

# International Affairs: 2018: No. 6, Vol. 64: Summary.

## "SUCH NEGATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW ARE UNACCEPTABLE"

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At present, anti-Russian hysteria has seized the U.S. However, there is also a different attitude toward our country in the U.S. We are in contact with dozens of politicians and civil society representatives who are absolutely normal, constructive and not affected by this anti-Russian virus. I believe that such negative relations, such a low point in bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow as now, are unacceptable. This can lead to completely unpredictable consequences.

I would like to believe that the Helsinki summit will be a starting point for a new round of positive developments, but final judgment can be passed a little later, after congressional elections that all political forces in the U.S. are preparing for.

Washington is the only pole in the global architecture of the 21st century. Yugoslavia, then Iraq and Libya, and now Syria - this is all about wiping the regimes and the leaders who do not fit into the logic of a unipolar world order off the face of the earth.

BRICS, a colossal integration bloc, recently held its summit in Johannesburg, where Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed the world with a keynote speech. Russia, India, China, Brazil, and South Africa - are all against a unipolar world order.

The U.S. needs Europe to save its concept of a unipolar world order. Today, with its population and its economy, the U.S. is not in a position to maintain a unipolar world order.

They are doing whatever they like with our image: We are portrayed as aggressors, criminals and corruptionists. We need to tell the truth about what is going on in Russia and bring this information home to the majority of countries throughout the world in their own language.

The more the U.S. lays claim to global domination, the more Russia is vilified and perceived as a "thorn in the side" of this unipolar world order.

I believe a BRICS parliamentary dimension will appear in the near future. Even now there is a strong scholarly dimension, which is growing and attracting experts and researchers from all member countries of this bloc and beyond.

BRICS is a real force that can stop dangerous trends in a unipolar world order.

Russia covers one sixth of the earth's land surface, but its population accounts for only 2% of the world's total, so we need to bring our compatriots back home, as other countries are doing.

Naturally, we need to provide conditions for our compatriots who want to return, and there are many of them. They could help increase Russia's population so that the dire predictions to the effect that if this trend continues, then by 2050 we could turn into "an empty space, whose fate would be decided by others," do not come true.

We need to uphold peace. There is nothing more important today. We need to prevent humanity from slipping into conflicts, into any kind of war, and we need, like never before, to be together and build a peaceful, stable society for our children.

## **"THE U.S. WANTS SYRIA TO BECOME ITS GLOBAL POLICY TOOL"**

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A settlement in Syria can be facilitated by halting outside interference in Syria's affairs, including instructions to the opposition as to what position it should take in the course of dialogue. When this outside interference finally ends, then the dialogue will become truly intra-Syrian, thus contributing to the success of the political settlement process.

I would like to say that this is not the first time we have been subjected to U.S. aggression, and this is not the first time the alleged use of chemical weapons has been used as a pretext to justify such aggression. I would like to reiterate that Syria has no chemical weapons, as they have been destroyed since Syria joined the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

As for staging fake chemical attacks, that is very easy to do, since they use the White Helmets for staging such fake attacks.

It needs to be said that U.S. objectives are not purely U.S. objectives. In reality, these are Israeli objectives that the U.S. is working to achieve in Syria.

The problem is not the opposition as such, but its curators. There is no united opposition in Syria. There are various opposition groups, and what they do depends on where their leaders are based - in Western or Arab capitals. Each group acts by taking into account the wishes of the host state. Therefore, the opposition is not free to make independent decisions, and dialogue with the Syrian government is not based on its wishes. The opposition says that it wants a direct dialogue, and we say that this is possible when foreign countries stop their interference in the affairs of the opposition as such.

America's objective in Syria is to establish control over everything Syria will do in the future, and to do so in Israel's interests

I urge all Syrians to return to Syria if they want to. We will ensure them security and decent living conditions.

One objective of terrorist attacks in Syria, as well as an objective of terrorist sponsors, was to destroy Syria's infrastructure, especially considering that it is a country that stands up to Israel. This objective was achieved, and about 75% of Syria's infrastructure was destroyed.

Taking into account the fact that in the war against terrorism we have relied on our friends from the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation, naturally, in the reconstruction process, we will give priority to our friends from Iran and Russia and their respective companies. This shows appreciation for the contribution they have made to Syria, as well as the availability of resources to participate in the reconstruction process.

## **A NEW HELSINKI PROCESS: PROS AND CONS**

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RECENTLY, debate has intensified over whether a new international order is needed and what role the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should play in forming it. Of course, this debate was "triggered" by events around Crimea and Ukraine, which have shown that the current world order and its international-legal configuration do not correspond with obvious realities.

It is becoming evident that Russia and Ukraine have not yet finished building their nations and their nation states. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was only the beginning of that process, which could take a long time.

At the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in the Finnish capital, nearly all the states of the continent, as well as the United States and Canada, signed the Helsinki Accords. It declares the peaceful coexistence of different social systems, two military blocs and neutral countries. Those documents became the foundation of a new European security architecture.

Isn't it time for OSCE member countries to return to the negotiating table and revise the Helsinki Final Act and other accompanying documents, taking into account the new geopolitical realities?

However, the principles of territorial integrity and border inviolability enshrined in the Helsinki Act pertained to the system of bipolar confrontation that existed at that time.

"The OSCE principles never permitted coups d'états and they prohibited encroaching on ethnic and linguistic minorities," Lavrov stressed. "Those principles were grossly violated by the perpetrators of the coup d'état in Ukraine."

At the annual "Potsdam Meetings" that took place in 2015 in conjunction with the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Conference, Chairman of the Board of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) Fyodor Lukyanov said: "The Helsinki process played a role, and it is impossible to restore it to its former form.... The Helsinki Act fixed in documentary form a certain, rather stable situation. And now Russia and the EU are in state of flux that cannot be put on paper." Therefore, in his view, a new negotiating process is needed, as well as a new "non-Helsinki" act whose spirit and principles everyone must discuss together.

This approach is directly linked to Russian diplomats' long and sustained efforts to reform the OSCE.

