further study in a package of measures to counter unlawful interference in the information infrastructure of the economic and social sectors.

Key words: cyber security, protection of information resources.

"We're People of the Same Race – We're Slavs": The Problem of Identity in Regions Along the Russian-Ukrainian Border

I. Tatarinov

FRONTIERS are an inseparable feature of statehood. They are both barriers and points of contact. Simultaneously, as identifiers of borderland residents, they facilitate "our own vs. foreign" identification. The border between Russia and Ukraine is artificial and controversial, and this problem, exacerbated by the recent souring of relations between the two countries, has been leading to territorial claims put forward at various levels. The border problem was made particularly acute by the developments of February 2014 in Kiev.

A large amount of historiographical and methodological material on issues relating to the Russian-Ukrainian border has been accumulated recently. "Border studies," research focusing on areas along the Russian-Ukrainian border as sites of unique forms of political, economic and cultural interaction, have become a regular field of regional studies. Various actors have been involved in this interaction. They have included governmental bodies, regional and local administrations, economic agencies, sociocultural institutions, media groups, and, in the Soviet era, Communist Party bodies as well.

Scholars have made comprehensive studies of the borderland phenomenon, including its nature and functions [2; 7; 10; 11; 17], the identities and routines of the population of border areas [13; 14; 20; 23-25], and practices of its ethnic identification [3-6; 18]. At the same time, only fragmentary studies have been made of the shaping and evolution of the identity of the population of areas along the Russian-Ukrainian border, and the actual term "borderland identity" is ambiguous and far from definitively conceptualized.

_____

Igor Tatarinov, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies and International Relations, Vladimir Dahl Lugansk East Ukrainian National University, Candidate of Science (History); igortatarinov76@gmail.com

Today, the term "borderland" is taken to mean territories along the border between two countries that possess characteristics and functions stemming from their being located near the frontier [2, p. 24]. Scholars draw a clear line between the terms "identification" and "identity."

By identification they normally mean "a process whereby the individual recognizes various constitutive qualities as his own individual characteristics and begins to see himself as a member of a group possessing such qualities" [20, p. 131]. Identity, on the other

The population of eastern Ukraine has consistently seen Russia as a culturally close country, as a country of friends and brothers, despite outbreaks of tension between the two countries' governments.

hand, is the result of such processes and "a concept denoting the individuals' perception of what they are" [1, p. 155]. It is "a new combination of old and new identificational fragments more than a simple sum total of identifications" [19, p. 131].

Mikhail Krylov says that, by analyzing borders and identities together, one comes to perceive "identities as borders, or borders between identities (geographical divisions between identities) and connections between formal borders and identities" [14]. Historically, borderlands have been populated by defenders of their country who drew a clear distinction between what was part of their own country and what was not. This is essentially the meaning of Karl Haushofer's appeals for "psychologically subjecting the entire spirit of the nation to the entire problem of defense of its form of existence" [21, p. 452]. This, however, is a limited approach.

As regards the term "borderland," it might mean a relatively narrow strip next to a frontier, but it can also be applied to larger areas near a frontier, although in many respects life in such areas may be similar to life in territory in the immediate vicinity to the frontier. Oleg Bresky and Olga Breskaya argue that there is "no consistent theory" distinguishing these two types of territory and that borderland understood as larger areas than just narrow strips along a border has "rather an imaginary, symbolic, social dimension" [7, pp. 56-57]. As for the identity of residents of territories next to frontiers, it is the subject matter of various fields of study with descriptions of it varying from "uncertain," "variable" and "binary" to "combined," "mixed" and "archaic" [14].

Areas along the Russian-Ukrainian border are sites of intensive inter-actions of regional, ethnic, political and other identities that combine to form a multi-component borderland identity. As Krylov says rightly, "the evolution of frontier identity may go hand in hand with the drastic redrawing of frontiers with whole regions passing under the jurisdiction of another state, something that often causes transformations of identities, although quite often borderland identities remain stable. Such stability is a combined effect of cultural borders that have existed for long time and of people's inertia" [14]. In fact, the border between two countries may be a site of interaction of identities or a site of conservation of identities.

This study aims to systematize interpretations of the Russian-Ukrainian borderland identity concept and examine dynamics of interac-tion between various types of borders. It is important to trace evolution mechanisms and dynamics of borders, find out principal reasons for ter-ritorial division and their impacts on Russian-Ukrainian borderland iden-tity, supporting such studies with empirical evidence.

The Specific Nature of Development of Russian-Ukrainian Borderlands

AFTER THE COLLAPSE of the Russian Empire with its pan-Russian identity, the Ukrainians, the Belarusians, and ethnic groups in Transcaucasia and other regions of the former empire began to develop their own nation-state identities. The term "Little Russian" was being rapidly ousted by the term "Ukrainian" [12], and it was not only the lead-ers of the Ukrainian People's Republic and Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky's Ukrainian State that based their nation-state ideologies on the term "Ukrainian."

The "Ukrainian idea" was also exploited by the Bolsheviks, who tried to implant the belief that there existed an Ukrainian Soviet identity into public opinion. Ukrainianization also aimed to give the alleged Ukrainian identity a high prestige with the potential redistribution of social roles between the Russians and Ukrainians [5, c. 174]. Official propaganda stressed differences between the status of Ukrainian lands in the Russian Empire and the allegedly free status of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The hyping of Ukrainian Soviet identity peaked in a 1935 instruction that prescribed stating the ethnicity of functionaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in committee

documents. Ordinary Soviet passports also stated their holders' ethnicity on the basis of one of their parents' ethinicity. By taking advantage of the disappearance of imperial-era pan-Russian identity, the Soviet leadership succeeded in making public opinion accept the idea that there existed a distinctive Ukrainian identity different from Russian identity and was emphasizing that the Ukrainians were a nation in its own right. "Little Russian" was given a negative connotation while "Ukrainian" was intended to be associated with socialist achievements [5, c. 176].

In the 1920s, the Soviet leadership launched the country's adminis-trative territorial division, including the territorial delimitation of emer-gent constituent republics of the Soviet Union. Politics and economics were the main criteria for the location of the borders between republics. The delimitation process involved fierce arguments about where some of the borders were to be drawn with numerous appeals from republics to Moscow. What borderland residents thought of this was often disregard-ed. The Soviet leadership ran across serious problems in drawing bound-aries and looked for solutions in Vladimir Lenin's books The Right of Nations to Self-Determination and Critical Remarks on the National Question. Study of those books led to the decision to give the status of a republic to a territory whose population spoke the same language. Such population groups were claimed to be nationalities. While language was the criterion, ethnic and cultural self-awareness, which historically had been a key factor in ethnic identification, was completely disregarded [15, c. 254].

As a result, the ethnically homogeneous population of some regions was divided between two republics and some of the regional economic systems were ruptured, causing changes in economic specializations or bringing about the collapse of some economic centers. On the other hand, the situation that had taken shape ruled out any other solutions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union with its republics becoming independent states, the population of areas near the Russian-Ukrainian border was beset by a range of problems in its everyday life. Due to the complexity of social, economic, political and cultural processes in those territories and the complexity of intercommunications in them, those lands need to be studied as a unique zone of political, economic, ethnic, and cultural interaction.

The development of statehood always implies the strengthening of border control. On the other hand, quite often state frontiers interfere with economic ties and contradict ethnic and historical regional boundaries.

This has been the case with areas along the Russian-Ukrainian frontier, whose population has developed a unique identity with distinctive everyday practices. It would be appropriate here to quote a point made by Eric Hobsbawm in his book Nations and Nationalism since 1780: "In the Soviet Union … it was the communist regime which deliberately set out to create ethno-linguistic territorial 'national administrative units,' i.e., 'nations' in the modern sense, where none had previously existed or been thought of, as among the Asian Moslem peoples – or, for that matter, the Byelorussians. The idea of Soviet Republics based on Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Tadjik, and Turkmen 'nations' was a theoretical construct of Soviet intellectuals rather than a primordial aspiration of any of those central-Asian peoples" [22, p. 263-264].

The self-identification of the present-day population of lands near the Russian-Ukrainian border areas often fails to fit into common methodological patterns. One important point is the language it speaks and its identification of that language. During the drawing of borders between Russia and Ukraine back in the 1920s, it was argued on the Russian side that disputed border districts presented a complicated language picture. It was pointed out that the borderland was mixed ethnically, and that "the population of a considerable part of the strip in Kursk Province along the border with the Ukrainian SSR speaks an intermediary language that is a transition from Ukrainian to Great Russian," and that "the border strip … is a territory of purely Great Russian … dialects." Therefore, "dialect cannot be a valid criterion for considering the southern borderland of Kursk Province Ukrainian territory," and "economic criteria should remain the determining principle in establishing the new administrative boundary" [6, p. 212].

Moreover, the population of the Russian Central Black Earth Belt, which was classified as "Little Russian" on the basis of a census of 1897, was worried, and sometimes felt strongly negative, about the intensive Ukrainianization of the 1920s. The head of administration of Ostrogozhsk district said that "the majority of the population of the district definitely don't consider themselves Little Russian," and that "Ukrainianization in the district is completely impossible and would surely turn the entire local life upside down." Remarkably, back in 1917, the Ostrogozhsk administration carried out a survey to find out whether the local rural population wanted Ukrainian to be the language of instruction at local schools. The responses made clear that Ukrainianization was unwanted: of the district's 44 village communes only nine were in favor of it and the rest were

against it [6, p. 220]. Thus, the self-identification of the borderland population in those times did not benefit the Ukrainian SSR.

Attempts to Ukrainianize schools in areas with predominantly Ukrainian population were not successful either. Many local Ukrainians strongly rejected a plan for the schools to teach in Ukrainian as from school year 1923/24. This "opinion of the peasantry," one report said, "means that it has no desire for Ukrainianization, as the latter would inevitably entail the breaking down of everyday practices and speech that have evolved historically."

Areas along the Don river – the Taganrog region and eastern Donbass – that were included in the Ukrainian SSR in 1920 offered a similar picture. "We forgot the Ukrainian language a long time ago. We are willingly learning Russian, and so are our children. We can't understand Ukrainian literature," local people were quoted as saying [6, pp. 221, 224]. Yelena Borisenok confirms that Ukrainians made up a relatively large proportion of the population of those lands. However, many of those Ukrainians said that they did not know the Ukrainian language and did not want to learn it or to have their children taught in it [6, p. 222].

We can come across similar instances of mixed self-identification today as well. In a survey in the village of Kantemirovka in Russia's Voronezh region in the 2000s, respondents often said, "I'm a Khokhol [a Russian nickname for Ukrainian] but Russian at heart." Hence Russian was their perceived background identity, an identity that can otherwise be called East Slavic or "imperial." As for their Ukrainian identity, it was a subethnic identity or "old" ethnicity, or otherwise subethnicity raised in status to full-scale ethnicity under the influence of the existence of a new state, Ukraine, but within the limits of Russian identity [14, c. 150].

Soviet national identity was designed primarily as supra-ethnic and integrational. It never took shape definitively, and by the late 1980s, was deep in crisis and unable to outweigh the increasing ethnic and cultural isolation of Soviet republics. Only in individual border areas was it possible to maintain something that was an illusion of Soviet identity, and the lands near the Russian-Ukrainian border, especially Donbass, were some of these areas.

Due to the polyethnicity of Donbass and its special role in the Soviet economy, its population evolved into a distinctive cultural community. Field studies have shown that the Donbass population maintained a Soviet supra-ethnic identity as its main identity for a long time after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Due to its historical, territorial and cultural

ties to Russia and its principal religious affiliation with the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate, the Donbass population has been looking to Russia as its source of political and cultural guidelines, thereby demonstrating the evolution of its Soviet identity into a mainly Russian national identity.

The areas along the Russian-Ukrainian border that this study examines make up a belt that is rather diverse ethnically, is several hundred kilometers wide, and is approximately split into halves by the frontier, which cuts through some of the urban agglomerates in Donbass, Slobozhanshchyna and some agricultural areas. This has left an imprint on the everyday life, culture and attitudes of the local population.

The disappearance of the Soviet Union was seen by many local people as vast-scale destruction. It deprived them of a stable sense of belonging to a specific social environment, leaving them with a vacuum. In other words, they believed it meant an end to their civil and national identity [8, p. 67]. Attempts at post-Soviet Western-type, mainly liberal, replacements for this identity cannot be considered serious strategies. The elimination of solid historical and cultural mainstays and the admiration of parts of the political elites for Western civilization triggered ideological chaos and identity collapses in the 1990s.

In 2007, a working group of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences carried out wide-scale surveys. Its conclusion was the following: "Citizens of present-day Russia have serious problems with their collective identity – by and large, there is little that brings them together: there are neither a common ideology nor common goals or interests" [16, p. 9].

"We're Slavs – I Have Nothing to Add"

IN SOME RESPECTS, territories along the Russian-Ukrainian border are not typical borderlands. Apparently, people living near Ukraine's eastern border with Russia see it as a border between "ourselves," and that conflicts with government policies. Polls carried out in 2009 and 2013 in Lugansk, the Ukrainian region with the longest common border with Russia, showed how much life in borderland determined the self-identification of the local population. The polls also answered questions about the role and regime of the frontier.

Noteworthily, the population on one side of the border is not different ethnically or culturally from the population on the other side, and both

sides profess the same values. The returns of the polls make clear that the Lugansk population sees the Ukrainian-Russian border as not a border between "us and them" but as one between "ourselves." This is a stable attitude, according to the returns – 71.8% of respondents held it in 2009 and 72.6% did in 2013. Only 8.5% saw the border in classical terms as a barrier between "us and them" in 2009 and only 11.9% did in 2013 [24, p. 67].

Table 1
How would you describe the border between Ukraine and Russia?

		Lugansk Region, 2009, %	Lugansk Region, 2013, %
1.	Border between "us and them"	8.5	11.9
2	Border between "ourselves"	71.8	72.6
3	Other	1.7	3.0
4	Undecided	17.3	11.7
5	No response	0.6	0.8
6	Total	100	100

Hence, 47.6% of respondents believed the border was unnecessary and 41,3% would have liked it to be looser, rather like the borders in the Schengen area. These returns reflected the most common views [24, pp. 67-68]. "Actually, this border doesn't make our life more difficult," respondents were quoted as saying. "We'd just like this border to be a bit more transparent, so that it should be easier for us to meet with our relatives in Russia, so that there should be more opportunities for this. Because there do arise some problems … with crossing this border. There always are holdups on the border. Long queues to cross it." A coal mine conveyor belt operator in the town of Chervonopartyzansk had similar complaints: "We can't go there freely now. To go there, you must fill in a

migration card. That's if you go by bus. It's a real problem, though, if you go by car. There's no problem as such with the Ukrainian customs – they just check you and you go through, you just make one stop. But over there, on Russian territory, there's a customs post, and just after you get past that there's border control. You opened your car there [at the customs post], they checked everything, looked into everything, and then you go 20 meters further and the same thing happens. They've made this very complicated, it's very hard. And you can't bring anything back from there either. A woman I know was there recently and tried to bring back a fish, but it was easier to throw it away. Or otherwise hide it somewhere, I don't know where. Of course, economically this makes our life difficult" [9, pp. 30-31].

Table 2
How should the Ukrainian-Russian border be set up?

		Lugansk Region, 2009, %	Lugansk Region, 2013, %
1.	Sealed, with barbed wire and a plowed control strip alongside	2.8	2.3
2.	Open for people, capital and goods to move across as in Schengen area	38.7	41.3
3.	No border necessary	45.1	47.6
4.	Other	0.8	0.7
5.	Undecided	11.2	7.9
6.	No response	1.5	0.1
	Total	100	100

The population of the north of Lugansk region believes that it is Sloboda Ukraine (Slobozhanshchyna) that the frontier divides, while the population of the south of the region think it is Donbass that the border runs through. "What is Slobozhanshchyna?" a school principal in the vil-

lage of Bilolutsk asked. "No one knows clearly how far it goes. It goes all the way up north to somewhere near Kursk. And now they've split up this living body. All the way up north to Belgorod and Voronezh, everyone speaks Ukrainian." A nurse in the village of Parkhomenko in Krasnodon district said: "I'm strongly against there being any frontier. If there's anyone who thinks, there's a danger…. We are ordinary people. There are no borders between us. None at all! Anyone would support me. We're people of the same race, as it were. We're Slavs. I have nothing to add" [9, p. 30].

It is also remarkable that eastern Ukrainians feel closer to people living in Russia than to western Ukrainians. Very often people from eastern Ukraine feel culturally more comfortable in Russian cities than they do in many cities in western Ukraine. For example, 40.4% of respondents in a poll in Lugansk region said that they felt in their element in Rostov-on-Don but only 17.7% said they did in Lvov [24, c. 68]. "I don't feel that our region is a border area," people in Lugansk said. "It's just a city as any other. As regards Ukrainian cities, it doesn't matter where you are, in Kiev or in Cherkassy or in Lugansk. There isn't much difference. The same kind of people, the same kind of mentality. And I personally can't feel the proximity of the Russian border either" [9, c. 30].

And this is what a teacher in Chervonopartizansk said: "I don't know about Lugansk or Rostov, but I know about the town of Chervonopartizansk and the town of Gukovo. What makes us similar? Gukovo is a mining town, and so are we. Our people are used to work, they are used to earning their money, and not in the easiest of ways either. Hard workers live here. And what about western Ukraine? They are too lazy to work." A Chervonopartyzansk pensioner was speaking in the same vein: "It doesn't seem to me that we differ from the Russians, from Rostov region. We're people of the same kind…. Our living standards may be a little different. Of course, they may be better off. Who knows? And as for the west, they've never considered us Ukrainian anyway, nor do they do these days" [9, p. 33].

Similar opinions were expressed in the north of Lugansk region, which borders the Russian regions of Belgorod and Voronezh and, unlike Russian-speaking Donbass, has an ethnically mixed population with Ukrainians slightly outnumbering the rest. "We've been separated," one of the respondents said. "We, people living in borderland villages, are all like relatives. We are also Ukrainian, we love Ukraine. But why western Ukrainians want to prove that they love Ukraine more than we do?" [9, p. 33].

These studies confirmed stable mutual friendliness of Russians and Ukrainians even though such friendliness may not be a feature of government policies. In a survey in 2009, a time of tension between Russia and Ukraine, 60.6% of respondents described relations between the two countries as poor at government level but good at the grassroots and 8.1% called them good both at government level and at the grassroots. In a 2013 survey, the proportions were 48.3% и 24.6% respectively. In a survey made a few years later, the proportion of respondents sure of friendly relations between the two governments was 16.5% larger, while grassroots relations were assessed as negative by 15% but as positive by 73% [24, pp. 69-70].

The population of eastern Ukrainian borderlands attaches little and dwindling importance to ethnic self-identification but attaches increasing importance to mother tongue-based self-identification. Moreover, the Russian-Ukrainian border is not perceived as a defense or isolation barrier, and therefore is not seen as a strict dividing line. In one survey, 86% of respondents who were in favor of either liberalizing the frontier regime or abolishing the frontier altogether wanted Ukraine to have two official languages, Ukrainian and Russian. Among respondents advocating a sealed border, nearly 30% wanted Ukrainian to remain the country's only official language [24].

In conclusion, it needs to be pointed out that, as they were demolishing their former identities, post-Soviet states were rapidly designing a new history, laying claim to ethnic, sociocultural and other uniqueness, and negating and methodically discrediting the past. Most of the new identity constructs were potential sources of conflict as has been illustrated by developments in former Soviet republics over the past few decades. Ukrainian society is engulfed in a deepening crisis caused by a conflict between regional identities and unsustainable ethnocratic constructs. Public opinion in Ukraine is fragmented and riddled with contradictions as the majority of the population lacks a stable ethnic identity. There are some unification factors, but they are weak and local identities predominate [18].

In the period under study, those preferring to speak Ukrainian and those preferring to speak Russian made up equal proportions of 45% while 10% had perfect command of both languages [18, c. 516]. Experts see the summer of 2012 as the starting point of a mass-scale escalation of an identities conflict [3, p. 20] that split the country and sparked a civil war. Ukraine's 2012 Law on Regional Languages stoked that conflict.

The civil war in eastern Ukraine practically makes empirical research there impossible. If it were possible, it would undoubtedly produce far from objective findings because of the politicized character of the subject matter and various other factors.

Conclusion

EMPIRICAL STUDIES confirm that the official frontier between Russia and eastern Ukraine conflicts with ethnic and historical regional borders. The population of Ukrainian borderlands consider those living on the other side of the frontier "our own people." The population of Donbass does not consider the border with Russia as a border with foreigners. The population of Russian regions along the Ukrainian border fragmentarily identifies itself as ethnic Ukrainian but all residents of those regions identify themselves as parts of the Russian nation.

The population of eastern Ukraine has consistently seen Russia as a culturally close country, as a country of friends and brothers, despite outbreaks of tension between the two countries' governments. Sociocultural and extensive economic ties with Russia explain why, of all foreign countries, the population of eastern Ukraine stably likes Russia best, which is more a civilizational than a political preference. Sociocultural, ethnic and psychological similarity, a common historical memory and shared foreign policy preferences warrant the conclusion that the population on both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border has the same identity. This identity is based on the awareness of the indivisibility of the millennium-long history of Russia and belief in the continuity of what are cultural constants on both sides of the frontier.

LIST OF SOURCES

1. Aberkrombi N., Khill S., Terner B.S. *Sotsiologichesky slovar.* Moscow: Ekonomika, 2004, pp. 155-156.
2. Arsentyeva, Irina Ilyinichna. "Ponyatiye 'prigranichye' v sovremennom nauchnom diskurse," *Vestnik ChitGU.* 2012. No. 6 (85), pp. 24-29.
3. Baranov A.V. "Identichnost Novorossii: istoriya, sovremennoye sostoyaniye, vozmozhnosti stroitelstva," *Krym i Donbass: god posle gosudarstvennogo perevorota na Ukraine* / Edited by V.V. Chernous. Yuzhnorossiyskoye obozreniye, Center for Regional Studies of the Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of the Southern Federal University. Issue 88. Moscow-Rostov-on-Don: Sotsialno-gumanitarnyye znaniya, 2015.
4. Borisenok Ye.Yu. "A chto my znayem o litse Ukrainy?": *Ukrainizatsiya kak model gosudarstvennoy politiki v 1918-1941 gg.* Moscow, 2017.
5. Borisenok Ye.Yu. "Iz malorossov – v ukraintsy: bolshevistskaya strategiya identifikatsii natsionalnoy prinadlezhnosti," *Slavyansky almanakh.* Moscow, 2014. Issue 1-2, pp. 171-186.

6. Borisenok Ye.Yu. "Ukraina i Rossiya: spor o granitsakh v 1920-ye gody," *Regiony i granitsy Ukrainy v istoricheskoy retrospekive.* Moscow: Institute for Slavic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2005, pp. 205-237.

7. Bresky, Oleg; Breskaya, Olga. *Ot tranzitologii k teorii pogranichya. Ocherki dekonstruktsii kontsepta Vostochnaya Yevropa.* Vilnius: European University for the Humanities, 2008.

8. Ziza Ye.N. "Postsovetskoye obshchestvo: rost anomii v epokhu postmoderna," *Vestnik Baltiyskogo federalnogo universiteta im. I. Kanta.* Issue 8. Seriya: Gumanitarnyye i obshchestvennye nauki. Kaliningrad, 2007, pp. 62-72.

9. Kononov I.F. "Vostochnaya granitsa Ukrainy: praktiki vlasti i zhiznenny mir," *Narody, kultury i sotsialnyye protsessy na pogranichye.* Grodno, February 22-23, 2010 / Yanka Kupala State University of Grodno, Grodno, 2010, pp. 27-34.

10. Kononov I.F. "Problema granits i yeye znacheniye dlya sotsiologii," *Metodolohiya, teoriya ta praktyka sotsiolohichnoho analizu suchasnoho suspilstva.* Kharkiv: V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 2004, pp. 45-49.

11. Kononov I.F. *Etnos. Tsinnosti. Komunikatsiya (Donbas v etnokulturnykh koordynatakh Ukrayiny).* Luhansk: Alma-mater, 2000.

12. Kotenko A.L., Martynyuk O.V., Miller A.I. "'Maloross': evolyutsiya ponyatiya do Pervoy mirovoy voyny," *Novoye literaturnoye obozreniye.* Moscow, 2011. No. 108, pp. 9-27.

13. Krylov M.P. "Istoricheskaya pamyat kak faktor vzaimodeystviya regionalnoy i etnicheskoy identichnosti: sluchay Rossii i Ukrainy. Metodologicheskiye zamechaniya i nekotoryye rezultaty polevykh issledovaniy," *Gumanitarnyye resursy regionalnogo razvitiya.* Moscow, 2008, pp. 118-131.

14. Krylov M.P. "Kategoriya 'identichnost' v kontekste problem prigranichiy," *Mir psikhologii.* 2012. No. 1 (69), pp. 137-151.

15. Matveyev V.A. *Ukrainsky krizis 2014 g.: retrospektivnoye izmereniye (osobennosti istoricheskoy kodifikatsii v vostochnoslavyanskoy etnicheskoy srede na yuge Rossiyskoy imperii i yeye proyavleniye v noveyshuyu epokhu).* Rostov-on-Don: OOO "Omega-Print," 2015.

16. Rabochaya gruppa IS RAN. Rossiyskaya identichnost v sotsiologicheskom izmerenii. An analytical report. Part 3 // *Polis.* 2008. No. 3.

17. *Rossiysko-ukrainskoye pogranichye: dvadtsat let razdelennogo yedinstva.* A monograph. Moscow: Novy khronograf, 2011.

18. Semenov V.S. "Transformatsiya massovogo soznaniya naseleniya Ukrainy v XXI v." *Sostialnoye protivostoyaniye i yego proyavleniya na Yuge Rossii v XX-nachale XXI v. (k stoletiyu nachala Grazhdanskoy voyny i obrazovaniya Donskoy respubliki): Materials of a Russian scholarly conference,* Rostov-on-Don, September 18-22, 2018. Rostov-on-Don: Southern Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2018, pp. 514-519.

19. Smit, Entoni. *Kulturnyye osnovy natsiy: iyerarkhiya, zavet i respublika.* Moscow: ESEM Media Ukrayina, 2010.

20. Filippova O.A., Soroka Yu.G. "Politiki identichnosti: antropologicheskiye metody i sotsiokulturnyye interpretatsii," *Metodolohiya, teoriya ta praktyka sotsiolohichnoho analizu suchasnoho suspilstva.* Kharkiv: V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 2009, pp. 129-135.

21. Khauskhofer Karl. "Granitsy v ikh geograficheskom i politicheskom znachenii," *Klassika geopolitiki, XX vek.* Compiled by Korolev. Moscow: AST, 2003, pp. 227-598.

22. Khobsbaum E. *Natsii i natsionalizm posle 1780 goda.* St. Petersburg: Aleteya, 1998.

23. Khobta S.V. "Vostok Ukrainy: transformatsiya identichnostey v usloviyakh pogranichya," *Perekrestki.* 2010. No. 3/4, pp. 207-222.

24. Khobta S.V. "Granitsa, natsionalnaya i regionalnaya identichnosti v vospriyatii zhiteley Donbassa," *Visnyk Luhanskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Tarasa Shevchenka. Sotsiolohichni nauky.* 2013. No. 23 (282). Part II, December. Sotsiolohichni nauky, pp. 64-77.

25. Khobta S.V. "Dynamika suspilnoyi dumky meshkantsiv Donbasu pro kordon iz Rosiyeyu," *Metodolohiya, teoriya ta praktyka sotsiolohichnoho analizu suchasnoho suspilstva.* Issue 20 Kharkiv: V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 2009, pp. 143-149.

26. Shtelting E. "Sotsialnoye znacheniye granits," *Kochuyushchiye granitsy.* St. Petersburg: Tsentr nezavisimykh sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii, 1999.

*Key word*s: Russian-Ukrainian border, frontier, borderland, language, identity.

Moldova's East-West Dilemma

D. Malyshev

IN RECENT YEARS, the territory of the former Soviet Union has been the site of escalating East-West rivalry. On one side there are Euro-Atlantic bodies – the European Union and NATO. On the other there are the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), organizations active on former Soviet territory. This rivalry was made more intense by the crisis of 2013 and 2014 in Ukraine and the reunification of Crimea with Russia. The future nature of international relations in ex-Soviet territory and those in Europe as a whole largely depends on whether former Soviet republics will prioritize relations with the EU or activities in the EAEU format. For Moldova, this is a vital choice to make for historical (and geographical) reasons.

Moldova's Self-Establishment as an Independent State

DESPITE its comparatively small area of 33,846 square kilometers and a population of a little more than four million, which rank it 135th and 132rd in the world respectively, Moldova holds an important geostrategic position on the border between the EU and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Moldova is a landlocked country bordering Romania and Ukraine. It is close to Romania ethnically and historically and owes its name to the Romanian river Moldova. That river was also the source of the name of the Principality of Moldova (or Principality of Moldavia), which existed from the 14th to the 19th century.

As other republics of the former Soviet Union, immediately after the latter's collapse Moldova looked for its own niche in the changing system of international relations even though its post-Soviet history has been marred by the conflict with its region of Transnistria, which remains unre-

_____

Dmitry Malyshev, Senior Research Associate, Ye.M. Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Science (Hist.); dimal.68@mail.ru

solved. Since 1992, Moldova has been a member of the United Nations and of some of its specialized bodies – the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop ment (IBRD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Moldova is also a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which it

> Moldova will undoubtedly seek to take advantage of its unique geographical location in a spot where the interests of the EU overlap with those of the EAEU.

joined in 1992, when the organization was called the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). It has been a member of the CIS since 1994, the Council of Europe since 1995, and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2001. Moldova is, besides, a member of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which brings together 12 countries, including Russia. It is also a member of the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, a four-nation group whose members, besides Moldova, are Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. GUAM, which takes a clearly anti-Russian line, seeks to portray itself as an organization alternative to the CIS and all other Russia-backed associations.

Moldova's constitution declares the country a neutral state. Moldova has announced repeatedly that it seeks to join the EU, which on the whole does not contradict its official neutral status as the EU is not a military bloc.

After becoming an independent state, Moldova has intensively developed its relations with Romania. The replacement of Moldovan with Romanian as the name of Moldova's official language and the idea of Romanianizing Moldovan society has gained considerable public support in the country. But Romanianization was not to everyone's liking. The main opposition to it came from the chiefly Russian-speaking population of Transnistria and from the Gagauz, a Turkic people living in southern Moldova. Gagauz made up more than 80% of the population of the self-proclaimed Republic of Gagauzia, which existed from 1990 to 1994 and changed its status to that of an "autonomous territorial unit" in December

1994 via referendums. Due to these mixed feelings about Romanianization, Moldovan politicians are careful not to overhype it and prefer to talk about a "European option." But Gagauzia is a stumbling block there too: it is more Russia-oriented. Gagauzia sells the bulk of its agricultural produce to Russia, and Russian is the region's business language. There is also considerable Turkish influence in the region.

At the referendum in Gagauzia in February 2014 that had a turnout of 70% but was not recognized by the Moldovan government, 97% of voters rejected Moldova's proposed accession to the EU and 99% supported a proposition for Gagauzia to secede and become an independent state if Moldova became an EU member.[1]

Romania, just as Moldova, refused to recognize the referendum, Romanian state news agency Agerpres said, citing the then Romanian foreign minister, Titus Corlățean. "We support the position of the government of the Republic of Moldova on the so-called referendum, namely that it represented a violation of a ruling by the judicial authorities of the Republic of Moldova that has clearly qualified those supposed consultations as illegal and unconstitutional," Corlățean said.[2] This was a predictable reaction given Romania's unconditional support for Moldova's ambition to join the EU. But on the other hand, Moldova couldn't afford to ignore sentiments in Gagauzia and took a break in its EU accession efforts.

Ukraine, which maintains close economic and political ties with neighboring Moldova, is seen by the latter as a strategic partner. Moreover, Ukraine is an important stage in the transit of Moldovan goods to Russia. Early in 2019, Moldovan President Igor Dodon, in a letter to Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, complained that a new set of Russian sanctions against Ukraine hampered Moldovan exports to Russia by forcing Moldova to choose longer delivery routes.[3]

Russia has had a rocky relationship with Moldova for a long time. One reason is that Chisinau accuses Russia, which has no border with Moldova, of backing separatism in Transnistria.[4] However, the election of Igor Dodon, leader of the Party of Socialists (PSRM), as president of Moldova in November 2016 brought about some positive changes in Moldovan-Russian relations.

Dodon launched a constructive policy toward Russia, described Moldovan-Russian relations as a strategic partnership, and called the Russian people brothers. During his election campaign, Dodon had advocated closer relations between his country and Russia and promised that

Russia would be the first foreign country he would visit if he won the election,[5] a promise he kept.

However, his Russia-related plans were difficult to put into practice as Moldova's parliament and cabinet were less euphoric about Russia and Moldova was still struggling with a dilemma that had beset it ever since it became an independent state – should it seek to join the EU or try to ally with Russia-led organizations? Both options had their strong supporters in Moldova.

The European and Eurasian Options

IT IS OBVIOUS to any analyst that neither option means instant solutions to Moldova's main problems. One of these is its traditionally agrarian economy with a poorly developed industry. Other are increasingly serious social problems caused by unemployment, which leads to mass outmigration.

It is not quite clear what Moldova's role would be in the European division of labor, even in EU agriculture, which is rather strictly regimented by Brussels. The pro-EU lobby in Moldova hasn't been able to suggest any realistic way of ensuring significant growth for the country's economy. Moreover, Moldova is engulfed in a political crisis caused by the amorphous character of its political system, which is drifting toward a parliamentary republic. Incessant conflicts between the executive and legislative branches and within the executive branch itself – between the president and the cabinet – further destabilize the situation.

Moldova's society, including its ruling elite, is deeply divided with one part wanting closer cooperation with Russia and the other being pro-Western, and naturally anti-Russian. As one study argues correctly, by opting for either path, Moldova would objectively be forced to follow either Euro-Atlantic values or values stemming from the Eurasian model and consequently have to join either Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian bodies.[6]

But while the EAEU is willing to admit Moldova quickly and without any significant conditions, the EU presents the country with a set of tough accession criteria. For objective reasons, Moldova would be unable to meet many of these criteria, including effective anti-corruption measures, solid guarantees of civil rights and economic freedoms, and the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict.[7]

One more factor Moldova needs to take into account are its trading partners. The top five importers of Moldovan goods are Romania, the

country where Moldova sends 24.38% of its exports, Russia (11.34%), Italy (9.02%), Germany (6.91%), and Britain (5.88%). Romania and Russia are also the main exporters to Moldova with Romanian products accounting for 13.76% and Russian goods for 11.99% of Moldova's imports. The top five exporters to Moldova also include Ukraine (10.30%), China (10.06%) and Germany (7.97%).[8] Finding new trading partners is a problem for Moldova because of its limited range of merchandise and its transportation problems such as its lack of sea access.

Quite often, Moldovan politicians claim that Moldova is able to sit on two chairs at the same time – that it has been managing to build equally good relations with the EU and with the EAEU. Ukraine tried such a policy a while ago, but it can hardly work for Moldova: the EU and EAEU have different objectives, and attaching the same importance to its relations with the EU and EAEU would give Moldova problems that other former Soviet republics pursuing multidirectional foreign policies have had on their plate. Moldova's main potential problem is its association agreement with the EU, which was signed in June 2014 and fully came into force on July 1, 2016. Among other things, the accord has established the so-called EU-Moldova Free and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), an arrangement conflicting with the EAEU free trade area.

Yet despite the assurances of many Moldovan politicians that Moldova is firmly on the European path, the country is strengthening its relations with the EAEU and Russia. Between January and August 2018, Russian-Moldovan trade grew by more than one-third, with Russian exports to Moldova swelling by nearly 50% and Moldovan exports to Russia going up by 14.4%.[9] At a CIS summit in Dushanbe in September 2018, Dodon insisted that the CIS and EAEU boost trade with the EU and called for activities to put the Europe "from Lisbon to Vladivostok" concept into practice. He promised that Moldova would be building up cultural, economic, social and other relations with fellow CIS members.[10]

Moldova's Relations with the EU

MOLDOVA'S RELATIONS with the EU are governed by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), an EU instrument to build closer ties between the EU and neighboring countries that has a budget of 14.4 billion euros for the period from 2014 to 2020. The ENP is implemented through regional initiatives such as the Eastern Partnership (EaP), the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and Cross-Border Cooperation

(CBC). The EU declares CBC a key element of its policy toward its neighbors.

Dodon, after taking office in December 2016, has said repeatedly that he plans to initiate the abrogation of the EU-Moldova Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which was signed in November 1994 and came into force in July 1998. He has argued that the accord inflicts heavy losses on Moldova by putting the country under Russian countersanctions against European goods.[11] However, the agreement remains in effect.

In 2005, the EU set up a delegation in Chisinau, its diplomatic mission to Moldova,[12] thereby making the latter one of the 136 countries where it has its delegations. Since 2009, Moldova has participated in the Eastern Partnership. In August of that year, four Moldovan parties – the Liberal Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Democratic Party, and the Our Moldova Alliance – formed the Alliance for European Integration, which set itself the task of working for Moldova's accession to the EU.

Since April 28, 2014, Moldovans holding biometric passports have been allowed visa-exempt entry into the Schengen area. By April 2018, 1.4 million Moldovans had made use of that right. The EU has been financing projects in Moldova in various fields, including the construction of drinking water supply infrastructures, public transportation, and the conservation of cultural monuments.[13]

Other cooperation projects are the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), which helps monitor Moldova's frontier and was launched by the EU in 2005,[14] and the Mobility Partnership, an EU-Moldova migration and mobility regulation agreement signed on June 5, 2018.[15]

Moldova's strengthening of ties with the West is fueled not only by governmental activity and by the efforts of the media controlled by the influential pro-Western elite but also by the nature of the country's political system. Dodon is not the only powerful figure. A great deal of economic and political clout is in the hands of Democratic Party leader Vladimir Plahotniuc, Moldova's richest oligarch who is known for his anti-Russian rhetoric. In 2017, Moldova adopted a mixed system for parliamentary elections with 50 seats in the legislature to be filled through a proportional representation vote and the other 51 through first-past-the-post (FPTP) polls. Plahotniuc expected that the Democratic Party would win more seats in parliament through the FPTP vote in the elections late in February 2019 and that this would fortify the country's pro-EU line.[16]

Public opinion is rather volatile in Moldova. In a Public Opinion

Barometer poll in May 2018,[17] 55% of respondents expressed support for accession to the EU and 48% were in favor of joining the EAEU.[18] By the end of the year, the EAEU option gained more support, something that will be discussed below.

Nevertheless, Plahotniuc's ambitions have a solid social basis under them. The current six-month presidency of the EU, the period from January 1 to June 30, is held by Romania. This boosted the spirits of Moldova's pro-EU lobby. "The presidency of the Council of the EU implies impartial and professional management of issues on the agenda, from simple to the most complicated ones," said Romanian Prime Minister Viorica Dăncilă. The Moldovan deputy prime minister for European Integration, Iurie Leancă, has described Romania's presidency as a unique opportunity for Moldova to build closer relations with the EU. "We expect support from Bucharest in organizing more extensive debates in the EU on a clearer prospect for the Republic of Moldova joining the European Union," he said.[19]

Moldova's pro-EU lobby has meanwhile made some progress. In an agreement with Romania signed back in 2012, Moldova pledged to put its armed forces under the command of the Romanian general staff, and hence under NATO control, something that runs against Moldova's constitutional status as a neutral state. After signing a military cooperation treaty in summer 2013, Moldova and Romania began to de facto merge their armed forces.[20]

However, EU-Moldovan relations are marred by the Transnistrian conflict, which had an armed phase in 1992 and remains unresolved. The conflict was sparked by the rejection by the population of Transnistria, an industrial and, for historical reasons, predominantly Russian-speaking region, of the plans for Moldova's Romanianization. In 1991, the conflict gave birth to the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, a state that has not been recognized by any of the United Nations' member states. One source of danger is that Romanian troops may be used in attacking Transnistria in a potential new outbreak of fighting as NATO's member countries uncompromisingly stand for Moldova's territorial integrity.