The current stage of debate and diplomatic consultations regarding a new Helsinki process is directly related to the initiative of Belarusian President A. Lukashenko, who officially proposed the idea of a new Helsinki process at the opening plenary session of the 26th annual session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July 2017. OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President C. Muttonen supported Belarusian President's idea about the need to reboot the Helsinki process.<sup>12</sup>

Returning to the events surrounding Ukraine, one cannot help but notice that discussions about a new Helsinki process in this regard are not merely academic but have practical application.

To improve the situation around Ukraine and restore normal relations between Russia and the West, a coordinated understanding needs to be reached of the previously established framework and "rules of the game," and there possibly needs to be an agreement to modify them.

## **JULY 2018 NATO SUMMIT: "TECHNICAL" DECISIONS AND "STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY"**

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THE BRUSSELS Summit Declaration informed the world that "today, we have taken important decisions to further adapt NATO to the more challenging security environment. We have agreed a new, strengthened NATO Command Structure that meets the requirements of today and tomorrow. As part of our ongoing institutional adaptation, we have also agreed a new model to deliver shared NATO capabilities faster."

The European allies of the United States were not absolutely sure that they would finally arrive at an agreed upon document. Firm and reliable transatlantic balance and strategic unity were shattered by the planned transformations of the Alliance that presupposed, among other things, a much bigger European contribution in response to Donald Trump's ultimatum. The same can be said about the future of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has become abundantly clear that Europe and the United States as strategic partners have reached the line beyond which transatlantic unity should be preserved and consolidated; meanwhile, the future of the alliance looks very different from the opposite side of the Atlantic.

Europe has realized that its request to the United States to strengthen American guarantees should be reciprocated by pouring more money into its own security. First, Europe's potential is limited and, second, a bigger contribution does not mean a fairer distribution of responsibilities to make Europe a real, not declarative, partner and a valuable ally of the United States.

The changed schedule of bilateral meetings of President Trump with his European colleagues and partners on the summit's margins agreed upon well in advance speaks volumes. Some of them were shifted to later time, others annulled. This perfectly fits Trump's political style: on the summit's eve, many expected a repetition of what had happened at G7 when the American president left the summit. This might become his trademark at the Brussels summit as well; this should be expected. The fact that Trump slammed the door and closed it in front of the allies in the new building of NATO Headquarters forced Europeans to ponder over the price of American security "guarantees" and Trump's personal ability to reach agreements.

By making Germany the main object of his attacks, Trump undermines European unity within NATO, steadily heats up the subject of the European share and European responsibilities and rejects compromises.

His concentration on the military spending issue did not come as a surprise at the Brussels summit. Everybody knew that it was more than a pressure instrument applied to the allies.

At first, Europeans hoped that an agreement with Trump was possible and that the different approaches to the issue could be adjusted. It turned out, however, that Trump was not ready to compromise, and Europe had no choice but accept this.

The summit passed no decisions related to long-term strategy of transatlantic relations while the so-called Russian question still keeps Alliance together. "Russia's aggressive actions" are mentioned in the first lines of the summit declaration. Today, the transatlantic solidarity is determined not only along the Europe-America line but is also shaped by different groups of interest inside the Alliance which intensifies European disunity. The group of countries that staked on collective defense and deterrence of Russia profited from the 2014 Ukrainian crisis.

Disagreements or even antagonisms that have become too obvious at the meeting of the NATO leaders can be defined as its key strategic result 10 that will determine the future of NATO and the nature of Euro-Atlantic relations.

## **NATO AND THE OSCE: PARTNERS OR RIVALS?**

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NATO AND the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are the main Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security organizations. From time to time, NATO and OSCE leaders make assurances that the two organizations are determined to cooperate in the interests of peace and stability, but in fact their relationship isn't devoid of rivalry or mutual suspicions since they have different ideas of what needs to be done to carry out these peace and stability tasks.

NATO, which was set up at the very start of the Cold War as a firm counterbalance to the Soviet Union and its allies, remains a primarily military Euro-Atlantic alliance for the collective defense of its member countries, although, with the world having changed as much as it has, the organization makes no secret of ambitions to play first fiddle in global as well as Euro-Atlantic security affairs.

NATO's behavior toward the OSCE is marked by inconsistency, contradictoriness and duplicity.

Some Western analysts argue that, throughout the existence of the CSCE/OSCE, NATO has considered it a weak, ineffectual organization and has been raising all kinds of obstacles to it. One irritant for the United States and its allies is the OSCE's consensus decision-making rule, which seriously hinders plans to make the OSCE a puppet of NATO. Simultaneously, the United States and other Western countries believe that even a weak OSCE is a threat to the very existence of NATO.

NATO member states block proposals from Russia and its Collective Security Treaty Organization partners for an OSCE reform that would include the adoption of a charter by the OSCE; vesting the organization's executive bodies with more powers; strengthening the consensus decision-making rule; doing away with imbalances in OSCE's range of activities, personnel and geography; bringing out uniform rules for the OSCE's institutions and missions; and enhancing the OSCE's role in developing a new security architecture for Europe and in dealing with pan-European challenges such as terrorism, drug trafficking and cybercrime.

At the same time, there is an increasing belief in some quarters in the West that NATO needs closer cooperation with the OSCE. Some American and other experts are convinced that the OSCE is a unique organization that can help NATO member countries solve problems such as conflict prevention and settlement and global threat management. They argue that blocking OSCE activities runs against the interests of NATO member countries.

DESPITE NATO's duplicitous and controversial behavior toward it, the OSCE prefers to be flexible in its relations with the North Atlantic alliance. The OSCE remains open to closer cooperation with NATO in reacting to revisions by the alliance of its objectives, to changes in the two bodies' organizational resources, and to the evolution of their perceptions of threats and challenges to Europe.

The OSCE, ever since its moment of emergence, has had a relationship with NATO that can hardly be described as equal or mutually beneficial, least of all as a model for other international organizations to follow.

Undoubtedly, NATO and the OSCE are partners in some respects but rivals in others. According to many Western analysts, NATO has never seen the OSCE as Europe's main security organization.