Moldova and the EAEU:
Tentative Attempts at Cooperation

IN MARCH 2017, Dodon announced that Moldova may join the EAEU soon. In an agreement negotiated by Dodon and Russian President

Vladimir Putin during a meeting the same month, Russia pledged not to levy import duties on Moldovan agricultural products, wine and canned food.[21] On April 14, 2017, Moldova asked the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (SEEC), the highest EAEU body, to grant it observer status at the Union. All the EAEU member states backed the request, and Dodon signed a memorandum of cooperation between Moldova and the EAEU.[22]

During a session in Sochi, Russia, on May 14, 2018, the SEEC approved regulations on the status of an EAEU observer state. Moldova became the first country to receive this status.[23]

Observer status, which is based on Article 109 of the Treaty Establishing the Eurasian Economic Union, authorizes a state to have its representatives at the meetings of EAEU bodies by invitation and to obtain documents that do not contain any confidential information, but it does not authorize such a state to participate in decision-making. Importantly, a state applying for observer status must pledge to "refrain from any action that may infringe the interests of the Union and its Member States, as well as the object and purpose of this Treaty."[24] Dodon wants Moldova to be, in a sense, a bridge between the EU and EAEU. He believes Moldova needs a referendum on whether it should become a full member of the EAEU. He doesn't see it as a foregone conclusion that such a referendum would throw out the idea as there still are numerous Moldovans who want their country to join the EAEU. In a survey whose returns were published late in November 2018, 41.5% of respondents were in favor of Moldova's accession to the EAEU and only 38.7% wanted the country to join the EU.[25] This suggests that Dodon's EAEU initiative enjoys considerable support.

But joining the EAEU would by no means be a smooth process for Moldova. The Democratic Party and the parliamentary majority are against the president's pro-EAEU policy. Parliament chairman Andrian Candu, who is a Democrat, said recently that it is Moldova's strategy to seek to join the EU. The Democratic Party insists on amendments to the constitution to formalize the EU accession course as the country's foreign policy priority.[26] "The government will not allocate any money for financing activities that have to do with Moldova's observer status in the EAEU," said Prime Minister Pavel Filip. "Integration into the European Union is the only option for Moldova." Filip pointed out that, since Moldova is a parliamentary republic, any foreign policy initiative needs approval from parliament and the cabinet.[27]

The parliamentary vehicle of pro-Russian policies is the group of the Party of Socialists (PSRM). It is the legislature's largest group (35 members) but is outweighed by pro-EU groups. After Dodon was elected president, he was replaced as PSRM leader by former prime minister Zinaida Greceanîi. The PSRM's counterpart in interparliamentary contacts between Moldova and Russia is the A Just Russia party.

The PSRM has published a proposed development program for Moldova entitled *The Moldovan Progress: 10 Steps of Creation.* These steps are: (1) Building an economy serving the people and not a handful of high-ranking robbers – creating a "Moldova without oligarchs and corruption"; (2) Building strong guarantees of Moldova's neutrality by signing an international pact establishing Moldova's permanent neutrality; Russia, the United States, China, and EU countries would be the guarantors of the pact; (3) Unification of Moldovan society – making Moldova a "united sovereign, multinational, federal and democratic" state with Transnistria reunited with the rest of the country to create a "single civil society" with a "Moldovan identity"; (4) Achieving a high pace of development – measures to include setting up a general international transportation and logistical center, organizing the production of ecological food and establishing innovation centers; (5) Eurasian integration as "a guarantee of development of the country" and of the solution of numerous social and economic problems; negotiating a reduction of the price for natural gas imports to those paid by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia; (6) unification of the ethnic Moldovan communities of all countries; (7) opening up Moldova to the world, so that there should be no "iron curtain" separating the country either from the East or from the West; (8) Ensuring "loyalty to the traditions of our ancestors," a set of measures including the insertion in the preamble to the constitution of a reference to Orthodox Christianity as the traditional religion of the Moldovan people, implementation of the People's Assembly project, and banning the propaganda of homosexuality; (9) Creating "an intelligent Moldova" – borrowing scientific and educational achievements from foreign countries; (10) Building "advanced and accessible healthcare" – borrowing the "Scandinavian model" of healthcare, which is recognized as "one of the best in the world."[28] As we can see, this is a vast-scale but challenging program.

Despite heavy pressures both within and outside Moldova, Dodon has not abandoned his EAEU initiative. In autumn 2018, he paid another visit to Russia. During his stay from the end of October to the beginning of

November, he negotiated with Putin, met with Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and spoke to students at the Lomonosov Moscow State University, sharing his views on the situation in Moldova and his outlook for Moldovan-Russian relations. On November 11, 2018, he set out his views on Moldovan-Russian relations in a speech to the Russian State Duma.

Dodon and Putin went through a wide range of issues during their negotiations but weren't able to come to any significant agreements. On the Transnistria issue, Dodon reaffirmed his position that the region is part of Moldova but didn't go further than a noncommittal thesis that contacts between the governments of Moldova and Transnistria would help resolve the conflict. A discussion of Moldova's foreign policy didn't bring any surprises either except that Dodon, unlike his predecessors, strongly advocated closer relations between his country and the EAEU.

Putin and Dodon also discussed proposals for increasing the volume of trade between their countries and for Russian investment in infrastructure projects in Moldova and Transnistria, and a Russian decision to loosen residency rules for Moldovan labor migrants.[29] The two leaders approved a plan to declare 2019 the Moldova Year in Russia and 2020 the Russia Year in Moldova. Dodon assured the Russian president that the majority of Moldova's population supported "the course to maintain friendly relations between the two countries that have evolved historically and to strengthen Moldovan-Russian strategic partnership."[30]

Moldova and the EAEU moved closer together in December 2018 as, at Putin's invitation, Dodon attended a session of the SEEC – he was representing Moldova as an EAEU observer state at the event held in St. Petersburg.

Dodon and Putin then reconvened in Moscow on January 30. They discussed bilateral and regional issues, paying special attention to February's upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova. "Needless to say," said Putin, "we in Russia are not indifferent to the future Moldovan Parliament because it forms the country's Government and the future development of Russia-Moldova relations will largely depend on this, as well as the future Government's support of the initiatives brought up by the President of Moldova on the development of our bilateral ties."[31]

The two presidents also raised the issues of Moldovan labor migration into Russia and a Moldovan proposal for Moldovan exports to Russia to pass through Ukrainian territory. Dodon thanked Russia for its "consistent position on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic

of Moldova." He also said that "Russia is considered a friendly country by 65 percent of our population."[32]

Dodon and Putin reached an agreement for their countries to continue to cooperate in the CIS and EAEU formats. Another agreement between the two leaders allows Moldovan exports to Russia to pass through Ukraine, which can boost their volumes significantly.[33] All this reflects the positive dynamics of Russian-Moldovan relations and their friendly character.

<center>***</center>

MOLDOVA will undoubtedly seek to take advantage of its unique geographical location in a spot where the interests of the EU overlap with those of the EAEU. Will this policy work? The arrangement of forces in parliament after February's elections may provide some clarity, namely it may suggest whether the country will continue to be torn by political battles or will be able to come to some harmonized decisions.

Russia still has a good chance of building a fruitful relationship with Moldova, which is an important country for Russia to be on good terms with. Although it is Moldova's number two trading partner after Romania, Russia is the biggest foreign investor into Moldova's economy, and Russian-Moldovan cooperation is based on about 150 agreements. The Moldovan community in Russia is a serious source of state revenues for Moldova. About one million Moldovans are working abroad, and about 700,000 of them have jobs in countries east of Moldova, mainly in Russia.

There also are historical ties between Russia and Moldova. Moldova was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1812. Two centuries of being parts of the same state have left their imprint. Moreover, Moldova is an Orthodox Christian country, and therefore it was logical that Dodon was present at a celebration of the tenth anniversary of the enthronement of Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church. Practically the entire population of Moldova can speak Russian, and one million Moldovans consider it their mother tongue. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova neither bans nor tries to eradicate Russian but has given it the official status of a language of interethnic communication. Back in the Soviet era, tremendous amounts of Russian-language literature, including Russian classics, were published in Moldova. Great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin, who visited Moldova, is no less popular there than at home. As 2014 developments in Ukraine made clear, severing ties of this kind may be a painful exercise with grave consequences.

There are purely economic factors as well. Moldova sends about 70% of its agricultural exports, mainly wine, fruit and vegetables, eastward – to countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Agriculture is the basis of Moldova's economy, and EAEU member countries are used to Moldovan agricultural produce. The EU neither wants nor can replace EAEU countries as importers of farm products from Moldova.

And, of course, Moldova might be well-advised to study the experience of European countries such as Switzerland that are not members of the EU but cooperate with it closely. There may also be options for associated membership in the EU. Which path Moldova will take, depends on how wise and farsighted its leadership is.

NOTES

1 Erdemir, Aykan and Lechner, John. *Erdoğan's Interests Converge with Putin in Moldova's Gagauzia* // http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/611-erdoğan's-interests-converge-with-putin-in-moldova's-gagauzia.html

2 *Rumyniya "ne priznayet" itogi referendum v Gagauzii* // https://point.md/ru/novosti/politika/ruminiya-quotne-priznaetquot-itogi-referenduma-v-gagauzii

3 *V Moldavii pozhalovalis na rossiyskiye sanktsii protiv Ukrainy* // https://iz.ru/832460/2019-01-10/v-moldavii-pozhalovalis-na-rossiiskie-sanktcii-protiv-ukrainy

4 For more details, see: Malyshev D.V. "Pridnestrovsky konflikt: trayektoriya razvitiya," *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Series 25: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika.* No. 1. 2013. January-March, pp. 106-126.

5 *Prezidentom Moldavii izbran vystupayushchy za sblizheniye s Rossiyey sotsialist Igor Dodon* // https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3780297

6 *Yevropeysky soyuz i Yevraziysky ekonomichesky soyuz: dolgosrochny dialog i perspektivy soglasheniya.* St. Petersburg: Centre for Integration Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank, 2016.

7 *Moldove predyavlyayutsya chrezvychayno zhestkiye trebovaniya dlya liberalizatsii vizovogo rezhima s YeS* // https://viza.md/ru/content/молдове-предъявляются-чрезвычайно-жесткие-требования-для-либерализации-визового-режима-с-ес

8 *Torgovyye svyazi Moldovy: s kem torguyet strana i chto sama prodayet* // https://ru.sputnik.md/infographics/20170904/14324468/struktura-export.html

9 Sokov, Kirill. *Yevraziyskaya integratsiya* // https://www.ritmeurasia.org/news--2018-10-09--moldavija-mezhdu-es-i-eaes-38935

10 *Dodon vystpayet za svobodnuyu torgovlyu mezhdu SNG – YeS i YeAES – YeS* // https://noi.md/ru/politika/dodon-vystupaet-za-svobodnuyu-torgovlyu-mezhdu-sng-es-i-eajes-es?prev=1

11 *Moldaviya gotova otmenit soglasheniye s YeS radi soyuza s Moskvoy* // https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-38652324

12 *YeS v mire* // https://eeas.europa.eu/ru/eu-information-russian/area/geo_ru

13 *EU-Moldova relations. Factsheet* // https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/4011/node/4011_en

14 http://eubam.org

15 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/interna-tional-affairs/global-approach-to-migration/specific-tools/docs/mobility_partnership_republic_of_moldova_en.pdf

16 *V Bryussele vsyo spokoyno: Status Dodona v YeAES – vnutrenneye delo Moldavii //* https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2417421.html

17 http://bop.ipp.md/en

18 *Chlenstvo v YeS privleklo grazhdan Moldavii bolshe, chem v YeAES //* https://www.interfax.ru/world/612591

19 *Rumyniya pomozhet Moldavii stat blizhe k Yevrosoyuzu //* https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2019/01/03/rumyniya-pomozhet-moldavii-stat-blizhe-k-evrosoyuzu

20 Bukarsky, Vladimir. *Pridnestrovye na poroge voyny //* http://ruspravda.info/Pridnestrove-na-poroge-voyni-6840.html

21 Badalyan, Akop. *Novy chlen YeAES? Nepriyatnyye novosti dlya Armenii //* https://inos-mi.ru/politic/20170322/238921151.html

22 *Moldaviya prisoyedinyayetsya k YeAES v kachestve strany-nablyudatelya //* https://tehnowar.ru/print:page,1,61070-moldaviya-prisoedinyaetsya-k-eaes-v-kachestve-strany-nablyudatelya.html

23 https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/01417792/scd_16052018

24 SEEC outcomes: Moldova granted Observer State status at the EAEU, Union countries reinforcing foundation for sustainable economic development and interaction with third countries, implementing Digital Agenda, and expanding single services market // http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/14-05-2018-3.aspx

25 *Zhiteli Moldovy – za vstupleniye v YeAES i kategoricheski protiv NATO* (foto) // http://aif.md/zhiteli-moldovy-za-vstuplenie-v-eajes-i-kategoricheski-protiv-nato-foto

26 *Dodon: Moldaviya mozhet stat mostom mezhdu YeS i YeAES //* https://tass.ru/mezh-dunarodnaya-panorama/5204687

27 *Moldaviya otkazalas finansirovat uchastiye v YeAES v kachestve nablyudatelya //* https://www.interfax.ru/world/613171

28 http://socialistii.md/ru/progresul-moldovenesc-10-pasi-de-faurire

29 Artemenko, Sergey. *"Day milliar-r-r-r-rd!" Prezident Moldavii v Moskve: sbor dani… i drugiye nekhitryye radosti za rossiyskiy schet //* https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2515852.html

30 *Dodon nazval 4 vazhneyshikh rezultata vstrechi s Putinym //* https://point.md/ru/novosti/politika/dodon-nazval-4-vazhneishikh-rezultata-vstrechi-s-putinym

31 *Meeting with President of Moldova Igor Dodon //* http://en.kremlin.ru/events/presi-dent/news/59752

32 Ibid. See also: *Putin: Konfiguratsiya budushchego parlamenta Moldovy Moskve ne bezrazlichna //* https://ru.sputnik.md/politics/20190130/24419805/putin-konfiguratsiya-buduschego-parlamenta-Moldova-Moskva-ne-bezrazlichna.html

33 *Putin i Dodon soglasovali tranzit moldavskikh tovarov v Rossiyu cherez Ukrainu //* https://ria.ru/20190130/1550155152.html

The Political Party Landscape of Germany

M. Kopylenko

THE POLITICAL PARTY LANDSCAPE of Germany has been undergoing serious changes recently. The picture used to be quite simple: There were two large "people's" parties, and there were two smaller parties, one of which would sometimes join one of the bigger parties in a government coalition; there also were regional parties that stayed out of federal politics; and sometimes there have been "grand coalitions" – alliances of the two large parties.

One of the big "people's" parties is the CDU/CSU, an alliance of the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian version, the Christian Social Union (both the CDU and CSU were founded in 1945 and the alliance was formed in 1949). The other is the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which was set up in 1863 and is Germany's oldest party. Of the smaller parties, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) has been playing an extremely important role by invariably being the junior coalition partner now of the CDU/CSU, now of the SPD. The CDU/CSU had won all Bundestag elections before 1969. Occasionally, the SPD received more votes than the CDU/CSU but not enough to form a government and no one wanted to join it in a coalition.

The CDU/CSU as a Postwar Constant

THE CDU/CSU was generally seen in Germany as a bourgeois party championing a market economy and the conservative values of the postwar world order. On the other hand, the SPD continued to defend the rights of workers and advocate higher social expenditure. There existed a saying that the Christian Democrats know how to earn money and the Social Democrats know how to spend it.

At a congress in Bad Godesberg in 1959, the SPD approved a pro-

_____

Maria Kopylenko, political scientist, Candidate of Science (Philology); mkopylenko.mk@gmail.com

gram that involved abandoning Marxism and class-society principles. That opened a road into government for the Social Democrats. But it happened to be a long road.

After the parliamentary elections of 1969, the Social Democrats formed a government coalition with the Free Democrats and SPD leader Willy Brandt became chancellor. In 1971, Brandt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his Ostpolitik (short for "Neue Ostpolitik," New Eastern Policy), a policy of normalizing relations between the then West Germany and Eastern European countries that were in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. However, even that most prestigious of international accolades was powerless to safeguard Brandt against intrigues within the ruling coalition. In 1974, he was forced to resign and was replaced by Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt.

In 1982, the Free Democrats, who had always held the golden share, withdrew from their coalition with the SPD and formed an alliance with the CDU/CSU. This ushered in the 16-year era of Helmut Kohl.

Effects of Germany's Reunification on the Party Landscape

THE REUNIFICATION of West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin on October 3, 1990, set off major developments in the reunited country.

The first of them was the collapse and subsequent revival of the Green party, a party formed from various left-wing and left-leaning protest movements of the 1960s, including campaigners against nuclear energy, left radicals, anarchists, post-Marxists, and Christian pacifists. Germany's best-known Green politician, Joschka Fischer, foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, used to be an anarchist. The Greens' left leanings made them a natural partner of the SPD at federal, state and local level.

In 1983, the Greens won some seats in the Bundestag and did even better at the next elections, largely because of the Chernobyl disaster, which had forced the international community to pay priority attention to environmental issues.

However, at the first post-reunification parliamentary elections, the Greens failed to reach the 5% threshold of votes needed for being represented in the Bundestag. Experts believe the reason was that Green ideologists hadn't expected Germany to reunify so soon and made skeptical comments about processes of integration with the former West Germany

in ex-East German regions. A good example of this mistaken policy was the Greens' electoral slogan, "Everybody talks about Germany, we talk about the weather." What happened afterward made clear that it was Germany that had needed talking about.

The Greens were shocked by their electoral defeat, which led to mutual accusations and attempts to revise the party's line. At a congress in April 1991, the Greens for the first time pledged loyalty to parliamentary democracy. They said that they were reforming and removed their self-description as an "anti-party party" from their program.

In today's 19th Bundestag, as in former legislatures, parties are in a state of war with one another.

East Germany had its own green party, which was set up in 1990 and brought together various groups. Before the East German Green Party was registered, two of its members were elected to the Bundestag as civil society activists and not as members of the party.[1] The party then formed a coalition with East Germany's Alliance 90. In May 1993, this coalition merged with the West German Green Party to form Alliance 90/The Greens. Today, Alliance 90/The Greens is increasingly often referred to as just the Greens. It has become part and parcel of Germany's party landscape after traversing a path from protests and non-conformism to a center-left bourgeois position that makes the party perfectly eligible as a member of any government coalition at federal, state, or local level. Joschka Fischer, who for many years was the party's unofficial leader but has now abandoned all leadership posts, is a splendid embodiment of this transformation. At the start of his political career, he had the image of a near-hooligan (he used to be an anarchist, after all), always wearing jeans and trainer shoes, but finished his career as a respectable-looking gentleman wearing expensive suits, carefully looking after his physical shape. This metamorphosis has earned him the nickname "Ideal Son-in-Law."

The Greens as a Parliamentary Party

BY MOVING into parliamentary politics and ditching extremist tactics, the Greens attracted numerous voters for whom until then the SPD had been the only alternative to the conservative CDU/CSU.

Anne-Sarah Fiebig, a political scientist at the University of Hamburg, says: "Unlike the SPD, the Greens have been intensively working on their

image. Their constant pursuit of clear interests (environment protection, pacifism, women's liberation) and certain intolerance of some other opinions has served to boost their role. Due to this policy of pursuing their own interests, the Greens have run ahead the SPD in public opinion polls, pushing the SPD into second place with a difference of 18% to 19%. They are reputed to be a modern party, and above all a party rooted in values."[2]

German analysts have detected this process of transformation of extremist parties into good supplements to, and sometimes replacements for, one of the "people's" parties. Torsten Holzhauser, for instance, discusses this in his article "Are Extremists of Yesterday Democrats of Today?"[3]

Moreover, the Greens are constantly looking for new leaders, and this also increases their popularity. Today, the party is co-chaired by Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck. The two previous chairpersons (the Greens are always headed by a duo), Simone Peter and Cem Özdemir, the son of Turkish immigrants who is one of Germany's most popular Green politicians, withdrew to make room for younger leaders. According to opinion polls, the Greens are evolving into a large "people's" party, winning over votes from the CDU/CSU, from the SPD, and even from The Left.

The SPD's Fight to Reassert Its Identity

AFTER THE EMERGENCE of new left-wing and socially oriented parties in Germany, the SPD has been continuously losing support, practically having failed to update its agenda.

"The SPD is demoralized," says Fiebig. "It won't leave the Grand Coalition because it's afraid that, if new elections are called, it may have a result of less than 10%."[4]

The SPD also owes some of its problems to the activity of some of its outstanding members. One of them is scandalous Thilo Sarrazin, a former senator of finance for the state of Berlin. What explains his high profile are not the senior posts he has held but radical and politically incorrect views he has expressed in his books. Until now, the best known of these has been *Germany Is Doing Away with Itself*,[5] a bestseller in which Sarrazin states his views on immigration and birth statistics in Germany, accuses immigrants of seeking to live on welfare allowances rather than looking for work, and claims that their children can't make progress at school, all of which, he warns, threatens the very existence of Germany.

Despite (or possibly due to) the unacceptability of Sarrazin's airing

such views in publing, 1.5 million copies of *Germany Is Doing Away with Itself* have been sold. The book topped the country's list of bestsellers for 21 weeks.[6]

After that, Sarrazin published one more book, *Hostile Takeover*,[7] whose title conveys its main idea. Hostile takeover is an economic term (which is unsurprising, since Sarrazin is an economist by profession) meaning unfair acquisition of a company by another company. Sarrazin claims that uncontrolled Islamic immigration would mean "hostile takeover" of Germany and Europe in general. In his book, he elaborates on his former views on the Islamic world, and this has urged the SPD to seriously consider expelling him because a party that was just hardly staying afloat could not afford to have a scandalous public figure of this kind among its members. This will be the SPD's third attempt to expel Sarrazin and it apparently will be successful, which would give him and his books excellent publicity.

Many in Germany believe that Sarrazin's books have accelerated German society's overall rightward drift. It is seen as a serious mistake that the SPD still hasn't expelled him. It is a widespread perception that his membership in the party is putting the latter in an ambiguous position: the SPD is a distinctly left-wing, socially oriented organization but it tolerates a person among its members who completely rejects these principles.

Oskar Lafontaine, who was prime minister of the state of Saarland for many years, has been another source of trouble for the SPD. He was always left of fellow Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder, the former chancellor of Germany, and became famous by criticizing the Social Democratic Cabinet of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt for allowing the United States to enlarge its arsenal of missiles stationed in Germany.

A Split in the SPD

IN 1995, Lafontaine was elected SPD leader, and three years later, the Social Democrats won Bundestag elections and formed a coalition government with Alliance 90/The Greens. Schröder became chancellor and Lafontaine economics minister, but this was a setup with a preprogrammed conflict. Disagreements with Schröder over the latter's social policy made Lafontaine resign as economics minister and SPD leader early in 1999, just a few months after such a difficult electoral victory. Lafontaine's unexpected move was covered in practically all German

newspapers, and many rank-and-file Social Democrats felt sorry that this true champion of working people's interests had withdrawn from big politics. In 2013, yet another prominent Social Democrat, novelist Günter Grass, a recipient of the 1999 Nobel Prize in Literature, said: "In the history of the Social Democratic Party, there has never been a dirtier treason than Oskar Lafontaine's betrayal of his fellow party members."[8]

Leaving aside this grave accusation from the writer who passed away in 2015, it needs to be admitted that Lafontaine did deal a blow to his fellow Social Democrats that they still haven't recovered from.

Lack of prominent personalities became the SPD's main problem: with no leaders equaling Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Egon Bahr, Franz Müntefering, Gerhard Schröder, and Oskar Lafontaine, the party had no locomotive that could have drawn it in the right direction. An attempt by the SPD to put forward a top-caliber politician from among its ranks was a failure.

The Chancellor's Gender Trap

THIS NEW POLITICIAN was Gesine Schwan, whose star rose in the first decade of this millennium. Schwan is a political scientist and from 1999 to 2008 was president of the Viadrina European University in Frankfurt (Oder), where many of the students come from Eastern European countries. Schwan was nominated by the SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens for president of Germany in 2004 and 2009 but on both occasions lost to Horst Köhler, a candidate of the CDU/CSU and FDP. In the 2004 presidential vote in the Federal Assembly, Schwan even received 10 votes from the adversary camp. She carried through a very successful election campaign in 2004, but an objective factor closed the office of president to her. This is what journalist Kathrin Haimerl wrote in 2010: "She wanted to demonstrate that she would be up to the role of an intellectual president who was close to their citizens. Eventually, she was even more popular than candidate Köhler, according to surveys by opinion studies service Emnid. At that moment, Gesine Schwan was the president of the hearts. But the CDU/CSU believed that she should not be president, for then Angela Merkel would never become chancellor."[9]

In those days, it was unthinkable that women could hold both top state posts. Moreover, Schwan would have become Germany's first woman president had she won. In 2005, Angela Merkel became the country's first woman chancellor. Obviously, Schwan had no chance of

becoming president. Today, at a time of maximum gender tolerance, when same-sex marriages are legal and a third gender may be stated in a birth certificate, the gender of German leaders is no longer perceived as such an issue, but in 2004 Germany was just at the outset of the long road that preceded this.

The post of president became vacant again in spring 2017. Since upcoming Bundestag elections promised to be a rough experience for Merkel and her party, the SPD needed to be deprived of a charismatic leader who would be a threat to a CDU/CSU candidate. The Christian Democrats' target in the SPD was Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. After incumbent president Joachim Gauck announced he wouldn't seek a second term, Steinmeier received a proposal to run for president. A proposal like this is difficult to turn down.

Steinmeier was elected president and took office on March 19, 2017, leaving the SPD damaged and disoriented. None of the former SPD leaders – Kurt Beck, Sigmar Gabriel, or even Hamburg Mayor Olaf Scholz, - had been able to suggest a new course, a new program, or new ideas that could have made the SPD a powerful rival of the CDU/CSU, on the one hand, and of The Left, on the other. Incumbent SPD leader Andrea Nahles, who was minister of labor and social affairs in Merkel's previous coalition government, hasn't built up enough influence in the party to fulfill such a role.

New SPD Leaders

AT THAT POINT, SPD policy makers remembered Social Democrat Martin Schulz, president of the European Parliament. He appeared to be influential enough in that position, looked fine in his numerous television interviews and seemed to represent the European perspective that the SPD lacked. In a reshuffle in spring 2017, Gabriel, who became foreign minister, stepped down as SPD leader and was replaced by Schulz, who was elected candidate for chancellor to run in the September 2017 parliamentary elections.

As we know, nothing good came out of this for the SPD. Schulz failed to become a charismatic leader and to come up with any new or revolutionary ideas. The SPD suffered a crushing defeat at September's elections, mustering just 20.5% of the vote, which was the worst showing in its entire postwar history.

The SPD leadership went over to 47-year-old Andrea Nahles.

Although Lafontaine called Nahles "God's gift" to the SPD, she didn't have unanimous support in the party, which she had joined when she was still at school. She is known for her rather rude statements and harsh actions. This was probably why it was by a vote of only 66% that she was elected SPD leader at a party congress in April 2018. This represented one of the lowest degrees of support for a candidate leader in the SPD's entire history. But she is also the SPD's first-ever woman leader. Will her leadership enable the SPD to get rid of the loser image that has firmly stuck to it? The near future will make this clear.

The Left – a Party of Schism and Unity

ONE OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' PROBLEMS is The Left, a party organized by dissenter Lafontaine in 2007. The Left grew out of a left-wing offshoot of the SPD that became a party in its own right in 2005 under the name Labor and Social Justice – The Electoral Initiative. It allied with the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), which had been founded in 1990 and was the legal successor to the East German Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). Understandably, the population of what had been East Germany was the PDS' sole source of support, although this was enough to enable the party to win some seats in the Bundestag. At the same time, Lafontaine's party with a name so complicated that it was a job trying to remember it was making little progress even though it was winning over voters from the SPD. It formed an alliance with the PDS that was named The Left and enabled the former East German communists to make a thrust into the west and simultaneously earned the Social Democratic dissenters support in the east with a serious chance of winning seats in the Bundestag. To maintain an east-west balance, The Left has to this day been co-headed by two persons – one representing the new, eastern states and one representing the old, western ones. Today's co-leaders are Katja Kipping for the east and Bernd Riexinger for the west.

The Left is present in all eastern state parliaments. In Thuringia, Left politician Bodo Ramelow is prime minister, and in Berlin and Brandenburg, The Left has formed ruling coalitions with the SPD. In the west, The Left is represented in the parliaments of Hamburg, Bremen, Hesse, and Saarland. The party's success in Saarland is not surprising – Saarland is the birthplace of its founder, Oskar Lafontaine, who is still hugely popular there.

The PDS and The Left have repeatedly won seats in Bundestag, receiving 8%, 9% and 11% of votes. These can be considered good results as a party needs a minimum 5% of votes to be represented in parliament. The old and battle-tested FDP hasn't always been able to achieve that 5% mark over the past few years. At the last elections of 2017, The Left received 9.2% of votes, running a little ahead of the Greens.

What explains such success of a party that is comparatively new and "unwelcome" at federal level, is strongly opposed to principal parties on all key domestic and foreign policy issues, and clearly favors Russia?

Firstly, The Left advances the interests of large numbers of people living in the east of Germany who quickly became disappointed with the German reunification despite the efforts of large groups of western officials delegated to that part of the country to help match local living standards with those in the west of Germany. Secondly, The Left has convincingly expounded left-wing ideas and proclaimed left-wing slogans, which was something that the Social Democrats have been too busy with their internal squabbles to do. Thirdly, the personality factor has played a role too: The Left has brought together quite many impressive figures.

Besides Lafontaine, The Left's upper tier includes Gregor Gysi and Sahra Wagenknecht, who are the party's former and current parliamentary leaders. Gysi was born and grew up in East Berlin, became a lawyer and joined the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). He began his political career in autumn 1989, when a liberalization movement began in East Germany. He was one of the authors of the text of a new law on entry into and exit from East Germany. In the same year 1989, he was nearly unanimously elected leader of the SED. In that position, he was able to salvage the party, its property, and jobs in the SED system. He also reformatted the SED, with the party's reformed version receiving the name PDS. Gysi is a brilliant public speaker who can win over large numbers of people, and this is what he did when former East German regions were transforming into states of the united German state. He is also one of the ex-East German politicians who are not ashamed of their East German past, and attempts to accuse him of ties to Stasi, East Germany's security agency, never worked. Gysi has by now withdrawn from big politics for health reasons, which is a great loss for The Left.

Sahra Wagenknecht, leader of The Left's group in the Bundestag, is a uniquely beautiful and intelligent German woman politician. She is an outspoken adversary of Merkel on both home and foreign policy, and occasionally makes politically incorrect statements. In an interview with

the Deutschlandfunk radio station, she said that the anti-Russian sanctions were senseless and harmful for Germany.[10] Since 2014, Wagenknecht has been married to Lafontaine. Federal and state election returns suggest that this has benefited The Left. In any case, The Left has become an inalienable part of Germany's political landscape. However, considerations of political correctness stop other parties from collaborating with it, though, as mentioned above, there exist government coalitions in some states that include Left politicians.

Wagenknecht's discontent with government policies on many issues – refugees, relations with the United States and Russia, Nordstream 2 – has made her, some of her fellow Left members and other left-wing politicians to set up a movement in summer 2018 that is called Aufstehen ("Standing Up") and is designed as an umbrella left-wing alliance bringing together The Left, the Greens and the SPD. Aufstehen is not intended to be a party as such but has the long-term goal of forming majorities in the Bundestag and state legislatures. One more task that Aufstehen sets itself is to win over voters from Alternative for Germany (AfD).

The Christian Democrats' Coalition Passions

THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS of September 2017 were won by the Merkel-led CDU/CSU, but it was a hard victory to win.

Although the German press was full of appeals not to vote for Merkel or even boycott the elections, the turnout reached 75%. The electorate numbered 65.1 million by that time.

Six parties got past the 5% threshold. The CDU/CSU received 32.9% of votes, the SPD 20.5%, AfD 12.6%, the FDP 10.7%, The Left 9.2%, and the Greens 8.9%.

Both "people's" parties had worse performance in the previous elections, the CDU/CSU getting 8.6% and the SPD 5.2% fewer votes. The CDU/CSU's loss was remarkable – Merkel said that the 1949 elections had been the only instance of the Christian Democrats' doing worse than that. On the other hand, the FDP returned to parliament after many years of being kept out.

Then came a lengthy and agonizing period of forming a government coalition, with the SPD becoming the CDU/CSU's partner once again. The coalition took shape in March 2018. This time round, though, the Social Democrats were able to wrench more power from Merkel and to secure two highly prestigious and important portfolios, that of economics

and that of finance. The Interior Ministry had to go to Merkel's frenemy Horst Seehofer, leader of the CSU.

Later,Seehofer's appointment spawned major immigration issues. In June, in breach of a deal with Merkel, Seehofer ordered the frontier police not to let illegal migrants into the country. This plunged the new government into its first crisis, one that nearly ended up in the collapse of the coalition and new elections.

In January 2019, Seehofer passed over the helm in the CSU to someone who wasn't his own choice – Bavarian prime minister Markus Söder. The rest of the CSU leadership has stayed on, which means that so have obstacles to necessary renewal. Söder didn't have an easy path to the CSU's top post. Some of the party's key figures were against his appointment. Former German defense minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg doubted that Söder would be up to the task. "He can't yet reach the mark of Strauss or Waigel," Guttenberg told the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* daily.[11] Statements of this kind suggested there was some confusion in the CSU.

Surely, the days of bright figures such as Franz Josef Strauss, the former prime minister of Bavaria, and his successor Edmund Stoiber, an experienced tactician, are a thing of the past. Seehofer, whom many have considered and still consider a very talented politician, is in his last job in politics and faces retirement and apparently oblivion after that. Moreover, his action to stop illegal immigration has seriously stained his reputation – and thereby the reputation of Merkel as well.

Refugees or Migrants?

NO MATTER who is German interior minister, he or she will inevitably have to deal with the highly complex and practically unsolvable program of migration, a problem whose nature no one has been able to explain coherently. In this sense, a lot became clearer during one of the numerous political talk shows on German television,[12] one that brought together high-profile politicians and journalists, among them Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, former Bavarian prime minister Edmund Stoiber, and Stefan Aust, a former chief editor of the weekly *Der Spiegel* and the current publisher of the daily *Die Welt.*

All of them expressed what would have been an impossible idea even as little as two years ago: people facing an existential danger make up a minority of the majority of refugees coming to Europe. The majority are

economic migrants, and economic migration has always existed and always will exist because it's part of human nature to look for better life. But economic migration needs a different way of handling. In any case, uncontrolled entry, admission of everyone, including people with no documents or clear explanations as was the case in 2015, is the wrong practice. Merkel said in those days: "We will cope with it." It doesn't seem Germany has coped, but the reckless politically correct decision brought about a radical change in the country's political landscape.

Lamya Kaddor, a German specialist in Islamic studies, has described Germany as an "immigration country." Roughly every fifth person living in Germany has a migrant background, she said. Islam is the number two religion in Germany. Atheists and people who don't belong to any specific religion or religious denomination are Germany's largest single community in terms of worldview and attitude to religion and make up one third of the country's religion-worldview spectrum, she said. "Germany is a multiethnic, multicultural and multireligious country. There is practically no going back on it. This reality can no longer be destroyed by any form of right-wing nationalism. The reality of diversity will soon become part of German political culture," she says.[13]

However, this reality has already resulted in a heavy defeat for the CDU in Hesse state elections in October 2018. The party received 11% fewer votes than in the previous polls. This forced Merkel to announce that she would step down as leader of the CDU. She said she was going to serve out her tenure as chancellor but wouldn't run for the post again after that.

The End of Operation Merkel

AT A CONFERENCE on December 7, the CDU elected Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer as party chairman Kramp-Karrenbauer, who is sometimes referred to as AKK, was general secretary of the CDU before being elected leader. The CDU won't undergo any significant changes under her stewardship. She is an experienced party functionary, and some observers dub her mini-Merkel or Merkel II.

Merkel had been very careful purging her entourage of potential rivals. These days, the Christian Democrats have no rebels among them of the kind Merkel herself was back in 1999, when she was urging fellow party members to liberate themselves from Helmut Kohl's influence and thereby provoked a rejuvenation of the party.

But even the actual generational change is important. This is less clear to CDU members than to those who are watching the party from the outside. Kaddor is one such outsider: "The era of Angela Merkel is definitely over, and a new start always offers new opportunities. But it seems that there is much less clear desire for change in Germany than one normally assumes…. Although there have been constant complaints in the Merkel years that the chancellor has paralyzed the country with her style of leadership, one needs to admit that there has been quite a lot of discussion. Never in history has there been as much public debate as during Merkel's tenure, partly because of the Internet. Consequently, in the post-Merkel times, there will be no need to build up the scale of discussions – what will matter is how to discuss, what to discus, and with whom to discuss it."[14]

AKK and Her Main Rival

HOWEVER, it would be a mistake to see AKK as no more than a somewhat younger replica of the chancellor, at least because she faces a job that one can't carry out without breaking out of the Merkel image.

AKK was elected CDU leader by defeating her rival Friedrich Merz with a margin of only 18 votes. This means that the party's rank-and-file membership is strongly polarized and that there's something to be done with the nearly half of the members who didn't vote for AKK. Theo Sommer, former chief editor and publisher of *Die Zeit*, says that AKK and the CDU general secretary face the tasks of "closing the rifts in the Union, ironing out internal controversies, and bringing the mutually hostile flanks back together."[15] "Renewal is easy to promise but hard to achieve; the trials and tribulations of the SPD prove this," Sommer says.[16]

Paradoxical as it may seem, AKK won't be able to do it without the involvement of her vanquished rival Merz, one of those "purged" by Merkel a while ago.

From 2000 to 2002, Merz was the CDU's parliamentary leader, a position he was succeeded in by Merkel, after which he moved into private business, where made a glittering career.

Analyst Ferdinand Otto argues that it would be dangerous for AKK to leave someone who has been able to win so much support so quickly outside her control,[17] and that therefore AKK will try to integrate him either into CDU governing bodies or even into the Cabinet. Elections to the European Parliament, the parliament of Bremen, and three state parlia-

ments in the east of the country are coming soon. AKK would be blamed for anything that goes wrong for the CDU, and any failure would inevitably raise doubts about her potential candidacy for chancellor. The inclusion of Merz in the vanguard would relieve AKK of some of her tasks and simultaneously preclude him from being a threat to her role as party leader.

An Alternative in a No-Alternatives Environment

THE RETURNS of the last parliamentary elections included a sensation, albeit a predictable one – the double-digit result of Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-wing populist party set up in February 2013. AfD did better than all the parties that have traditionally been following in the wake of the "people's" parties. It scored the third-best result and became the first right-wing populist party to win seats in the Bundestag in quite many years. At the previous elections, AfD failed to get into the Bundestag, but since then it has received seats in the parliaments of all 16 German states and in the European Parliament. AfD has the largest opposition group in the Bundestag.

Observers think that AfD partially owes its existence to Sarrazin's ideas,[18] which are reflected in the party's program.

Skeptics forecasted for AfD the fate of the Pirate Party Germany the star of which had dropped as abruptly as it had risen. This is probably what would have happened with AfD, if migration hadn't become such an issue and Britain hadn't had its Brexit vote: migrants had become a real headache for many ordinary Germans while the British showed a solution. AfD, which is called a Eurosceptic party, is against European Union telling Germany what to do and is against uncontrolled migration.

AfD's phenomenal success is easy to explain. Sahra Wagenknecht said that the CDU and SPD were AfD's mother and father. "Many people … vote for AfD today and some of [them] take part in demonstrations organized by circles close to AfD. It is simplistic to brand them all as Nazis. Because just a few years ago many of them voted for the SPD or The Left," she said.[19]

Unsolved problems such as EU red tape that borders on insanity, North African refugees who have radically changed Germany's social landscape, growing poverty among children and old people, wages that are too low to live on, and deteriorating social services have been making genteel Germans move rightward and vote for AfD.

In a comment on riots in Chemnitz in summer 2018, Bundestag deputy and AfD member Marcus Frohnmeier tweeted on August 26: "If the state can't defend its citizens, they take to the streets and defend themselves."

Although AfD has been present in the Bundestag for more than a year, the majority of German politicians still shun it, slamming it not only for what it needs to be slammed for, for instance its right-wing extremism, but for something that is based on their personal subjective impressions.

In this sense, Bundestag Vice President Claudia Roth of the Greens made a remarkable statement in an interview with the *Rheinische Post* newspaper. She said that even the way of Bundestag deputies talking to one another had "changed radically," and that "we have been witnessing uncontrolled language, an attack on democratic institutions and an attempt to reinterpret history."[20]

A Stably Unstable Landscape

AS WE CAN SEE, in today's 19th Bundestag, as in former legislatures, parties are in a state of war with one another. Even natural allies such as the Social Democrats and The Greens or the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats watch each other closely and never miss a chance to earn some dividends at each other's expense. One instance was the attempt by the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the Greens to form what was dubbed the Jamaica Coalition because of the three parties' symbolic colors, which coincided with the colors of the Jamaican flag – green, the Christian Democrats' black, and the Free Democrats' yellow. At the last moment, FDP leader Christian Lindner announced that his party was backing out of coalition talks, which meant the country might need new elections. That happened in November 2017. Four subsequent months of agonizing efforts brought a CDU/CSU-SDP coalition into being. The reason for Lindner's move remains unclear. His official explanation was that no adequate coalition agreement had been reached. But more likely, the reason was the FDP's declining popularity and influence. The Free Democrats' presence in the current Bundestag follows four years when they were never able to attain the 5% threshold, and Lindner's announcement would have been a way, even though negatively tinged, to draw the limelight to the party.[21]

Incidents of this kind mean that Germany's party landscape is not a motionless picture but a continent that is in continuous motion with no taboo stay on forever.

The CDU/CSU remains a relatively stable bloc, although it may cease to be a bloc any moment at the whim of one of the partners. Today, it alone deserves being described as a "people's" party, though it was heavily battered in the defeats of 2017, a year the Christian Democrats call "terrible." But the CDU/CSU is being torn by internal conflicts. Merkel's career isn't yet over, AKK hasn't yet fully asserted herself as party leader, Merz hasn't been destroyed, nor younger politicians such as Health Minister Jens Spahn or CDU General Secretary Paul Ziemiak have built up enough muscle. The Christian Democrats are an old and conservative party, and its voters are also generally conservative, although more from habit than because of convictions. Generational change is an objective and unavoidable process, and the Christian Democratic leadership would be well-advised to pay more attention to self-rejuvenation.

On the right, the Christian Democrats are under pressure from AfD, which amazingly wins over votes from all other parties, including The Left, and may well rise to the role of a "people's" party despite being rejected by the establishment. AfD is a splendid example of a phenomenon of extreme rightists and extreme leftists coming together if there are interests they share. The AfD version of right-left unification is based on anger at the inflow of migrants.

The FDP is unlikely to get to its feet any time soon, despite the 2017 move of its leader. It needs some charismatic figure such as Hans-Dietrich Genscher or even Guido Westerwelle, both of whom were foreign ministers in coalition governments. Both have died, Genscher of old age and Westerwelle of illness. It is the FDP's lack of politicians of this caliber that explains the party's modest showing in the last elections and its fear to take responsibility for the future of the nation.

The SPD cuts the poorest picture – it is rapidly losing voters and may become a rather small and irrelevant party, ceding its trump cards to The Left, the Greens, and AfD almost without battles.

The Greens, on the other hand, are on the rise. They are back in fashion, getting the votes of young intellectuals for whom The Left is too far on the left and AfD too far on the right and odious. The Greens long ago became a bourgeois party that espouses what are progressive ideas from the viewpoint of general human values – their platform includes advocacy of controlled migration and rejection of any form of militarism. In fact, a supporter of any other party might benefit by changing their mind and voting for The Greens.

Paradoxically, it is The Left that is the most stable party. The party has

a specific category of voters, a clear program, and charismatic leaders. Plus, today is an excellent moment to play on weaknesses shown by other parties. And that's what Sahra Wagenknecht is trying to do in her Aufstehen activities.

Instability is the main feature of Germany's political landscape. But instability is a feature of world politics as well. Apparently, external factors will exercise a powerful influence on Germany's domestic politics. Each party will try to align its course with these factors.

NOTES

[1] Funk, Albert. "Die Schwarz-Rot-Gold-Wahlen," *Der Tagesspiegel.* 02.08.2013.

[2] Fiebig, Anne-Sarah. "Die falsche Toleranz der Sozialdemokratie," *Zeit Online,* 22. Dezember 2018.

[3] Holzhauser, Thorsten. *Extremisten von gestern – Demokraten von heute? Zum Umgang mit systemfeindlichen Parteien am Beispiel von Grünen und Linkspartei* // MIP 2018, 24. Jhrg. S. 5-13 // http://www.pruf.de/publikationen/mip-zeitschrift/download-des-mip.html

[4] Fiebig A.-S. Op. cit.

[5] Sarrazin, Thilo. *Deutschland schafft sich ab. Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen.* München. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (DVA), 2010.

[6] Bader, Naomi. "Auf der Suche nach dem Sarrazin-Effekt," *Zeit Online.* 1. September 2018.

[7] Sarrazin, Thilo. *Feindliche Übernahme. Wie der Islam den Fortschritt behindert und die Gesellschaft bedroht.* München: FinanzBuch Verlag (FBV), 2018.

[8] Jacobsen, Lens und Hugendick, David "Oskar, Warum hast du mich verlassen?" *Zeit Online.* 13. August 2013.

[9] Haimerl, Kathrin. "Die Präsidentin," *Süddeutsche Zeitung.* 17. Mai 2010.

[10] "Wir brauchen auch Russland, um Probleme zu lösen." Sahra Wagenknecht im Gespräch mit Falk Steiner // Deutschlandfunk.de. 03.06.2018.

[11] Georgi, Oliver. "Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg: 'An Strauß oder Waigel reicht Söder noch nicht heran'," *Frankfurter Allgemeine* // faz.net. 18.12.2018.

[12] Maybrit Illner. ZDF. 21.06.2018.

[13] Kaddor, Lamya. "Angela Merkels Erbe ist multikulturell," *Zeit Online.* 11. Dezember 2018.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Sommer, Theo. "Weder Mini-Merkel noch Merkel II," *Zeit Online.* 11. Dezember 2018.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Otto, Ferdinand. "Das Merz-Dilemma," *Zeit Online.* 14. Dezember 2018.

[18] Sauerbrey, Anna. "Thilo Sarrazin legt nach – verletzend, grenz-rassistisch und manipulative," *Der Tagesspiegel.* 30.08.2018.

[19] Stein, Timo. *Nicht alle zu Nazis abstempeln – so verteidigt Sahra Wagenknecht Wutbürger von Chemnitz* // watson.de. 15.09.2018.

[20] Mayntz, Gregor und Quadbeck, Eva. *"Hass ist keine Meinung."* Interview mit Claudia Roth und Wolfgang Kubicki // RP Online. 29. Dezember 2018.

[21] Pokraka, Daniel. *Ein Nein und die Folgen* // Tagesschau.de. 19.11.2018.

Key words: Germany, party landscape, CDU/CSU, SPD, AfD, Bundestag.

Russia and Cyprus:
Active Cooperation Despite Difficulties

S. Osadchiy

International Affairs: Dear Stanislav Viliorovich, please tell us about current relations between Russia and the Republic of Cyprus, considering that Cyprus is a member of the European Union, while the EU and Russia are now in a situation of sanctions and countersanctions? How do the Cypriot authorities comment on this?

S. Osadchiy: Regardless of the situation in the world, Russia and Cyprus have always worked to build relations based on mutual respect and a desire on both sides to develop multidimensional and mutually beneficial cooperation. At present, there is practical cooperation in a wide range of areas thanks to an active political dialogue at the highest level, an extensive legal framework created over the decades, and close economic, cultural, religious, and humanitarian ties between our countries and peoples.

To be sure, some changes began to take place when Cyprus joined the EU in 2004. The impact of its EU membership has become particularly noticeable since 2014, when the West launched an aggressive, politically motivated anti-Russian campaign and imposed sanctions on our country. At the same time, it should be noted that in recent years Cypriot political leaders at different levels have criticized such measures. Judging from repeated public statements by members of the Cypriot leadership, Nicosia has invariably opposed existing and planned additional restrictions on Russia, emphasizing their counterproductive nature and calling for the earliest possible normalization of Russia-EU dialogue. One example of this sober approach is the Cypriot refusal to join the EU member countries that have followed London in expelling Russian diplomats on a flimsy pretext in connection with the so-called "Skripal case." Unfortunately, EU countries taking such a stand are still in the minority.

Stanislav Osadchiy, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Cyprus

As for Cyprus itself, our retaliatory restrictive measures have had a serious effect on a number of its major agricultural exports to Russia. Another cause for concern in the republic is that escalating sanctions have led to a decline in investment cooperation, created problems with banking services for Russians at local banks, and caused some of the Russian companies to leave the island.

Nevertheless, largely in spite of these difficulties, cooperation between our countries has continued actively even during these years. There is still a significant interest in Cyprus among Russian businesses and tourists. Russian developers and consulting firms continue to flock to the island, and an influx of IT specialists is a new trend. There is interest in projects in the sphere of innovation and high technology, including medicine and alternative energy. Inter-university collaboration is another promising area. Cyprus is also a popular holiday destination for Russians: in 2018, almost 800,000 our compatriots visited the island, a figure comparable to the population of the republic.

> Nicosia has invariably opposed existing and planned additional restrictions on Russia, emphasizing their counterproductive nature and calling for the earliest possible normalization of Russia-EU dialogue.

Q: What has changed in our relations since the 2013 financial crisis, when Russians lost a lot of money in Cyprus? What are the prospects for getting this money back? Has Cyprus regained the confidence of Russian depositors? In what way can Cyprus currently be attractive to Russians apart from tourism?

A: In 2013, a year of crisis for Cyprus associated with the collapse of the local banking sector and the resulting "haircut" on deposits at Cypriot banks imposed by the Cypriot government, Russia's investment position in the republic weakened significantly. According to various estimates by Cypriot and Russian experts, our businesses and ordinary depositors lost a total of 10 billion to 20 billion euros. At the same time, coordinated action by the governments of Russia and Cyprus made it possible to offset some of the losses and maintain the Russian presence on the island.

However, the continuing confrontation over sanctions between

Russia and the West has once again had a negative effect on the business environment for Russian companies in Cyprus. Russian business is once again going through difficult times on the island even before it has had time to recover from the events of 2013. As part of a crackdown on money laundering, the Central Bank of Cyprus has issued a circular requiring local banks to eliminate certain risks of illegal financial flows coming from shell companies. As practice shows, these measures have primarily affected our compatriots and companies with Russian capital. Sometimes one gets the impression that they were actually the main target of that move, undertaken not without prompting from across the ocean.

This situation has triggered an exodus of Russian capital from the island. In the last six months, according to local experts, from 20,000 to 60,000 accounts of foreign individuals and legal entities, mainly Russian or with Russian capital, have been closed in Cyprus under the banner of compliance with U.S. directives to combat money laundering. Moreover, under pressure from Washington, Nicosia has had to comply with U.S. extraterritorial sanctions against Russia regarding Russian individuals and entities.

According to the Cyprus Russian Business Association, the past year has brought a qualitative change in investment flows from Russia to Cyprus. Today, they are largely private, being used to buy residential real estate and luxury goods, to take part in the Cyprus Citizenship by Investment program and resolve other personal issues.

At the same time, considering that for many years Russia-Cyprus relations have been based on strong historical and cultural ties, mutual respect and support, we hope for a normalization of the business climate in the foreseeable future.

Q: In the past, trade and economic ties between Russia and Cyprus were at a high level. And how do things stand today? What are the sectors where these ties have been developing?

A: Unfortunately, the trend toward a decline in trade and economic relations between our countries continued in 2018. In January-August 2018, according to the Statistical Service of Cyprus, bilateral trade totaled 108.4 million euros, down 20.8% year-on-year. In particular, Cyprus imports from Russia fell by 12.3% to 91.8 million euros, while exports to Russia fell by 48.6% to 16.6 million euros.

Russian exports to Cyprus mainly consist of primary commodities. In 2018, they were traditionally based on oil products, which made up about 70% of the total. As for Cyprus exports to Russia, last year they mainly consisted of goods such as yachts and pharmaceuticals, which accounted for more than 70% of total Cyprus exports to our country.

All in all, one can say that the shares of Russia and Cyprus in each other's trade are insignificant. As noted above, this is due in large part to EU sanctions against Russia and our countermeasures. Possible ways to remedy the situation will be discussed, thoroughly and frankly, at a meeting of the Russia-Cyprus Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation at the end of February 2019. I believe it is time to switch to a new track in our trade cooperation, focusing on areas such as medicine and pharmaceuticals, transport, telecommunications, and information technology.

Until recently, the situation in the area of investment cooperation was quite different. Although the fight against the so-called money laundering in Cyprus is already beginning to affect this area as well, Russia and Cyprus are still among each other's main source countries for foreign direct investment (FDI) in their national economies. On July 1, 2018, according to the Central Bank of Russia, the stock of Cypriot FDI in the Russian economy was $164.1 billion, while Russian FDI stock in the economy of Cyprus was $166.1 billion. Cypriots mainly invest in Russian manufacturing, finance, insurance, wholesale and retail trade, professional and scientific activities, mining, and real estate. Russia invests in Cypriot manufacturing, agriculture, tourism, hotel business, real estate, and construction.

Q: How are Cypriots reacting to the war that has been going on close to them, in Syria, for several years? Are there any Syrian refugees on the island?

A: Given the geographical proximity of that country, the Cypriot authorities are naturally concerned and keep a close watch on events in Syria. Our approaches are close as regards the need to eradicate terrorist organizations, maintain the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic, and restore peace and security throughout its territory. Cypriots call for the earliest possible achievement of a political settlement and agree that Syria's future should be decided by the Syrian people themselves.

The problem of Syrian refugees, which has troubled Europeans for

more than five years, has affected Cyprus as well. Recently, there has been a significant increase in the flow of illegal migrants from Syria to Cyprus. Illegal entrants arriving in the buffer zone patrolled by UN peacekeepers create particular difficulties. Some of them find themselves in the territory controlled by the official authorities, while others settle in the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, so that their actual number is difficult to estimate. But even the official figures are above the European average for the number of illegal migrants per capita. This is a serious challenge for Cyprus. After all, the problem not only implies an economic burden, but also has a security dimension, since international terrorists on the run may enter Cyprus in the guise of refugees.

Q: How realistic is the prospect of the establishment of a U.S. military base in Cyprus? Moscow has publicly warned the Cypriots about the consequences of such a move. What does the local press say about this?

A: We are closely monitoring this situation. Nicosia denies plans for the construction of a U.S. military base. As we are told, it can only be a question of creating a "way station" for the so-called humanitarian evacuation of U.S. citizens from zones of escalating armed violence in the region. In any case, we believe that such intentions should be given wide publicity. The Americans make no secret of their plans to create some kind of security system in the region to contain Russia's growing influence in the Mediterranean. We hope that Cyprus foreign policy, traditionally oriented towards the development of partnership relations with all countries, will not be part of the logic of confrontational policy towards Russia pursued by the West led by Washington.

Overall, I want to emphasize that Russia, which has demonstrated its support for Cyprus on many occasions throughout the history of our diplomatic relations, is open to developing partnership-based cooperation with the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and the brotherly people of that country. We are convinced that further strengthening of cooperation between Russia and Cyprus, immune to short-term political fluctuations and to outside pressure, is in the long-term interest of our countries. Hopefully, the Cyprus leadership has similar views on the prospects of our bilateral relations.

Key words: Cyprus, Russia, European Union, cooperation, diplomatic relations.

Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council: The Case of Chile

R. Zimin

A Turning Point in Chilean Foreign Policy

THE 1990s were a time of change for Chile. March 11, 1990 was the first day in office of the first democratically elected president in 17 years, Patricio Aylwin. Aylwin succeeded dictator Augusto Pinochet, who had ruled the country since 1973. Pinochet's Chile was generally ostracized by the international community. His radical right-wing regime was condemned by the Soviet Union and its allies. Most of them, including the Soviet Union, severed their diplomatic relations with Chile after the military coup of September 11, 1973, and the death of the overthrown president Salvador Allende. The majority of Western states denounced mass violations of human rights in Chile. A workgroup on Chile was established within the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, a measure that had no precedents in UN history and in effect represented condemnation, although indirect, of the Pinochet regime by the organization.[1] Chile immediately became an international pariah, a country shunned by the Eastern bloc, the West and the Non-Aligned Movement alike.

Chile's democratization brought about radical changes in its foreign policy. The country embarked on a strategy of reintegration into the international system, launching wide-scale diplomatic efforts that were based on the principle of multilateralism and included activities in the UN framework. The international community hailed this process and supported it via UN mechanisms. In 1993, Chile's then permanent representative to the United Nations, Juan Somavía, was appointed president of

Roman Zimin, Third Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Cuba, doctoral candidate at the Department of European and American Studies, School of International Relations, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; romzimin@gmail.com

the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). However, many analysts believe that this process peaked when Chile was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, something that has continually been interpreted in Chile as appreciation of the country's honoring its commitments under various multilateral agreements.

Before examining individual aspects of Chile's non-permanent Security Council membership, it is essential to point out that the country's foreign policy between 1990 and 2017 can be divided into two main stages. During the first stage of 1990 to 2005, Chile was intensively trying to reintegrate into the international system and was looking for its niche in it – an agenda that could have enabled the nation to make its most significant contribution to international affairs. Chile did find such an agenda – it was economic and social support for developing countries, advocacy of free trade, and championship of sea conservation activities and environmental protection in general, gender equality, and human rights, including LGBTI rights. During the second stage of 2005-2017, Chile focused on putting this agenda into practice. This periodization may help understand initiatives put forward by Chile as a Security Council members.

Non-Permanent Membership in 1996-1997:
A Test Run

CHILE'S EFFORTS to return into the international system and its multilateralism-based diplomacy coincided in time with deep-going changes in the Security Council itself. In those years, the council ceased to be a site for ideological battles and began to transform into an institution for developing legally binding mechanisms for the settlement of international conflicts.[2] Simultaneously, threats to international peace and security received a broader interpretation as the Security Council's competence – analysts and politicians in various countries were beginning to examine regional effects of domestic political crises.[3]

Importantly, neighboring countries backed Chile's candidacy for Security Council membership. Chile largely owed its election to the council to its then foreign minister, José Miguel Insulza, who extensively discussed his country's bid for council membership on the fringes of numerous international conferences in 1995.[4]

During Chile's membership of 1996-1997, the Security Council held 180 meetings and passed 110 resolutions, and the council president issued

more than 100 statements. Chile's priorities as a council member in those years were looking for consensus-based solutions to international crises, insistence on compliance with international law, mainly the UN Charter, and defense of fundamental human rights and freedoms.[5]

Chile's first stint of presidency of the Security Council in April 1996 has been the most challenging experience for the country as a council member. On April 18, 106 people, 52 of them children, were killed and about 116 were injured in what was allegedly a mistaken Israeli

> Chile believes that its Council membership reflects a high degree of confidence vested in it by the international community and the recognition of the country as a reliable and responsible partner.

artillery attack[6] on a UN compound at Qana, Lebanon. Despite Israeli and even heavier American pressure, Juan Somavía, the then Chilean permanent representative to the United Nations and president of the Security Council, raised the Qana incident issue at a council meeting.[7]

As a result, the council unanimously passed Resolution 1052, which had been drafted by France at Somavía's request and called for "an immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties," urged "all concerned to respect the safety and security of civilians," and asked the UN secretary general "to keep the Council informed of developments on a continuing basis."[8] Remarkably, it was because of a UN report on an inquiry into the attack that the United States refused to support Boutros Boutros-Ghali's candidacy for a second term as UN secretary general. In a letter to the Security Council president dated May 7, 1996, Boutros-Ghali quoted the report as saying that, "while the possibility cannot be ruled out completely, the pattern of impacts in the Qana area makes it unlikely that the shelling of the United Nations compound was the result of technical and/or procedural errors."[9]

One important step taken by the Security Council during the next stint of Chilean presidency in October 1997 was Resolution 1134, which condemned "the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities" to give UN inspectors access to suspected sites of production of weapons of mass destruction.[10] The Security Council paid serious attention to Africa during Chile's presidencies in 1996 and 1997 – it passed Resolution 1053 on Rwanda, Resolution 1132, which called for the restoration of constitutional order in Sierra Leone, Resolution 1133 on the situation in Western

Sahara, and Resolution 1135, which extended the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Angola.

Noteworthily, Chile repeatedly expressed concern about humanitarian aspects of international crises. At a council meeting on April 18, 1996, Somavía said, in part: "I hope that someday the Security Council will make its first priority the security of people, the security of individuals."[11] The Chileans proposed regular consultations between the council and major international humanitarian organizations such as poverty relief group Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières ("Doctors without Borders") and Care International. Chilean politicians see this as their country's most important contribution to Security Council activities in 1996 and 1997.

Non-Permanent Membership in 2003-2004 and the Position on Iraq

THE IRAQ ISSUE dominated the agenda of Chile's Security Council membership period of 2003-2004. The president of Chile, Ricardo Lagos, refused to support a draft Security Council resolution to approve the armed invasion of Iraq and firmly rejected a proposal by U.S. President George W. Bush that Chile join a proposed American-led armed coalition that was going to invade Iraq in circumvention of the Security Council.[12] In doing so, Lagos ignored unprecedented U.S. pressure and a danger that the United States would refuse to sign a bilateral free trade agreement with Chile, an accord the Latin American country needed badly and had already been drafted with the text finalized by the end of 2002.[13] Chile explained that behind its stance was defense of multilateralism against unilateralist pressure.[14]

Some Chilean analysts claim that it was Lagos who persuaded French President Jacques Chirac to issue his warning that France would veto a resolution giving the go-ahead to the invasion of Iraq. In a phone call early in March 2003, these analysts say, Lagos indicated that France's veto power and Chile's ordinary right to vote represented a "fundamental difference" of status between the two countries in the Security Council. Therefore, Lagos argued, if France abstained from voting on an invasion resolution it would be commended for not vetoing it while Chile would be punished for not supporting the resolution if it abstained.[15] Lagos was hinting at different degrees of U.S. influence on France and Chile.

That conversation between the two presidents would hardly have taken place if there had not existed a powerful pro-invasion camp in the

Security Council. Of the council's 15 member countries, two permanent members – France and Russia – were against invasion. Two other permanent members – the United States and Britain – were in favor of invasion and were backed by non-permanent members Spain and Bulgaria out of NATO solidarity. China, also a permanent member, was holding a wait-and-see position and most likely would have abstained if an invasion had been voted on. As regards the rest of the non-permanent members, Mexico was following blindly the United States' foreign policy course, Pakistan was a traditional Asian ally of the United States, and Angola, Guinea and Cameroon were heavily dependent on American financial aid.[16]

Hence it was largely due to the independent position of Chile whether the council would vote on an invasion resolution or not. Putting such a resolution to the vote would have run against Chile's interests as it could have torpedoed its planned free trade agreement with the United States. That explained Lagos' stance, and his plan worked: a few days after his phone call with Chirac, France warned that it would veto an invasion resolution if such were put to the vote, and this forced the United States to give up seeking UN approval of its invasion plan.

Another landmark in Chilean membership in the Security Council was its presidency of the council in January 2004, during which Chile organized debates on national reconciliation issues and the role of the United Nations in dealing with them.[17] A key result was the establishment in 2005 of the Peacebuilding Commission,[18] an intergovernmental consultative body on peace efforts in countries that had been through conflicts.

Peacekeeping was yet another area of Chile's international activity. The Chilean military took part in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (UNSTAMIH),[19] which was launched in summer 2004. During Chilean membership in that period, the Security Council adopted a resolution on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,[20] a resolution extending the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO),[21] a resolution concerning the UN Observation Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the situation in that country,[22] and in January 2005, the council's then Chilean president issued a statement on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.[23]

Chile's Security Council membership in 2003-2004 was in a sense the period that completed the democratization of the country's foreign policy. By its position on the Iraq issue and on related developments Chile

demonstrated that it could pursue an independent foreign policy and consistently follow its multilateralism principle. The frequency and nature of initiatives put forward by it in that period, its close involvement in the activities of various UN bodies, and its participation in UN decision-making made clear that Chile was an independent international actor.

Non-Permanent Membership in 2014-2015

CHILE'S LATEST STINT of Security Council membership were the years 2014 and 2015, a period during which the conflict in Ukraine, the crisis in Syria and the North Korea issue dominated the council's agenda. Chile essentially sided with the West on those issues: it refused to recognize the Crimean referendum on reunification with Russia, supported the Minsk agreements, and voted for Security Council Resolution 2254 on Syria, although it argued that Bashar al-Assad's removal as president of Syria could not be an essential condition for the settlement of the conflict.

During its presidency of the Security Council in January 2015, Chile organized a debate on an "inclusive development in the maintenance of international peace and security." The country called for comprehensive social, economic, religious, ethnic, and territorial development and for the eradication of inequality as ways to avert conflicts and facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding.[24]

Chile was also active in council bodies such as the Côte d'Ivoire Sanctions Committee, the South Sudan Sanctions Committee, the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals (a body that primarily dealt with matters relating to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Tribunal for Rwanda), and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. Chile was the architect of resolutions that renewed the mandates of the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It also launched and carried through the first inspection of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.[25]

Chile was also instrumental in the strengthening of ties between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Owing to the efforts of Chile, the Security Council provided the ICC with comments on the conflicts in Libya in 2011 and South Sudan in 2013 in response to a request from the court that had remained unsatisfied for several years. The council adopted resolutions on developments in the Central African Republic,[26] the Democratic Republic of the Congo,[27] and Cyprus.[28]

Chile's Standing on Proposed Reforms of the Security Council

REFORMING the Security Council is an issue that the council debated during all the periods of Chilean membership. Chile has argued that post-Cold War changes in the international system made it essential to reform the council. Chile has consistently put its multilateralism principle at the basis of its views on council reforms.

Chile believes that reforms of the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole should aim to consolidate the democracy, transparency and consistency of the organization and its readiness to provide undelayed and comprehensive reports on all its activities. Legitimacy and balanced composition must be the main principles for the reform, the Chileans insist. They want the reforms to be more than vesting non-permanent members with more powers.

Chile has been deeply involved in reform initiatives on several occasions. It was among various countries that put forward proposals for Security Council reforms recorded in a report released by the UN secretary general in July 1993. Chile joined a working group established in December 1993 to consider all aspects of a proposed increase in the Security Council membership and other matters related to the council.[29] In 2007, the Chilean permanent representative to the United Nations, Heraldo Muñoz, was one of the facilitators of consultations on Security Council reforms. Finally, Chile played an important role as a member of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT), a body that was set up in 2013 to look for more "transparent" Security Council methods and brought together 27 small and mid-sized countries.[30]

Chile sees the Security Council as an insufficiently democratic body, and this is the country's main grievance with the council. Chile's main concern is the permanent members' veto power. Back in 1947, the then Chilean representative to the United Nations, José Maza, told the General Assembly that veto power was a privilege accorded to great powers by smaller nations as a demonstration of confidence.[31] Chile normally supports any initiative to limit the permanent members' veto power. One such initiative was a French proposal in 2017 for any genocide-related resolutions to be non-vetoable.

Chile proposes that the Security Council hold more frequent meetings that are open to the public as a democratization and transparency reform. Another initiative by Chile, one that the country intensively lobbied for during its Security Council membership period of 1996-1997, is for the

council to draw more practical support from nongovernmental organizations.

Chile's position on Security Council reforms bears imprints of its general foreign policy line. One instance is Chile's continual defense of gender equality. Chile was in the vanguard of a group that was drumming up support in 2015 for women candidates for UN secretary general. Five women were running for the post.

Chile also advocates changes to the Security Council's composition. It proposes instituting a category of permanent members without veto power and enlarging the number of non-permanent members. It argues that 24 or 25 countries would be the council's optimum total number of members. But Chile's main proposal is that what it sees as today's peripheral status of the non-permanent members should be done away with.

<p align="center">***</p>

AN ANALYSIS of Chile's three periods of non-permanent Security Council membership leads to the following conclusions about Chile's vision of its role in the council. Firstly, Chile believes that its council membership reflects a high degree of confidence vested in it by the international community and the recognition of the country as a reliable and responsible partner.

Secondly, as Chile is neither a member of the nuclear club nor one of the world's key military powers, it plays a limited role in international security debates, and therefore often allies with large Western countries.

Thirdly, Chilean initiatives have consistently had strong humanitarian aspects to them, aspects that have seemed to be more in tune with issues addressed by ECOSOC. It is partly humanitarian proposals by Chile that explain the trend in the Security Council to include humanitarian issues in peace and security debates. Chile has had no plans to initiate any overlaps between Security Council and ECOSOC agendas. More likely, its humanitarian initiatives have been reactions to the increasing structural complexity of modern threats and challenges. It is essential to understand their causes, forms and potential consequences to be able to handle them successfully.

Fourthly, Chile has consistently advocated selectivity about international bodies where bilateral issues should be raised. For instance, Chile has never put its territorial disputes with Peru and Bolivia on Security

Council agendas. The United Nations' International Court of Justice is the only international body Chile has taken the matter to.

Some analysts argue that Chile has played an insignificant role in the Security Council.[32] They claim that the large number of resolutions concerning African countries passed by the council during Chilean presidencies means that Chile lacks a global outlook and has been incapable of coming up with an agenda that would interest all the council members. This is not the attitude taken in Chile. Heraldo Muñoz, its former representative to the United Nations, has pointed out that 70 countries expressed interest in participating in a debate on "inclusive development in the maintenance of international peace and security" organized by Chile during its Security Council presidency in January 2015.[33] This and other above-mentioned achievements mean that Chile has a successful record as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

NOTES

[1] Fermandois, Joaquín. *Mundo y fin de mundo: Chile en la política mundial 1900-2004.* Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2005, p. 418.

[2] Dedring, Juergen. *The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s.* New York, 2009, p. 42.

[3] Ibid.

[4] *Memoria Anual del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile 1995.* Santiago: Academia Diplomática, 1996, p. 64.

[5] Somavía, Juan, Oyarce, Pedro (editors). *Chile actor del sistema multilateral. Una tradición nacional.* Santiago, Chile, March 2018, p. 185.

[6] Response to UN Secretary's Report on Kana Incident // Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, May 9, 1996 // http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/hizbullah/pages/response%20to%20un%20secretary-s%20report%20on%20kana%20incident.aspx (retrieved on December 15, 2018).

[7] Somavía J., Oyarce P. Op. cit., p. 156.

[8] Resolution 1052 (1996) of the UN Security Council // UN Security Council. April 18, 1996 // http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1052 (retrieved on December 12, 2018).

[9] Letter Dated May 7, 1996 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council // United Nations. May 7, 1996 // https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/62D5AA740C14293B85256324005179BE (retrieved on December 11, 2018).

[10] Resolution 1134 (1997) // United Nations Security Council. October 23, 1997 // http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1134 (retrieved on December 1, 2018).

[11] Agenda for the Security Council's 3654th meeting // United Nations. April 18, 1996 // https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/210581/files/S_PV.3654-EN.pdf (retrieved on November 11, 2018).

[12] Baeza, Freer Jaime; López Varas, Miguel Ángel. "El Congreso Nacional de Chile y el Proceso de Ratificación del Tratado de Libre Comercio con los Estados Unidos de América," *Estudios Internacionales* núm. 182 (2015), p. 40.

[13] Bywaters, C. Cristóbal. "El 'No' de Ricardo Lagos a la invasión de Irak en 2003: el pro-

ceso de toma de decisiones en la política exterior de Chile," *Estudios Internacionales.* 2014. Vol. 46, núm. 177, p. 69.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Somavía J., Oyarce P. Op. cit. p. 90.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Agenda for the Security Council's 4903rd meeting // United Nations, New York, January 26, 2004 // https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/513886/files/S_PV.4903-EN.pdf (retrieved on October 10, 2018).

[18] Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005) // United Nations. December 20, 2005 // http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1645 (retrieved on December 12, 2018).

[19] Security Council Resolution 1542 (2004) // United Nations. April 30, 2004 // https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1542(2004) (retrieved on December 12, 2018).

[20] Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) // United Nations. March 12, 2004 // http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1533 (retrieved on December 12, 2018).

[21] Security Council Resolution 1523 (2004) // United Nations. January 30, 2004 // https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1523(2004) (retrieved on December 12, 2018).

[22] Security Council Resolution 1524 (2004) // United Nations. January 30, 2004 // https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1524(2004) (retrieved on December 12, 2018).

[23] Statement by the President of the Security Council // United Nations. January 19, 2004 // https://undocs.org/en/S/PRST/2004/1 (retrieved on December 12, 2018).

[24] ¿Qué aportó y qué obtuvo Chile en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU? // *El Mercurio.* 10 de enero de 2016, p. D10.

[25] Vocación de Paz. La Política Exterior de Chile. A Vocation for Peace. Chilean Foreign Policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile. Santiago, 2016, pp. 62-66.

[26] Security Council Resolution 2196 (2015) // United Nations. January 22, 2015 // https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2196(2015) (retrieved on December 12, 2018).

[27] Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015) // United Nations. January 29, 2015 // https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2198(2015) (retrieved on December 12, 2018).

[28] Security Council Resolution 2197 (2015) // United Nations. January 29, 2015 // https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2197(2015) (retrieved on December 12, 2018).

[29] General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/26 // United Nations. December 3, 1993 // https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/48/26 (retrieved on December 19, 2018).

[30] Dundukova T.A. "Osnovnyye predlozheniya i pozitsiya postoyannykh chlenov Soveta Bezopasnosti OON po voprosu reformirovaniya Organizatsii Obyedinennykh Natsiy," *Molodoy ucheny.* 2016. No. 9, pp. 972-979.

[31] Somavía J., Oyarce P. Op. cit., p. 357.

[32] ¿Qué aportó y qué obtuvo Chile...

[33] Ibid.

Key words: Chile, UN Security Council, non-permanent members, multilateralism, reforms of the Security Council.

Who Is Doing Well in Ecuador?
Social Reforms and *Buen Vivir*

T. Vorotnikova

DECENT LIFE, well-being, the common good, progress, and development are universal concepts, but they take different cultural and historical forms. In the early 21st century, the government of Ecuador launched a unique sociopolitical project with social inclusion, eradication of poverty, and equal opportunities being priority objectives [6].

This project was based on the philosophy of *buen vivir* ("good living" or "living well") – a Spanish translation of the Quechua phrase *sumak kawsay,* which stands for a worldview based on Andean-Amazonian Indian institutions and cultures [10].

Buen vivir has no strict boundaries [4], but its main principles are peaceful coexistence, tolerance, ethnic diversity, pluralism, and harmony with nature.

Buen vivir is not limited to any economic strategies. It represents a new vision of national development, transparency and civic engagement, principles that it holds can be asserted through civil and social rights, economic opportunities, and ethical standards.

Rafael Correa, during his three terms as president of Ecuador from 2007 to 2017, launched economic and social reforms that mitigated impacts of external factors such as the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the past few years' declines in world energy prices and laid the basis for higher living standards. These reforms included tax legislation, measures against unemployment, and revision of the foreign debt and oil contracts. Financial, regulatory and institutional reforms and innovative anti-inflationary and monetary measures were particularly effective [23]. Higher state revenues enabled the government to significantly increase

Tatyana Vorotnikova, senior research associate, Institute of Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Sciences (Politics); vorotnikovat@yandex.ru

social expenditure, which won wide public support for the reforms and achieved political stability for the country [5].*

Social Policy Priorities

ECUADOR'S current constitution, approved by a referendum in 2008, bases the country's political system on new principles: It is considered unique and one of the world's most progressive constitutions. It prioritizes humanism and social justice. Besides reaffirming universally recognized human rights, the constitution declares the free access to water a "fundamental and inalienable" human right and states that people and entities "have a right to secure and permanent access to healthy, sufficient and nutritive food"; to "free, intercultural, inclusive, diverse, and participative communication in all environments of social interaction and via any medium and in any form, in their own language and with the use of their own symbols"; to authentic information; to education; to "adequate and appropriate living conditions"; to adequate health care, and "a healthy and ecologically balanced natural environment" [3].

The constitution pays special attention to the country's indigenous ethnic groups. It prescribes that the state guarantee all of the country's ethnic groups the ability to lead their traditional way of life, and all the normal rights and freedoms, including the right to self-determination and the right to civic participation [7]. In addition to the constitution, more than 170 laws were brought out during Correa's first term reforming the political system. One third of them established civil rights guarantees [22].

Ecuador set out its development strategy in a set of five-year reform roadmaps each of which was entitled *Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir (The National Plan for Good Living).* The third plan of the series, which covered the period from 2013 to 2017, set 12 key objectives based on principles of equality, comprehensive development, a "citizens' revolution," a "cultural revolution," an "agrarian revolution," and a "revolution of knowledge."

Al least five of those 12 objectives can be considered social policy goals – promoting "equality, cohesion, inclusion, and social and territorial equity in diversity"; improving the population's quality of life; helping the population strengthen its creative potential; providing chan-

---

* The 2017 presidential election was won by Lenín Boltaire Moreno Garcés, who had been vice president from 2007 to 2013.

nels for communication; consolidating the national identity of the Ecuadorians, multiethnicity and multiculturalism; reforming the judiciary; and guaranteeing "comprehensive security with strict respect for human rights."

The plan contained a comprehensive analysis of key development indicators and sets specific economic and social policy tasks. Between 2007 and 2011, public investment reached a "record level" of 14.5% of gross domestic product (GDP), making Ecuador one of Latin America's public investment leaders, the document said [18, p. 415].

Ecuador's current constitution, approved by a referendum in 2008, bases the country's political system on new principles: It is considered unique and one of the world's most progressive constitutions.

As regards social policy, between 2007 and 2016, the poverty rate declined by 38% from 36.7% to 22.9% and extreme poverty plummeted by 47% from 16.5% to 8.7% [23, p. 5].