It is naturally in the interests of Russia that the OSCE should play the dominant role in various fields of European politics. Therefore, Russia is determined to continue trying to promote its own concept of an OSCE reform to ensure a more prominent role for the organization in security affairs. Russian diplomacy is building up efforts to at least partially prevent the OSCE from becoming an obedient tool of NATO in its Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian policies.

## THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S MERKELIZATION AND DEPARTURE FROM BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK

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SINCE THE STATE OF AFFAIRS in the European Union, the latter's role in global affairs, and developments in the transatlantic partnership largely depend on Germany, European and world experts focus on the domestic and foreign policy of the new coalition government of Angela Merkel, formed by the CDU/CSU - an alliance of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union - and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). There still are those who, from force of habit, assume that the SPD would be able to make a substantial contribution to the security and stability of Europe and to do a great deal to normalize Germany's relations with Russia. However, what SPD leaders have said and done recently shows that the party is losing initiative in defending its positions and that the traditions of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) are being undermined.

BRANDT set moral and political guidelines for the implementation of the European idea and was able to carry through fundamental projects to establish good-neighborly relations between Germany and countries to the east of it, thereby laying solid foundations for historic reconciliation between the Germans, on the one hand, and the Russians, Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks, on the other.

Merkelism means individualism composed of many elements, including political narcissism stemming from Merkel's overestimation of herself and her confidence that she is the world's most powerful woman politician.

Statements of Brandt show the priorities of his foreign policy, which rested on the principle of Germany's complete integration into the Western system of alliances with simultaneous strategically pragmatic, constructive relations with the Soviet Union (Russia).

THERE ARE HARD TIMES for the SPD. An SPD report of June 2018 that was entitled "Learning from Mistakes" and analyzed the latest Bundestag elections came to the less-than-optimistic conclusions that the SPD had ceased to be a vehicle of hope, had become a "tragic hero," and had lost most of its former mass public support.

Some German experts have written a series of articles in seeking scholarly explanations for the SPD's volte-face. They concluded that Brandt's Ostpolitik had been untenable and unsuccessful and that it would be a disastrous mistake to use this experiment of the architect of détente in the present-day environment.



The goals of German reunification remain largely unachieved. Contrary to pompous official declarations, the society of the east of Germany is still strikingly different from that of the west of the country. The recent large inflows of migrants that the government was powerless to control triggered an upsurge in frustration in eastern Germany.

Merkelism means purely situational decision-making and lack of principles, ideas and concepts and the inability to set development guidelines. Another aspect of Merkelism is stagnant thinking, which shackles Merkel's behavior, hinders reforms within the CDU, prevents disputes on vital issues, and perpetuates the chancellor's archaic governance style. The author of this article doesn't share some of these assessments, seeing them as the personal perceptions of some of the abovementioned psychologists. He respects Merkel as a prominent German and European leader with all her strong points and human weaknesses.

NEITHER THE POLITICAL CLASS nor the media of Germany proved ready to support initiatives that Putin set out in a speech in the Bundestag on September 25, 2001, or other proposals he had put forward.

Nevertheless, relations with Germany remain a foreign policy priority for Russia, which hopes that the anti-Russian sanctions and mutual alienation are temporary.

Our contemporaries and descendants will gratefully remember German politicians, diplomats, businesspeople, and artists who have made substantial contributions to Russian-German cooperation.

## **UK SECURITY AFTER BREXIT: PRIORITIES AND SAFEGUARDS**

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AS DISTINCT from the European continental political tradition, the island political tradition of the United Kingdom invariably treated the problems of security and defense as two strictly separate issues. To lower real military risks, the British strengthen their security by building up their military and political influence in the key parts of the globe and participating in the settlement of all sorts of international conflicts. This practice survived for a long time partly due to the colonialist policy of the British Empire that preserved its weight in the Eurocentric system of international relations at the desirable level.

After World War II, military threats disappeared from the UK horizon. In the post-bipolar world, the quality of threats changed radically: non-military threats moved to the fore together with the security problems that finally prevailed over the defense issues.

Traditionally, NATO plays the main role in ensuring security and defense of the United Kingdom: it outlived the bipolar world to become the key institute of North Atlantic security for the global world order.

The Brexiteers' victory at the June 2016 membership referendum in Great Britain opened for the EU the road toward its military-political integration and the "European army," even though the exit of one of the biggest donors and the militarily strongest European state created financial problems and lowered the status of this organization and, therefore, its influence.

Brexit, likewise, dented the UK security and erected financial and military-technical barriers to its involvement in global problems. It created a danger of a total loss of interest of the United States in Great Britain as a champion of American interests in Europe and a loyal ally in military campaigns the U.S. launched to establish the world order according to American wishes. This article has looked into the priority trends in Great Britain's national security and the means to ensure it which, in the final analysis, will define its post-Brexit place in the world.

Britain's involvement in the operations (mainly peacekeeping missions) carried out by the UN all over the world is an important instrument of ensuring international security and maintaining its global status.

Its involvement in the OSCE and the Commonwealth was also intended to ensure Britain's security. The same fully applied to its collaboration with the Five Eyes intelligence community of the UK, USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This helped Great Britain add efficiency to Europol by its biggest and most important contribution to the Europol criminal data base.

The number of terrorist acts either carried out in Great Britain in 2017 by ISIS or prevented shows that the threat of Islamic terrorism is much bigger than the so-called Russian threat. It may undermine the country from inside. Indeed, the Muslim community in Great Britain is big and highly consolidated; authorities are hardly aware of the scope of its true feelings. The imams are dead set against gay marriages on the British Isles; British Muslims prefer to settle disagreements in Sharia rather than British courts.

TO A GREAT EXTENT, Britain's ability to ensure its national security was challenged by Brexit. The far from favorable outcome of the Brexit talks lowered its capabilities to successfully oppose comprehensive threats to international security. The special relationship between Britain and the United States might be undermined; Britain's influence in NATO together with the country's authority in the UN and the

Commonwealth might decrease; business activities and economic development might also suffer. Today, it is no longer possible to cut security relationships along the patterns of imperial times claiming that "international processes unfolding outside British control are potentially dangerous for the country's security and its influence in the world." It means that the road to becoming one of the world power centers will be neither short nor easy. The situation is further complicated by a very real possibility of a "hard Brexit" and its long-lasting negative repercussions for British economy.