Inequality also fell – as measured by the Gini coefficient, it went down from 0.55 to 0.47 [23, p. 2]. These achievements, which can be considered a breakthrough after mounting inequality between 1996 and 2006, were based on economic growth, job creation, and state support programs for the underprivileged. Unemployment dropped to an average of 4.9% for the period from 2007 to 2016. The minimum wage increased by 48% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms between 2007 and 2016 [23, p. 6], helping defuse social tensions.

One of the Correa administration's best-known achievements was a financial support program for poorer strata, which, besides making them better off, facilitated their social inclusion and social mobility. The program, called Human Development Benefits (*Bono de Desarollo Humano*), involved the payment of allowances to people with incomes below the official subsistence minimum. During Correa's first term, 1.9 million allowances were paid, with 1.2 million people receiving monthly allowances of $50 [12]. There were, besides, housing allowances [8, p. 16]. Human Development Benefits was a burden on the state, but it helped many poor people improve their material status, give at least basic education to their children, and even set up a small business.

In 2013, the *International Living* magazine ranked Ecuador as the best country for retirees to live in due to state support, affordable health

care and a favorable climate. Besides pensions, people aged over 65 qualify for various kinds of discounts such as tax concessions, reduced electricity and water charges, reduced prices for tickets for cultural and sports events, and reduced fares on travel within the country in both state and private transportation systems [2, p. 102].

Serious support has been given to the disabled, with a constitutional law on disability brought out and the state disability budget enlarged by a four-digit percentage.

The government has launched programs for the disabled, including Manuela Espejo Solidarity Mission, which is a social psychology and medical study program, and the Joaquín Gallegos Lara program, which involves treatment and the payment of monthly $240 allowances. Ecuador's current president, Lenín Moreno, who took office in 2017 and has been confined to a wheelchair after being injured in a gun assault in 1998, was nominated for the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize for championing social inclusion for the disabled and combating discrimination against them.

The government has paid special attention to children. It has launched a priority program for children aged six months to five years that included the construction of kindergartens. Various firms have "children's centers for good living" (*centros infantiles del buen vivir*) attached to them where employees can have their children looked after. In 2013, such centers took care of 314,000 children. There is a large-scale plan to restructure Ecuador's school infrastructure. It includes setting up "educational institutions of the millennium" (*unidades educativas del milenio*).

Increased social expenditure by the state, which between 2006 and 2016 rose from 4.2% to 8.6% of GDP, has helped improve the population's quality of life. Priority was given to health care and education with spending on them accounting for 2.5% and 4.5% of GDP respectively [17, p. 112]. We discuss Ecuador's health care and education spending in greater detail below.

Public Health as a Condition for Prosperity

AS SAID ABOVE, health care is one of the duties of the state under Ecuador's constitution. Under Article 362, diagnosing, treatment, provision of drugs, and rehabilitation must be free of charge [9]. This has required larger state spending. Over the past few years, medical services have improved significantly and become more accessible. Ecuador was

13th in Bloomberg's 2014 health care efficiency rankings that were based on criteria such as life expectancy, cost as a percentage of GDP and cost per capita [16].

Life expectancy in Ecuador increased from 71.8 years in 2007 to 76 in 2014 [24]. The World Health Organization notes that maternal and child mortality in Ecuador has declined. This has been a general Latin American trend – between 2000 and 2010, child mortality fell by 64% in Mexico and Venezuela and by at least 50% in Brazil, Costa Rica, Peru, and Ecuador [17, p. 161]. However, child mortality has persistently remained high among indigenous peoples. Developmental delays in children under five remain a problem in Ecuador, even though between 2002 and 2012 the developmental delay rate dropped from 33.5% to 25.3% [11].

Ecuador is one of the countries with Latin America's highest incidence of tuberculosis. About 13% of the country's population have no access to safe drinking water [24]. Rural clinics are understaffed and underequipped; they are generally in poor condition. It remains an imperative to hire more doctors and nurses and set up more clinics, primarily in mountain and other remote areas.

Ecuador has a rather complex health care system, which includes the Ministry of Public Health, the Institute of Social Security (IESS), the National Police Social Security Institute, the Armed Forces Social Security Institute and other organizations that are under the jurisdiction of various ministries or local administrations. Many of them are independent of one another and have their own sources of funding [15, p. 756].

The IESS has undergone what was has been one of the most significant reforms in Ecuador's health care system. As a result, all working Ecuadorians, members of their families, pensioners, children, and teenagers may receive medical assistance at IESS hospitals and outpatient clinics on the basis of compulsory medical insurance funded with levies paid by employers. There also exist private clinics, but they offer quite expensive services, and so they mostly have well-to-do patients. Some Ecuadorian and international companies offer private health insurance.

The health care reforms have aimed to build an efficient system complying with *buen vivir* philosophy. They have had the priority objectives of making medical services accessible to the most vulnerable strata, building out the network of hospitals and outpatient clinics, raising salaries in the health sector, and recruiting more personnel for it.

Between 2006 and 2016, public investment in health care increased

from 4% to 10% of GDP, while in 2013 it reached a record level of 14.8% of GDP [23, p. 8]. The health care system partly owed its higher standards to the incorporation of the ambulance service into the country's single emergency service, ECU-911, as a result of which there was one ambulance vehicle per 35,000 people compared with 115,000, the coverage rate that preceded the ambulance service's inclusion in ECU-911, although the 35,000 rate was still too high (for comparison's sake, in Russia, the rate is 10,000 people per vehicle) [15, p. 756]. Between 2006 and 2014, the number of available hospital beds increased by 23.5% and the number of patients being treated at public hospitals grew by 40% [23, p. 7]. There were 36 million registered instances of people seeking medical assistance in 2013 compared with 14 million in 2006 [15, p. 756].

Hospitals and outpatient centers have been built, state-of-the-art equipment has been installed, doctors have been invited from abroad, mainly from Spain and Cuba, and scholarships have been instituted to boost medical training at home.

The *buen vivir*-based reforming of the health sector implied changes in other sectors as well. For example, the Ministry of Public Health was given the authority to participate in designing policies on alcohol and tobacco taxation, on drug price control, and on food product marking. An article – Article 94 – was included in the Law on Mass Communications, which says: "Media of mass communications shall not advertise products whose regular or recurrent use may exert any negative effect upon human health. The Ministry of Public Health shall compile a list of products of these types. Authorization from the Ministry of Public Health is necessary for the advertising of any products intended as food products or as health-related products" [15, p. 758].

Education: A Right or a Privilege?

ECUADOR'S GOVERNMENT attaches a great deal of importance to education and the development of talent as instruments for social development. According to the World Bank, in 2015, Ecuador was one of Latin America's biggest education spenders – education money made up 13% of that year's total state expenditure [13].

The 2008 constitution guarantees the right to education to every Ecuadorian regardless of their gender, race or ethnicity. It is one of the state's main duties to ensure equal access to education for everyone. In addition to the Constitution, the education system is based on the

Constitutional Law on Higher Education and the Constitutional Law on Intercultural Education, both of which came out in 2010.

Ecuador also has a ten-year education plan that covers the period from 2016 to 2025 and sets objectives such as guaranteeing access to preschool education to all children, compulsory attendance of primary school, reduction of illiteracy, increasing the numbers of *bachillerato* holders (people who have finished the upper tier of secondary school), improving the education infrastructure, raising educational standards and the professional standards of teachers, and increasing state expenditure for education.

The educational reforms were designed to put an end to a state of society caused by economic backwardness, misguided government policies, and cultural and social prejudice. Before the reforms, education was a privilege of the wealthy, who could afford to send their children to expensive private schools and universities. The ethnic fragmentation of Ecuadorian society were other obstacles to general education.

Ecuador is one of the countries that still have not defeated illiteracy. About 5% of males and 7% of females aged over 15 cannot read or write in any language, either in Spanish or in any local Indian languages [14], with 12.9% of the rural and 3.7% of the urban population being illiterate. Illiteracy is particularly widespread among Indian women, 27% of whom cannot read or write.

Social inequality is one of the main causes of educational inequality. The majority of young people who fail to finish school come from low-income families or are rural residents or are native Indians or Afro-Ecuadorians. Fortunately, the situation is improving. Between 2002 and 2014, there were growing proportions of holders of secondary school diplomas in all such groups in Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala.

The largest increase of 64% was recorded among indigenous peoples, the group that at the outset of that period had the lowest proportion of secondary school diploma holders [17, p. 140]. This was partly attributable to the Law on Intercultural Education, which gave members of indigenous ethnic groups the right to education in their own language. Nevertheless, indigenous peoples still have limited access to education, and it would take a major effort to put this situation right.

Another serious obstacle to the social integration of young people in Latin America is finding employment after finishing education. Generación Nini (a term whose English equivalent is NEETs, people who

are "not in education, employment, or training") is a special source of concern. This situation helps reproduce inequality and prevents the use of opportunities offered by demographic advantages. Unemployment is a particularly serious problem for women and indigenous peoples. However, Ecuador is one of the Latin American countries that have made progress in dealing with this problem [17, p. 26].

Basic education in Ecuador is free of charge. There are about 1,100 primary schools in the country. Attending school is compulsory for all children who have turned six. But although 95% of all children start school, some of them drop out before finishing the fifth grade. The main reason is that some children need to work to help their families. The government is concerned about these two categories of children, the 5% who fail to start school and the dropouts.

Child labor remains a problem in Ecuador. As of 2012, children aged between five and 17 made a workforce of 360,000 in the country with 71% of them employed in agriculture, 21% in the service sector and 8% in industry [17, p. 138]. However, it has been possible to reduce the scale of child labor. A recipient of a Human Development Benefits allowance is duty-bound to send their children to school. As a result, more children have been attending school.

Secondary education in Ecuador is a two-tier system consisting of a three-year senior secondary school course and a *bachillerato*, a higher course with a humanities, science or technology curriculum. The *bachillerato* degree entitles its holder to enter one of the non-university-level institutions training primary school teachers, social workers, nurses, etc. Secondary education is seen as potentially the main catalyst for reducing social inequality. However, there are serious differences in educational, and consequently professional, standards.

The higher education system consists of universities, *escuelas politécnicas* ("polytechnic schools"), *institutos técnicos* ("technical institutes"), and *institutos tecnológicos* ("technological institutes"). The licentiate's degree is the lower graduation level and is conferred after a course of two to four years. After that, one can do a two-year master's degree. Though higher education standards in Ecuador are rising gradually, only two Ecuadorian universities are regularly ranked among Latin America's 100 best universities. Universidad San Francisco de Quito (USFQ), which was founded in 1988 and provides education to 5,500 students, is Ecuador's leading university and is 57th in *QS Latin America University Rankings 2018,* part of *QS World University Rankings 2018*, a British

publication. The Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador (PUCE), a pontifical university having 7,000 students at a time, is 71st in the same rankings. Both universities are private institutions. Ecuador's best higher education institutions also include the Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral (ESPOL), which is also in these rankings, the Central University of Ecuador, the University of Cuenca, and the Universidad Católica de Santiago de Guayaquil (UCSG) [20].

Many of the Ecuadorians who can afford it prefer to study abroad, with Spain, the United States, Cuba, and Russia being some of the most popular destinations. In 2013, Ecuador's government launched a program, called Prometeo, to hire lecturers and researchers from abroad and encourage Ecuadorian graduates of foreign universities to return home. Ecuador chiefly needs programmers and specialists in renewable energy, nanotechnology, and biotechnology. The Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (also known as RUDN University) and South-West State University are the Russian universities with the closest ties to Ecuador. Ecuadorian students at RUDN University, whose numbers are growing continuously, give preference to medicine, engineering, ecology, agriculture, and nanotechnology [1]. In 2017, 87 Ecuadorians were studying at RUDN.

Innovation is one more objective pursued by Ecuador. Between 2006 and 2014, the country raised its science and technology expenditure from 0.20% to 0.56% of GDP. Research personnel grew from 2,000 to 15,000 [21]. There are 11 state-owned research institutes in the country. Yachay City of Knowledge, built with Russian assistance and opened in 2014, includes a university (Yachay Tech University), a technopark, an experimental agricultural area, and a biotechnological center. Yachay is a unique project for Latin America and is expected to become Ecuador's science center.

<div align="center">***</div>

The Whole Life. National Development Plan 2017-2021 prioritizes social policy and sets objectives including broader guarantees of social integration and economic, cultural and territorial equality; better health care; more opportunities for young people to develop their potential; more effective use of the nation's productive capacities; guarantees of the preservation of traditional languages and multilingualism; creation of a stable intercultural education system; and diplomatic action against climate change and for respect for nature (green diplomacy) [19].

However, Ecuador's progress in education and health care, sectors that need constant financial inputs, has not yet resulted in achievements that can guarantee sufficient systemic changes. Ecuador continues to be plagued by wide-scale undereducation, gender and ethnic inequality, labor market problems, and growing unemployment. It is imperative that today's government should act to sustain what has been achieved since 2007 and to attain the objectives set by *The Whole Life. National Development Plan 2017-2021.*

LIST OF SOURCES

1. Borzova A.Yu., Medina Gonzales, Vinisio Ksaviyer. "RUDN i Latino-Karibskaya Amerika: novyye napravleniya vzaimodeystviya v obrazovatelnoy sfere," *Vestnik RUDN. Seriya: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya.* 2018. Vol. 18. No. 1, pp. 208-220.

2. Vergara, Surita Kh. E. *Optimizatsiya sistemy upravleniya chelovecheskimi resursami kak dvizhushchey sily razvitiya natsionalnoy ekonomiki (na primere Respubliki Ekvador).* Dissertation for the degree of candidate of science (economics). Moscow, 2017.

3. Martynova M. "Novaya konstitutsiya Ekvadora: sotsializm XXI veka," *Pravo i upravleniye. XXI vek.* MGIMO, 2009. No. 2, pp. 69-80.

4. Pavlova Ye.B. "Kontseptsii 'khoroshey zhizni' v Bolivii i Ekvadore: rastsvet i upadok normativnoy sily," *Latinskaya Amerika.* 2016. No. 3, pp. 22-31.

5. Pyatakov A.N. "Pobeda Lenina Moreno v Ekvadore: mezhdunarodny i vnutripolitichesky aspekty," *Latinskaya Amerika.* 2017. No. 6, pp. 17-27.

6. Chaves, Savala P.A. "Oriyentiry i dostizheniya plana 'Dostoynaya zhizn'," // *Latinskaya Amerika.* 2014. No. 3, pp. 56-74.

7. Shinkarenko A.A. "Problemy politicheskogo uchastiya indeyskikh dvizheniy," *Indeysky mir pered vyzovami XX veka. Collection of articles.* Ed. by M.l. Chumakova. Moscow, 2011, pp. 11-37.

8. *Ekvador na puti "grazhdanskoy revolyutsii."* Sammit analytical series / Series editor V.M. Davydov. Moscow, 2009.

9. Constitución de la República del Ecuador. 2008 // http://www.asambleanacional. gov.ec/documentos/constitucion_de_bolsillo.pdf

10. Cuestas-Caza, Javier. "Sumak Kawsay is not Buen Vivir," *Alternautas.* Vol. 5. Issue 1. 2018, pp. 51-66.

11. *Country cooperation strategy at a glance: Ecuador.* World Health Organization. 2017 // http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/137163/1/ccsbrief_ecu_en.pdf?ua=1

12. El bono: salto de la pobreza a la inclusión social // *Diario El Telégrafo.* 27 de enero de 2014 // http://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/masqmenos-2/1/el-bono-salto-de-la-pobreza-a-la-inclusion-social

13. Government expenditure on education, total (% of government expenditure). The World Bank // https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GB.ZS

14. Literacy rate. The World Bank Data // https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SE.ADT.LITR.FE.ZS

15. Malo-Serrano, Miguel; Malo-Corral, Nicolás. "Reforma de salud en Ecuador: nunca más el derecho a la salud como un privilegio," *Revista Peruana de Medicina Experimental y Salud Pública.* Lima, octubre/diciembre 2014. Vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 754-761.

16. Most Efficient Health Care 2014: Countries. Bloomberg // https://www.bloomberg.

com/graphics/best-and-worst/#most-efficient-health-care-2014-countries

17. Panorama Social de América Latina 2016. Naciones Unidas, CEPAL. Santiago de Chile, 2017.

18. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo / Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir 2013-2017. Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo. Quito, 2013.

19. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2017-2021. Toda la Vida. Secretaría Nacional de Planificacíon y Desarrollo. Quito, Ecuador, 2017 // http://www.planificacion.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2017/10/PNBV-26-OCT-FINAL_0K.compressed1.pdf

20. QS University Rankings: Latin America 2018 // https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/latin-american-university-rankings/2018

21. RICYT – Red de Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología Iberoamericana e Interamericana // http://db.ricyt.org/ui/v1.0/index.html#

22. Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo. Quito, 2014 // http://www.planificacion.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2014/04/folleto_7_esp_web-2.pdf

23. Weisbrot, Mark; Johnston, Jake and Merling, Lara. *Decade of Reform: Ecuador's Macroeconomic Policies, Institutional Changes, and Results.* Center for Economic and Policy Research. Washington, February 2017.

24. World Health Organization. Key country indicators. Complete data set. Data from 2004 to 2017 // http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.cco.latest?lang=en

Key words: Ecuador, *buen vivir,* social policy, education, health care, social expenditure, reforms.

The Creative Potential
of Russian Public Diplomacy

A. Bobrov

MAKING the effective use of public diplomacy has for years been a keynote of all analytical studies devoted to soft power and its derivatives. Even though the concept of public diplomacy is clearly defined and has already entered the Russian political lexicon, the extent of its practical application is far behind the pace of scientific research and needs fleshing out in more detail. We believe that this can be ensured with the help of a person's social quality, such as creativity.

Regarding terminology, in this article, we propose our own definition of public diplomacy: the activities of public organizations and non-governmental entities, carried out in accordance with the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and designed to protect national interests; impact a foreign audience to take a positive view of the state's foreign and domestic policy objectives and ways of achieving them; ensure a better understanding of national values and state institutions abroad.

It should be mentioned that a different approach is also represented in Russian scientific and applied literature: "Public diplomacy is not a political concept; it is a manifestation of any civic activity in the cultural, scientific and (or) humanitarian spheres that, as a general rule, is not related to government contracts or the active participation of the state."[1]

However, we believe this definition is logically inconsistent, since the concept of diplomacy should not be used to define activities unrelated to foreign policy (if only due to the etymology of this word). Diplomatic activity must not have dual purposes: one for civil society or NGOs and the other for the state.

It should be noted that differences in the definition of such widely used concepts as *obshchestvennaya diplomatiya* [civic, social diplomacy] and *publichnaya diplomatiya* [public diplomacy] have yet to be ironed

_____

Artyom Bobrov, third secretary at the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs regional office in Rostov-on-Don, Candidate of Science (Sociology); artem.bobrow@gmail.com

out. An important nuance lies in their semantic meaning: Publichnaya is defined as open, transparent. Obshchestvennaya is defined as pertaining to society, being at its disposal. Herein lines the distinction between actors of diplomacy. In the first case, these are people holding government positions, as well as the state as a whole; in the second, civil society representatives are acting within the bounds set by the state.

However, we will not get carried away with semantic collisions and will agree that these concepts are practically synonymous, accepting the terms "public diplomacy" and "civil diplomacy" as a tool of engagement with societies abroad for political purposes.

Classical types of political ideologies may seem archaic in a modern information society, but it would be rash to completely abandon ideology, without which there can be no systemic organization – and therefore no effective policy.

In its traditional understanding, creativity means the ability to generate new ideas and create qualitatively new intellectual products. Creativity allows a person to put forward diverse and equally effective ideas with regard to the same object in dealing with the same problem.

At the same time, within the scope of this article, it is important to reflect the social and civic aspects of creativity, defined by Yu.G. Volkov as a new quality of public life related to the fact that millions of people cease being the mass, strive to become masters of the situation and look for identity in areas other than the desire to shock or cause a public sensation. Their personal impact on public life, the perception and awareness of their involvement in social change and the sharing of responsibility for the state of society become important for them.[2]

The close connection and interdependence between public diplomacy and creativity in both theory and practice stem from the fact that the sociopolitical activities of public organizations, in contrast to the institution of civil servants, are far less limited by norms and regulators, and therefore, have an incomparably greater room to pursue qualitatively new ideas and breakthrough methodologies in society, as well as contribute personal achievements to society.

In other words, in international relations, public diplomacy can effectively employ the creative potential as a driver of social progress and evolution.

Problems With Tapping the Creative Potential of Public Diplomacy in Russia

A THOROUGH ANALYSIS of the current sociopolitical situation causes concern that, devoid of creativity, public diplomacy will be unable to develop qualitatively. The reason for that is not the lack of financing. The situation in this regard has changed for the better: State grants and specialized foundations provide the necessary financial support. The problem is that all parties concerned lack the expertise, knowledge, experience, and willingness to develop this kind of diplomatic practice.

Here is just one example. Because of the difficult political situation in Ukraine, which the Rostov region borders, regional expert circles are highlighting the need to establish contacts with that country. In fact, every discussion with the participation of public organizations ends with a final document calling for proactive efforts to settle the current crisis in Ukraine. But why do Russian NGOs not see the futility of their persistent attempts to resolve a domestic crisis in another country? The question remains unanswered.

At the same time, students, postgraduates and young experts, who, in our opinion, have a significant potential for creativity, take a non-politicized view of the Ukrainian crisis as a kind of everyday objective reality, and are maneuvering within the existing set of coordinates, finding common ground, establishing contacts and promoting cooperation without touching on the toxic political sphere at all.

In this situation, the public's creative potential works as an effective compensatory mechanism. This goes to show once again that since we are living amid crisis-related transformations, the principal factor of development is the attitude toward creative thinking, which, unlike the traditional way of thinking, involves the ability to diversify the resources and methods of producing results in dealing with a particular problem. Whereas in Soviet days, one popular slogan was, "set a task and we will accomplish it with the available resources," these days, both the tasks and resources are variables, the main objective being to find an effective solution in any situation.[3]

In this context, the following remark by Ye. Ponomaryova and M. Mladenovich seems to be highly relevant: "Perhaps the most striking example of the unacceptability of neglecting public diplomacy is the political and humanitarian catastrophe in Russian-Ukrainian relations."[4] The fact that, according to acting Foreign Minister of the Donetsk

People's Republic N.Yu. Nikonorova, the population of Donbass is becoming increasingly tired of the existing uncertainty in relations with Russia is not only the result of Kiev's actions, but also evidently short-comings on the Russian side.[5]

At the same time, Western institutions have become actively involved in promoting networking between the creative, socially active segments of the population, especially young people. For instance, in August 2016, the European Foundation for Democracy (EFD) launched the City Hub project in the Ukraine-controlled Lugansk region to search for young leaders and promote engagement between residents of the region and the self-proclaimed Lugansk People's Republic. Go East Global is a similar EFD project to support the existing leaders, as well as to find and train new community leaders in the Donbass.

In addition, several European programs are widely represented in the region, including Observatory of Democracy; an online course for internally displaced people, How to Turn a Hobby into a Business; Lessons of Freedom, an initiative to promote and deepen the understanding of the values of freedom and democracy among schoolchildren, and the Razom initiative to create a community education and information center in the city of Mariupol, providing information on current social and political events in the Donetsk region.

At the same time, there are no signs of similar activity of Russian organizations in regions bordering the unrecognized republics, offering programs targeting proactive residents of the Donbass who wish to improve the quality of life in the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics (LPR and DPR).

The situation is such that internationally oriented NGOs, in particular in the Rostov region, are set on developing public diplomacy, focused only on the provision of humanitarian aid, which is necessary, of course, but ignoring the fact that Western donors are working to meet the professional, intellectual and creative needs of Donbass residents.

In this context, it is extremely important for regional nonprofit organizations and public associations to maintain constructive cooperation with young leaders in the DPR and the LPR, aimed, among other things, at realizing their creative potential. In the future, this will help prevent the shifting of DPR and LPR residents' cultural and value orientations away from the idea of the Russian World.

Going back to problems related to the development of public diplomacy, it should be noted that in the course of a regional study conducted

by the author in the form of an expert survey,* 42 experts expressed the opinion that public diplomacy is not an alternative to traditional diplomacy; it only complements it and makes it possible to create the most favorable political environment for subsequent steps in the foreign policy arena.

The results of this survey are fully in sync with our understanding of public diplomacy whereby it can effectively use the creativity potential only in close coordination with traditional diplomacy and based on the same values.

Thus, monitoring the state of public diplomacy in Russia has identified several significant conceptual problems limiting the creativity potential: 1) a lack of systemic mechanisms regulating the sociopolitical practices of public diplomacy; 2) structural amorphousness due to the lack of a single coordinating agency; 3) a shortage of professionals capable of implementing innovative practices; 4) the inarticulate presentation of Russian society values to foreign audiences.

Regarding the first point, one effective mechanism of transforming the system of interaction between public diplomacy actors is the creation of favorable conditions for fostering and reproducing creativity. Following the logic of this activity, the structured diversity of relations between parties to diplomatic relations can be described as a "diplomatic space" that becomes an area of engagement between all of its actors and is defined as an integrated process of reproducing the creative practices of public diplomacy. Elements of this space include the following: the Diplomatic Club at the Russian Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy, the Foreign Ministry's office in Masterslavl,[6] the CIS Forum of Young Diplomats, the Stanford Forum, and the Moscow Diplomatic Club (in this context, the idea of opening such clubs in each Federation member where the Russian Foreign Ministry has its regional office, with foreign diplomats accredited in the respective areas being club members, looks promising).

It should be noted that the diversity of elements of the "diplomatic space" is due to the fact that amid information pluralism, a person's ability to process data effectively, quickly and in a complex sociopolitical

---

* The expert survey "Growth points of public diplomacy in Russia" was conducted by the Foreign Ministry's regional office in Rostov-on-Don jointly with the Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of Southern Federal University in October 2016 as part of the author's dissertation research project "The creativity potential in social practices of the Russian institution of public diplomacy." The study involved 46 experts in social practices of public diplomacy, including 13 professional diplomats.

context is a crucial characteristic of a creative personality developing in the social environment of public diplomacy.

At the same time, the results of the aforementioned survey showed that most experts (37 out of 46) agree that a public diplomacy actor should possess such characteristics as the grasp of conceptual tools related to professional activities; the ability to plan and formulate the goals and objectives of such activities and identify methods and ways of achieving them; extensive expertise and erudition, and the ability to uphold and defend his position in any situation.

In addition, this actor, as a creative person, is endowed with such qualities as social altruism, self-motivation, involvement in the "production process," and high interest in transforming the existing methods of attaining set goals.

It would seem that there are no problems with training qualified professionals in Russia. For instance, apart from the Russian Foreign Ministry's Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, several universities offer training programs in public relations, promotion and advertising, and it would seem that such specialists could work effectively to establish communication with foreign communities.

However, first, priority in these areas has shifted to training specialists in advertising to the detriment of public relations. Second, a professional's creativity also presupposes personal characteristics that for a number of reasons are embryonic in modern Russian society. This leads to another problem mentioned earlier, i.e., the inadequate, inarticulate presentation of Russian society values to a foreign audience.

It should be noted that this issue is outside the scope of the present article. Generally speaking, we believe that the source of the problem should be sought in a Constitutional provision – namely, Art. 13, Par. 2 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which states that "no ideology may be instituted as a state-sponsored or mandatory ideology."

Obviously, this provision was adopted following the deideologization of the legacy of Soviet society, where the Marxist mono-ideology had existed for decades at the state level. However, from all indications, in fighting one kind of "excesses," exactly the opposite kind of "excess" occurred. Some may ask: If members of Russian society have this kind of difficulties in understanding domestic and foreign policy, then what is the extent of anti-Russian fantasies that this uncertainty with regard to values creates in the minds of a foreign audience?

We understand that classical types of political ideologies may seem

archaic in a modern information society, but it would be rash to completely abandon ideology, without which there can be no systemic organization – and therefore no effective policy.

So, the creative potential of the public diplomacy institution is being underused in its sociopolitical dimension due to the lack of systematic work by state and nonstate entities, a shortage of professionals capable of implementing innovative practices, and an insufficiently clear presentation of Russian society values. Taken together, these impediments can make it difficult for traditional diplomacy to achieve its goals.

Possible Ways of Using the Creative Potential
of Russian Public Diplomacy

WE SHARE the following view expressed by N.V. Burlinova: "Since the early 2000s, public diplomacy in Russia has been developing absolutely spontaneously, in isolation and without support from the state, which failed to appreciate its importance for Russia's geopolitical situation."[7]

We believe that the development of the public diplomacy institution entered an active phase in 2012, following the publication of an article by Russian President V.V. Putin that first stressed the need for soft power, public diplomacy being one of its tools. Until then, this topic had been discussed only within narrow diplomatic, political expert and specialist circles.

In analyzing the problematic area of public diplomacy in search of creativity potential, we proceed from the fact that Russia is very far behind major world powers, so defined only on the basis of economic stability and civic activity principles. The search for the impulse that motivates states to actively use the public diplomacy tool is especially interesting. It is obvious that even a rich cultural heritage cannot claim a special place in public diplomacy practices. There is a need for a synergy of diverse factors, from determination at the state level to public initiative.

As for NGOs involved in public diplomacy, the most important for them is the clear realization that in acting on the international arena, they represent the interests of the state and society. This also means that the legitimate and necessary criticism of the country's foreign policy, which may come in discussions at home, must not move to discussion platforms abroad. Such criticism looks ambiguous even to foreigners who are used to dealing with domestic political issues on their own.

The intentions of the state and society to meet each other halfway to

create conditions for the sustainable development of public initiatives in the international arena clearly coincide here. The Russian Foreign Ministry is doing a lot in this regard. Traditional meetings with representatives of Russian nonprofit organizations are held annually. In addition, the Russian Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy holds regular meetings of the Discussion Club, a venue for dialogue with foreign diplomatic missions.

Another significant project is the Global Forum of Young Diplomats, initiated by the Council of Young Diplomats at the Russian Foreign Ministry, which, according to Council Chairman K.O. Kolpakov, "has no equivalent anywhere else in the world and allows young diplomats from all over the world to get to know each other in an informal setting and discuss current international issues."[8]

Regarding the implementation of public initiatives, as mentioned earlier, it is important to improve corresponding specialist training programs. It should be noted in this context that the Creative Diplomacy Center for Support and Development of Public Initiatives has prepared a training manual entitled "A Course in Public Diplomacy."[9]

It is also important to mention a project of the journal *Rossia v globalnoi politike* [Russia in Global Affairs] – namely, *Atlas obshchestvannoi diplomatii* [Atlas of Public Diplomacy].[10] In a special issue, experts analyzed potential growth points of public diplomacy in Russia, focusing on the cultural identities of the country's regions.

According to our expert survey, a public diplomacy specialist should meet the following requirements:

- fundamental knowledge of international relations (35 respondents out of 46);
- command of foreign languages (37 out of 46);
- the ability to plan and formulate practical goals and objectives, and identify methods and ways of achieving them (24 out of 46);
- the ability to predict the situation (21 out of 46);
- a high level of cultural education (30 out of 46);
- comprehensive knowledge, extensive expertise and erudition (33 out of 46);
- the ability to think creatively, creativity (39 out of 46);
- altruism (35 out of 46);
- the ability to reach compromise (29 out of 46);
- the ability to express his/her thoughts clearly and convincingly (41 out of 46).

This is not an exhaustive list of requirements, but it gives some idea of what it takes to be an expert in creative public diplomacy. Most respondents agreed that public diplomacy is an extremely creative area of activity. However, it is necessary to provide incentives for the implementation of public diplomacy initiatives and it is also important to ensure cooperation between the older generation of diplomats and experts and their younger colleagues, sharing experience and adjusting it to the current realities.

At the same time, corresponding government agencies should be concerned mainly with creating a favorable conceptual environment. Since, in accordance with Section 2, Par. 9 of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of November 30, 2016, public diplomacy is an integral part of the country's foreign policy, guidelines for its development should evidently be formulated by the relevant executive agency, i.e., the Foreign Ministry.

For its part, the powerful creative potential of corresponding non-profit organizations, unencumbered with official job descriptions, should serve as an additional source of new ideas and approaches in dealing with pressing international problems.

That said, we believe that a basic method of enhancing the creativity potential of public diplomacy at the social level is diplomatic modeling, i.e., modeling a final product or idea for its subsequent presentation at international diplomatic forums by relevant government agencies or authorized representatives. It involves the need to overcome constant disagreements in the process of public diplomacy at the social level, including discussion, study, organization, forecasting, monitoring, analysis, and model building.

This is indirectly evidenced by our expert survey results. More than 73% of the respondents believe that with Russia's extensive human capital, high political and cultural potential, public diplomacy is a promising sphere of activity. However, these opportunities are not being used to the full extent. There is a lot of inertia, lack of focus and inefficiency.

Experts believe possible points of growth for public diplomacy are as follows: fostering civic initiative by the state; getting the business sector involved in the process; public diplomacy training programs; a general improvement of culture and education in society to successfully represent the state in the international arena; and developing new external communication mechanisms and methods of their application.

It is worth noting that this requires bringing public diplomacy into the

educational and training process with an emphasis on practice. This will be useful for all actors in the international and public sectors. Another proposal would be to include the subject of public (civil) diplomacy in advertising and public relations curricula.

In this context, relevant nonprofit organizations would help develop the architecture of a public diplomat's workplace.

It should be noted here that recreation areas such as open seminars, art galleries, interactive exhibitions and workshops, as well as quests, quizzes and student clubs in a variety of formats, have long been centers of attraction for creatively thinking people seeking to generate creative ideas and unconventional solutions in a comfortable environment. What they get instead are book-smart experts at various nonprofit organizations trying to predict the future of international relations on the basis of outdated models in the dimly lit rooms of state libraries.

In this regard, the architecture of a public diplomat's workplace is based on the premise that a creative person retains the basic principles of work organization as mentioned earlier and expresses his willingness to engage in internationally oriented public activities while recognizing the need for management and leadership.

There is reason to believe that the development of public diplomacy could be given an important impetus by the creation of foreign policy literacy centers on the regional level that would provide a high level of professional training for public diplomats and become important elements of diplomacy. In addition to personal communication and periodic seminars at such centers conducted by international relations experts and prominent political and public figures, it would be appropriate to establish a unified digital platform for diplomatic modeling, among other things, which would unite state agencies and nonprofit organizations working in the area of public diplomacy.

We proceed from the premise the success of public diplomacy can be ensured only if the proactive part of civil society, aware of its involvement in the state's foreign policy process and given access to effective education and training programs at foreign policy literacy centers, participates in discussions, forums, conferences and other events held abroad – performing the same functions as those of professional diplomats, but working at the PR level.

Otherwise, the quantity of roundtables organized by nonprofit organizations in Russia just to account for the grants received will never pass into quality, and the public diplomacy institution will remain embryonic.

P.S. Modern international relations are a constantly changing reality. Whereas in the past, before the rapid development of information and communication networks, it was possible to wait until a particular technology proved itself, now a lot has changed.

The current situation around public diplomacy practices is reminiscent of a well-known joke: "What are you doing?" "I am looking for my key." "Where did you lose it?" "Up there in the park." "Then why are you looking for it down here?" "The light is better here!"

It seems that the time has come to shed more light on other, previously inconspicuous aspects of public diplomacy in Russia.

NOTES

[1] Burlinova N.V. *Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki 2016 i myagkaya sila Rossii* // http://www.picreadi.ru/koncepciya-vneshney-politiki-2016-i-myagkaya

[2] Volkov Yu.G. "Interesy kreativnogo klassa v obshchestvennoi zhizni rossiiskogo sotsiuma," *Vlast.* 2013. No. 1 // http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/interesy-kreativnogo-klassa-v-obschestvennoy-zhizni-rossiyskogo-obschestva

[3] https://www.centrinvest.ru/ru/about/smi/29113 (retrieved: 09.10.2018).

[4] Ponomaryova Ye.G., Mladenovich M. "Publichnaya diplomatia Rossii: balkanskoye natpravleniye," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn,* 2016. No. 4, pp. 151-166.

[5] Vystupleniye N.Yu. Nikonorovoi na 9 Mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii "Osobennosti soveremennykh integrastionnykh protsessov na postsovetskom prostranstve," organizovannoi zhurnalom *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn.* Yalta. Oct. 17, 2018 (A.N. Bobrov's personal archive).

[6] https://www.masterslavl.ru/affiche/events/otkrytie-predstavitelstva-mid-rossii-v-master-slavle

[7] Burlinova N.V. *Publichnaya diplomatiya Rossii: praktika i problemy stanovleniya. 2014* // http://www.molpalata.ru/opinions/publichnaya_diplomatiya_rossii_praktika_i_problemy_stanovleniya (retrieved: 02.16.2016).

[8] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/4633976 (retrieved: 11.01.2018).

[9] http://russiancouncil.ru/activity/educationalmaterials/kurs-obshchestvennogo-diplomata (retrieved: 03.08.2018).

[10] http://globalaffairs.ru/media/docs/2017_book_final2.pdf (retrieved: 08.03.2018).

Bioethics and Global Challenges

Yu. Sayamov

THE UNITED NATIONS Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) pays special attention to bioethical issues when considering the social and ethical challenges facing humanity [6]. Bioethics, as an interdisciplinary field of knowledge at the intersection of philosophy, law, medicine, sociology, political science, demographics, and cultural and religious studies, addresses moral aspects of people's attitudes toward life and death. It comprises a wide range of socioeconomic, ethical and legal issues on the assumption that human values must not be considered separately from biological facts, and strives to develop moral and ethical norms, requirements and principles, establishing mechanisms for using scientific and technological achievements to benefit people and nature.

It encompasses analysis by doctors, biologists, philosophers, theologians, lawyers, psychologists, political scientists, and representatives of other scientific and academic disciplines. It includes educational activities and is a thriving social institution with a sophisticated system of international, national, regional and local ethics committees. In a certain sense, bioethics is a human rights movement in its field.

The UNESCO Bioethics Program was proposed by UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor, a biochemist by profession, and was launched in 1993. Later, in an article written for a UNESCO anniversary publication on the 20th anniversary of the Bioethics Program [1], Federico Mayor noted that the relevance and importance of this program is directly attributable to the growing importance of bioethics for humanity, whose dignity and equality serves as the basis of its rights and obligations. He posited that, from an ethical standpoint, not everything that can be achieved should be, and not every tool is acceptable for use in the

Yury Sayamov, head of the UNESCO chair on emerging global and social ethical challenges, Global Studies School, M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Professor, y.sayamov@yandex.ru

whole range of its possible application. Knowledge is always good, Mayor believes, but it is not always applicable, since it can be use perversely. That is why ethics has become so needful, he says – especially with respect to the expanding new knowledge and influence of economic interests on its application [2].

UNESCO contributed significantly to the successful completion of the human genome project, which has opened up unprecedented opportunities for health care but at the same time raised new ethical and social challenges. The renowned French research hematologist Jean Bernard was among the first to outline the basic ethical principles of biological research [3]. After analyzing various aspects of the moral consequences of the biological revolution, he turned to related fields (medicine, philosophy, theology, politics, economics, and law), paving, together with American psychiatrist Eugene Brody from the University of Maryland [4], Federico Mayor [5], Spanish geneticist Juan Ramón Lacadena from the University of Madrid [6] and other scientists [7; 8], a path to understanding bioethics as part of the mainstreaming of human rights, the most important of which is the right to life.