## **UNILATERAL U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA: THE VIEWPOINT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW**

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The United States unleashed its current war of sanctions against Russia in 2012 by adopting what is known as the Magnitsky Act.

The U.S. sanctions war against Russia reached its peak as a new law came out - the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. signed into effect by President Donald Trump on August 2, 2017.

The current economic sanctions against Russia can be seen as a throwback to Cold War-era sanctions campaigns against the Soviet Union. Sanctions have become part and parcel of the United States' foreign policy arsenal and one of its means of deterring Russia.

Economic sanctions that have not received approval from the UN Security Council cannot be legal under international law. However, far from all foreign experts on international law share this view.

The majority of foreign scholars can see no serious reason to ban the use of economic sanctions by individual nations and believe that clause 4 has nothing to do with economic sanctions and cannot be applied to anything else than the use of armed force.

In 2000, Russia submitted to the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations a working paper entitled "Basic conditions and standard criteria for the introduction of sanctions and other coercive measures and their implementation" (document A/AC. 182/L. 100).

Afterward Russia revised this working paper, giving it the form of a draft "Declaration on the basic conditions and standard criteria for the introduction of sanctions and other coercive measures and their implementation."

To sum up, the United States' policy of so-called sanctions against Russia and other states such as Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Ivory Coast, is patently illegitimate. Under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council alone has the authority to take measures that can be qualified as sanctions. Qualifying the U.S. anti-Russian measures as countermeasures cannot justify them legally either as Russia has never failed to meet any of its commitments under agreements with the United States.<sup>42</sup>

In conclusion, it needs to be added that so-called sanctions used by individual states can hardly be effective. According to Gary Clyde Hufbauer of the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics, a recognized expert on sanctions, of 54 cases of use of economic sanctions by the United States between 1970 and 2014, only 11 cases worked.

In 2014, the United States embarked on the gradual lifting of sanctions against Cuba that had been in force for more than 50 years. This was an indication of one more failure of the U.S. sanctions policy.

## **THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION: A NEW REALITY IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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THE IDEA of the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) surfaced in the world political discourse in the mid-2000s when an awareness of geopolitical connections between the Indian Ocean and the western part of the Pacific became much clearer in the geoeconomic and security contexts. It was at the borderline of the two basins that a new area of confrontation of world powers appeared. Economy is not the region's only distinctive feature. As an area of considerable conflict potential, it brims with military, territorial, ethnoconfessional, and ecological conflicts as well as conflicts rooted in its far from simple past.

By the early 2010s, the Indo-Pacific Region concept consolidated its positions in world political science and related discourse and found its way into official documents and public statements of American and Australian officials of high standing and the 2013 Defense White Paper of Australia. In 2008, President Obama brought the concept of Indo-Pacific Region into political parlance of his country. It, however, was rarely used since the president preferred the term Asia-Pacific Region.

A new arena of trade and economic rivalry is gradually emerging in the vast space of the Indo-Pacific Region; in the future, it will determine to a great extent the pathways of global economic development.

Americans are talking about the "free and open Indo-Pacific Region" based on the unity of the countries that share the common liberal values which are, according to McMaster, "freedom of navigation and air communication, the rule of law, freedom from coercion, respect for sovereignty, the principles of free enterprise and open markets."

The Indo-Pacific is rooted in the closely interrelated economic, international, political, and military processes. An analysis of the processes dynamically unfolding in the basins of the Pacific and Indian oceans suggests that a new regional community is taking shape based on interpenetration and interaction of two biggest world oceans.

A new arena of trade and economic rivalry is gradually emerging in the vast space of the Indo-Pacific Region; in the future, it will determine to a great extent the pathways of global economic development.

The widening area of security problems of the countries of Pacific Asia that is spreading to the states of the Indian Ocean basin is another important trend of our days. The region is gradually turning into an object of military, political and economic rivalry of the greatest world powers, the U.S. and China in the first place.

Seen from Washington, India can and should actively oppose the rising economic and military-political influence of China in the basins of the Pacific and Indian oceans.

Today, very much as in the past, India remains cautious when it comes to involvement, in any form, in military blocs. During the last decade, however, it has been pursuing a more active policy in Southeast Asia and the Pacific countries.

The concept of the Indo-Pacific Region stems mostly from several important strategic trends: greater interconnection between sub-regions of South, Southeast and East Asia, military-political and economic upsurge of China, stronger regional and global role of India, and growth of rivalry inevitable in the foreseeable future between the two Asian superpowers. This main geopolitical risk is rooted in the intercrossing vectors of military and economic expansion - western in China's policy and eastern in India's. On the one hand, this creates a vast area of rivalry; on the other, this ties together the Indian and Pacific oceans by zillions of new relationships and draws into their orbit the majority of the countries of South, Southeast and East Asia.

The Southeast Asian countries, including Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam, America's partners in the region, prefer non-alignment; they refuse to shoulder obligations that might be interpreted by Beijing as unfriendly.

## **THE MEDITERRANEAN: AN "EVER-FLOATING CONTINENT"**

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It is no coincidence that here in the Mediterranean, the three main world religions - i.e., Judaism, Christianity and Islam - originated and developed. It is quite natural that to this day, in our digital age, full of hustle and bustle, some irresistible mysterious force draws millions of people from all over the world to the shores of this sea.

Some authors have even written about the Mediterranean community and the special character of the people living there, noting their fiery temperament, amazing musical abilities, sociability, and an insatiable sense of humor that has enabled them to survive the misfortunes and hardships of fate and preserve their vitality and faith in a bright future.

The history of the Mediterranean involves both the rise of human spirit and brutal, devastating wars.

Political instability in a number of countries in this region has led to the escalation of armed conflicts, economic collapse and impoverishment of the population. Amid the growing public discontent with the social situation, ethnic and religious strife has intensified. The overall situation is seriously complicated by the unprecedented increase in migration flows.

These factors have set the stage for transforming the Mediterranean, especially its eastern and central regions, into a bridgehead for international terrorism, which has now become a major threat to peace and security. The groundwork for such a tragic turn of events was laid at the beginning of this century.

From time to time, there are reports in the Western media regarding a possible new intervention in Libya by European powers in order to "deliver a strike against the Islamic state." Considering NATO's previous "experience" in the region, these plans raise serious concerns about the consequences of such an action. The situation in Libya is further exacerbated by domestic conflicts and divisions between certain countries on Africa's northern coast.

The situation in North Africa is, without a doubt, a source of particular concern for EU countries. In recent decades, Europe's "security first" paradigm has left an imprint on the entire external, domestic and even broader regional dynamics of the five Maghreb countries.

THE CURRENT SITUATION in the Mediterranean is especially acute and dramatic due to growing migration, which has become a pressing problem for the European Union and has caused bitter disagreements among most of its members.

The scope that this problem has acquired is the fault of EU countries, which announced with great pomp several cooperation projects with southern and central Mediterranean countries, but because of their shortsightedness and tightfistedness were unable to implement them.

THROUGHOUT the 20th century and in the early 21st century, European countries have sought to consolidate their dominant positions in the Mediterranean basin. Following the breakup of the USSR, EU countries hurried to stake out this part of the world as a region of their special vital interests by fostering closer ties in various areas between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. These plans were supposed to be carried out via a number of projects.

FOR DECADES, the Mediterranean has been an arena of confrontation between the North and the South, that is to say, between industrialized and developing countries. In the era of globalization, the income gap between the southern and northern Mediterranean countries is widening, especially in the recent period. Despite a certain increase in growth rates in developing countries of the North African belt, the differences in the quality of life in the northern and southern Mediterranean remain dramatic.

Recent events in the world reaffirm that the Russian leadership's policy in international affairs - consistent, realistic, based on unwavering, strict compliance with norms of international law, respect for the interests of other countries and nations, and readiness to address all complex issues and conflicts through dialogue - has gained general approval throughout the world, including the Mediterranean.

## **THE LONE WOLF AS THE LATEST FORM OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY**

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THE RECENT WAVE of terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States forced the world community to pay special attention to the phenomenon of individual terror. Russia, likewise, had its share of similar acts.

The recent wave of lone-actor terrorism is a qualitatively new phenomenon that cannot be described as a simple continuation of the traditions of the past.

Despite the loud echo and a huge number of publications in the media and on the Internet, the lone-actor terrorism has not yet been fully comprehended by social science in Russia.

THE PHENOMENON that has become the talk of the day in recent years because of the terrorist attacks of ISIS supporters enumerated above has a fairly long history. In fact, it can be regarded as an archaic form of terrorist activities revived, contrary to the fundamental line of evolution of terrorist threats at the turn of the 21st century, viz., much better organized terrorist activities and the emergence of strong national or even transnational terrorist organizations.

This line of reasoning leads, however, in a wrong direction: at present, international terrorist organizations turned to the lone-actor terrorist tactics carried out on a mass scale and inspired through up-to-date information technologies.

The contemporary idea of individual terror in the digital era demands that the firmly rooted perception of those who travel the bumpy road of self-radicalization and embark on the path of terrorism as loners should be revised.

It was ISIS that was responsible for the spread of lone-actor terrorism across Europe achieved through a masterful information and propaganda campaign. It should be said that it was not the first Islamist organization that called to a lone-wolf jihad.

Individual terrorism, nevertheless, was not invented either by ISIS or by any other Islamist terrorist organization; this phenomenon has a history of its own. It was ISIS, however, its powerful propaganda machine and massive propaganda campaign that helped this phenomenon spread far and wide across the West.

THE LONE WOLF is a person who formally does not belong to a cell of any terrorist organization and who commits a terrorist act independently as a result of self-radicalization.

The lone-wolf label is explained by an absence of formal ties between him as a subject of terrorist activities and members of terrorist organizations. Such people are dangerous since it is practically impossible to discover in advance and prevent their illegal actions. Not infrequently they are not registered as "terrorists/extremists" by domestic intelligence services.



Today, Internet resources, Internet sites, video hosting, social networks and messengers serve the main channel of self-radicalization. Their content can be conditionally divided into propaganda materials and newscasts issued by the main media centers of terrorist organizations or products of individual network activities of ISIS supporters.

Experts have pointed out that "in the majority of cases accessing materials placed online by ISIS (banned in Russia) and online radicalization do not affect behavior in real life. Fear of death or arrest is much stronger than the desire to get the boons with which jihadis tempt potential martyrs.

In the world as we know it today electronic means of communication and Internet services have widened, to a great extent, the possibilities of individual self-radicalization, planning and carrying out terrorist acts.

The phenomenon of individual terror should be further investigated from the positions of criminology and other branches of science to arm the law-and-order and other state security structures with recommendation of how this latest outcrop of terrorist threat, a faithful reflection of terrorism of the digital epoch, should be neutralized.

## **U.S. DOCTRINAL APPROACHES TO THE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL SECURITY: POST-COLD WAR EVOLUTION**

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ISSUES related to the use of military force occupy an important place in the national security strategy of the United States. In the last quarter-century, the role of this instrument of protecting the interests and achieving the aims formulated by the state has been revised to fit the attempts of the U.S. ruling elite to adapt to qualitative shifts in international relations and world economy. The same fully applies to different conceptual approaches of the country's leaders to its place and role in the world.

THE BLOODLESS END of the U.S.-USSR confrontation came as a surprise to the American leadership. In the latter half of the 1980s, American analysts, who tried to forecast the future of the conflict with the Soviet Union, did not count on its peaceful resolution. This explains why Washington was not ready to the cardinal changes in the world.