In an effort to make medicine a humanitarian field, Jean Bernard initiated the establishment in France of the National Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences and became head of it in 1983. In 1990, he advocated for the widespread establishment of bioethics committees and encouraged UNESCO to develop and introduce three years later the international Bioethics Program. Lawyer Noëlle Lenoir, who chaired the International Bioethics Committee, believed that the concept of bioethics protection should extend to all life forms [9].

Considering the new social and ethical challenges brought about by scientific and technological development, UNESCO set out to elaborate the topic of human genetics and bioethics at the global level. An important achievement in this effort was the adoption in October 2005 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights [10].

The Declaration helped determine universal principles that could serve as the basis for seeking an appropriate response to all new dilemmas and contradictions facing humankind as a result of the development of science and technology. Along with general bioethical principles, the Declaration incorporates provisions on social responsibility and draws attention to the importance of reducing the equality gap between the North and the South. UNESCO considers the Declaration a unique instrument in the field of bioethics, since the agreement on its content was

adopted and approved by the General Conference of states. This document was preceded by and based on the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) [11] and the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003) [12].

Other documents used for international legal regulation in the field of bioethics are the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki on ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects (1964, revised in 2000) [13], the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) and its supplementary protocols concerning organ transplantation, biomedical research, and the prohibition on

> The risk of the knowledge possessed by modern humankind is the emerging possibility that humans will interfere with the foundations of life on Earth, and that the latest technological innovations will change lifestyles and ways of thinking.

cloning human beings [14], and the UN Declaration on Human Cloning (2005) [15].

The UNESCO Bioethics Program is run by the UNESCO Sector for Social and Human Sciences in Paris. In 1993, the Secretariat was established for administering the program. The International Bioethics Committee (IBC) was formed of 36 experts proposed by member states and appointed by the UNESCO director-general on the recommendation of the program Secretariat. In 1999, the program was complemented by the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC), which also comprises 36 members who represent the states that have been elected to the committee for a four-year term. Thus, UNESCO has two bioethics committees: one international and the other intergovernmental [16]. In 1997, the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology was established. A significant part of its activity relates to bioethics.

Growing global attention to bioethics issues was confirmed by the establishment of the UN Interagency Committee on Bioethics to coordinate the activities of specialized UN agencies in this field [17].

In the Council of Europe, the topic was taken up by the Steering Committee on Bioethics. The World Health Organization also has a working group on bioethics. World Bioethics Day was widely observed on Oct. 27, 2017. The UNESCO Chairs Program established a chair on

bioethics and its various aspects. One of the most active UNESCO bioethics chairs was inaugurated at the University of Haifa, in 2001. In 2005, the Global Ethics Observatory project was launched. Its electronic database became a repository of bioethics educational material and programs, as well as information about scientists around the world capable of serving as experts on bioethical issues and their particular aspects [18]. All this testifies to the growing importance of bioethics and attention to it.

Bioethics is a vital part of modern biopolitics, which broadly refers to the political and social application of life sciences (biology, ecology, genetics, etc.) [19]. Bioethics examines ethical issues related to supporting life in its various forms and is often referred to as the ethics of life [20]. To meet the challenges of bioethics, great importance is placed on developing and applying bio laws: laws regulating the activities of humans with respect to themselves and nature [21].

Bioethics is an interdisciplinary field dealing with research and its application with respect to ethical, philosophical and anthropological issues stemming from progress of science in general and biomedical science in particular, and the introduction of the latest technologies in various aspects of life, especially medicine and health [22].

The term "bioethics" is a very broad concept. The term is believed to have been coined in 1927 by the German Pastor Fritz Jahr (1885-1953) when proposing his bioethical imperative, which, unlike Kant's, demanded respect not only for humans but also for animals and plants [23]. In this respect, he closely echoed his contemporary, Albert Schweitzer (1875-1952), a fellow theologian, humanist and Nobel Laureate who pioneered the ethic of reverence for all life, which entailed humankind's recognition of its moral duty toward all other living organisms [24].

Long before them, the origins of thinking on bioethics can be found in the Buddhist philosophy of ahimsa – of not causing harm. And the writings and opinions of ancient humanist, thinker and mathematician Pythagoras (6th century BC), Aristotle (384-322 BC), Plutarch (46-127 AD), Thomas Aquinas, Francis of Assisi (13th century), Thomas Moore (1478-1535), Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), René Descartes (1596-1650), Henry Mora (1614-1687), John Locke (1632-1704), Voltaire (1694-1778), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) express various, sometimes opposing, bioethical views [25].

American scholar Aldo Leopold (1887-1948), a founder of the now widely known Wildlife Conservation Society [26], and later his colleague

at the University of Wisconsin University, Van Rensselaer Potter (1911-2001), initially characterized bioethics as an offshoot of environmental ethics. Later, Potter in his book "Bioethics: Bridge to the Future" [27], identified the main ways to develop the environmental and ethical ideas of Leopold in their application in biological research and medical practice.

However, long before Potter, the bioethical issues of medicine were outlined by our compatriot Vikenty Veresayev in his revolutionary book "Diary of a Physician" (1901) [28]. He advocated for an ethics in science in a broad, philosophical sense that should first and foremost fully encompass the issue of the mutual relationship between medical science and the living being. Veresayev viewed the primary objective of ethics to be a comprehensive theoretical examination of the relationship between the individual and medical science within borders beyond which the interests of the individual could be offered as a sacrifice in the interest of science. He stressed that the fundamental, central issue of medical ethics is inevitably becoming medical science infringing on human rights. Essentially, Veresayev should be considered the father of bioethics, although he did not use the term itself.

Bioethical views were significantly developed by the great Russian scientist Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky (1863-1945), a founder of biochemistry and biogeochemistry who developed the theory of the biosphere, which was the apogee of ecological thinking [29]. In 1940, prominent Soviet biologist Dmitry Petrovich Filatov advocated "an ethic of the love for life," an idea that distinctly draws on bioethics. In 1952, another Russian scholar, Alexander Alexandrovich Lyubishchev, wrote an article titled "The Basic Tenet of Ethics." A large contribution to the development of views on bioethics was made by the distinguished Russian scientists Yury Mikhailovich Lopukhin [30] and Alexander Grigoryevich Chuchalin, President of the Russian Committee on Bioethics, vice-president of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee.

Later, the concept of bioethics in various countries and at the global level assumed new meanings as people's biological lives increasingly became subordinated to social, political, cultural, moral, ethical, and spiritual needs, paving the way for public dialogue aimed at reconciling science with human interests [31]. However, the modern world community proved intellectually and morally unprepared for revolutionary scientific discoveries. The risk of the knowledge possessed by modern humankind is the emerging possibility that humans will interfere with the foundations

of life on Earth, and that the latest technological innovations will change lifestyles and ways of thinking. Society is now facing questions about how humans will survive as a species and how to conserve the Earth's biosphere. Today, biotechnology is:

- cultivating disease-resistant plants that do not need to be applied with chemicals harmful to humans and nature;

- addressing the problem of the bioconversion of waste using microorganisms;

- using special microorganisms to cleanse ocean water from petrochemicals;

- providing cheap protein-rich food to combat hunger in poor countries;

- coming up with new possibilities for processing and storing food. This list is by no means exhaustive.

Biotechnologies are opening amazing prospects for maintaining human health and treating various diseases by procuring the necessary proteins from plants, animals and humans for producing a wide range of medicines; directing the delivery of drugs in humans; diagnosing and subsequently treating hereditary diseases, etc. However, new technologies have created new ethical problems that are detrimental to human well-being.

Developing scientific knowledge today requires huge expenses that increase the cost of qualified medical care. Receiving quality health services is becoming a privilege of the wealthy.

Organ transplantation success helps save the lives of many people. This has led to a shortage of donor organs and thus the criminalization of the entire field of transplantation.

Biotechnology helps expand production and cut the manufacturing costs of drugs for treating rare diseases. But pharmaceutical companies, for commercial reasons, are either not producing them or keeping prices artificially high. The rights of subjects in clinical trials of new drugs are being violated.

The use of modern diagnostic methods helps identify people suffering from rare genetic and congenital diseases. But information about such diseases could be used for discriminatory purposes: terminating employment, denying insurance, inflicting moral damage. It is possible that a biologically lower class emerges whose members will become pariahs of society.

Solving demographic problems using assisted reproduction poses complex ethical issues with regard to the parents and the child.

Artificially prolonging life by using the latest drugs and treatment methods means populations are ageing in developed countries.

Preventive medicine allows many lives to be saved but leads to uncontrolled population growth and the exacerbation of the demographic situation in the world.

Because of their biosociological nature, people are under the supervision of physicians from birth to death. This allows for diseases to be identified and treated in a timely manner, but it also leads to restrictions on the human right to control one's own body and to make decisions concerning life and death. The introduction of new technologies has altered the traditional understanding of life and death, their beginning and end. This has raised the issues of the right to life of an unborn child, euthanasia and maintaining life using artificial devices.

For a long time, doctors often did not even know about new consequences, and when they confronted them, did not know how to avoid them. All moral and legal problems encountered in their professional activities were discussed behind closed doors. Medical errors were suppressed from the public. Medicine is increasingly losing its humanistic content: It is becoming more sophisticated from a technical perspective but more heartless.

Technocratic thinking in medicine, a focus on engineering and technology, has led to a crisis of traditional medical ethics. Its principles and rules have started to lose the function of regulating medical and pharmaceutical practices from the standpoint of kindness and justice. Thus, new possibilities of medicine and drugs associated with treating and managing human life, psyche, consciousness, and activity are conflicting with moral values and principles. The result is that people's confidence in medicine has generally been thoroughly undermined.

Society is facing important questions:

- does modern science correspond with principles of respect for the human person?

- how should already accumulated biomedical knowledge be viewed if it can be used for good and for evil?

- should research be developed, and where are its ethical limits?

- what is the role of researchers whose discoveries are often beyond their control and practitioners who are using new methods of intervention in the human body?

One component of bioethics is medical ethics, which historically is represented in four main models:

- the Hippocratic model ("do no harm"). In a famous debate in 1975 between two outstanding thinkers, Japanese Daisaku Ikeda and Englishman Arnold Toynbee, the latter commented that everyone, not just doctors should have followed the Hippocratic oath [32];

- the Paracelsus model ("do good"), where the focus is on ethical principles like humanism, compassion, beneficence, and treatment is regarded as showing love toward others;

- the deontological model, which assumes the moral integrity of doctors and their compliance with their obligations;

- the biomedical model, which involves the introduction of new relationship models based on the autonomy of patients and the respect of their rights to informed consent, confidentiality and truthfulness. For these purposes, medical and research institutions are establishing bioethics committees that are gradually forming a global network, since issues associated with research on human beings, organ transplantation, euthanasia, artificial reproduction, cloning, and genetic engineering affect humanity as a whole.

Complex bioethical issues affect many aspects of the development of modern societies. The conclusions and recommendations of ethics committees have a significant impact on the quality of public opinion, preparing it to tackle the most complicated moral and legal issues concerning every individual [33]. After all, for example, the world's first heart transplant operation, performed by South African surgeon Christiaan Barnard on Dec. 3, 1967, was met with delight as well as accusations of murder.

The environmental movement's ideology was the first and the most significant prerequisite for the formation of bioethics. Scientific and technological progress is a source of civilizational wealth, but it also often threatens human life, destroying humans' natural habitat. There is a limit to the use of natural resources. The report of the Club of Rome "The Limits to Growth" (1972) states that humans have gone beyond this limit. A report was published in 2018 to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the Club of Rome and it expresses its consolidated position. The report is titled: "Come on! Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet" [34].

The club above all sees the need to achieve a balance in the relationship between humans and nature based on sustainable development and environmental awareness. This position is first on the list of priorities. If we continue to live by the old rules, collapse is imminent, the report maintains. In this regard, it is important to form a new moral imperative:

What was permissible in the past is no longer acceptable today. Environmental education at all levels needs to be supplemented by bioethical education in a single representation system as a tool for forming a collective consciousness of bioethics and the environment.

Meanwhile, the situation in this area is deteriorating. It is characterized by the escalation of existing bioethical challenges and the emergence of new ones [35]. Hypertrophic tolerance has led to gender schizophrenia, to the normalizing of the abnormal and to attacks on family life, all of which are extremely dangerous to the bioethical well-being of society. The promotion of homosexuality, which has become indoctrinated in Western intellectual products, is now manifesting itself, for example, in the mandatory inclusion of perverted heroes in films. This was compounded by the recent campaign against so-called "harassment" that declared men's natural interest in women a "demonic phallocracy."

Moral degeneration is also evident in the medical field. More recently, a surgeon in England was caught signing his name on the internal organs of patients during operations.

However, there are also much greater causes for concern. There are indications that the development of biological weapons is continuing based on new principles, using the latest scientific and technological achievements to make them effective on Russians, for example, but ineffective on Europeans. It is thought that the U.S. is trying to collect biomaterial in Russia to that end, but after suffering a few setbacks and seizures at Russian Customs checkpoints of already collected samples, it has shifted to Ukraine, where this is easier to do and the people from a biological viewpoint are basically the same.

Viruses developed for military purposes are invisible and less expensive than nuclear weapons but could pose no less a threat. The Americans are now using former Soviet biotechnology labs in Georgia and the Baltic states. It has been speculated that a virus that decimated swine herds in southern Russia came from a laboratory in Georgia, and the false pneumonia virus that is actually a dangerous infectious pulmonary disease could have come from the Baltic countries.

No less dangerous is biotechnology designed to control humans. The Bilderberg Meeting, which many consider to be a club of shadow world rulers, in 2017 discussed the topic of future humans being managed by elites. This refers to using genetic engineering to alter humans as well as the animals and plants they eat. Genetic modification is supposed to create a managed and weak human mind and health that is constantly in need

of medical support and will not be able to survive until retirement age. The cover of the magazine *The Sun* showed a prototype of the "human of the future": a degenerate with long limbs and fewer teeth, just enough to chew on genetically modified foods [36].

Billionaire Bill Gates, the largest shareholder of Monsanto, a leading company in the GMO field, has proposed a "green revolution" project in Africa on the basis of GMO plants and allocated $120 million toward genetic engineering projects. Those who oppose GMOs because of the unstudied and unpredictable consequences of their use are harassed by those who make a lot of money in this business. This has directly affected Russian scientists. For example, Russian biologist Irina Yermakova, who opposes GMOs and has been prevented from publishing in foreign scientific journals, stopped getting invited to international symposiums and was forced to abandon her positions through threats [37].

As we stand on the threshold of a new technological paradigm, we should prepare for genetic wars that could determine who has a chance to survive. Viral and genetic weapons designed to radically reduce the Earth's population are being developed. That is the goal of projects like Project Coast, a recently revealed secret project in South Africa that developed bacteria that made black people infertile. A UNESCO nanotechnology chair, which is conducting several studies in the context of bioethical issues, is now working in South Africa.

Bioethics in Russia is now entering a new phase. On August 28, 2018, the Russian Foreign Ministry hosted a meeting of the Russian Committee for Bioethics under the Commission of the Russian Federation for UNESCO with new members, chaired by distinguished Russian academician A.G. Chuchalin. The long-term chairman of the committee and now its honorary president, RAS academician Rem Petrov, who contributed greatly to its work, addressed the meeting.

The committee outlined the range of issues of Russia's participation in the UNESCO Bioethics Program and mapped out an action plan for its development. The 25th session of the International Bioethics Committee, a meeting of the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee of UNESCO, as well as the 10th extraordinary session of the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technologies, took place at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, on September 10-14, 2018.

The Russian delegation, comprising the president of the Russian Committee for Bioethics, RAS academician A.G. Chuchalin, rector of the Kazan State Medical University, Prof. Alexander Sozinov, and the author

of this article actively participated in the discussions and talks. An important indicator of the international recognition of Russia's scientific contribution to the development of bioethics was the election of the president of the Russian Bioethics Committee as the vice-president of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee.

The next step was the holding in Moscow on November 30-December 1, 2018, of a Russian Bioethics Committee conference on "Ethical Challenges of the 21st Century," at which Dr. Christian Byk (France), chairman of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee, agreed to come and give a presentation as well as participate in the launch at the N.I. Pirogov Russian National Research Medical University of an online class on bioethics as a global issue and international law of the UNESCO chair for global problems.

The rapid development of views on bioethics and expansion of a range of related issues has prompted reflection on this discipline in the context of international relations, forming an ethically rich field of human activity. If you believe that the phenomenon of the bioethics of international relations exists as an ethically vibrant sphere of human activity, it would be important to examine its dimensions and characteristics.

Bioethics, after emerging as a new scientific discipline, was understood as serving to explore ethical problems related to potential threats to human survival in the modern world, and act as a bridge between science and humanitarian principles. It seems that today, international relations can to a much greater extent be viewed in a bioethical context than in past eras, when they almost exclusively were determined by states and their foreign policy. But even in the past, the actions and decisions of states were guided by specific individuals with their own morals, and attitude to life, death and the environment.

On the basis of the existence of the concepts of moral licensing and bioethical values in international relations, we should pay attention to the fact that a world order built on the cooperation of states and the balance of their forces is being replaced by a new type of international relations whose philosophy is formed by a much broader range of participants and filled with new values and meanings. The development of substantive views on the bioethics of international relations is playing an increasingly significant role in this process.

Global social and ethical challenges pose existential questions for humankind, adequate answers to which the global scientific community must work together to find.

LIST OF SOURCES

1. Mayor, F. *Dignity as the foundation for all Human Rights, in Global Bioethics: What for?* Twentieth anniversary of UNESCO's Bioethics Programme. Paris, 2015, pp. 47-52.

2. Ibid., p. 48.

3. Bernard J. *De la biologie à l'éthique.* Paris: Buchet/Chastel, 1990.

4. Brody E.B. *Biomedical Technology and Human Rights.* Paris: UNESCO, 1993.

5. Mayor F. *Mañana siempre es tarde.* Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1987.

6. Lacadena J.R. "Patentes de genes humanos, ¿sí o no? Reflexiones en torno a la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos," *Revista de Derecho y Genoma Humana.* 2013. №38, p. 167.

7. Corral, García E. "El derecho a la reproducción humana. ¿Debe permitirse la maternidad subrogada?" *Revista de Derecho y Genoma Humano.* 2013. №38, p. 45.

8. Casado M. *Estudios de Bioética y Derecho,* Barcelona, Cedes, see 'Buscando acuerdos universales' and intra. 1996, pp. 69-72.

9. Lenoir N. "Respect de la vie et droit du vivant," *The ethics of life / L'éthique du vivant.* Paris: UNESCO, 1998, pp. 175-211.

10. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2006 // http: //www. unescodoc.unesco.org

11. The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights. Adopted on November 11, 1997, by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization // http://www.un.org

12. International Declaration on Human Genetic Data. Adopted by the UNESCO General Conference resolution on the report of the III Commission at the 20th plenary meeting, October 16, 2003 // http://www.un.org

13. World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki on ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects // http://www. elibrary.ru

14. Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) // http://www. bioethics.imbp.ru

15. United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning. Resolution 59/280 of the General Assembly of March 8, 2005 // http://www.un.org

16. See: Guide No. 1. Establishing Bioethics Committees…

17. http://webarchive.unesco.org/frame/20151214145100/http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001448/144835R.pdf

18. http: // www.unesco.org/shs/ethics/geobs

19. See: *Bioetika: problemy i perspektivy.* M., 1992.

20. *The ethics of life / L'éthique du vivant.* Paris, UNESCO, 1998.

21. See: *Bioetika: printsipy, pravila, problemy.* M., 1998.

22. See: *Vvedenie v bioetiku.* M., 1998.

23. Jahr, Fritz. *Bio-Etis: eine Umschau über die Beziehungen des ethischen Menschen zu Tief und Pflanze – 1927.*

24. Schweitzer A. *Kultura i etika.* M., 1973.

25. See: Tishchenko P.D. "K nachalam bioetiki," *Voprosy filosofii.* 1994. No. 3.

26. See: Meine, Curt. A*ldo Leopold: His Life and Work.* Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.

27. Potter, Van Rensselaer. Bioethics: Bridge to the Future. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1971.

28. Veresayev, Vikenty. *Zapiski vracha.* M.: EKSMO, 2010.

29. Vernadsky V.I. *Sobranie sochineniy.* M.: Nauka, 2013.

30. Lopukhin, Yu.M. *Bioetika. Izbrannye statyi i doklady.* M., 2003.

31. *Bioetika i biotekhnologii: predely uluchsheniya cheloveka.* M.: Moscow University for the Humanities Press, 2017.

32. *Choose Life: A Dialogue Between Arnold Toynbee & Daisaku Ikeda.* M.: Moscow State University Press, 2007 (in Russian translation).

33. *Global Bioethics: What for? Twentieth Anniversary of UNESCO's Bioethics Programme* / Germán Solinís (ed.) Published in 2015 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

34. Report of the Club of Rome, 2018.

35. UNESCO documents and materials on bioethics. UNESCO, 2017 // http: // www.unesco.org/shs/ethics

36. See: yandex.ru/images > in the magazine *The Sun* prototype of the person of the future.

37. Ekologiya i zhizn'. Site of Irina Yermakova.

Key words: bioethics, UNESCO, challenges, UNESCO Chairs.

Bioethics: Solving Tomorrow's Problems Today

Christian Byk

Question: *Your Honor, what are UNESCO's bioethics bodies and what are their objectives?*

Answer: The discussion of bioethics-related problems at UNESCO started in the 1990s with the issue of a human genome program. Scientists expressed concern about the possibility of some human genome modifications being developed with the help of new technology. Irina Bokova, former director-general of UNESCO, and a group of international scientists decided to launch a program that included social and ethical aspects of human rights. It was launched here in Moscow in 1991, leading to the adoption of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, followed by the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data. This stimulated the development of educational activities and research programs.

Then, in 1998, UNESCO expanded the scope of its interests to the global problem of bioethics, creating the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee. Furthermore, the creation of the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology led to the formation of a commission on the ethics of communication and the ethics of outer space. In 2017, the Declaration on Ethical Principles in Relation to Climate Change was adopted. So, this is something more global. In the next several years, UNESCO will launch a program on ethics and artificial intelligence.

Q: *Can bioethics be considered an international security problem?*

A: Two years ago, China first sought to change genetics. In this connection, the U.S. president said that this would affect his country's security.

_____

Justice Christian Byk, Chairperson, UNESCO Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee
The interview was conducted by **Vasily Kozhenkov.**

Today, you understand that science is part of a scientific and technological society that uses technology for both medical and military purposes. We use miniature drones for killing people. They kill people in Afghanistan, while pilots are based, for instance, in the U.S. However, imagine that artificial intelligence allows you to do without any pilots at all; you build an algorithm, provide photos of the person you would like to be eliminated, and let a drone do this job on its own and simply notify you about the execution. Of course, it is good for a country when terrorists can be eliminated in this way.

There are situations where soldiers fight for three days in a row and have no time to sleep. In this case, soldiers of the future will be able to sleep for just one hour a day to improve efficiency. According to media reports, the U.S. Defense Department is subsidizing all research projects of this kind. Other countries are also studying such technologies and using them. As you know, there is a technology that allows soldiers to see clearly at night, and in the future, there will be a technology that will enable them not to talk, but to communicate by transmitting brainwaves so that the enemy will not hear them. I know that this has not yet become a reality, but this work is underway.

> The revolution of the past decade has brought various disciplines closer together to study not only ethics, not only social and medical disciplines, but also other disciplines.

Q: What agencies in France deal with bioethics?

A: There are many bodies studying bioethics. First of all, in 1988, we created a network of ethics committees to review medical research projects, and today it is part of the European legal framework. In areas where European legislation applies, they are part of the process of bringing new drugs to the market. However, we also believe in public discussion, and, as in Russia, the national bioethics committee in France was established long ago, in 1983. Every five years, it reviews French bioethics legislation, and during this time, the committee organizes countrywide public discussions – hundreds of public discussions for six months. We also have ethics forums at the regional level, where the public can receive information and where professionals discuss mostly medical issues with members

of the public. Naturally, a national ethics committee with a research center was created as part of a science and research organization. So, today there are many agencies and our ethics committees are institutionalized.

Q: What kind of future is in store for bioethics?

A: First, bioethics expands the concept of scientific ethics; this is about the convergence of ethics. It raises ethical questions in medicine. The revolution of the past decade has brought various disciplines closer together to study not only ethics, not only social and medical disciplines, but also other disciplines. Second, another important question is how to get society involved in this process and why it should be involved. Our present-day way of life greatly depends on technology, without which it is difficult for us to exist. If electricity and communication disappear, society will fall on hard times. If there is no electricity, we will have to go back to the 17th or 18th century. People need to understand the importance of technology in society, and they need to participate in discussing ways of using technology. Scientific achievements must be accessible to all. However, the problem of limitations also exists today. I cannot tell you more right now because I do not even know what we will look like in 100 years, but we know that we are going to be more technological and cultured people.

Key words: bioethics, ethics forums, international security.

Russia: The Past and Present
of Its Federation Model

Yu. Bulatov

IN THE LAST DAYS of czarist autocracy, the public displayed a lot of interest in the future political organization of Russia. People addressed all political parties with "Down with Autocracy!" and "Long Live the Republic!" slogans and wanted all political parties in the center and the provinces to present clear programs of Russia's future state order and national construction.

The parties that appeared at the national outskirts of the Russian Empire at the turn of the 20th century – the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun, Belorussian Socialist Hromada, the Party of Socialist-Federalists of Georgia, Turkic Democratic Party of Federalists Müsavat, Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, and some other left and liberal parties and organizations—lost no time to come up with their projects of a federative system.

Each of the national parties had its own ideas about the future federation.

Dashnaktsutyun wanted a federation based on geography as the first step to the creation of Trans-Caucasian Federation. Müsavat insisted on a federation based on historical and cultural closeness. The Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries were talking about the ethnographic principle and the need to unite all Ukrainians who lived in the Russian Empire and outside it into a federation.

Everything that was said about the future federation was fairly vague; nobody knew how to build it "on the ruins of despotism." The federalists, however, agreed that the federation would, in the course of time, develop into a complex union state consisting of state units with limited political and juridical independence. They deemed it necessary to point out that, as

Yury Bulatov, Dean, School of International Relations, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Professor, Doctor of Science (History); mo@inno.mgimo.ru

distinct from the state, the units of such state would not be sovereign, that is fully independent as regards internal and external issues.

Federalists were widely supported while those who saw Russia as a unitary state with its peoples having autonomous rights found themselves in the minority. Contrary to expectations of those who supported rights of the regions (Bolsheviks), the cultural-national autonomy (the Constitutional Democrats, or Kadets), the national-personal autonomy (the Poalei Tziyon), the national-state autonomy (the Shura-i-Islamiyya in Central Asia), and the national-territorial autonomy (the Alash Party in Kazakhstan), etc., their slogans stirred up no enthusiasm among the active part of the empire's population.[1]

The standoff between the unitarists and federalists, in which the latter obviously outweighed the former, was obvious for all, the dissenting elite of czarist Russia being no exception. The Union of October 17 Party that represented the interests of big bourgeoisie was very clear about its intention to prevent a union of states or a union state. Its leaders were convinced that Russia should become a unitary state; the leaders of the Constitutional Democratic Party were of the same opinion. They never criticized the projects of a federal state yet never concealed their support of a strong united and centralized Russian state.

The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks) headed by Lenin opposed the idea of a federal state for the following reasons:

(1) a federation did not harmonize with the Marxist teaching of the dictatorship of the proletariat, since, according to Karl Marx, a unitary state was the best possible variant of a proletarian state;

(2) federalism was weakening the proletarian movement since it divided the workers by nationalities contrary to the slogan of proletarian internationalism.

In their opposition to federalism, the Bolsheviks negatively assessed the Bund (the General Jewish Labor Union in Lithuania, Poland and Russia) that proclaimed the federative principle of party organization. The leaders of the RSDRP(b), in their turn, insisted that the federative projects of state and party construction had done nothing good to the proletarian movement in Russia. In their program, the Bolsheviks supported only the right of nations to self-determination and bypassed the future political organization of Russia. This issue was pushed aside till better times.

During the revolutionary events of February-October 1917, political parties in Russia demonstrated an even stronger support for the idea of a

federal model of the Russian multinational state. In May 1917, the Muslims of Russia organized their first congress in Moscow that defined federation as the form of Russia's future political organization, as was suggested by the Azeri delegation. In their speeches, delegates of the Congress of the Peoples of Russia convened in Kiev in September 1917 spoke of Russia as a democratic federative republic.

Soviet historians of the Communist Party maintained that in June 1917, at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, Lenin had allegedly spoken about the future of Russia as a federal state. These chroniclers, however, could quote only one phrase out of his "Speech on the War" delivered at the Congress: "Let Russia be a union of free republics"[2]; the word "federation" had not been mentioned.

> During his first presidential term, Vladimir Putin used administrative leverage to stop the disintegration of the Russian Federation; this was his great service to the country.

After the October Revolution, he, likewise, was very vague about the future political organization – federalism vs. unitarism – of the young Soviet State. The first documents of Soviet power offered no answer either. The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia of November 2, 1917 defined the future Soviet state as "a voluntary and honest union of the peoples of Russia." It seems that the meaning of this vague formula was clear only to the leader of the Bolshevik Party. An "honest union" is a fairly subjective definition; as for the "voluntary," all those who lived in the Soviet Union know what the word meant in Soviet parlance. To keep all citizens of the new Russian state within Soviet system, Lenin had to take into account the wide support of the idea of federalism by the peoples of the former Russian Empire. This explains why several months later he had gathered enough determination to proclaim the Soviet Republic a federation.

In January 1919, the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets held in Petrograd passed the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People that said: "The Russian Soviet Republic should be established on the principle of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics" based on the national-state (Soviet national republics) and administrative-state principles (Soviet republics). The document specified the foundations of Soviet federalism: voluntary unification of

working classes of all nations of Russia. According to the decisions of the Third Congress of Soviets, the Soviet Republic acquired an official name of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).

The same congress established a constitutional commission that received and studied all sorts of projects of the future federal structure of Soviet Russia. The RSFSR Commissariat for Justice, for example, offered the project of an All-Russia Labor Commune as a variant of a federal state that would exist until the expected and very close victory of the socialist revolution worldwide and transition of all peoples of the world to socialism. The same commissariat opposed the federation projects with its own project of the Soviet republic based on five professional federations of (a) land-tillers; (b) industrial workers; (c) civil servants; (d) traders; e) people employed by private persons. This can be aptly described as a federation of socio-economic associations rather than a union of peoples or territories. As could be expected, the project was dismissed without discussions.

The Constitutional Commission of the Third Congress of Soviets had to bring together the world experience of federative states and the program principles of Soviet power. In July 1918, the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets adopted the Constitution of the RSFSR that legally confirmed the basic principles of Soviet national building: (a) the principle of nationality as the cornerstone of the country's administrative-territorial division; (b) class approach to the nationalities policy understood as a union of the working people of all nations and free self-determination; (c) recognition of national-state units within the RSFSR in the form of Soviet national republics; (d) federation of Soviet national republics; (e) "Soviets of those regions which had a special way of life and specific national composition could form autonomous regional unions; the latter were federative components of the PSFSR; (f) a single legal field was created in which all citizens enjoyed equal rights irrespective of their racial or national affiliation; (g) admission of new members to the RSFSR and recognition of the secession of any parts of it were the prerogative of the All-Russia Congress and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

Bolsheviks demonstrated a lot of caution and pragmatism when moving toward a federation: the workers and peasants of all nations were invited to decide, at their national congresses of Soviets, whether they wanted and on which conditions to take part in the federal government and in all other federal Soviet structures.

The federation as a form of political order of Soviet Russia was a

mere declaration. First, the 1918 Constitution said nothing about representation of the federation subjects in the federal government structures; second, central power enjoyed exclusive competences while the local authorities had to be satisfied with leftovers. According to Articles 49 and 50 of the 1918 Constitution, "the All-Russia Congress and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee deal with the questions of state… [and] all other affairs which, according to their decision, require their attention." In fact, on the eve of the first Soviet Constitution, the country already was a unitary state formed from above on the initiative of the ruling Bolshevik Party with no national component yet in its administrative-territorial division.

It should be said that the Bolsheviks steered the country toward a united state of the peoples of the former Russian Empire for certain objective and subjective reasons.

The following can be described as objective reasons:

(1) division of labor between the peoples of the Russian Empire as a product of their common history;

(2) uniform structure of Soviet power that consisted of national-state and national-territorial units set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and cut to the Soviet pattern: (a) dictatorship of the proletariat; (b) the leading role of the Communist Party; (c) the union of the working class and the poorest peasantry, etc.;

(3) hostile imperialist neighbors and a threat of another attack of imperialist powers at Soviet Russia meant that all forces and means should be consolidated for the purposes of defense.

The list of subjective factors includes the military-political, economic and diplomatic union of Soviet socialist republics that took shape during the Civil War and foreign intervention. The issue of federalism reappeared on the agenda as one of the discussion items; an optimal Soviet model of national construction in the regions was needed. By that time, however, several forms of state units were already existing set according to the Soviet pattern:

(1) the Russian and Trans-Caucasian federations of Soviet national republics (the RSFSR and TCSFSR);

(2) Soviet socialist republics (Belorussian SSR and Ukrainian SSR);

(3) autonomous Soviet social republics (Bashkir ASSR, Tatar ASSR, Kirgiz ASSR (from 1925 Kazakh ASSR), Turkestan ASSR);

(4) autonomous regions (Chuvash AR, Mari AR, Kalmyk AR, Voty AR);

(5) the labor commune of the Germans of the Volga area and the labor commune in Karelia;

(6) People's Soviet republics in Central Asia (Bukhara and Khorezm People's Soviet Republics).

In August 1922, a special commission headed by Valerian Kuybyshev set up to create a plan of unification of Soviet republics arrived at a conclusion that all Soviet republics should become parts of the RSFSR as autonomies to form a state union that would be called the USSR. These decisions relied on Stalin's project of autonomization, a united economic organism on the united territory of the Soviet republics with the center in Moscow. This meant that the competence of the central governing structures of the RSFSR would be spread to all other republics.

Lenin rejected Stalin's plan and offered his own: "We consider ourselves… equal, and enter, on an equal basis, into a new union, a new federation, the Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia"3 rather than into the RSFSR. In Khrushchev's times, Stalin's personality cult was denounced while the decisions of the First All-Union Congress of Soviets (December 1922) and the foundation of the Soviet Union were presented as a triumph of Lenin's nationalities policy. It was said that Stalin's plan of autonomization of Soviet republics within the RSFSR had been humiliated. Is this true?

It should be said that the disagreements between Lenin and Stalin were related to tactical, rather than strategic issues: the Bolshevik leaders were always unanimous when it came to the future of the Soviet federation; the latter was considered just a temporal form of the state order in Russia. The Second Program of the RCP(b) of March 1919 that was expected to remain in force during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism stressed, in particular: "… the Party proposes, as a transitional form [italics mine. – Author] towards complete unity, a federation of states organized according to the Soviet type." This means that the USSR. was a joint decision by the RCP(b) leaders.

At the same time, the USSR can be regarded as a compromise of sorts: on the one hand, it was a union of equal republics (in line with Lenin's plan); on the other, the subjects of the RSFSR were ranked according to Stalin's plan of autonomization.

Later, the discussions about the federative system for Russia were unfolding among "national deviators" (national-uklonisty); they had nothing to do with the projects of Lenin and Stalin and their approaches to the Soviet Union and its structure. The debates about an efficient fed-

eration in Soviet Russia took place on the eve of the adoption of the 1924 Constitution of the USSR. Ukrainian Communists demonstrated a lot of zeal and interest. Christian Rakovsky, First Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, insisted on a well-organized centralized system of economic management and sovereign rights of the Union republics in national construction, social sphere and economy. Sovereignty in economy was the shortest way to political sovereignty, which means that Rakovsky was pushing the country not toward a Soviet federation but toward a confederation, in which the subjects would transfer to the center, on their own free will, the share of their powers agreed in advance.

Nikolay Skrypnik who filled the post of the People's Commissar of Justice and Prosecutor General of Ukraine occupied even more radical positions: he was talking about a sovereign Ukrainian state that in future would become member of the world socialist federation and insisted that the Communists of independent Ukraine should be independent of Moscow and that their relations with Russia required the mediation of the leaders of the Third Communist International.

Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities of the RSFSR, came up with his own variant of a "federative skyscraper." He was convinced that the federative relationships should be spread to all national regions within the USSR. The leader of Tatar Communists was talking about a North-Caucasian, Tatar-Bashkir and other federations; he said that the relations between the RSFSR and the Center should be revised to let all other subjects (and not only the RSFSR) join the Soviet Union with equal rights. He in fact had outstripped his time: in the 1990s, there appeared 89 legally equal federation subjects on the territory of the Russian Federation.

There is another no less interesting fact: in the course of discussions about the principles of the future federative state, it was suggested that the one-chamber Central Executive Committee set up at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR should be replaced with a two-chamber structure. This was approved together with the suggestion to raise the status of the autonomous republics to that of the Union republics. This was taken into account by the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR that in January 1924 adopted the Constitution of the USSR. The document registered that (1) the Congress of Soviets of the USSR elects the Soviet of the Union from among the representatives of the member Republics in proportion to the working population – it was a class representation, and (2) the Soviet

of Nationalities is composed of representatives of the member Republics and autonomous Republics on the basis of five representatives for each member Republic and one representative for each autonomous Republic.

The Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR defined the basic principles of the federative system of the USSR: (1) the USSR is a socialist federation based on the Soviets with the leading role of the Communist Party; (2) the federation is organized according to the nationalities principle; (3) all subjects of the federation are equal; (4) the republics join the federation on their own free will; (5) the federation should be organized according to the principles of democratic centralism (subordination of the minority to the majority, strict compliance with the instructions from the Center, etc.). In plain words, this meant that the norms of Party life were imposed on Soviet society.

An analysis of the 1924 Constitution of the USSR reveals that the Soviet federation stemmed from the principles very different from those accepted in the West, the United States in particular. First, the Soviet federation was built according to the nationalities principle, rather than administrative-territorial one, which meant that the Soviet Union was a federation of peoples rather than territories.

Second, unlike the constitutions Western-style that banned withdrawal from the federation, the Fundamental Law of the USSR gave the republics the right to leave the union state even if the mechanism of this move remained vague and was limited to the statement that an agreement of all republics was needed.

Third, while the Western federations were, as a rule, symmetrical, which means that its subjects had a unified legal status, the Soviet Union at the early stages of its existence was an asymmetrical structure. Under the 1924 Constitution, the Soviet Union had two federations – the Russian (RSFSR) and Trans-Caucasian (TCSFSR), as well as two union republics – the Belorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR. Stability of the union state was ensured by the Bolshevik Party, all-Union social organizations (trade unions, the Komsomol, etc.), the Red Army, the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), as well as the Union and republican People's Commissariats.

The course at the victory of socialism in one country resulted in stronger unitarist trends in the Soviet national construction. In practice, the federative order of the Soviet Union continued realizing Stalin's plan of autonomization in the Center/the periphery relationships. Article 1 of the 1924 Constitution stated that "The Union of Socialist Soviet

Republics through its supreme organs has the following powers…. (h) to establish the basic principles and the general plan of the national economy of the Union."

Stalin's plan of autonomization was gaining momentum: by the end of the Civil War, there had been four and by the end of 1936, 17 autonomous republics in the RSFSR. It should be said that the autonomization program was realized also in other republics of the Soviet Union. The leaders of those Union republics (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine) that by late 1936 had acquired national-state and national-territorial units never confronted the Center with the demand to abandon the unitary system of government. It should be said that, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, none of the former Union republics embraced the format of a sovereign federal state. At the turn of the 21st century, Russia was the only one among fifteen union republics that proclaimed the course at a federal state. Unitarism triumphed over federalism across the post-Soviet space.

A potential confrontation between the autonomous units and the Center was prevented with the help of a socialist competition of sorts between republican autonomies with a prospect of acquiring the status of a union republic introduced in the USSR in the 1930s. The following conditions were indispensable: "First, the republic concerned must be a border republic. Secondly, the nationality which gives its name to a given Soviet republic must constitute a compact majority within that republic. Thirdly, the republic should have a population of a million, at least."[4]

Kazakhstan and Kirgizia won the "socialist competition" to become Union republics on the basis of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR. Soon after that, the Karelian ASSR became the Karelo-Finnish SSR. The Union republics served as a sort of the security belt for the Bolshevik Center.

The autonomous republics in the RSFSR could not aspire to raise their status to the union because, according to the Soviet leaders, with no external borders they could not realize the right of withdrawal from the Soviet Union. It should be said that the 1936 Constitution corrected, to a certain extent, the norms of representation of the autonomous and Union republics in the federal organs of power.

The status of the autonomous republics in the USSR was lowered; previously, they had sent the same number of deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities as the Union republics. The Fundamental Law of the 1936 formulated new rules: "The Soviet of Nationalities is elected by the citizens of the USSR on the basis of thirty-two deputies from each Union

Republic and eleven deputies from each Autonomous Republic." The federation was no more agreement-based; it became based on the diktat of the Center: from that time on, new members were admitted to the Soviet Union by a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

How did the model of the USSR as a federation built up in the 1930s look in reality?

Chapter One of the 1936 Fundamental Law dealing with the social order of the USSR said: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants." This meant, in fact, that the leaders of the Bolshevik Party in no way took any other social group into account.

By the tradition inherited from czarist Russia, the intelligentsia was denied an independent role on the domestic stage. Those who had consolidated their positions on the political Olympus in Russia were convinced that the intelligentsia should serve the interests of the ruling regime and, at best, be squeezed into the second echelon of the ruling structures. It should be said in all justice that the Bolsheviks did never conceal their attitude to intellectual elite; in fact, they did not need it that much. In 1917, Lenin did not mince words: "We trust our Party. We see in it the intelligence, honor and conscience of our times."[5] The political regime relied on the multinational Soviet and Party nomenklatura.

These attitudes served the cornerstone of social politics of the Bolsheviks during socialist construction in the Soviet Union. Under the banner of struggle against Great Power chauvinism and local nationalism, the Communists "reduced to zero" (read: exterminated) the intellectual elite of the "former upper classes" both in the center and the periphery. Instead, they set the task of creating the working intelligentsia from among the workers and peasants. As could be expected, the layer of intelligentsia with proletarian roots was very thin. Let's have a look at the peoples of the USSR in the context of changes that took place in the social structure of Soviet society in less than three five-year periods. Historical science uses the "peasant nations" concept to define the nations too young to have intellectual elites of their own or the nations that lost theirs under certain circumstances.

This "ethnic" approach to the analysis of social processes in the Soviet state allows us to somewhat readjust the assessment of the Soviet Union found in the 1936 Constitution. Article 13 described the USSR as a "federal state, formed on the basis of the voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics having equal rights." The definition of the "peasant

nations" in the science of history allows us to de facto define the Soviet Union not only as a union of equal peoples but also a union of peasant nations with the Party of Bolsheviks at its head.

In these conditions, the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) monopolized the right on absolute truth. They acquired unlimited possibilities to manipulate with public opinion, shift accents and suppress any information in their interests. The Soviet leaders never answered the question why the Soviet Constitutions that legally confirmed that the Soviet Union was a federal state never used the term "federation" or replaced it with the term "union state." Here I will try to find an answer.

First, the term "union state" when used instead of "federation" camouflaged certain principles of Soviet federalism (the leading role of the Communist Party, the principle of democratic centralism as the main principle of the development of Soviet society) that had nothing in common with the universal principles of federalism widely used in the world.

Second, the Bolsheviks looked at the federation as a temporal form of the organization of Soviet power at first in expectation of the world socialist revolution and later because of the very short period of transition from capitalism to socialism (allegedly completed according to Stalin).

Third, when the Bolshevik leaders proclaimed, at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), that socialism had basically been built in one country, the unitary trends began to prevail over the federative system. It should be said than in the late 1930s national construction in the Soviet Union was determined by the need to resolve the most urgent problems in line with the unitary rather than federative trends: internationalization of all sides of life of peoples of the USSR, creation of socialist nations and bringing them together into a new community of people – the Soviet people.

The targets thus specified were realized according to what can be called the Three D program: de-rooting, de-politicization and de-nationalization. De-rooting meant the very specific personnel policy of the Party in the national (non-Russian) areas. The Union republics acquired an institute of second secretaries of the republican Communist Party structures and the institute of first deputies of prime ministers of Union republics. These posts could not be filled by members of the titular nationality or even by locally-born Russians. They went to Moscow-appointed members of the Soviet or Party nomenklatura accountable to

the Center for the personnel policy in the republics and the course at inter-
nationalization of all sides of life of local people.

De-politization meant, first and foremost, de-politization of the local
identity and the development of culture "national in form and socialist in
content." With the same aim in view, the written languages of the non-
Russian peoples of the USSR were transferred from the Latin script to the
Cyrillic script that deprived the younger generations of the non-Russian
regions of their cultural and historical heritage; from that time on, they
were educated in the spirit of loyalty to the ideas of Communism.

De-nationalization began before the war of 1941-1945 when the
Soviet leaders took the course at linguistic consolidation of the peoples of
the USSR on the basis of the Russian national dominant. The Russian lan-
guage was included into school curricular as one of the obligatory sub-
jects in the non-Russian republics; conscripts to the Red Army were
taught Russian if they did not know it.

The unitarian trends in the development of the Soviet state became
especially obvious during the Great Patriotic War when the Bolshevik
Party accumulated the entire volume of state, military, political, and eco-
nomic power. The Soviet Union became a unitary state with one national
center rather than a federation. The political course pursued by Stalin
acquired the obvious features of a power of one nation. In his diplomatic
correspondence, Stalin was using more and more frequently the word
Russia instead of the USSR.

The new State Anthem of the Soviet Union adopted in January 1944
expressed, eloquently and clearly, the very essence of the Soviet State:
"Unbreakable Union of freeborn Republics/Great Russia has welded for-
ever to stand." It should be said that Stalin personally edited the text and
inserted these lines instead of the previous "The noble union of free peo-
ples" written by the anthem's authors – war correspondents Sergey
Mikhalkov and Gabriel El-Registan.

The subject of Great Russia was further developed by Stalin in his
speech at the reception in honor of Red Army commanders given by the
Soviet Government in the Kremlin on May 24, 1945. He spoke about the
Russian people as the greatest nation "because it has won in this war uni-
versal recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the
peoples of our country." and "because it is the most outstanding nation of
all the nations forming the Soviet Union."[6]

This laid the foundation of a new federative model of the USSR. As
Russian scholar Robert Yengibaryan has pointed out in his recent work

Vremya pereotsenki tsennostey (The Time to Revise Values), the error made by the Soviet leaders in the process of building up the Soviet Union – the federation built on the national rather than territorial and civic principle – could have been corrected after World War II. Inspired by the victory, the country and the people were looking for new roads of development.[7] This was not done, and the chance of historic importance was lost.

During Khrushchev's rule (1953-1964), the Stalin model of a union state was gradually dismantled in the course of the campaign against the Stalin personality cult. In the sphere of economic management, Khrushchev tried, first and foremost, to destroy Stalin's project of autonomization; it meant decentralization of national economies and strengthening economic independence of the republics. During the reforms, 141 union and republican ministries were liquidated and the ill-conceived transfer from the branch (vertical) to territorial (horizontal) economic management was implemented. Over 11 thousand enterprises were transferred from the union to republican jurisdiction[8]; this measure broke the "Center-the periphery" chain, weakened the economic ties between the republics, triggered an uncontrolled growth of bureaucracy, and intensified nepotism in the Union and autonomous republics.

Khrushchev's economic and social policies increased the distance between the republics and the Center. The USSR Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior were liquidated, and their functions transferred to the Union republics that assumed responsibility for their courts of justice, the civil, criminal and procedural codes, internal administrative-territorial division, etc. The national (non-Russian) republics acquired their own elites from among the members of the local Soviet and Party nomenklatura who belonged to the titular nations; the centrifugal trends were accelerating and growing more and more obvious.

The legal mayhem launched by Khrushchev was weakening the Soviet federative model. In 1954, for example, he transferred the Crimean Region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR to mark the 300th anniversary of reunification of Ukraine and Russia. This was done on the strength of the decisions of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of both republics contrary to the corresponding articles of their Constitutions that demanded preliminary discussions and voting in their legislatures.

There was another document also affected by legal nihilism that nevertheless remains in power. Here I have in mind the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of October 29, 1948 that defined the legal status of Sevastopol as the city of Union jurisdiction.

This means that when Crimea was transferred to Ukraine in 1954 the latter's jurisdiction did not spread to the Hero City. These "trifles" had been disregarded in Ukraine and Russia both in Soviet and post-Soviet times until President of Russia Vladimir Putin reminded about this at his meeting with Mayor of Moscow Sergey Sobyanin. The president deemed it necessary to remind that Sevastopol, the sister city of Moscow, had been part of Russia in Soviet and post-Soviet times. It remained a city of central jurisdiction when Crimea was illegally detached from Russia. The Russian president has rightly pointed out that Sevastopol was forgotten; it had never been transferred from the RSFSR to Ukraine.[9]

Khrushchev could change the status of any Union republic at his own free will, something that even Stalin could not afford. In 1956, for example, allegedly upon the request of the working people, it was officially announced that, due to the national composition, common economy and close cultural ties between the Karelo-Finnish SSR and the RSFSR, the former was renamed the Karelian ASSR and became part of the RSFSR. Voluntarism and subjectivism were the distinctive features of Khrushchev's politics, the nationalities policies being no exception.

The development prospects of the Soviet republics began to look more like mythical goals. They were formulated in the Third Program of the CPSU, the program of communist construction, adopted by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961. According to Khrushchev, the country should go back to the Lenin principles of nationalities policy. The First Secretary of the CC CPSU was holding forth about further blossoming of nations and drawing them closer to achieve complete unity; it was pointed out that all Soviet nations should acquire a common internationalist culture. It should be said in all justice that Lenin had formulated these ideas before October 1917 only to abandon them after the revolution. What is "complete unity" of nations? How can a unified culture be created outside national identity? The Communists never clarified these points.

Communist rhetoric and social demagoguery were shared also by the next leader of the Soviet Communists. In 1971, speaking at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev said that "during the years of socialist construction, a new historical community of people, the Soviet people, has been formed." This was said despite the fact that no matter how strange, the country obviously had no language of communication between nations: the number of those members of the titular nation who could speak Russian in any of the Union republics left much to be desired:

(a) in six Union republics (Belorussia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, and Moldavia), over half of the titular nation could speak and read Russian;

(b) only one-third of the population in titular nations of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kirgizia, and Estonia had an adequate command of Russian;

(c) less than one-third of the autochthonous population in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan could speak Russian.

It should be said that none of the Constitutions of the USSR contained an article on the state language or defined the status of the Russian language. This means that those proclaiming the Soviet people a new historical community were indulging in idle talk.

At the same time, the trend to reaching this goal in the multinational Soviet state really existed; it was confirmed during the Great Patriotic War but did not develop beyond a trend.

The programmatic guidelines of the Party leadership often were far from the realities of everyday life. Thus, the Third Program of the CPSU officially stated that communication between the peoples of the USSR was increasing since "the material and spiritual needs of every people are satisfied to the same extent" and that common spiritual features of all Soviet peoples explained why "the boundaries between the Union republics of the USSR are losing their former significance." But can this thesis of the Party program be in harmony with the statements of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Nikolai Podgorny who, as First Secretary of the CC Communist Party of Ukraine (1957-1963), insisted that the Krasnodar Territory should be transferred to Ukraine because the Kuban Cossacks living there were Ukrainians?

It is likewise hard to explain the fact that the Germans of the Volga Area, having been politically rehabilitated in 1964, could not restore their autonomous national-state status and return to the places of their historical settlement from Kazakhstan where they had been deported by Stalin during the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Germans were not seeking forgiveness but restoration of their legal civil rights after World War II. Let me remind that the Germans who had fought against the Soviet Union set up two states – the FRG and the GDR – after the war. In 1976, the Politburo of the CC CPSU passed a decision on the German Autonomous Region in Kazakhstan, but it was blocked by local authorities.

Nagorny Karabakh and the relations between Armenians and Azeris, repatriation of the Meskheti Turks and the Crimean Tatars, etc. represented the problems that people in power preferred to sweep under the carpet.

They merely shifted the responsibility to the KGB of the USSR. From 1976 on, that is, when the Fifth Chief Directorate was set up, this omnipotent special service was oblibated to protect the Constitutional order, cut short nationalist provocations and oppose all sorts of ideological subversion.

As soon as some leaders of Union republics (Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan) were elected Member or Candidate Member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, these republics became "untouchable," that is, exempt from laws. Protected by the "umbrella" of the union state, they developed into ethnocratic regimes with structuralized (Party, economic, academic, etc.) national elites consisting of the titular nation. The Union republics were getting isolated while the personnel policy became ossified. This means that the federation model of the USSR was obviously malfunctioning.

The disintegration of the federal model was set in motion when, during the perestroika, the CPSU was deprived of its role of the political core of Soviet society. This load-bearing framework of the Soviet multinational federation was destroyed by General Secretary of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev, among others. In March 1990, the Third Congress of People's Deputies annulled, with Gorbachev's approval, Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution that defined the CPSU as "the leading and guiding force of the Soviet society."

The 28th Congress of the CPSU held in July 1990 delivered the final blow: it adopted a new version of the Charter of the CPSU that established the federative status of the party; all Communist parties of the Union republics became independent. All first secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist parties of the Union republics followed the example of Gorbachev to become presidents of their "possessions." The CPSU, the main unifying bond of the Soviet Union, was eliminated. The Union republics retreated to their national "apartments"; later, they became sovereign states in the post-Soviet space. The future was sealed, the rest was a formality.

On the eve of the Soviet Union's dissolution, the first President of Russia Boris Yeltsin called on the Russians to start building up a new federation from scratch. In the summer of 1990, during his visit to Kazan, he said: "Grab as much sovereignty as you can swallow" which brings us back to Lenin's time and his slogan "steal back the stolen" made public immediately after the October Revolution of 1917. Very soon, however, that Bolshevik slogan addressed to the wide popular masses was sup-

pressed. The first President of Russia, eager to consolidate his power, encouraged trade in sovereignties between the Center and the regions which launched the process of unrestrained souvereignization of peoples and territories that had been parts of the Soviet Union.

In August 1990, for example, the leaders of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan adopted a Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Republic that without prior arrangement registered its new status of a Union republic. Chukotka, on the other side of Russia, announced that it wanted to become part of the new federation without any intermediaries in the form of regional structures. Heads of regions sent to the President of Russia requests to upgrade their regions into republics: Pomorye, Maritime, Novosibirsk, Omsk, etc.

On the whole, Moscow received over 50 requests to set up new national or administrative territorial units including 22 national republics, 16 territorial republics, two confederations (the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus which was an Islamist project and the Great Turan, a pan-Turkic federation) as well as several autonomous regions and national districts. The Center was even invited to set up an International Ecological Park as one of the subjects of the Russian Federation.

Finally, in December 1993, the new Constitution of the Russian Federation confirmed the federal status of Russia with 89 subjects, 57 of them based on the administrative-territorial principle, and 32, on the nationality principle. Para 3 of Article 5 of the Constitution specified: "The federal structure of the Russian Federation shall be based on its State integrity, the unity of the system of State power, the division of matters of authority and powers between State government bodies of the Russian Federation and State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the equality and self-determination of peoples in the Russian Federation."

Very much as usual, we have found ourselves "ahead of the game." History knows no other federation with this number of subjects. It cannot be managed efficiently from one center; it is impossible to take the interests of all and every federation subject into account. On the other hand, none of the federation subjects can hope to independently realize all its plans, let alone highly specific.

In the mid-1990s, Russia was living amid the parade of sovereignties and constitutional and legal nihilism. Constitutions or Charters adopted by the federation subjects that in parts contradicted the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation became the fashion of the time.

The majority of the RF republics defined themselves in their Constitutions as sovereign states with the right to suspend those of the federal laws that contradicted their Constitutions. Certain leaders of national republics (the Republic of Sakha being one of them) went even further: they assumed part of the rights of the Commander-in-Chief of the RF, in particular the right to pass decisions on troop movements and control of troop movements across the republic. The Republic of Tyva appropriated the right to introduce martial law on its territory, to declare wars and sign peace treaties. The Republic of Kalmykia, in its turn, decided that it had the right to mint money and declared that within its borders the ruble was foreign currency.

The subjects of the Russian Federation created on the basis of the administrative-territorial principles also demonstrated a lot of ingenuity. The heads of the Saratov Region, for example, announced that, according to the results of local referendum, federal acts could be suspended as contradicting local laws or the interests of the local population. The Omsk Region introduced death penalty for drug use, etc.

In the late 20th century, Russia moved dangerously close to the line behind which the federation could become a loosely connected confederation. In 1990, in his first Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Putin critically assessed the quality of the federation status quo of post-Soviet Russia: "We still do not have a full federal state. I want to stress this: we do have a decentralized state" and "federal relations in Russia are incomplete and undeveloped."

In which way does the current structure of the Russian Federation differ from the federal structure of the Soviet Union?

First, as distinct from the Soviet Union that was a federation of peoples, Russia is a mixed variant of federative order that relies on the national-state, national-territorial, state-administrative, and administrative-territorial principles. Today, the Russian Federation is a federation of peoples and territories.

Second, the Soviet federation was symmetrical which means that its subjects had identical legal statuses of Union republics. Today, the RF subjects are asymmetrical which means that their legal statuses are different: there are republics, territories, regions, federal cities, autonomous regions, and autonomous districts. The RF subjects are not only asymmetrical; they are hierarchical since their territories, population strengths, political and economic weights are incomparable – this is a "federation of ants and elephants," according to certain Russian and foreign editions.

Third, the Constitutions of the USSR envisaged free access and free withdrawal from the Soviet Union; the FR Constitution relies on the "universally acknowledged principles of equality and self-determination of peoples." It should be said that self-determination here is not limited to political issues; it refers also to the economic, social, cultural, etc. spheres within the Russian Federation that can be interpreted as a "soft" ban on withdrawal from the Federation. Constitutions of federations in the West are much more rigid and much more categorical: they ban withdrawals, ban unilateral change of the status of their subjects and separatist agreements between their members.

Further development of Russia's federation model should take into account the Soviet experience. It should be said, first and foremost, that the Soviet Union's disintegration was not only the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century but also a lesson of historic importance to all peoples of the world: all federations based on the nationality principle are short-lived in the context of history. Territorial federations are much more viable.

During his first presidential term, Vladimir Putin used administrative leverage to stop the disintegration of the Russian Federation; this was his great service to the country. The majority of the sub-laws passed by the subjects of the RF that contradicted the 1993 Constitution of the RF were annulled. The President announced that no agreements between the Center and any of the federation subjects could be signed without informing all other subjects. Some of the large-scale changes were overdue: in 2005-2007, President Putin cut down the number of the federation subjects based on the national-territorial principle.

Referendums were organized in Siberia and the Far East where the population of six autonomous districts that were subjects of the RF preferred to be united with economically stronger neighbors. Related, to a certain extent, to national identities of some peoples of Siberia and the Far East, this was a far from simple and very painful process. That is why, in the early years of the 21st century, the process was slowed down and remained uncompleted.

Administrative mechanisms are not sufficient enough when it comes to the development of the Russian Federation; its federative structure needs a firm economic foundation. So far, it is too early to discuss the economic prerequisites of the federal structure. In 2005, there were 19 donor regions in the Russian Federation; in 2013, their number dropped to 10. Today, only four subjects are self-sufficient in the true sense of the word: Moscow, the Moscow region, St. Petersburg, and the Nenets

Autonomous District in the Arkhangelsk Region. All other subjects rely, to different degrees, on donations, which means that the leadership of the Russian Federation has no choice but to pursue the policy of state paternalism.

The members of the systemic opposition insist on radical changes in the federal structure of the Russian Federation. Their goal is to replace the national principle with the territorial one.

Those who supported Mikhail Prokhorov's Civic Platform maintained that all subjects based on the nationality principle should be liquidated. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who wants to restore the division of the country into gubernias, says essentially the same. From time to time, transitory projects appear in the media: the country should be divided into administrative-territorial units; the territories with autochthonous populations of over 50% of the total can remain national-territorial units or acquire internal autonomy. The rights of all other national groups should be reduced to cultural-national autonomies.

Some "hotheads" are talking about a new Constitution (the sixth in the last 100 years) to legalize these novelties. They might tip the balance of power in the Russian state with unpredictable repercussions. We should bear in mind that none of the peoples of today's Russia will abandon its national identity. The ethnocratic regimes of the federation units based on the nationality are actively promoting national identities. This process is gaining momentum which means that we should look for the answers to the questions: Can the centrifugal process be transformed into centripetal? What should be done to achieve this and how to begin?

It seems that the prerequisites are here: we should rely on the federal districts; their status should be long ago confirmed in the Constitution. They represent the vertical of power and should become the cornerstones of Russia's federal order and cement the mosaics of the subjects of the Russian Federation within their borders.

The economies of the federal districts should be strengthened; the latter should replicate the regional economic diversification. Today, this principle is not taken into consideration in full measure. For example, the Asian part of Russia is traditionally divided into three economic regions: the West Siberian, East Siberian and the Far Eastern while today they are partly divided, for some reason, between the Siberian and the Far Eastern federal districts. Can anybody explain why the Kurgan and Tyumen regions as well as the Khanty-Mansi and the Yamal-Nenets autonomous districts, situated in the West Siberian economic region, are found in the Urals Federal District?

Today, eight federal districts are situated on the territories of eleven economic regions while it would have been much more logical, first, to align the number of federal districts with the number of economic regions and, second, to make them administratively tied to corresponding economic regions. This will make the federal districts and make them more sustainable and independent.

Today, much attention is paid to the economic forums in St. Petersburg (Northwestern Federal District) and Vladivostok (Far Eastern Federal District) invariably attended by the top officials as the main platforms on which promising projects of the country's economic development are discussed. These forums consider the innovation programs that might help develop the country's economy, such as nanotechnologies, digital economy, etc. The experience gained by the federation subjects based on the administrative-territorial principle may come useful.

Harmonious interaction between the federal Center and the federation subjects is a challenging task. President Putin has deemed it necessary to point out once more that Russia is a multi-national state with a very complex federative structure.[10] It is still too early to start talking about a new model of the Russian Federation. Today, all guesses are nothing but idle talk. We will live, and we will see.

NOTES

[1] For more detail, see: *Politicheskie partii Rossii: istoriya i sovremennost.* Moscow, 2000, pp. 260-299.

[2] Lenin V.I. I Vserossiyskiy syezd Sovetov rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov 3-24 iyunya (16 iyunya-7 iyulya) 1917 g. *Rech o voyne* 9 (22) iyunya // PSS (Polnoe sobranie sochinenii). Vol. 32, p. 286.

[3] Lenin V.I. *Ob obrazovanii SSSR. Pismo L.B. Kamenevu dlya chlenov Politburo TsK RKP (b) ot 26. IX. 1922 g.* // PSS. Vol. 45, p. 211.

[4] Stalin I.V. *Doklad o proekte Konstitutsii SSSR.* Moscow, 1936, p. 42.

[5] Lenin V.I. *Politicheskiy shantazh* // PSS. Vol. 34, p. 92.

[6] Vystuplenie tovarishcha I.V. Stalina na prieme v Kremle v chest komanduyushchikh voyskami Krasnoy Armii. 24 maya 1945 g. // Stalin I. *O velikoy otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuza.* Moscow, 2002, p. 151.

[7] Engibaryan R.V. *Vremya pereotsenki tsennostey.* Moscow, 2018, p. 10.

[8] Kara-Murza S. *Sovetskaya tsivilzatsiya. Ot Velikoy Pobedy do nashikh dney.* Vol. 2. Moscow, 2001, p. 31.

[9] *Nezavisimaya gazeta.* October 24, 2018.

[10] Poslanie Prezidenta RF V.V. Putina Federalnomu Sobraniyu. March 1, 2018.

Key words: federation, Constitution of the USSR, Constitution of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation model.

Russia's Diplomatic Service
in the Second Quarter of the 19th Century

A. Panov,
O. Lebedeva

ANY STATE realizes its foreign policy through its diplomatic corps. As an official representative of his country, any diplomat defends the interests of his state and of its citizens and participates in talks and other events.

Not only heads of permanent missions but also all and everyone sent to a foreign country to take part in all sorts of ceremonies should be accredited. Special missions are expected to inform the opposite side about all sorts of problems.

By the 19th century, relationships with foreign diplomats had already developed into the ambassadorial law as a legal branch on its own right. It allowed independent governments to send and receive diplomats to represent their interests while a system of ranging specified the rights of diplomats depending on their ranks.

A unified system of ranks accepted by all participants in international relations appeared after 1815; before that, each country had relied on its national system of ranging in which the rank of a diplomat depended on his specific mission.

In the latter half of the 18th century, there were three classes of diplomats: ambassadors (including extraordinary), extraordinary and common residents. For the latter two, a vast variety of ranks, none of them being specifically defined, was also used. In fact, the term "minister" was applied to any agent with a diplomatic mission.

This complicated the relationships between the sides: each side tend-

_____

Alexander Panov, Head, Department of Diplomacy, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Doctor of Science (Political Sciences); panovtaishi@yandex.ru

Olga Lebedeva, Deputy Dean, School of International Relations, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Candidate of Sciences (Sociology); o.lebedeva13@gmail.com

ed to appoint diplomats of the ranks identical to those held by the representatives of the opposite side.

The problem was resolved in 1815 by the Vienna Congress at which representatives of the main European states agreed on three diplomatic ranks: ambassadors, envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary, chargé d'affaires at foreign ministries. Three years later, at the Congress of Aachen, the new system of ranks was extended by the rank of minister-president that occupied the third level out of four.

> The highly important and far from simple relations with the Ottoman Empire were the reason for the multifaceted tasks carried out by the Russian mission in Constantinople.

The system of ranks of the early 19th century survived till our times practically intact; legally, the diplomats were equal irrespective of their ranks; the rank differences might be observed at receptions.[1]

Appointments at certain posts followed certain rules: kingdom appointed ambassadors to other kingdoms; as direct representatives of monarchs, they expected royal receptions. Diplomats of lower ranks were treated as royal envoys with no special honors. Chargés d'affaires represented foreign ministries and frequently acted on the strength of a letter addressed to the opposite foreign minister, not on letters of credence and other diplomatic attributes.[2]

In the second quarter of the 19th century, Russia was represented practically in all states. Under Catherine II, there had been 21 ministers; by the end of the first quarter of the 19th century, there were 24 of them. Their number was steadily rising: under Nicholas I, Russia was represented in three new states – Brazil, Greece and Belgium. Meanwhile, between 1835 and 1853, Russia did not recognize Queen Isabella II of Spain which explains why it had no diplomatic representative in this country.

The number of diplomats of the first rank was limited: in the second quarter of the 19th century, there were four of them: K.O. Pozzo di Borgo who represented Russia in France and Britain, P.P. Palen (France), Kh.A. Lieven (Britain), and D.P. Tatishchev (Austria). All other Russian diplomats had the second rank.[3]

Diplomats who represented their countries in host countries finally acquired certain privileges. Karl Martens, one of the founders of ambas-

sadorial law of that time, pointed to certain distinctions and advantages of diplomatic agents of a "sacred nature,"[4] immunity of the diplomat and his property being one of them. This fully applied to the servants employed by the mission. Turkey was the only exception in this respect: During wars, diplomats were expected to be confined to the Yedikule Fortress ("Fortress of the Seven Towers") in Constantinople,[5] which was never done.

Diplomats were immune to the taxation laws of the host country as well as to its criminal and civil laws. It was prohibited to lodge soldiers in the houses of foreign envoys; the local land taxes, however, were paid. The ministers could organize private religious service.[6] Diplomatic correspondence was treated as secret yet states regularly violated this rule.

The staff of the Russian diplomatic missions abroad was determined by the staff payroll of 1800. Excessively big staffs were not only too expensive; they made it much harder to keep secrets. The 1800 staff payroll specified the number of officials employed by the central structures of the Foreign Ministry, slashed the number of people employed by missions abroad and increased their wages.[7]

It was decided to have up to two capable young men at diplomatic missions without wages to train them as secretaries or counselors at embassies.

This developed into a so-called Junker system: several capable young men (Junkers) were placed in embassies headed by experienced ambassadors; later, they filled vacancies in other embassies. As members of the noble families of Russia, they received no wages.[8]

Missions were headed either by ambassadors or ministers of the second rank who had at his disposal a counselor or a secretary (depending of the status of the host country).[9] All missions were identically organized; in the East, they hired dragomans (interpreters) with a good knowledge of local tongues.

In the first half of the 19th century, Russia intensified its international contacts and, therefore, needed the fullest possible information about its opponents. The staffs of the Russian missions abroad were increased while their structures remained the same. Early in the 19th century, the embassy staff consisted of two officials and several Junkers (trainees); by the 1850s, there were four or five officials in each mission. In 1826, the Russian mission in Constantinople hired 17 people, more than any other Russian mission abroad. The Russian missions in France, Austria and Rome were not small either: eight staff and non-staff members.

Some missions, however, were much smaller with two or even one member.[10] This was mainly typical of small German states. More than that, one person could represent Russia's interests in several states. For example, the Russian ambassador to Prussia performed the same functions in the neighboring dwarf states: Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz. The secretary remained in the mission while its head turned up a couple of times every year. This was done to cut down the costs of diplomatic service: indeed, the tiny Italian and German states were sort of immune to earthquakes of any kind.[11]

In the middle of the second decade of the 19th century, the number of missions with considerable staffs of counselors increased: from that time on, they were employed by all embassies and two missions (in Prussia and the Ottoman Empire).[12] For a short time (in 1823-1826), the mission in Rome, likewise, had a counselor.[13] Counselors were expected to contribute to the discussions of the most complicated problems.

The number of officials was gradually increasing: one mission could hire up to three secretaries. The staff payroll of 1835 created the rank of "junior secretaries" related to the representatives of the second and third ranks, the ranking depending on the personal qualities of the functionary. The first class acquired the rank of "senior secretaries."[14] Office clerks occupied the lowest steps in in the diplomatic table of ranks.

Secretaries were expected to write messages, work with documents, compose telegrams to the ministry, supervise the chancellery, and deal with related problems. They cyphered telegrams, registered documents and issued passports.[15] In some cases, they worked as couriers for additional payment.[16] Fyodor Tyutchev, well known in Russia as a poet, spent considerable part of his life at diplomatic service, in Turin in particular, and frequently performed courier functions.[17] Secretaries could combine their duties with consular duties as was customary in 1850 in Hamburg.[18]

Not infrequently officials of other ministries, the ministry of war on many occasions, joined diplomatic missions as staff members. At first, they had been paid by their ministries; from 1833 onwards, they received their wages from the Foreign Ministry.[19] In 1829, special officials of the Ministry of Finances were sent to other countries to obtain information about latest scientific discoveries and technical innovations; the ambassadors and ministers in host countries were instructed to help them fulfill their missions.

Diplomats were instructed to maintain close contacts with local sci-

entific communities to inform them of Russia's achievements and organize ad hoc contacts with officials of the Finance Ministry.[20] The first mission of this sort was sent to France to learn more about its scientific and industrial potential.

The institute of Junkers was short-lived; it disappeared before the period under discussion. Russia's mission in Constantinople was the biggest and structurally the most complicated: from the mid-1818, it hired 33 people, nine of them dragomans of different levels. The mission was divided into two chancelleries one of which was responsible for diplomacy and the other, for commercial affairs. There were two staff doctors.[21]

In 1842, a new staff payroll cut down the number of officials to 24, five of them students. It was at this time that the mission acquired a church.[22]

The highly important and far from simple relations with the Ottoman Empire were the reason for the multifaceted tasks carried out by the Russian mission in Constantinople. Navigation in the Black Sea Straits was critically important for Russia's trade with the Mediterranean countries and Russia's safety. The Christians of the Ottoman Empire counted on Russia's patronage; the lion's share of armaments that allowed mountaineers to continue fighting in the Caucasus arrived from Turkey. The sultan and his closest circle protected their power by maximally restricting foreigners' activities in Turkey.

Relations with other South European countries were no less important. Immediately after the Peace of Adrianople of 1829, an increase of the staff of the Russian mission in Greece was contemplated. It was decided to start with the Commercial Chancellery in Nafplio to settle trade and other commercial problems in which the subjects of the Russian Empire were involved. Viktor Panin who headed the Russian mission in Greece believed that the chancellery should be entrusted to a vice-consul. He pointed to a certain Lavinzon with a huge experience of trade with the Levant as the best candidate.[23] Having considered the issue, the Foreign Ministry declined the idea.

Talking about Russian missions in Oriental countries should include discussing the role of dragomans (interpreters) in diplomatic activities. Most of them were local people with European roots (Greeks, Genoese and others) who had spent a larger part of their lives in Istanbul (many of them were born here). The Turkish term *tercüman* for the interpreter[24] was gradually transformed into dragoman. Not infrequently, they finally

became subjects of the country in the mission of which they worked. In their memoirs, contemporaries mentioned Pisani, Kiriko, Fonton, Timoni and others who had served Russia's interests as dragomans at the mission in Constantinople.[25]

Members of these families moved even higher on the diplomatic ladder. P. Pisani and A. Timoni, for example, filled important posts at the mission's Commercial Chancellery, G. Karakasi represented Russia in Greece in the 1830s while A. Fonton rose to privy councilor[26] and was member of the Council of Ministry. Several members of the Fonton family became prominent diplomats. In 1853, for example, Felix Fonton, chargé d'affaires in Austria, prevented Turkish invasion of Montenegro by drawing Austria to the side of Russia. Both of them demanded that Turkey should withdraw its troops from Montenegro; Constantinople had no choice but to retreat.[27]

In his memoirs, Fyodor Tyutchev described Fonton as a determined man whose initiative prevented a catastrophe in Montenegro in a far from simple international situation.[28]

Not all dragomans, however, deserved praise. Nikolai Muravyov, for example, with no soft spot for foreigners at Russian service, was very critical of Antoine Franchini whom he described as a greedy man who valued state awards and money more than his duties and was never shy to admit it.[29] Sergey Tatishchev was of the same opinion and accused Apollinary Butenyov who headed the Russian mission in Constantinople of ignoring the mess in this sphere and of the fact that senior dragomans had too much influence.[30]

Dragomans were necessary because Europeans were not fluent in Oriental languages, while the specifics of local mentality and the rules of negotiations made it much harder to achieve the desired results.[31] Other diplomats pointed out that only Turks could reach an agreement among themselves since they were negotiating in the same language and possessing the same mentality.[32] Any document compiled by Turks brimmed with subtleties and concealed meanings, therefore a word-for-word translation from Turkish was not enough – it was highly important to grasp less obvious meanings. This explains why the dragomans were instructed to accompany their translations with comments based on their own knowledge and on information obtained from other sources.

This means that the practice of hiring dragomans had no options; on the other hand, dragomans did a lot to establish and maintain relations between European states and the Ottoman Empire.

In Russia, Oriental tongues were taught by the best possible teachers hired by the Department of Oriental Languages at the Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry with good results[33]; the Department had a vast library composed of works by Oriental writers and scholars.[34]

This, however, was not enough: the problems created by inadequate knowledge of Oriental languages were worsened by insufficient knowledge of traditions, everyday life and the rules of conduct at negotiations which made the positions of Phanariotes unassailable.[35]

The positions of dragomans were firm and important; the first dragoman was dealing with the most significant issues of the relations with the Ottoman Empire[36]; this made him a highly important figure for the minister.[37] Contemporaries pointed out that it was far from easy to get the post: vacancies were few while the position was on the very top.[38]

The first dragoman had an assistant who was expected to work with the Turkish courts of justice, the police and take part in settling commercial issues. All other dragomans supervised less important fields in full conformity with the rules of the chancellery which employed them.[39]

In the fall of 1840, the Foreign Ministry initiated ranking of dragomans and raised wages to bring more order into their work. The mission in Constantinople was instructed to liquidate the post of the assistant of the first dragoman and establish two posts of dragomans of the second and third levels; the fourth level was liquidated.[40] As a result, the mission was left with five interpreters.

In the summer of 1842, the mission received a new staff payroll that consolidated the changes of the previous two decades. Despite the higher wages, the mission spent 2200 rubles less every year; this was achieved at the expense of the positions that had remained vacant for a long time and by lowering the ranks of some of the consulates operating in the Ottoman Empire.[41]

Diplomats were expected to know all and everything about what was going on in the host country and to keep the Foreign Ministry in St. Petersburg informed. Each more or less important event was described in a letter; this means that each mailing might contain several letters related to different events. In 1827, on the eve of the tripartite Treaty of London, Khristofor Lieven, Russian Ambassador to Great Britain sent 22 letters in one mailing to inform the Foreign Ministry about the attitude of Britain to the Porte, about the squadron of Admiral Dmitry Senyavin including information about the personnel, about latest developments in the political situation in Britain, etc. Some of the letters described the situation

around the Pyrenees, Great Britain's interactions with third countries on a wide variety of issues, etc.[42]

On the whole, the missions were inevitably involved in a wide range of questions, the choice determined by the situation in the host country. The mission in Great Britain, for example, was regularly participating in the work of the London Conferences that discussed the events unfolding in Greece and Belgium.[43] The crisis of 1839-1841 between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt increased pressure on the Russian mission; the same fully applies to the signing of the London Straits Convention, the document of unrivaled importance for Russian diplomacy.[44]

Tasks of the Russian embassies changed, sometimes fast, together with the changing situation. In the 1820s, for example, the Russian mission in France was expected to restore interaction with the country that had reestablished the monarchy. Ten years later, the Russian diplomats stationed in Paris worked hard to prevent revolutionary ideas from infiltrating Europe, and Russia in the first place. At the same time, Ambassador Pozzo di Borgo remained convinced that cooperation with France was highly needed to confront the alliance between Austria and Germany.

The Russian embassy in France had to deal with the Polish Question; from time to time, Russian diplomats asked the French government to deport some Poles who had settled in France after the 1830-1831 revolution. In most cases this was done. In the last decade of a half-a-century interval discussed here, the relations with France were practically frozen; they were maintained by charges d'affaires which limited the scope of cooperation.

The mission in Berlin, likewise, faced a huge amount of problems to be resolved by diplomatic means. The diplomats were expected not only to trace down what was going on in the numerous German states. They had to oppose, as efficiently as they could, their unification into a single state: Russia did not need a powerful adversary in the West. The revolution of 1848-1849 led to the election of the Frankfurt Parliament convened to discuss unification of the German states. The Russian mission had to work hard to follow the events and to influence the process as best as it could. The main role belonged to Russian envoy Peter von Meyendorff.[45]

In Austria, the situation was not simple either; on the one hand, Vienna remained Russia's ally on many traditional issues; on the other, it tried to play the central role in the process of German unification, some-

thing St. Petersburg actively opposed. The Austrian Empire was home to a fairly great number of Slavs, and the Russian government deemed it necessary to protect their interests. This was the main task of the Russian embassy in 1848.