The nature of potential conflicts had changed: the threat of a world nuclear war was replaced with the threat of large-scale inter-state regional crises. This forced the armed forces of the United States to move away from deterrence to the "collective

engagement" doctrine which meant sharing responsibility between allies and partners with the special emphasis on the forces and resources of NATO and justified America's global presence. The military got also involved in major counterdrug, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations that required the use of innovative methods and means of warfare.

The Democrats wrongly believed that the risks might be decreased by the limited, "tailored" military involvement in world affairs while addressing threats not only with military instruments. The doctrinal pattern registered in seven National Security Strategies, each of which developed and widened the provisions of the previous one, came to be known as the strategy of "selective engagement" and "expansion" The expert community tagged it "ad hoc" or acting according to circumstances.

In the new conditions, military command should concentrate on new methods of fighting and be ready to carry out operations similar to the war in Afghanistan. New conflicts unfolding in the remote theaters of war called for fast and precise operations of all services, "a capability to deliver rapid, extended range, precision kinetic and non-kinetic (elements of space and information) effects in support of theater and national objectives."

IT WAS EXPECTED that the Democrats in the White House would change the approaches to the security strategy.

The Obama administration made it its aim to restore the U.S. authority in the world, as well as the U.S. economic potential undermined by the recession. It also decided to lower military activity and move away from the policy of involvement in multifaceted wars waged far from the U.S. national territory.<sup>26</sup> The new approach was fully reflected in the 2010 directive known as A Strategy of National Renewal and Global Leadership.

The United States proceeded from the assumption that accelerated and increased interdependence of processes were affecting global and American security.

New conditions needed new approaches. The White House had to admit that the United States had been unable to deal with the world problems on its own - collective efforts were obviously needed.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY devised as a form of report to the Congress to justify the money spent on defense is now the main document that specifies the military-strategic ideas of the U.S. leadership. The American armed forces rely on it when preparing lower-level directives.

Throughout the last 25 years, American administrations invariably stressed their special responsibility for international security, mainly through the use of armed forces "to preserve America's leading role in the world." They were guided by the "global nature of

American interests" and proceeded from its readiness to be involved in conflicts of any intensity against any adversary in any place of the world. Irrespective of its interpretation of the world around it, Washington invariably tried to create an international order according to its own patterns that it can control and that differs greatly from the genuinely collective system of world order based on the universal international and legal principles and the key role of the United Nations. This approach has been preserved and will not change in the foreseeable future.

## **GERMAN IDEAS ON SECURITY**

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GERMANY'S PERCEPTIONS of new threats and plans for security policy adjustments are stated in the Defense Ministry's White Paper 2016, which was published in July that year and maps out the country's military policy strategy for the next few years. In the 1970s, the ministry published White Papers on an almost annual basis, but the 2016 document was the first White Paper since 2006. "The security situation has changed significantly over these ten years, but Germany has changed too," Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen said in explaining the reason for the new White Paper.

Experts said that Germany had made the decisive contribution to the European Union's Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), published two weeks before the release of the German White Paper, and so it is not surprising that descriptions of challenges in the EUGS and proposals for ways of addressing them put forward in that document largely coincide with those in the White Paper. Both documents argue that the European security environment has become more complex, volatile, dynamic, and unpredictable. The White Paper points out that the incorporation of Crimea into Russia, the Ukrainian conflict, Islamic State, international terrorism, hybrid threats, and cyberattacks are among the most significant new dangers.

Other principal hazards to European and international security are, according to the White Paper, "the erosion of state structures" and "civil wars" in North Africa and the Middle East, "uncontrolled and irregular migration," nationalism, climate change, and epidemics and pandemics.

Disagreements between Russia and Germany on the nature of threats and causes of conflicts must not be obstacles to compromises for dealing with them.

German society and the majority of Germany's ruling elite have been demanding that the country revise its relations with the United States to become less dependent on the latter in security affairs.

Germany's security priorities are to protect its citizens and its allies and ensure "unimpeded world trade." Germany attaches special importance to cooperation with international organizations and alliances in handling these tasks.

German experts argue that hybrid warfare is not a threat to Germany because there need to be domestic conditions for destabilization and, they claim, there are no such conditions in Germany. However, they do consider propaganda that is a component of hybrid warfare to be a source of danger and believe that part of the Russian media poses a potential threat.

Germany has been asked by its Eastern European allies to build up its military presence in Eastern Europe. The German government takes these requests seriously, and this gives rise to numerous problems.

Since 2015, Germany has been a member of the counterterrorism coalition involved in the Syrian conflict, but the Bundeswehr doesn't take part in any armed action and limits its activities to some auxiliary work and intelligence.

On the whole, there is a consensus among German parties on new security challenges and priorities, but there are disagreements among them, sometimes very serious, about what specific measures need to be taken.

Russia and Germany also have been joining forces to ensure energy security for Europe. Both countries base their energy policies on permanent postulates. Germany follows the principle that the more oil and gas the EU imports from various regions the better as the more hydrocarbons there are in the market the cheaper they are.

The Russian-German High-Level Working Group on Security Policy is likely to resume full-scale meetings. This format, which has been suspended by Germany, is more necessary today than ever before as it would enable Russian and German officials to hold comprehensive discussions on international conflicts and to seek mutual understanding to address new hazards, threats and challenges.

Nevertheless, intensive Russian-German summits in 2018, busy contacts in various fields, the restoration of former formats, and the possible resumption of meetings of the High-Level Working Group on Security Policy are reasons for cautious hopes that Russia and Germany will normalize their relations.

## FRINGE POLITICAL PARTIES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

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EUROPEAN POLITICS have displayed one remarkable feature in recent years - the emergence and rapid progress of fringe parties. Significantly different from mainstream parties in terms of structure and methods, those parties are mouthpieces for protests in their societies. They enjoy increasing support as more and more people are angered by the policies of their governments and European Union bodies, which is an indication of an escalating systemic crisis in the EU as a whole and in some of its member countries. Those parties focus on economic and financial problems, immigration issues and Euroscepticism, agendas that have been fueling their movement to top echelons of government.

Initially such parties received little support and were considered marginal groups, but by now they have been able to win substantial following in some European countries, and to even win parliamentary seats.