St. Petersburg responded to the petition in which Serbs asked the Russian emperor to defend them against the violation of their rights in Banat by an analogy with Russia's support extended to the Serbs who lived in the Ottoman Empire. In the fall of 1848, Nicholas I received a letter from Josif Rajačić, Serbian Patriarch, with a request to extend his patronage to the Serbians of Vojvodina.[46] Russia's active diplomatic interference improved the situation significantly: Vojvodina received the status of a territorial unit with special rights that survived for several years before being liquidated by Vienna.[47]

At all times, the mission in Constantinople was the biggest: the relations with Turks, dotted by numerous conflicts, were highly important for Russia even if far from simple. According to the memoirs by diplomats, they had to cope with a huge amount of work.[48] Turkey sold weapons to Caucasian mountaineers who, in their turn, brought Russian slaves to the Turkish markets.[49] To confront it, Russian diplomats had to visit the places of criminal activities from time to time. The mission had to protect the interests of the region's Christian population and react officially to all violations of their rights by the Muslim majority.

In view of the regular Turkish-Russian wars, the diplomats were instructed to gather information for the Russian army and the navy, such as construction of fortifications, location of military units, the state of the Turkish navy, and the time of ships' departure. It was military intelligence pure and simple even if there were no military and naval attaches at the Russian embassies; they appeared later, under the law of 1856. Before that they operated on a temporary basis.

Russian topographers, likewise, were very active in the region, in Bulgaria and Romania in the first place. Opinions about the results of their efforts differed greatly. Some people believed that what they were doing was necessary: their maps had come handy at the turn of the second quarter of the 19th century and were used in the mid-19th century during the Crimean War.[50] On the other hand, authors of numerous memoirs about the war of 1828 bitterly complained that the maps were very imprecise making it harder for the troops to find water. Such remarks are invariably accompanied by explanations that in the Ottoman Empire the Christians abandoned their villages to escape Muslim persecutions; this

explains why Russian troops found abandoned villages instead of those marked on the maps where they had expected to obtain provisions.[51]

On the whole, Russian ministries of war and foreign affairs maintained close contacts; due to very limited number of intelligence officers, some of their tasks were shouldered by diplomats stationed abroad. Despite the absence of necessary experience, they created efficient agent networks that supplied ambassadors and ministers with valuable information.

In 1831, the Russian embassy in London was instructed to secretly acquire new rifles invented in Britain and were vastly superior by their technical characteristics to the rifles used by European armies. Next summer, Grand Prince Mikhail Pavlovich who headed the engineering service of the Russian army issued a personal order to obtain, by hook or by crook, technical literature and documents for them. This task was basically fulfilled. Russian diplomats also got access to the special documentation related to the carriages of French field gunnery and instructions for French gunners as well as information related to all sorts of upgrades for rifles (such as replaceable carriage-clips).[52]

The Russian missions were steadily monitoring revolutionary sentiments in the host countries; reports were sent directly to imperial chancellery. Today, the State Archives of the Russian Federation can boast of a huge number of such documents going two centuries back.

Due to the variety of tasks and the frequently arising need in activities unrelated to diplomacy Russian diplomats needed a high level of professional training. It required specialized educational establishments Russia didn't have at the time.

For several years, aspiring diplomats were learning the skills inside the country as officials of the Foreign Ministry: they were taught the basics of diplomatic work and the rules of diplomatic correspondence. After that they could count on being posted abroad.

Once stationed outside Russia, the diplomat was never returned to the central apparatus of the Foreign Ministry. This was typical of European countries as well. In 1800, France adopted its own rules of rotation: its diplomats were expected to spend some time abroad and then return to France; this practice survived for several months.[53]

In general, Russian diplomacy relied on the norms of the so-called old school rooted in the theory of balance of power formulated in 1648 by the Congress of Westphalia and developed and consolidated in the course of time. Peace at any cost was its main provision explained by the history of

Europe that for two decades at the turn of the 19th century was waging endless and exhaustive wars.

The balance between the main political alliances achieved at the Vienna Congress was the main instrument of peace on the continent. Another instrument was encouragement of concessions to prevent emergence of conflicting situations between political opponents. This explains frequent and long conferences organized to ensure peace on the continent.

The numerous weak points of the balance of power system finally destroyed it despite the frantic efforts of all countries to prevent the rise of a hegemon. The system was first tested for endurance in 1815 and large-scale revolutionary upheavals of 1830 and 1848 revealed even more serious problems. The situation was further aggravated by colonial expansion of European powers that led to clashes of interests in Europe and outside it.

It should be said that the editing skills were highly important for a diplomat. To be adequately understood in European capitals, any document should have precise wording. Adequate responses depended on the right understanding of information received.

Stationed far from their capitals, diplomats were free to make decisions: their communication with the foreign ministry depended on the postal service; the speed with which letters were delivered to the addressee was all important and was encouraged accordingly. In 1835, for example, state courier Guntashvili spent less than a week to cover the distance between London and St. Petersburg with an important letter and was lavishly rewarded with 100 Dutch guilders.[54]

The center needed a month to study the letters received from its ambassadors and take adequate measures. This means that instructions from the center were losing their expediency before they reached the embassies and that diplomats had to rely on their experience and common sense. If a diplomat moved too far from the policies pursued by the foreign ministry, he could have been punished. This happened to Russia's envoy in Greece G. Katakazi who advised the Greek monarch to agree to a Constitution. The diplomat acted in Russia's interest but lost his post because the foreign ministry of the country of absolute monarchy found the idea unpalatable. Later, however, he was again employed by the ministry to supervise Greek affairs.[55]

Russian diplomacy was not free from shortcomings. All correspondence with Russia's diplomatic missions was in French. During the war of 1828-1829, the task of writing a detailed report to General Paskevich

who commanded the Russian army caused a lot of problems in the Russian mission in Constantinople. The knowledge of Russian there had much to be desired, and the report. was written and rewritten several times. Felix Fonton who also contributed to the effort mentioned that the knowledge of French was much better than that of Russian because of wider practice.[56] It should be said that at that time French was the language of international communication which explains why diplomats of Russia and other countries knew it better than their native languages.

On the whole, Russia's diplomatic service of the time did not differ much from the European where its structure and functions were concerned. Their staffs were adequate to the tasks; this means that no large-scale changes were needed. Closer to the mid-19th century, however, intensified diplomatic contacts demanded bigger staffs and a greater number of secretaries in the first place. When needed, the staffs were increased; there was no specialization by types of activities, the Commercial Chancellery at the mission in Constantinople being the only exception. According to the system of ranks adopted at the government level, the majority of Russia's missions abroad belonged to the second rank and was headed by envoys extraordinary (ministers plenipotentiary).

All countries, Russia being no exception, combined their diplomatic work with intelligence acivities; representatives of the finance and war ministries were members of diplomatic missions. It was the prerogative of the Foreign Ministry to appoint diplomats to Russia's missions abroad. Once stationed abroad, the diplomats from the central apparatus never returned to the ministry. Experience was highly important at the time when communication required a lot of time: any diplomat was expected to rely on his knowledge and skills, which was especially true at the time of crises when promptness was very important.

This means that Russian diplomatic service was moving in the right direction.

NOTES

[1] Martens K. *Diplomatiya, ili rukovodstvo k poznaniyu vneshnikh gosudarstvennykh snosheniy dlya posvyashchaushchikh sebya diplomaticheskoy sluzhbe.* Moscow, 1828, pp. 23-25.

[2] Ibid., p. 29.

[3] *Ocherk istorii Ministerstva inostrannykh del 1802-1902.* St. Petersburg, 1902, pp. 96-97, 132.

[4] Martens K. Op. cit., p. 47.

[5] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[6] Ibid., pp. 53, 55, 66, 74.

7 Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). Record group 1. Administrativnye dela. Inventory IV-53. 1800 g. File. 1, p. 1-1 rev.

8 Ibid., p. 1 rev.-2 rev.

9 Ibid., pp. 21-27 reverse.

10 Calculated from: *Mesyatseslov i obshchiy shtat Rossiyskoy imperii na 1826-1830 gg.* (Mesyatseslov i obshchiy shtat Rossiyskoy imperii na [1831-1842]. St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1830-1842.)

11 *Ocherk istorii Ministerstva inostrannykh del …* Appendices. pp. 7-26.

12 AVPRI. Record group 161. IV-2. Inventory 148. 1850 g. File 42. pp. 1-2.

13 *Mesyatseslov i obshchiy shtat Rossiyskoy imperii na 1823-1826 gg.*

14 Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA). Record group 1149. Inventory 2. 1835 г. File 45 b, pp. 149 rev.-151.

15 Martens K. Op. cit., p. 108.

16 AVPRI. Record group 161. IV-34. Inventory 179. 1848 g. File 8, pp. 8, 10.

17 Tyutchev F.I. *Sochineniya v 2-kh tomakh.* Vol. 2. Moscow, 1984, pp. 29.

18 Kudryavskiy Khristian Emelyanovich // *Russkiy biograficheskiy slovar.* Knappe-Küchelbecker. Moscow, 1995, p. 516.

19 AVPRI. Record group 161. [-]. Inventory 781. 1832 g. File 263 b, pp. 44-49.

20 *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiyskoy imperii* (PSZRI). 2nd collection. Vol. 4. No. 3079, pp. 592-593.

21 AVPRI. Record group 161. IV-7. Inventory 126. 1818 g. File 3, pp. 1-3 rev.

22 Ibid. Record group 149. Missiya v Konstantinopole. Inventory 502 a. File 852, pp. 13-15 rev.

23 Ibid. Record group 161. IV-4. Inventory 123. 1829 g. File 1, pp. 1-2.

24 Dragoman (Iz zapisok starogo diplomata) // *Russkiy arkhiv.* 1886. No. 10, pp. 203-204.

25 Ibid., pp. 206-207.

26 *Russkiy biograficheskiy slovar.* Faver-Tsyavlovskiy. Moscow, 1999, pp. 200-201.

27 For more detail, see: *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya na Balkanakh. 1830-1856.* Moscow, 1990, pp. 297-299.

28 Tyutchev F.I. Op. cit., p. 205.

29 Muravyev N.N. *Russkie na Bosfore v 1833 g.* Moscow, 1869, p. 31.

30 Tatishchev S.S. *Vneshnyaya politika imperatora Nikolaya I. St. Petersburg,* 1887, p. 416.

31 Bazili K.M. *Bosfor i novye ocherki Konstantinopolya.* Vol. 1. St. Petersburg, 1836, pp. 299-300.

32 Fonton F.P. *Vospominaniya. Yumoristicheskie i voennye pisma iz glavnoy kvartiry Dunayskoy armii v 1828 i 1829 gg.* Vol. 2. Leipzig, 1862, pp. 40-41.

33 Kononov A.N. *Istoriya izucheniya tyurkskikh yazykov v Rossii. Dooktyabrskiy period.* Leningrad, 1982, p. 182.

34 Ibid.

35 *Dragoman…* p. 211.

36 AVPRI. Record group 149. Missiya v Konstantinopole. Inventory. 502 a. File. 851, pp. 7-7 rev.

37 Dragoman... p. 216.

38 Ibid., pp. 214-216.

[39] AVPRI. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[40] Ibid., p. 2.

[41] Ibid., p. 8.

[42] *Vneshnyanya politika Rossii.* Vol. 7 (15). Moscow, 1992, pp. 673-674. Note 117.

[43] See, for example: *Istoriya vneshney politiki Rossii. Pervaya polovina XIX v.* Moscow, 1995. Chapter V.

[44] See: *Vostochnyy vopros vo vneshney politike Rossii. Konets XVIII-nachalo XIX v.* Moscow, 1978, pp. 102-120.

[45] Zametki iz dnevnikov Varnhagena von Ense // *Russkaya starina.* 1878. No. 9, p. 149.

[46] Churkina I.V. "Natsionalnoe vozrozhdenie yugoslavyanskikh narodov Gabsbugskoy imperii," *Na putyakh k Yugoslavii.* Moscow, 1997, p. 43.

[47] Ibid., pp. 53-54.

[48] Riboper A.I. "Zapiski grafa Aleksandra Ivanovicha Ribopera," *Russkiy arkhiv.* 1877. No. 5, p. 21.

[49] See, for example: AVPRI. Record group 161. IV-2. Inventory 119. 1831-1851 gg. File 4, p. 40.

[50] Chaykovsky M. "Zapiski Mikhaila Chaykovskogo (Mekhmet Sadyk-pashi)," *Russkaia starina.* 1898. No. 10, p. 187.

[51] Fonton F.P. Op. cit., pp. 96-97.

[52] *Ocherki istorii rossiyskoy vneshney razvedki.* Vol. 1. Moscow, 1996, pp. 146-147.

[53] Zallet R. *Diplomaticheskaya sluzhba. Ee istoriya i organizatsia vo Frantsii, Velikobritanii i Soedinennykh Shtatakh.* Moscow, 1956, p. 61.

[54] AVPRI. Record group 161. I-1. Inventory 781. 1835 g. File 266, pp. 31-31 rev.

[55] Bray O. "Imperator Nikolay I i ego spodvizhniki," *Russkaya starina.* 1902. No. 1, p. 127.

[56] Fonton F.P. Op. cit., pp. 92-93.

Key words: Russia, Europe, diplomatic service, foreign policy activities.

"Electrician": A WWII Spy Story

S. Brilev

REMEMBER Pastor Schlag from the TV series "Seventeen Moments of Spring"? Remember when in the spring of 1945, the poor bloke played by Rostislav Plyatt stumbled on skis from Germany to Switzerland with only a hunch that the person who sent him there, Stirlitz, was not a German patriot but a Soviet intelligence officer?

Did such a pastor really exist? Yes! Only he was Dutch, not German. And he crossed the border in a plane, not on skis. And he was flying not from Germany to Switzerland, but from England to Belgium. And he was working for the USSR quite willingly. His name was John William Kruyt.

Maybe some of you will remember the television special report that VGTRK's European correspondent Anastasia Popova and I aired on the 75th anniversary of Kruyt's exploit. But don't put this article aside just yet, thinking you already know everything!

Fortunately, we did not get anything wrong in our television investigation, but after our program was aired, the SVR made a crucial clarification to the story. Seeing how much information we dug up after cross-referencing declassified material from the British National Archives (TNA), the archives of the Comintern in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and even the archives of the Yasnaya Polyana museum-estate (!), the SVR responded to a query from VGTRK and declassified documents that shed new light on the story.

The fragmentary and often quite muddled information in the West about Pastor Kruyt is now forming a complete story.

Sergey Brilev, Deputy Director for Special Information Projects, Rossiya TV, Candidate of Science (History); sbrilev@vgtrk.com

Initial Puzzles

INTEREST in the West in the fascinating figure of Kruyt appeared after the TNA in London declassified a large number of documents related to Operation Ice Pick, a joint British-Soviet operation in 1941-1944 to send covert agents from the USSR through Britain and across the English Channel.

For those who don't know, Operation Ice Pick was the result of a unique collaboration agreement that was very quickly (in all senses) reached in August 1941 by the Soviet NKVD and the British headquarters for organizing sabotage and subversion behind enemy lines,

Did such a pastor really exist? Yes! Only he was Dutch, not German. And he crossed the border in a plane, not on skis. And he was flying not from Germany to Switzerland, but from England to Belgium.

officially known as the Special Operations Executive (SOE). As part of this operation, political intelligence officers (NKVD), Red Army military intelligence officers (GRU) and agents were sent to Nazi-occupied Europe. In any event, my English friend and historian Bernard O'Connor and I discovered when cross-examining the personal files of these officers and agents in the TNA and the RGASPI that the vast majority of them were recruited from the Comintern.

As part of Operation Ice Pick, a mission codenamed "Burgundy" was launched on June 24, 1942, during which a certain "von Krumin," who had been sent from the USSR to England, parachuted from a British Royal Air Force Halifax airplane into the Belgian village of Huy, Liège. The English, at the time of his "transit" in the United Kingdom, procured identity documents for him in the name of Swiss neutral Jean Philippe Castaigne. This was the same Pastor Kruyt.

When this information was declassified in London, Western researchers were immediately struck by the fact that at 63, Kruyt was the oldest person to make a parachute jump not only during Operation Ice Pick but the entire war.

Another distinctive feature of this unique operation was that a few days earlier, as part of BARSAC, another mission in the operation, "von Krumin's" son Nico made a parachute landing in the Netherlands.

These two episodes of Operation Ice Pick had special resonance in the

West for another reason. Even though documents from Soviet intelligence relating to Operation Ice Pick were declassified only this year, some very important memoirs were published in the West in the 1970s. They were written by Leopold Trepper, known in the Red Orchestra Soviet intelligence network as the "big boss." He wrote: "William Kruyt, a member of the Dutch group, who parachuted at the age of 63, was captured immediately after landing. He swallowed a cyanide pill but survived. The Gestapo tortured him to find out the identity of the second parachutist who landed with him. But he kept silent, and then the Germans dragged him to the morgue and pulled back the sheet of the corpse of his companion. It was his own son, who had been killed as soon as he landed."[1]

In fact, as will be seen, the elder Kruyt was not captured immediately on landing, and his son lived until 1954 (a separate article about Nico should, and I hope will, be written). Why did Trepper say the younger Kruyt died and the older Kruyt was captured immediately?

In his recent book, British researcher Stephen Tyas recalls that, even though Trepper had a falling out with the official communist authorities of the Socialist camp countries after the war, he was still regarded in the West as all but a triple agent. In his book on the Red Orchestra, French historian Guillaume Bourgeois implies that Trepper deliberately sowed confusion by sending those who wanted to learn more about Nico Kruyt, who continued to live in the Netherlands even after the war, on a false trail.[2]

Be that as it may, Leopold Trepper always emphasized that he and his Red Orchestra intelligence network were not part of the NKVD or military intelligence. So, if Trepper wrote about the Kruyts, that means they were from the GRU.

A postwar British intelligence investigation into the fate of the elder Kruyt concluded that "based on earlier information, we thought the Germans completely erroneously associated [him] with the Red Orchestra,"[3] but soon London also speculated that he was the one who was supposed to "reinforce Yefremov's network in the Netherlands."[4] It may be recalled that Konstantin Yefremov was the man Trepper wrote about from the GRU. And Stephen Tyas, a scrupulous author, states as a fact that it was the GRU who sent the younger Kruyt to the European continent.

And now the incongruities. First, right after the elder Kruyt arrived in Britain from the USSR in 1942, the SOE considered him "too honest to

be a spy"![5] But perhaps he was only pretending to be a naïve simpleton (we will return to this point later).

Second, in a batch of declassified documents we and the VGTRK obtained in October 2018 from the SVR, a document on the deployment of Kruyt to Arkhangelsk (from where he traveled on to Britain by ship) was not on an official form. In other words, at first glance, this would seem to confirm the theory that the NKVD intelligence directorate merely handled Kruyt's logistics, and Kruyt himself was with the GRU. However, the SVR official information sheet states in black and white later on: "Kruyt, John William ("Electrician"), born in 1877, a Dutchman, a native of Amsterdam. Recruited by the NKVD in 1942 and sent via England to occupied Belgium."[6]

So, the elder Kruyt was not with GRU military intelligence; he was with NKVD political intelligence! Agent "Electrician"!

Granted, even SVR records state that "no information about this foreigner has been received since July 1942."

Again, let's break this down. First, Kruyt's trip to Belgium was no vacation. By calling him a recruited foreigner, the SVR clearly positions him as a covert agent; otherwise he would have been called an employee. This is an important clarification. Second, this prompts an even greater desire to learn more about his life both before and after his recruitment. And this was possible.

Pastors and Shepherds

STRICTLY SPEAKING, Pastor Kruyt was not the only minister to come on the radar of the Cheka-GPU-NKVD as a special agent, not a victim of repression.

Of course, the first thing that comes to mind is the unforgettable Pastor Schlag. Rostislav Plyatt, the actor who played the character, said in interview with *Literaturnaya gazeta* that he played an "honest German, one of those who are building today's Germany."[7] Perhaps. But no less interesting is the fact that "Seventeen Moments of Spring" director Tatyana Lioznova gave Plyatt's character traits of the clergy of several Christian denominations. For example, in the fourth part of the film series, he wore pants and a frock coat with a white collar. In other words, he was a protestant pastor. But in the same series, the cover of an investigation folder says: "The case file of Fritz Schlag, a Catholic priest." Perhaps this was not a mistake. Perhaps it was deliberate. But why?

Because Schlag had had other prototypes besides the Calvinist Pastor Kruyt.

One of them was an Orthodox Christian priest. Back in the 1920s, Bishop Vasily Ratmirov joined the GPU. During the war, he taught NKVD officers Ivanov and Mikheyev to impersonate priests who then worked under his "cover" in German-occupied Kalinin, although he is not very well remembered today in Tver. But immediately after the war, at Stalin's behest, he was awarded a gold watch and a medal.

But were there Christian ministers from the West helping the USSR? Yes. Both in the Comintern and in intelligence agencies. For example, Pavel Sudoplatov himself identifies Hungarian Catholic priest Theodor Maly as an covert agent working in England and France before the war.

At the same time, German Protestant minister Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who also had extensive church ties outside Germany, launched an entire church resistance campaign against the Nazis when they came to power. However, unlike Schlag, Pastor Bonhoeffer did not leave the Reich in the spring of 1945 but was charged with attempting to assassinate Hitler and hanged after spending time in prisons and concentration camps. He did not work at all for the Soviet Union.

In this sense, Pastor Kruyt, the subject of this article, holds a truly special niche. He was not a skier but a parachutist. And although once a pacifist, he became an active communist (but probably not a militant atheist).

Communist Pastor

JOHN WILLIAM KRUYT (the Comintern added the patronymic Germanovich to his name[8]) was born on September 8, 1877, in Amsterdam.[9] The fourth of five children, in 1901, he married the daughter of a Lutheran pastor. Her name was Catharina, and she became not only his wife but at times also his philosophical trailblazer. The year after they got married, Kruyt enrolled in a Christian gymnasium in Utrecht. In 1907, in Utrecht, he took a theology course and became a minister in the Dutch Reformed Church (Calvinist).

That same year, the League of Christian Socialists (LCS) was established in the Netherlands. The political and philosophical quest of these "progressives," as we would call them today, was peculiar. On the one hand, they sang Church hymns. On the other, they combined ideas like gender equality and the abolition of the monarchy, minimum wage and

the right to conscientious objection to military service, as well as independence for the Dutch East Indies. In other words, Kruyt and his fellow thinkers from the LCS were typical of an amusing type of European who in the early 20th century was apparently searching for social progress but nevertheless was apprehensive of totally breaking with the centuries-long conservative tradition of the church.

In 1913, Kruyt was sent to minister in the city in Gennep, in the province of Limburg. An important detail is that most of the parishioners there weren't Calvinists but Catholics. In other words, the Protestant church saw Kruyt as someone who could unite the flock and possibly be a missionary. Very much like what he would eventually become! In fact, ironically, maybe it was the church that turned Kruyt into a communist missionary?! But already in his church period, Kruyt had a broader agenda.

The "litmus test" was the stance he and his wife took to World War I, which broke out shortly thereafter. While the Netherlands remained pragmatically neutral, seeking to withdraw its finances, trade and colonies from the line of fire of the warring parties, the Kruyts spiced up their anti-war articles, so to speak, with transcendental concepts. Specifically, Pastor Kruyt became fascinated with the pacifism of Leo Tolstoy's "passive resistance," while his wife Catharina became taken up with none other than Rosa Luxemburg.

By the end of the war, the "Russian component" of Pastor Kruyt's activities became even more evident: He advocated for better conditions at the Harderwijk internment camp, where Dutch authorities interned Russians in order to suppress Bolshevik propaganda. It was at this time that Kruyt met Maxim Litvinov, who represented Bolshevik interests in Europe. In September 1920, Moscow appointed Kruyt its representative for prisoner affairs; it follows from MI-5 correspondence on file in the TNA.[10]

In 1918, World War I ended for Kruyt with him becoming a Dutch parliamentary deputy.

Pastor-Deputy

KRUYT'S ELECTION to the Dutch parliament is recorded in his personal file at the Comintern.[11] But more details of his time as a Dutch parliamentarian are contained in Western sources.

Let's start with the fact that these elections were the first in the

Netherlands to be based on universal suffrage for men and a proportional system. The parliamentary threshold was only 0.5%. This allowed for the creation of the so-called "Revolutionary Socialist faction" in the Dutch lower house of parliament. It included the only deputy from the LCS (Kruyt), a socialist parliamentarian and two deputies from the Social Democratic party. As for the latter, however, it is worth noting that a significant portion of its "clergy" held much more radical positions than just social-democratic ones. In particular, one of its two deputies, David Wijnkoop, would later become leader of the Dutch Communists. Kruyt immediately hit it off with him (incidentally, this probably had something to do with the fact that Wijnkoop, the son of a rabbi, could hold a conversation about convergence points between Marxism and the divine).

It is hard to say now whether this was a consequence of Kruyt's conversations with Wijnkoop or the general radicalization of contemporary political life in Europe, but the pastor began to rapidly drift to the left. He even began to push for his LCS to join the Comintern.

It seems Kryut's fellow party members still remained God-fearing people, and his "flock" opposed joining the Comintern. This is unsurprising: From Russia, where the communists had begun to put their theories into practice, reports were coming about persecutions of the church.

The topic of whether Dutch Christian Socialists would join the Communist International was one of the first items recorded in a case file opened on Kruyt by British intelligence.[12] Indeed, MI-5 had been keeping a close eye on Kruyt since the early 1920s. His personal case file was recently declassified.

For example, the file contains a report from Christiania (now Oslo), Norway, that Kruyt himself had sought to reach out to the Comintern, albeit in a personal capacity – namely, that he traveled "through Trondheim toward Murman" (i.e., subarctic Russia) to attend the Second Congress of the Communist International.[13]

Surprisingly, the Comintern's own records on Kruyt do not mention his arrival at the Second Congress in Petrograd (although, as we shall see, there is documentary evidence of his stay in Russia). But a document of the Executive Committee of the Communist International shows that Kruyt was invited to the 1921 Congress as a guest.[14]

Moreover, according to information from Dutch media, the pastor also attended the inaugural gathering of the World Communist Party in 1919. This version is accompanied by what seems to be a very specific and therefore even more convincing detail: "The Italian delegates

expressed amazement at the very notion of Christian socialism," "Karl Radek ridiculed the LCS as organization of bishops" and the only ones who understood Kruyt's political ideas were Soviet People's Commissar of Education Anatoly Lunacharsky, Jules Humbert-Droz and Pavel Biryukov. In the latter case, this was actually not a communist but a biographer of Leo Tolstoy. How did Kruyt wind up in the Comintern's orbit? We will talk about that separately a bit later. In the meantime, we note that, according to Dutch sources, Pastor Kruyt met at the Comintern Congress with the leader himself, Lenin.

On the one hand, everything lines up. After arriving in England in 1942 and communicating with SOE officers, Kruyt mentioned his acquaintance with Vladimir Lenin. On the other hand, it is known that when Kruyt started exploring the compatibility of the ideas of communism and Tolstoy at the Comintern Congress, either Lenin himself or Biryukov proposed that he visit Tolstoy's Yasnaya Polyana estate. Dutch publications note that he was received by the writer's daughter, Aleksandra Lvovna Tolstaya, who assured him that the Bolsheviks had not touched the estate. It turns out that after this conversation, the pastor became convinced that Tolstoy's work was alive, and he returned to the Netherlands a complete leftist. And here there is a discrepancy – and not just an ideological one.

Pilgrimage to Yasnaya Polyana

THIS IS ABOUT a gratifying urge that any person might feel to visit the estate where "War and Peace" and "Anna Karenina" were written. And get a coveted personal tour.

The foreign tourist was probably overly excited (and certainly ideological), and more interested in the political and philosophical heritage of the great Russian writer than his literary heritage. The organizer of the tour was either the head of the revolutionary government of the host country (Lenin) or the Tolstoy biographer (Biryukov). The host was the anxious guardian of the genius's heritage: his daughter.

What is the confusion?

The 1919 Version

WHY COULDN'T KRUYT have visited Yasnaya Polyana in 1919? Of course, at that time, there was just an estate, no museum. What is confus-

ing is that Dutch researchers have another detail pertaining to a possible trip that Kruyt took to Soviet Russia in 1919: The pastor-deputy made it even to Saratov on the Volga. This detail supposedly confirms the story. Supposedly.

The problem is that in the spring of 1919, Aleksandr Kolchak's army was attacking the Bolsheviks from across the Volga region. Saratov was where he was supposed to join up with Anton Denikin, who was advancing from the south. That year in Saratov, which lay at a crucial crossroads, clergy members were being repressed. It is highly unlikely that a foreign Christian socialist pastor who had yet to be convinced of the compatibility of communism and the ideas of Tolstoy would have been sent there then.

So, we will consider the option that Kruyt made his pilgrimage to Yasnaya Polyana after the Second Comintern Congress, in 1920. This is the year MI-5 caught wind of the pastor-deputy's stopover in Norway. Maybe that was the year Kruyt met Lenin and visited Tolstoy's estate?

The 1920 Version

BINGO! The Yasnaya Polyana visitors' log records a visit on July 11, 1920, of a group of delegates to the "Second Convention of the Communist International." We will forgive the custodians of Tolstoy's heritage for mixing up the words "convention" and "congress." But entry 1020 in their detailed records reads "J.W. Kruyt from Utrecht." All doubts are dispelled even further when you see the indication of his profession: "M.P.," meaning "Member of Parliament." In other words, a deputy. Which means our Kruyt!

What more would we need to settle the question of when exactly Kruyt visited Yasnaya Polyana? But...

There is something else confusing here. First, the Comintern Congress was held in August 1920 and the Comintern delegates visited Yasnaya Polyana in July. So, this clearly was not the visit inspired by Lenin. How, then, could Kruyt be at Leo Tolstoy's museum-estate before the Congress?

Second, it was the NKVD who brought Kruyt to London in 1942, of course. But in 1920, as far as we can tell, he still had no ties to Soviet intelligence. Meanwhile, neither Pastor Kruyt nor anyone else who was not a member of the intelligence services could visit Aleksandra Lvovna Tolstaya in that year.

That is because in the spring of 1920 (i.e., before Kruyt went to Yasnaya Polyana in July), Aleksandra Tolstaya was arrested by the Cheka. She was tried in the so-called "Tactical Center" case. At a meeting of the renowned Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal of the RSFSR, she said that she had merely prepared tea for gatherings of those disgruntled with Soviet power. Nevertheless, revolutionary integrity meant she was still slapped with a three-year sentence. Aleksandr Khiryakov wrote about this in his poem "A terrible conspiracy, or the triumph of Soviet power":

> Dampen your civil ardor
> In a country where a brave belle
> Is flung into a cramped cell
> For bustling about the parlor

Aleksandra Tolstaya served her sentence in a camp at the Novospassky monastery. Well, Kruyt obviously didn't visit her there! Kruyt probably would not have concluded that Communism is compatible with the ideas of Tolstoy had he visited a monastery that had been converted into a prison.

When could Kruyt have made a trip to Yasnaya Polyana after a Comintern Congress and met with Aleksandra Lvovna Tolstaya?

A 1921 Theory

I THINK Kruyt must have visited Yasnaya Polyana twice: in 1920 and in 1921. Why?

Because, again: The Third Comintern Congress took place in June-July 1921, and we know Kruyt attended it because the Executive Committee of the Communist International has documents confirming that. And on June 10, the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets approved the decision to establish a museum at the writer's estate. The first directors of the museum were the writer's son Sergey and daughter Aleksandra (in late 1920, she was released early from the clutches of the Cheka at the request of the peasants of Yasnaya Polyana). So, in 1921, Kruyt could not only have visited the place where Tolstoy wrote all his works but also physically met the writers' daughter.

Oddly enough, confirmation of Kruyt's 1921 visit to Aleksandra Lvovna Tolstaya comes from confusion in Western publications about who sent him to Yasnaya Polyana, Lenin or Biryukov. That is because in 1922, the last volume of Pavel Biryukov's biography of Count Tolstoy

was published. Meanwhile, the Tolstoy Biryukov depicted, of course, differed from the one Lenin depicted in his "Tolstoy as a Mirror of the Russian Revolution," which had already become canonical for Soviet Russia. Accordingly, Biryukov, having known Lenin even before all the revolutionary events, was simply obligated to try to be in the leader's circle in order to secure the publication of his book, which had become more and more questionable in terms of the acceptable canon. Here, in these circumstances, they (Biryukov and Lenin) could have both met Kruyt (whom one of them sent to Yasnaya Polyana to the now freed Aleksandra Lvovna).

Why Is This Important?

AT FIRST GLANCE, what difference does it make when Pastor Kruyt went to Yasnaya Polyana: in 1919, 1920 or 1921?! And yet the question is rather imperative.

The year 1919 was a time of "war communism" in Soviet Russia: Townspeople were forced into the labor army, and all "surplus" goods were "requisitioned" from peasants. And 1921 is remembered in Russian history not so much for the Third Comintern Congress as for the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, which declared NEP. The liberalization of economic life was accompanied by a largely symbolic easing ("political payoffs") for the Russian intelligentsia who for patriotic reasons did not leave the country but of course were already completely sick and tired of the Bolshevik experiments that defied common sense. One of those payoffs was opening a state museum at Tolstoy's estate, appointing his daughter (now freed from prison) as a director of the museum, and allowing a clergy member (albeit a socialist one from the Netherlands) to visit it.

If the pacifist Pastor Kruyt's visit to Yasnaya Polyana really did take place in 1921, did he realize that Lenin blessed this trip for reasons that had only very indirect relevance to Kruyt? Did the pastor, who was clearly out of touch with the domestic Russian political situation, realize that he was making a U-turn from Christian socialism to the militantly atheistic Bolsheviks? I'm afraid he did not.

Meanwhile, Kruyt was head over heels. It is known, for example, that when asked at a rally in the Netherlands after returning from Soviet Russia about the state of health care in the new Russia, he replied that "there are no sick people in communist society." At home in the

Netherlands, he was called among other things "Tolstoy's fig leaf on communist terror." But he clearly believed he had seen the right path.

Later, Kruyt, a former pacifist, would acknowledge that some violence is legitimate and appropriate – but for a good cause, of course.

Yasnaya Polyana After a Pause

WHEN THE KRUYTS moved to the USSR for permanent residence in 1935, in theory, he could have decided to pay another visit to Yasnaya Polyana. And why not? It was nice and quiet there. And it was just a stone's throw from Moscow.

But Kruyt would not have found the writer's daughter there: In 1929, Aleksandra Lvovna Tolstaya was forced to emigrate because her aesthetic views still differed greatly from that of the Bolsheviks.

Liaison and Member of the Underground: A Spy?

KRUYT senior's Comintern file shows that in 1921, he was "excommunicated from the church for revolutionary activities."[15] In the same year, Kruyt switched to the Communist Party and even ranked fourth on its list in the 1922 elections to the Dutch lower house of parliament. The Communists lost the elections. What became of Kruyt after leaving the church and losing his parliamentary seat?

The dossier the SOE opened on Kruyt states that he told the British officers who accompanied him about his personal acquaintance in the interwar period with not only Vladimir Lenin but also the Indian Jawaharlal Neru.[16] Meanwhile, it is known for certain that the leader of the Indian National Congress appeared in Moscow only in 1927, when he came to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Bolsheviks' coming to power. However, Kruyt was not in Moscow that year, and according to both British information and Soviet sources, the next time he traveled to the USSR was only in 1929.[17] That means he met with Nehru somewhere outside the Soviet Union. And this indirectly proves that he, a former MP, still kept abreast of European political life. And at various venues.

His interwar activities are recorded most fully in his personal archive at the Comintern. There we read:

"Kruyt, John Germanovich. Born September 8, 1877, in Amsterdam. Member of the Dutch Communist Party since 1921. Member of the German Communist Party since 1922. [That same year] he moved to

Berlin and until 1930 was a member of the Executive Committee of Workers' International Relief. In 1926, he worked in the Netherlands on behalf of international proletarian unity and in the bureau of the League Against Imperialism (Anti-Imperialist League); in 1928-1929, in Paris, he managed the publication of the French illustrated journal *Noe Regarde*."

The TNA dossier adds to this that, as of August 27, 1928, Kruyt also headed the Workers International Relief office in Berlin and was also a "technical adviser" to the Dutch organization "New Russia."

But British documents contain another interesting detail.

Not Naïve

IF YOU EXAMINE the conclusion of Kruyt's MI-5 dossier that states that his home addresses in the Netherlands and in France were used for Comintern correspondence,[18] then we see that he was very much a liaison. Of course, on the one hand, you could always assume that he was only a passive "mailbox," forwarding messages. But let's read on.

At the end of the Comintern personnel document, we read the following about his prewar activities outside the USSR: "1930-1935: worked in the USSR Trade Mission in Berlin; 1935: arrested by the Gestapo and temporarily released after a short imprisonment; October 1935: arrived in the S[oviet] U[nion] with the consent of the Party through the Trade Mission."[19] Would a mail carrier really be arrested? In theory, they would only watch him to see who came to him.

Why arrest him? Was he forced to leave Germany just because he was a communist or because he was a spy?

French researcher Guillaume Bourgeois emphasizes that Kruyt's work in the Berlin agencies of the Comintern and the Soviet Trade Mission coincides exactly with the time when Soviet intelligence recruited through these organizations such emblematic figures as Henry Robinson (who would become Trepper's collaborator in the Red Orchestra) and Sandor Rado (who would be in charge of Soviet intelligence in Switzerland).

And what about Kruyt?! Did he just passively watch this? Let me put it this way: He was no passive liaison. At least, you can certainly argue that he participated in clandestine work. From Comintern records: "During the underground period of the German Communist Party, he furnished foreign material for illegal publication that he himself had translated."[20]

Personal

HOW EASY it would be to judge a person based solely on work records and political views (even ones that change over the years)! But we all have a personal life that, of course, no less affects our biographies.

Kruyt senior had three spouses. The first, Catharina, can with certitude be called his wife and comrade-in-arms. We already wrote about that earlier – about how when his idol was still Tolstoy, she was already fond of Rosa Luxemburg. But in October 1922, Catharina died. She was only 46, and their children were 19, 17, 15, and 6. Relatives took the older children into their care and the younger, Nico, stayed with his father.

Kruyt soon married Nelly Dentz, a 33-year-old piano teacher and dancer from Utrecht. Two sons were born from this marriage: John William ("Wim") and Leopold Ferdinand ("Fred"). Jumping ahead: These children will not go with Kruyt to Moscow because in 1932, the pastor-communist and his second wife divorced.

His third wife, with whom he arrived in the USSR, was the German communist Gustel Schmidt. Incidentally, like his first wife, she was the daughter of a minister, but Kruyt's Comintern file states that his wife was a NKVD employee (although the personnel officers of the Executive Committee of the Communist International acknowledged that they "could not confirm the veracity of these decisions."[21]). She, too, was an enigmatic figure. Jumping ahead again: She died in 1941, according to British records,[22] but Dutch journalists claim she committed suicide by jumping into the Moscow River.

Paperwork Trickery

IN MOSCOW, the Kruyts were given all possible amenities and even deference: Kruyt senior was registered in the Usachevka quarter, which was specially built for the new Soviet mid-level elite in Khamovniki. Address: ul. Malye Kochki (now Dovatora), House 7, Building X, Apt. 393.

In 1942, SOE records show Kruyt senior said he worked in Moscow at the Lenin Library. This detail is frequently cited by Western authors who write about him.