Obviously, governments can no longer disregard these peripheral parties as the latter represent considerable proportions of the electorates. Ignoring their demands would threaten mainstream parties with loss of support. Mainstream parties are forced to start dialogue with fringe groups, or even partner with them, discussing some issues or planning coordinated action if not making coalitions.

European ruling elites are mainly worried about right-wing populist parties that gave their strength drawn from protest sentiments. Those parties surely put European stability in danger with protests against the alleged watering down of basic national values, appeals to go back to them, demands for tighter border control, and allegations that national sovereignty is being eroded. Their traditional tactics of criticizing political elites, fanning mistrust in government, and making loud promises of simple and determined solutions wins them support.

The growing popularity of fringe parties is a logical characteristic of today's European politics, but these parties employ a new form of populism, a form that addresses specific wide-scale public sentiments.

FORMER marginal, extra-establishment parties are becoming an inseparable part of the European political landscape. Some of them are represented in national parliaments and supranational bodies, receive cabinet portfolios and participate in top-level decision-making. However, only those of them are successful that have distanced

themselves from radicalism, consistently sought mainstream status without abandoning their alternative platforms, and tried to drop their images as marginal groups.

Sometimes, the same slogans are proclaimed, and the same issues raised by right-wing fringe parties such as France's National Rally, M5S, and the Austrian Freedom Party and by left-wing ones such as Podemos.

The rise of fringe parties means that mainstream parties are in crisis and that ruling elites should launch immediate reforms. The change in Europe's political landscape is a key indication of instability.

Russia should boost contacts with European parties that want to cooperate with it but should avoid ultraradical groups. For example, the above-mentioned agreement between United Russia and Lega, which is no longer seen as a semi-marginal group in Italy, opens new opportunities both for the improvement of Russian-Italian relations and for Russia's relations with the EU. La France Insoumise is another party that openly insists on better relations with Russia. On the other hand, ties with radical parties may have a negative effect on Russia's international image.

## **FRANCE: CHALLENGES TO EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY** **(2017-2018)**

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LIKE ANY OTHER COUNTRY, France treats the national security issues as a state priority ensured by diplomatic means and armed forces when external security is on the agenda and by domestic policy measures and the forces of law and order when internal security problems call for attention. Both dimensions are closely interconnected in the context of the open "Schengen" borders between the EU members and the steady flows of migrants from Africa and Asia traditionally heading to France.

IN THE 21ST CENTURY, France formulated the basic conceptual provisions in *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale* issued in 2008 and 2013. In October 2017, the Defense Ministry of France published *Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale* (later *Revue stratégique*) that pointed to Islamic terrorism (known in the West

as jihadism) as the key threat to the country's security [1, p. 44, 104; 2, p. 17, 37]. The terrorist acts organized by jihadis in France in 2015-2016 forced Paris to identify North Africa and the Middle East as "the zones of special attention," that is, the territories of Mali, Iraq and Syria, in which Paris is involved in the struggle against the Islamic State (banned in the Russian Federation).

The authors of *Revue stratégique* have voiced their concerns caused by the interstate contradictions in the Balkans, the U.S. - China rivalry, the nuclear proliferation problems in India and Pakistan, the crises around Iran and North Korea, the far from simple African context, and the grave problems in Afghanistan [2, p. 25]. The document enumerated the non-military problems emanating from different regions of the world: population growth and migration flows, climate change, spread of viruses, energy security, and organized crime [2, p. 32]. Cyber threats received their share of attention: fast and accelerating progress of the developed states toward data digitization and integration of data systems that make them even more vulnerable [2, p. 35].

President Trump's statements that Europeans should pour more money into their security made them even more willing to create "Europe de la Défense," the idea inspired and driven by France and Germany. It is a very complicated vertically arranged system of command structures, multifunctional units and several organizations supervising the EU military-industrial complex.

ITS GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION in the center of Western Europe made France vulnerable to practically all recent threats with which the EU had to cope, the migration crisis and Islamist terrorists being two biggest threats to France's internal security.

The migration threat has remained on the agenda for several centuries now, yet its scope increased in the wake of World War II.

TODAY, France is far from stable and comprehensively secured while the French make no secret of their concerns about internal and external security. Terrorist threats, frequently of external origins, that crop up on the territory of France, have come to the top of the long list of security threats of military and non-military nature. This made the country more aware than before that it needs reliable defense.

France and the other EU members are facing the same challenges as Russia: terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate, viruses, etc. This objectively promotes a dialogue between Russia and the EU in the sphere of security, in the classical military and in other dimensions. In this context, we should pay attention to what Emmanuel Macron said in August 2018 in Helsinki about the need to revise the relations with Russia [23]. One would like to see these words translated into action and an agenda in the interests of both Brussels and Moscow. More importantly, this agenda must be realized despite the serious contradictions on some acute international issues.

# KALININGRAD AS THE BALTIC OUTPOST OF RUSSIA'S SOFT POWER POLICY

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Russian foreign policy, in view of its scale and priorities, is being equipped with soft power instruments and mechanisms more intensively than the foreign policies of other states. But admittedly, soft power is still an area where we are quite a good way behind leading Western countries.

It won't be an exaggeration to say that the West exercises soft power not only to build a positive international image of itself but also to blacken the image of Russia. The West's increasingly aggressive anti-Russian rhetoric and its hostile, and at times provocative, practical anti-Russian action confront Russia with a task of evolving more effective soft power methods.

Because of mounting pressure on Russia and escalating anti-Russian propaganda from Western countries, it is increasingly difficult resource-intensive for Russia to use any facilities in such countries as sites for its soft power projects.

Soft power projects pursued from within Russia are apparently going to be more important because of the unfavorable foreign environment.

This article suggests Kaliningrad, a region unique geographically and geopolitically, as an example of a region that can be used as one of the sites for the implementation of this strategy.

KALININGRAD'S geographical location is one of its key soft power resources. On the one hand, this geographical and geopolitical position may be seen as an obstacle to Kaliningrad's comprehensive development and a security problem for it. But on the other, it gives the region some advantages, including the proximity of Western and Eastern Europe.