Meanwhile, if you dig through his RGASPI file, you will find that in Moscow, he initially worked as a "political censor at Glavlit and Narkompros"[23] (a position only very indirectly related to library work)

and he filled out a "Form for Literary Translators" at another library: the library of the A.M. Gorky Institute of World Literature (IWL).

On the one hand, the fact that the IWL had a form filled out by him adds little to what was already known in the West. For example, he indicated that his native language was Dutch and that he could translate from French, English, German, and the Scandinavian languages."[24] His SOE files states that he is a polyglot who speaks "fluent English, French, German, Dutch, Flemish, Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish; however, like most people who speak many languages, he speaks with a strong accent in all of them, except Dutch."[25] Kruyt includes Dimitrov's May Day article among the works he translated (from Russian, it turns out). According to the same form, he translated Engels' "Anti-Dühring" into Dutch, and Ernst Fischer's book "The Mensheviks" from Dutch.

On the other hand, on this IWL form, Kruyt senior somehow very laconically answers questions that could reveal that he was more than just a linguist. That is, he seems to be telling the truth, but in a way that sheds only partial light on a lot of truly substantial information. For example, to the question of where he learned the relevant languages, Kruyt answered: "In the relevant countries and schools." But in which ones? This was not spelled out. Meanwhile, there is an interesting twist behind this phrase; one regarding his previous trips to the UK (one of the most "relevant" countries with a "relevant" school).

The catch is that the Dutch citizen Kruyt was only partially a guest in the British Isles. His first name, John (Jan), is Dutch. But his middle name is William. His mother, Maria Aida Perkins, was Scottish, and sent him to study for a year at a boarding school in Great Britain when he was a boy.

By "burying" this fact in the formally true but very general phrase "in relevant countries and schools," Kruyt senior freed himself from having to explain another twist: Where did he get the money to travel around Europe while yet a boy? The fact of the matter is that Kruyt's father was not a proletarian but a wealthy Dutch newspaper publisher.

In principle, it would seem that by filling out the IWL form so circumspectly, Kruyt senior assumed, based on the knowledge he had acquired in the USSR, that it would be better not to take risks with some nonstandard information like his nonproletarian origin and not very common education. But all this was known about him by those who needed to know it – i.e., the special human resources managers who handled personal files not in innocent libraries but in institutions that used labels like "secret" and "top secret" (these labels were stamped, for example, on

folders of the Executive Committee of the Communist International). The question is, did these special human resources managers advise Kruyt to fill out the IWL forms as concisely as possible, since library bosses simply didn't need extra knowledge about someone who had sat too long as a linguist and was actually on reserve? As we know, the reserve, the Comintern pool, was where Soviet intelligence agents were selected.

Adaptation

NO MATTER how radical the views Kruyt embraced on his occasional trips to Soviet Russia, the system he encountered on a daily basis after moving to the Soviet Union for permanent residence undoubtedly changed some of his habits.

The first example is from the same IWL form. Another peculiar aspect of the way he filled it out is that he answered at least one question that was not on the form – namely, he unexpectedly identifies himself on the form as an owner of a typewriter: "I have a typewriter and can record my translations."[26] Why did he write that?

As older Russian readers will recall, until almost the very final days of Soviet power, people who owned typewriters (especially undocumented ones) were suspected of using those typewriters to copy anti-Soviet materials: from leaflets to banned literature. And for good reason. A lot of samizdat was produced on such typewriters! Sometimes it was better to launch a "preemptive strike" and self-report owning a typewriter. Otherwise, you could be turned in for owning this potentially anti-Soviet mechanism. The phrase about the typewriter on Kruyt's form shows that he, of course, learned to navigate the "kingdom of crooked mirrors" of Soviet socialism.

The second interesting detail is in the file of Comintern HR managers.

"The personal file has some statements indicating that he at one time showed an excessive interest in ties between Trotskyists and families of those repressed by the NKVD, trying to get information from them.

"According to KULTS Georg, Comrade KRUYT approached the wife of the arrested UNGER German and asked her a number of questions about their family life. Unger's wife said that she had supposedly been recently visited by Kruyt's wife with a proposal to invite various people to her place, and she promised to reimburse her all the associated costs because she works for the NKVD. We could not verify the veracity of these decisions.

"According to Comrade REICH, KRUYT also called on MEYER, Gertrud, whose husband had committed suicide in Sverdlovsk.

"In 1937, a delegation from the Netherlands came to the USSR to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the October Revolution, and with it came the secretary general of the Society of Friends of the USSR, FAN LOEN. KRUYT asked LOEN about ties between Trotskyists in the Netherlands and the USSR, and whether he would report this to the appropriate authorities of the USSR. His apartment was where his acquaintance HOFFMANN, Rudolf was arrested on August 10-11, 1937.

"The reasons for this behavior are not clear to us; he himself said that he felt it was his duty as a communist to be interested in this."[27]

Today, some people in the Netherlands think Kruyt's interest in the families of repressed individuals was, so to speak, not quite out of a sense of his "duty as a communist." What do they mean?

First, a Dutch radio program about Kruyt said that after Dutch Communist Wim de Wit was arrested by the NKVD in Moscow, Kruyt allegedly went to his wife, Augusta, in an attempt to get their apartment for his own family. Second, it was reported in the Dutch press that Kruyt senior informed the NKVD about the "strange behavior" of a certain German communist – i.e., he himself was "informing on people," bringing people under repression.

Unfortunately, knowing the mores of the Stalin era, this is totally conceivable. On the other hand, we should take information from the Netherlands that Kruyt was informing on people in the Soviet Union with a grain of salt. As practice shows, in the case of Comintern people, such episodes are often recorded not only in the documents of the NKVD but also the Executive Committee of the Communist International. However, in Kruyt senior's RGASPI file, no such episodes are recorded. Maybe he was one of the lucky ones who got left alone? But with the outbreak of the war, people like him, of course, were again very much in need.

A Strange Surname

WHAT is behind the strange surname Kruyt senior used when he arrived in Great Britain from the USSR? What sort of name is "von Krumin"?

Donal O'Sullivan, the most prominent researcher in the West of the history of cooperation between the British and Soviet intelligence services, believes that this alias could have been given to Kruyt by the person who recruited him as a spy, Aleksandr Korotkov, who did this to com-

memorate his NKVD colleague V.P. Krumin, who was killed as an "enemy of the people" in 1938.

This theory also seems odd.

Several people with the last name Krumin served in the prewar NKVD but only one had the initials V.P. But we know that he, State Security Lt. Vladimir (Voldemar) Petrovich Krumin, despite being arrested in 1938 and convicted in 1940, was nevertheless released, and by the end of the war, had become a captain in the quartermaster service and head of the captured military hardware division of the 51st Infantry Corps of the 40th Army. How could Kruyt be named in memory of him when this person was still alive?

At the same time, as we said, there were several other people in the NKVD with that same last name but with different initials: Yan Yanovich Krumin (1897-1938, was in fact shot and buried at the notorious Butovo firing range), KGB second Lt. Karl Petrovich Radetsky-Krumin (1893-?, was arrested in 1938, sentenced in 1941 to eight years in a labor camp and rehabilitated in 1956), and honorary worker of the Cheka-OGPU Fritz Martinovich Krumin (1892-1931, who died fighting with a rebel detachment in Irkutsk).

However, not only were all these Krumins repressed, they were also Latvians. The translation of this last name, incidentally, means "bush." But! The NKVD decided to send Kruyt back to Britain with the last name of not just "Krumin," but with the Germanized "von Krumin." But these last names do not exist in Latvia! Drawing an analogy with the Russian and English languages, this would be a last name like "von Sidorov" or "von Smith."

One unwittingly gets the impression that by consciously giving Kruyt a paradoxical last name, the NKVD decided to see whether British intelligence would recognize him as someone who had been banned entry to the UK back in 1925. Did they?

"The First We've Heard of This!"

THEY DID! But when? Only after the war, when London finally compared the file on "von Krumin" that the SOE prepared in 1942 and the one on Willy Kruyt that MI-5 had been keeping since the 1920s. Of course, today, when everything is computerized, such an oversight is absolutely unthinkable; all it takes is just a couple of clicks to compare facts, much less pictures. But a 1947 internal letter from an MI-6 agent (signature

illegible) addressed to Miss F.M. Small contains an exclamation mark, rarely used in official correspondence: "This is the first we've heard of this!"[28] – that Kruyt was a pastor and a parliamentary deputy.

The SOE guessed that he was not just a "charming" but also a "clearly well-known person."[29] For example, he is described as: "A man of very considerable intellectual powers, who must have spent most of his life wandering about Europe, lecturing at various universities. By nature a savant, he is probably a well-known man (he was a personal friend of Lenin, and also knows Nehru well), and this is rather borne out by his genuine anxiety about being recognized either in England or Holland. He spent a year at an English school as a child, and has kept up his knowledge of the language by mixing with English people ever since; his knowledge of English literature is phenomenal."[30]

When seeking answers to questions about the past life of "von Krumin," the SOE got hold of his... diary!

Kruyt's Diary

HIS DIARY contains many details that people in my profession would call "cinematic" – in the sense that they would be useful when writing a movie or TV series.

For example, a description of the journey that Kruyt and his son took from the Soviet Arctic to Britain includes their "warm welcome" aboard the British ship *Bulldog* (incidentally, the same ship that had earlier transported the German Enigma cryptographic machine). It describes how from this ship the father and son saw icebergs and watched the cruiser Edinburgh fight the Germans.

It also describes their time in England, where, in addition to a tour (and prayers!) at St. Paul's Cathedral, the father and son went to the cinema, ate in Hungarian, Turkish, Czech, and Italian restaurants, and toured Madame Tussauds Wax Museum in London, as well as the Manchester Art Gallery (which they visited while taking parachute jumping courses; incidentally, the British instructors noted the "grandpa's" courage).[31]

However, there is nothing in the diary about Soviet intelligence assignments (except for the address where the father had to report in Brussels). It does not even contain the real names of the father and son. In other words, over the years, this "simpleton" and "twit" became a very secretive and circumspect liaison and underground agent.

On the night of June 23-24, 1942, the pilot remarked that Kruyt senior

was "a little nervous at one stage but jumped immediately on green light."[32] He didn't know that the SOE had mistakenly given him luggage that had been prepared for his son.

And he certainly he did not give himself away in Belgium.

The Landing: Bitter "Burgundy"

IN MAY 1942, the NKVD prepared passwords for "Electrician." In this document, he was given an interesting name: "Our man who needs help."[33] The password for Kruyt was: "We have seen nothing in Ghent."[34]

Based on what we read in the SVR archives, "Electrician" was given a Comintern two-way radio in Brussels that was stored at a safe house.

TNA records tell us what happened next. After the war, Belgian intelligence began an investigation of the case, handing the material it collected over to London.

After getting dropped outside the village of Huy, near Liège, in the Belgium capital, Kruyt senior went to the district of Ganshoren. There, in house No. 56 on Charles-Quint avenue, lived the 63-year-old widow Marie Pierre, designated in NKVD instructions as "mother."[35] Kruyt went to stay with her, whose photo he had been shown back in Moscow. Her son Gaston had been a member of the local communist party, fought in Spain and was killed during hostilities in Belgium in 1940. Could there be a more reliable safehouse? But... The woman, already getting on in years and having lost a husband and a son, fell in love with a waiter from Antwerp 10 years her junior. His name was Charles Bocar. He so openly sympathized with the Germans that he even wore a Nazi symbol. In a postwar Belgian police report, based on the interrogation of arrested Gestapo agents, he was directly called an "informer."[36]

Based on the testimony of Sezarin Boucher, a neighbor of Marie Pierre and Charles Bocar, when the Germans came at night to the apartment where Kruyt was hiding, the Germans did not have to break in. According to Boucher, she clearly heard what Ms. Pierre told the Germans: "Come in, gentlemen." Boucher also added: "Then I saw the Germans drag a man by the feet. It was the man who lived in the apartment of Ms. Pierre.... Two Germans put the man in a car that was parked in front of the house."[37] Then Boucher told how she bumped into Marie Pierre after that: "I met her on the landing. I asked her: 'Why was that man killed?' She responded with an ironic smile: 'If he had not meddled in politics, nothing would have happened to him.'"[38]

Marie Pierre and Charles Bocar denied everything when questioned by the Belgian Justice Ministry's counter-intelligence service in 1946. But the fog lifted when in early 1947, the Belgians questioned Georg Eppstein, a German who admitted his involvement in the arrest of "parachutist Kruyt" during the occupation of Belgium. From his testimony, it follows that Kruyt fell victim to what French researcher Bourgeois, in our view, very accurately described as "classic indecency."

The Germans came for Kruyt at dawn: 4:30 a.m. on June 30, 1942. From Belgian records: "The key to the room was in the door from the outside. The lock and hinges were already thoroughly lubricated by the informer to allow the Germans to enter the room noiselessly. The parachutist was arrested in his bed."[39] As mentioned in the interrogation records, "he was tall (185 cm or 190 cm), approximately sixty years old, strong, without a beard and bald. His clothes and even his teeth were carefully examined for poison, which was on his person, but to no avail."[40]

Kruyt then asked to use the toilet. And there he took the poison that he had hid somewhere. Wasting no time, the Germans dragged the parachutist to a car and took him to Brugmann hospital, where they flushed his stomach. He was transported in an ambulance to a Luftwaffe hospital and then transferred to Breendonk fortress, where other members of the Red Orchestra were being held.

As far is known, just like Pastor Schlag in the movie, Kruyt told the Germans nothing – no matter what stooge they planted in prison with him or how they interrogated him. More precisely, he told them anything about his past life but no secrets about the assignment that took him to Belgium.

The Germans killed him in July 1943 in Moabit prison in Berlin.

_____

NOTES

[1] Trepper L. *The Big Game* // http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/trepper_lz01/index.html

[2] Bourgeois, Guillaume. *La véritable histoire de l'Orchestre rouge.* Paris: Nouveau monde éditions, 2015, p. 170.

[3] TNA KV 2/991: [Major] J.M. Gwyer to Lt-Col Brooke-Booth, Intelligence Bureau Detachment (Belgium). Copied from SF.422/GEN/3, ROTE KAPELLE. 272a.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] SVR response to VGTRK.

[7] "Rostislav Plyatt: Pastor Schlag goes skiing for the first time," *Literaturnaya gazeta.* 12.12.1973.

[8] RGASPI. F. 495. Op. 244. D. 191.

[9] Ibid. L. 2, 4, 24; TNA KV 2/991; SVR response to VGTRK.

10 TNA KV 2/991: Extracted from P.P. 474. MINISTER. Carl. Vol. 1. No. 44.
11 RGASPI. F. 495. Op. 244. D. 191. L. 4-5.
12 TNA KV 2/991: Extracted from P.P. 474 Vol. 1 MINISTER. Carl. No. 45.
13 TNA KV 2/991: Extract from S.F. 300/4/Russian Conferences. Vol. 1. No. 4.
14 RGASPI. F. 495. Op. 244. D. 191. L. 4-5.
15 Ibid.
16 TNA KV 2/991.
17 TNA KV 2/991: SZ-2000 referring to SZ-1918 B. 768. K; RGASPI. F. 495. Op. 244. D. 191. L. 4-5.
18 TNA KV 2/991.
19 RGASPI. F. 495. Op. 244. D. 191. L. 4-5.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 TNA KV 2/991: Extract from File No. PF. 38375.
23 RGASPI. F. 495. Op. 244. D. 191. L. 4.
24 Ibid. L. 2-3.
25 TNA KV 2/991.
26 RGASPI. F. 495. Op. 244. D. 191. L. 2-3.
27 Ibid., L. 4-5.
28 TNA KV 2/991: CX/ R. 5 G.2 1321 dated 28th January 1947.
29 TNA KV 2/991.
30 TNA KV 2/991: Von Krumin from PF 38375.
31 TNA KV 2/991.
32 Ibid.
33 SVR response to VGTRK.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 TNA KV 2/991.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.

Free Journalism:
Challenges of Our Time

M. Kurakin

IN DECEMBER 2018, an international forum, "Freedom of Journalism in the Context of Human Rights, New Technologies and International Information Security," took place in Pezinok, a suburb of Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia. It was attended by more than 70 experts and members of the media from 12 countries. The forum was organized by Moscow State University, the *International Affairs* journal, the Russian Union of Journalists, and several foreign media outlets. Russian Ambassador to Slovakia Alexey Fedotov said in his welcoming remarks that Bratislava is perhaps the best venue for such international conferences, considering the high level of mutual understanding that exists between Russia and Slovakia, as well as common Slavic historical traditions.

"I am convinced that preserving media freedom and independence is a necessary prerequisite for the successful democratic development of civil society in any sovereign state. This is an essential condition for the normal peaceful functioning of the system of international relations and a secure world order. This is precisely why any attempts to obstruct media activities for political reasons are unacceptable. However, as we can see, professional journalists are being put on sanctions lists, denied entry, deported, and subjected to physical and psychological violence.

"Unfortunately, there are numerous examples of this kind. A case in point is the detention of Kirill Vyshinsky, a journalist who was arrested by the Ukrainian authorities simply for honestly performing his journalistic duty. In France, it came to the point where Russian journalists were barred from a meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his French counterpart. Many Western countries, which call themselves models of media freedom, are using special bureaucratic obstacles to impede the work of uncooperative journalists. It is important to understand that this unacceptable practice with regard to Russian journalists is becoming commonplace and can affect any journalist, not only a Russian

─────────────────────
Mikhail Kurakin, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of *International Affairs*; mkurakin@mail.ru

one. This is what is happening in Ukraine, EU countries and the United States," Alexey Fedotov said.

Representatives of various international organizations showed great interest in the conference, which was due to their concern about the situation with the dissemination of information, threats related to the surge in the use of so-called fake news and risks to

Bratislava is the best venue for such international conferences, considering the high level of mutual understanding that exists between Russia and Slovakia, as well as common Slavic historical traditions.

reporters' lives, as well as many other problems accompanying professional journalistic activities. This was the focus of remarks by Marius Lukošiūnas, a program specialist at UNESCO Headquarters in the Division of Freedom of Expression and Media Development, who presented key points of a special UNESCO report on the issue.

"The report is based on four main reference points: We have analyzed the state of freedom, independence, security, and pluralism, using them to identify global trends. Media freedom: On the negative side, the transmission of information is being limited, but on the positive side, access to information is improving. That is, with regard to restrictions, the number of Internet resource closures is growing, but at the same time, UNESCO member countries support the concept of Internet universality. In other words, the picture is a mixed one. Pluralism: On the one hand, there is broad access and it is expanding, but on the other, choice within this broad access is being limited. Here too, the picture is mixed. Media independence: There is a tendency toward greater vulnerability – that is, increasing dependence on state and corporate subsidies, and media credibility is declining in several regions. On the other hand, the sector is showing growing resistance to encroachments on its independence," Lukošiūnas said.

According to the report, in 2016-2017, 182 journalists were killed around the world, which is a little less than in the previous two-year period (203). Law enforcement agencies are stepping up their activities in investigating the deaths of members of the media. However, in Lukošiūnas's expression, this trend reflects only the "average hospital patient temperature": Security and law enforcement agencies in various parts of the world respond differently to attacks on journalists.

"As for Central and Eastern Europe, we are witnessing a trend toward deterioration: a general decline in respect for media freedom, intensifying pressure on journalists, including attacks with the use of digital technology, such as online harassment, insults, fabrication of criminal cases, and so on," Lukošiūnas said.

Martin Nesirky, acting director of the United Nations Information Service in Vienna, recalled that in 2018, 80 reporters were killed around the world. Most of these crimes go unsolved (89% between 2006 and 2016).

Responding to a question from an *International Affairs* correspondent regarding the problem of objective news coverage on social networks, where a large amount of fake news circulates, the UN representative said that disinformation has become a serious problem recently. "You have rightly observed that social networks have become an integral part of life for many people. We understand that there are both positive and negative aspects of their use. UNESCO is paying special attention to this. For its part, the UN is working to involve young people communicating on the Internet in its activities, telling them in detail about current problems, such as respect for human rights, climate change, and so on. We believe that the knowledge and experience thus acquired will help the younger generation analyze data and identify disinformation," Nesirky stressed.

In his remarks, Andrei Richter, senior adviser at the OSCE Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, recalled that the problem of media disinformation has been around for much more than one decade, and all this time international agencies have been trying to tackle it. "The first such organization was the League of Nations, which in 1927 held a meeting of journalism and media experts to understand the impact of the spread of false news that affects relations between nations, provokes distrust between them and hurts international peace," he said.

The first document specifically devoted to the issue of false news was a convention adopted by the League of Nations in 1936, which is officially still in force. It is on the list of existing UN treaties. The Russian Federation is a party to this convention, as are some other countries, such as Lithuania and Estonia. It is the International Convention concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace whereby states undertook to prohibit and to stop within their respective territories any transmission likely to harm good international understanding by statements the incorrectness of which is or ought to be known to the persons responsible for the broadcast. In practice, the convention urged governments to issue

guidelines for state broadcasting services to ensure the verification of information concerning international relations, as well as issue similar recommendations for nonstate broadcasters, Richter recalled.

According to him, following the creation of the UN, false news was one of the first key issues in discussing documents related to human rights. Limiting the dissemination of false information was viewed as an important factor in maintaining peace throughout the world. In 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted a special resolution urging states to make proposals on ways of countering false information. The majority of democratic countries stated that false news could be countered with official denial, via press conferences, where authorities would ensure citizens access to various sources of truthful information and news.

"The adoption of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the basic document on freedom of expression in the world, was preceded by years of discussions in various committees. As a result of those discussions, it was proposed that freedom of expression be limited in the event of the deliberate and systematic spread of false or distorted news that undermined friendly relations between peoples and states. Western countries, above all the United States, were categorically against any such limitations. They said that would mean the imposition of unacceptable censorship, that punishment for those spreading false information would not solve the problem, and judicial verdicts imposing such bans would not achieve the set goal. The UN Commission on Human Rights finally rejected any such limitations. Attempts to introduce restrictions were also made during the discussion of other documents, including the European Convention on Human Rights," the OSCE representative recalled.

He also dwelled on some legal documents that enable states to refute false or incorrect information disseminated by other countries, as well as the relevant legal practices and procedures. In particular, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has confirmed citizens' right to the truth – not just to information.

Speaking about the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Richter also mentioned what he referred to as interesting rulings, for instance, in the Bader v. Austria case, which was examined in 1996. Erwin Bader, an Austrian professor, complained that the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) had violated his right to receive objective information in the context of the referendum on Austria's accession to the European Union.

The applicant complained that in covering the referendum, the ORF disseminated incomplete and biased information for unduly influencing the voters in favor of a positive vote at the referendum, thus violating the National Broadcasting Act and norms of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court agreed that the ORF's coverage was biased. Nevertheless, the applicant's rights were not violated, since his intention to vote No in the referendum remained unchanged despite the biased information disseminated by the broadcaster. Furthermore, that information did not prevent the applicant from the effective exercise of his rights. The court declared the application inadmissible.

In closing, the OSCE representative commented that the international court and other agencies believe that the right to receive information also means the right to receive false information, the right to disinformation, and that such decisions have been made, in particular by supreme courts in the U.S. and Slovakia.

Stefan Garabin, justice of the Supreme Court of Slovakia, said that with modern information technology and social networks, countries are losing the ability to control and influence public opinion and people's behavior to achieve their own goals.

"So, several power groups decided to take control of all media in the world and impose their opinion on everyone else – take, for example, the propaganda of war and the 'humanitarian' bombing of Yugoslavia. However, there was no UN Security Council resolution! That is a clear violation of international law, an act of aggression. Nevertheless, the media spread information about the need for democratization of Yugoslavia. That was also the case with Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria. U.S., British and French forces bombed Syria without the approval of the UN Security Council, while the media supported those strikes, substantiating their position in particular by the alleged presence of chemical weapons in Syria. As a member of the Supreme Court, however, I cannot accept these charges without conclusive proof. As for the 'responsibility' of a specific party, such decisions are based now solely on media reports," he said.

According to Garabin, Brussels politicians are limiting the state sovereignty of EU countries. "We do not want to take in migrants who are being imposed on us; we do not want our cultural and moral values to be dissolved. I announced my decision to run for the presidency. As soon as I did, forces that do not want to have the rule of law in the country launched an attack against me. In addition to constant personal attacks

against me, the so-called mainstream media became a platform for politicians seeking to influence the Supreme Court. I was targeted by the press. Take, for instance, my video where I first criticized the migration policy. This video was blocked on Facebook the following day without any reason. They did not even try to substantiate their decision. And these are people who position themselves as human rights advocates and defenders of freedom of expression. This is not simply exclusion and censorship, but interference in future elections; the state is opposing a potentially successful candidate.

"This case shows how deplorable the situation is. I am not complaining. I am just stating facts. What if I, as a judge, were to accuse someone without providing any cause or evidence? That is nonsense! Some topics are absolutely off limits to us. Instead of discussing them freely, people can only say what is allowed. Actually, what we have here is diktat – what to say and how," Slovak politician said in conclusion.

Responding to a question from an *International Affairs* reporter, Stefan Garabin said that if he wins the election, the first thing he will do is to ensure that all rule-of-law state institutions function properly: "After all, both national and international law contains provisions regarding respect for freedom of expression. Unfortunately, these provisions are often ignored. We are witnessing journalists' apartments being searched by police following the publication of certain articles. This is wrong. It is necessary that everyone, from the prime minister and the president to law enforcement officers, do their work in keeping the existing law and regulations. I would like to stress that criminal legislation must not be used for political purposes."

Revise Values or Protect Them?
Sorrowful Reflections
on a Book by My Contemporary

Yu. Krasnov

IN THE COURSE of human history, democracy, a child of European Christian civilization, a form of individual involvement in political life of a state was changing – it lost some features and acquired new ones. Born in small Greek mono-cultural and mono-national republics, democracy today is functioning in fundamentally different contexts. The total population of the planet has practically reached the figure of 8 billion, and the latest means of communication, financial and banking system and international division of labor have made it more integrated than at any period in the past.

Several mighty powers armed with atomic weapons and airspace delivery systems have spread their interests far and wide to become the de facto close neighbors of any state irrespective of its geographic location. There is another and no less important factor: the world is divided along the religious-cultural rather than national-racial lines; the development has become even more uneven than before: some states have remained at the early stages of human civilization while others have entered the 21st century.

This multidimensional and contradictory conglomerate of states has embraced democracy as the form of their political organization. The majority (there are over 200 states on our planet) speaks of themselves as democratic. Despite its considerable shortcomings, democracy has no alternatives in the contemporary world. What is behind its attractiveness?

In an effort to arrive at plausible answers, political scientists and soci-

Yury Krasnov, Professor, Department of Legal Foundations of Administration, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations (MGIMO (U), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Science (Law), Doctor of Science (History); y.krasnov@yandex.ru

ologies have already produced piles of scholarly books and thousands of essays. The discussion has been going on for many years now.

The work by Professor Robert Yengibaryan, prominent Russian jurist, Doctor of Law, Honored Worker of Science, Scientific Counselor of the Department of Legal Foundations of Governance and Policies, MGIMO (U), has made an important contribution to this discussion.

His encyclopedic and varied knowledge of cultures, mythology, religious texts, and philosophy made his contribution highly valuable. He has revised the fundamentals of political science, ethics and culturology, while remaining loyal to his subject and his type of reflection.

He has opened his book "The Time to Revise Values"* with a discussion of the most interesting and extremely topical issue of the role of the individual in the historical process and the factors that shape it. This chapter discusses civilization as the cornerstone of existential values and national identifications. This is the starting point of his discussion of all other aspects of the development of Russia and the contemporary world: the ups and downs of Russia in the 20th century, the fates of political forces and trends, and the future of international relations.

One of the key chapters analyzes the crisis of liberal ideology that has undermined the pillars of European democracy, life style and civilizational identity of the majority of the West European countries. The author has analyzed the internal and external problems of the Russian Federation related to the process of building up a civil society governed by law, the federal form of the state and the deepening confrontation with NATO.

The author has written that European democracy and tolerance – more fragmented and shapeless than all other similar political cultures – are facing a severest test. The liberals are taken aback: they have discovered that under the contemporary conditions, democracy, a miraculous and universal cure for all political disorders, is useless. The European governments that tried to tune up a dialogue of peoples and cultures failed: the differences were too vast. The migrant minority recurs to violence to impose its values, lifestyle and morals on the autochthonous population of Europe.

Having assessed the situation, the author insists, passionately and with a great deal of conviction, that a dialogue of different cultures requires from the sides at least the minimal tolerance of the opinions of others. Today, there are too many subjects that resolutely reject a dialogue

---

* Yengibaryan R.V. *Vremya pereotsenki tsennostey.* Moscow: Norma, 2018. 224 pp.

and, by the same token, the basic values of Christian culture and democracy such as the secular state, freedom of conscience, gender equality, equality of followers of different religions, rejection of violence, etc. Today, we have reached the stage predicted by the most far-sighted representatives of humanitarian thought: democracy in its liberal garbs is not a universal instrument of dealing, successfully and fast with numerous and very painful problems of all peoples on our planet. The future of democracy is threatened.

Very much like in his previous works, Prof. Yengibaryan has offered a very careful analysis of the role of the Islamic factor in the development of Russia and the rest of the world. The author insists that the opposition between Christian and Islamic civilizations along the perimeter of their cultural confrontation stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific is a permanent factor of human history. This is confirmed by the repeated waves of Muslim expansion in this region.

The first wave of Islamic expansion moved across North Africa and South Europe. It reached France where it was stopped by Charles Martel in 732 in the Battle of Poitiers. Arabs retreated to North Africa where they live today and the Iberian Peninsula, from which they were driven out late in the 16th century by Charles the Great, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile.

Ottoman Turks were the driving force of the second Islamic invasion: they defeated Byzantium that was left alone to face the invaders, captured Constantinople and later the Balkans (Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania) and were stopped at Vienna in 1683. The Janissaries entrenched themselves in the main Christian city and in vast territories in the south of Europe. In the early 20th century, Turkey survived World War I and retained Constantinople because Russia left the Entente in 1917 and because the Bolshevik revolution triumphed in the Russian Empire. By a miracle, Turkey survived World War II when Soviet troops were ready to reclaim the vast territories of Georgia and Armenia (parts of the Russian Empire) that the Turks had captured while the Bolsheviks naively expected a proletarian revolution in the Ottoman Empire.

The third Islamic wave was brought to the continent not by the force of arms: it is a huge flow of hungry people (mainly women, children and adolescents) that reached dramatic dimension when the U.S. and allies stirred up "color revolutions" in the Arab world. The process is going on.

The chapter about the Russian dimension of the Islamic challenge, demography and migration as the main methods of Islamization of

Europe and Russia has been obviously written with a lot of pain and concern. The author looks at the demographic outbursts in Islamic countries and massive uncontrolled migration of Muslims to Europe and Russia organized by Turkey and Saudi Arabia as a serious threat to Christian civilization.

Another equally important chapter offers a profound analysis of the new features of America's policies. The author has pointed out that President Trump's foreign policy turned out to be much more widescale where its possible repercussions are concerned and much more chaotic than his domestic policies. The chapter dealing with the confrontation between the liberal Congress and the 45th president of the United States, whom Prof. Yengibaryan has assessed as a traditionalist, is especially interesting.

Highly polemical on many points, the book is a result of many years of studies of the problems discussed; it is a profound and well-substantiated work. Its expressive style perfectly matches the dynamics of historical, culturological and ideological dimensions of the contemporary world.

In his new book, Prof. Yengibaryan develops and specifies his previous course at defending consistently, passionately and argumentatively the traditional values of our civilization and strives to persuade his readers that abandonment of these values will push Christian civilization into a crisis which will become the beginning of its end.

Parts of the reviewed monograph have already appeared in Russian and English in Russia and abroad and stirred up a wide response. The work undoubtedly will ignite a lot of interest and scholarly discussions in the academic community and will inspire even more profound studies of the relevant problems.

From the Ten Commandments
to the Modern Definition of "Human Rights"

M. Kozhemyak

THE YEAR 2018 saw the publication of the book "Human Rights in Judaism and the Jewish Legal Tradition."* It includes a translation of an article with the same title previously published in 10 foreign languages (Hebrew, Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, English, French, Spanish, German, Italian, and Portuguese). Its authors, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Doctor of Science (Law) Valery Vorobiev and President of the Synergetics Foundation for the Study of Civil Society and Human Capital Roman Iliyev, have dealt with this topic before.[1]

The work examines the notion of "human rights" in its current form and its development trends. It should be noted that the authors of the article not only compare modern-day view of human rights and freedoms with the understanding of those terms in the Hebrew scriptures, but also devote attention to the views of Western scholars in the 17th-18th centuries who contributed greatly to developing this concept, as well as contemporary documents dealing with this topic.

In examining the development trends of the concept of "human rights," the authors clearly show that, even though the modern understanding of the concept was conclusively articulated in documents such as the 1776 American Declaration of Independence and the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the first mention of "rights and freedoms" can also be found in the Jewish religious tradition.

It is worth noting that Vorobiev and Iliyev's new collaborative work has sparked keen interest not only in Russia but abroad. This study has attracted the attention of state and public figures, as well as academics and researchers in various countries. The publication of the book was

* Valery Vorobiev and Roman Iliyev. *Prava cheloveka v iudaizme i yevreiskoi pravovoi traditsii.* Moscow: Natsionalnoye obozreniye, 2018. 248 pp.
Maria Kozhemyak, independent analyst

welcomed in particular by Morocco's King Mohammed VI and UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay.

The main assertion of Vorobiev and Iliyev's article is that human rights and freedoms in their modern conception could not exist without a long evolutionary period: from the Ten Commandments to documents more familiar to modern society like the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and the Declaration of Independence.

Judaism is the oldest religion on Earth: It emerged in the 12th-13th centuries BC, when the Jews were given the Law of God after being freed from Egyptian bondage. The other two monotheistic religions emerged much later: Christianity arose 2019 years ago and Islam 1440 years ago. All three religions are Abrahamic, with the prevailing understanding that Abraham was himself a Jew. Accordingly, many of the concepts, principles and rules of human interaction are in one form or another present in all three major religions, which have one common root.

The authors approach interpretation of the term "human rights" with caution, asserting that "the very concept was formulated within the framework of Jewish religious tradition, and Judaism is one of the richest and most intelligible primary sources on the issue, but it is nevertheless not the only source. However, the modern definition of 'human rights' to a large extent is based on the principles identified in this religion."

In the first part of the work, Vorobiev and Iliyev draw a parallel between Exodus 20 and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The authors reveal that both texts virtually overlap, suggesting that the foundations of Jewish legal tradition originate from sacred Jewish writings. The authors cite examples from other sacred Jewish texts where such familiar modern concepts as the right to life, self-defense and rest and leisure are fundamental provisions. The mention of these rights in sacred ancient works tells us that, even though the term "human rights" was not used per se, the understanding of the need for their existence appeared long before the emergence of democracy as such.

Vorobiev and Iliyev devote special attention to the right to security: In today's world, "human rights" implies that individuals are guaranteed freedom and security in their country of residence. In Western civilization, acknowledgement of the need for the existence of the right to security was indeed of great importance: It led to the abolition of slavery and the formation of modern ideas about rights and freedoms. However, according to many Jewish theologians, the right to security is fundamental in Judaism: It means freedom from bondage. As an example, the

authors of the article cite the exodus of the Jews from Egypt as the main symbol of liberation from bondage.

When speaking about freedom, the authors touch on such concepts as the freedom of speech, the freedom of self-determination and the freedom of belief. Vorobiev and Iliyev acknowledge that the Bible and the Talmud contain many provisions limiting free speech; however, these restrictions have a purely moral and religious nature, the most important of which is the prohibition of defamation. The Talmud and the Torah also touch on the treatment of foreigners: Citing the example of the life of Jews in Egypt, the holy scriptures call for foreigners to be treated benevolently: "Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him: for you were strangers in the land of Egypt," which may indicate the origin of the foundations of equality and the substantial increase in the value of human life in the Jewish religious tradition.

In general, when talking about the intrinsic value of every individual, the authors of the article, using the method of comparative analysis, cite many quotations from sacred Jewish works, explaining that the basic idea of Judaism is that the existence of every person has specific meaning and is an integral part of God's plan. That is why murder is not a crime against the individual but against God.

Vorobiev and Iliyev's study repeatedly emphasizes that the right to life is the basis of the Jewish religious tradition, as evidenced by a quote from the Talmud that states that the life of the last outlaw is still a life that is as important to God as our own existence.

The authors also note that the idea that every person has an obligation to treat others with respect and do them no harm is discernable in many ancient Jewish scriptures: "What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow." They emphasize that such treatment of others suggests that "in the Jewish legal tradition, precedence is given to obligations to individuals, not obligations to God," which again confirms the fact that the foundations of the concept of human rights appeared long before the concept itself.

Vorobiev and Iliyev touch on the issue of wealth: "Wealth is seen as a gift of God" and comes with special responsibility. However, the authors note that wealth in no way imposes obligations on the individual with respect to society or the state; it is primarily accountability before God, implying charity and honesty, and a mutually beneficial relationship with hired workers. This approach clearly demonstrates the origin of such concepts such as honesty and integrity in business and related areas.

The authors pay special attention to the currently topical issue of women's rights. Applying the method of content analysis, they quote the Talmud, which states that men and women are equal before all the laws of the Torah. The right of women to work and pursue a career were recognized even in ancient times. The authors also argue that many Jewish works underscore the sacred role of women as mothers and wives. Jewish tradition clearly does not consider women equal to men, but it asserts that women were not created solely for the sake of men but have their own rights and obligations.

Significant attention is also given to the establishment of a judicial system. A concept taken for granted today was first mentioned in the Talmud: The last of the commandments to the sons of Noah in fact acknowledges "the need for every member of society to obey laws, thereby giving everyone the opportunity to rely on legal protection." The authors also cite provisions of the Bible regarding fair and impartial judgment.

However, Vorobiev and Iliyev in the final part of their study openly criticize contemporary religious circles that, in their opinion, inhibit further development of the concept of human rights and freedoms. The pressure of religious circles in modern Israel has a significant impact on such aspects of life as marriage, the status of women in Israeli society, current difficulties with public transportation and stores, holidays and attitudes of religious circles to non-Jewish people.

Even though idea of drawing a parallel between the modern understanding of the term "human rights and freedoms" and provisions in Jewish scriptures is interesting, it is debatable that the foundations of this concept were derived precisely from Jewish religious tradition. It is worth noting that the authors do not deny the fact that Judaism is not the only pioneer of the concept of "human rights," mentioning in their article the Roman Empire and the possibility of the existence of such provisions in other religions. Some concepts they examined – for example, the freedom of belief or the freedom of thought and religion – are not supported with quotations from sacred Jewish works, which, however, does not call into question the existence of these concepts in Judaism.

In their study, the authors graphically illustrate the fact that Judaism has historically played a significant role in the development of the concept of human rights and freedoms, and has had a major impact on the formation of the Israeli legal system. However, despite all the evidence the authors provide, it is difficult to conclusively state that the Jewish reli-

gious tradition was a pathfinder that laid the foundations of the modern understanding of the term "human rights."

NOTE

1 V.P. Vorobiev. *Konstitutsionno-pravovaya sistema Gosudarstva Izrail.* M.: Natsionalnoye obozreniye, 2002; E.V. Vorobieva, R.L. Iliyev. *Konstitutsionno-pravovoi status cheloveka i grazhdanina v Gosudarstve Izrail.* Moscow: MGIMO-Universitet, 2009.