ONE OF THE ADVANTAGES of Kaliningrad is that the region can be used as a vehicle for soft power policies with two simultaneously but essentially different targets:

- the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic countries, especially in Latvia, which is ratcheting up efforts to eliminate the cultural and linguistic identity of its Russian-speaking community;
- the indigenous population of the Baltic countries and the population of Poland.



It would also benefit Kaliningrad to borrow experience from neighboring countries. Poland, for example, pursues a highly effective soft power policy targeting students and young professionals.

Surely the suggested formats would mean use of only some of the large diversity of soft power resources existing in Kaliningrad. They may seem much too obvious, or maybe too local. But today Russia doesn't even use obvious and local soft power instruments on a scale that can meet its foreign policy objectives.

## **INTEGRATION TRENDS OF BELARUS: LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS**

**Author: A. Yegorov**

THE GEOPOLITICAL STATUS of Belarus, which is quite a small country even by European standards, is a source of some unease for its neighbors. Belarus is located right in the center of Eurasia and lies between Russia and the European Union, both of which seek to win it over to their side. But whereas the Russian political elite is consistently and calmly building partnership with Belarus, Western politicians are trying to destabilize the situation in the country, resorting to the well-tested "color revolution" method, a method that doesn't, by the way, work too well with the Belarusian mentality.

Russia, in relying on its close historical ties with Belarus and on the two nations' common ethnic and cultural origins, is unfazed by this situation, but unreasonably so. With this idyllic view of Russian-Belarusian relations, one wouldn't think it was worth paying too much attention to spats over moves such as the suspension of imports of dairy products from Belarus by Russia's Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor) or adjustments of natural gas prices or volumes of oil exports.

There is no need to set up any bilateral political institutions or to write any union constitutions. The collapse of the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is good proof that strict political identification ruins an integration project.

Belarusian and Russian lawmakers should not only work on harmonization doctrines to underlie Union State laws but also harmonize draft domestic legislation of one of the countries with that in the other.

The legal systems of Belarus and Russia have the same basic principles for codification, parliamentary lawmaking, and judicial law enforcement as key aspects of social regulation.

Simultaneously, Belarus rejects some of continental Europe's legal principles that Russia has traditionally adhered and continues to adhere to. Belarusian law is an emergent symbiosis of several legal systems and includes Romano-Germanic and Scandinavian components.

THE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS of the Belarusian ethnos is bound to play a major role in Belarus' integration processes. Legal consciousness, as is well known, consists of two components - legal ideology and legal psychology.

Belarusian civil society is materially homogeneous, unstratified, which explains the nature of relations between the individual, society and the state. Therefore, any Belarusian individual would apparently welcome an integration project that didn't mean them changing their ethnicity and guaranteed the maintenance of this civil society homogeneity.

Belarus' integration policy is not only an important factor in the country's domestic development but also, in a sense, a catalyst for broader Eurasian unification processes.

Belarus' geographical and non-geographical partners would need a tremendous amount of diplomatic effort to make Belarus act in line with their objectives. This explains the distinctive nature of the agenda of the Belarusian diplomatic service, something that President Lukashenko has pointed out repeatedly [2]. This agenda is not purely economic. It includes political tasks as well. It amounts to trying to find out which country would be Belarus' best partner in all respects, including economic. The neighbors, for their part, would need to understand Belarus' objectives and detect the sentiments of its society and political elite. That is something one wouldn't like Russia to fail to do.

## **RUSSIA AND JAPAN: A NEW AGENDA**

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AT ALL TIMES, relations between Russia and Japan unfolding under pressure of two opposite trends were complicated and contradictory. On the one hand, the two countries, and their business communities in particular, hailed new chances to expand economic cooperation. On the other, this trend was kept within certain political limits

created by the unresolved problem of Northern Territories. In 2012, Shinzo Abe, having regained the post of prime minister of Japan and being aware that the border problem would not be resolved any time soon, decided, no matter what, to expand cooperation with Russia. In effect, this meant that Tokyo accepted Russia's approach to bilateral relations that presupposed, first and foremost, economic cooperation and deeper mutual trust followed by the quest for a solution of territorial disputes.

Today, Russia, likewise, is more interested than before in cooperation with Japan. Russia's pivot to Asia performed under pressure of the rapidly worsening relations with the United States and the European Union means, among other things, diversification of trade partnerships to avoid excessive dependency on Beijing. In fact, China's rapidly growing prominence and steadily increasing influence, likewise, forced Japan to look for new regional partners.

At the same time, it doesn't seem to be helpful for the Moscow-Tokyo relations that Donald Trump's attitude to Japan is more balanced: Washington bureaucracy and part of the political establishment are determined to keep its Asian allies under control.

Japanese sanctions did not strongly affect Russia's economy and were, in fact, a balancing act between Tokyo's obligations as a G-7 member and its Russia-related national interests.

In 2017, Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India resumed their Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. "The grouping of the four 'like-minded' democracies - known as the Quad - was first mooted by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007." It was rooted in the then topical concept of "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" that included India and Australia. The dialogue was dropped in 2007 after Beijing protests.

Officially, the participants flatly denied that the format was spearheaded against China, yet top Japanese bureaucrats made no secret out of Tokyo's real aims.

In May 2016, Tokyo officially announced the Eight-Point Cooperation Plan as part of a "new approach" politics in its relations with Russia that envisaged, among other things, regular personal meetings between the leaders of Russia and Japan and wider economic cooperation between the two countries. There is a lack of clarity, however, about what precisely is meant by the "new approach."

Eleven bilateral documents signed at the Moscow meeting between Putin and Abe included the joint statement on the specification of cooperation between the RF and Japan, a joint plan of cooperation in digital economy and higher labor productivity. The Ministry of Housing Construction of the Russian Federation and the relevant Japanese department signed a memorandum on cooperation in construction, housing and utilities and urban environment to create "smart cities".

BILATERAL COOPERATION between the two countries has its limits. The current deliberate turn of Moscow toward Tokyo might cause certain concerns in China, Japan's main rival in the struggle for regional leadership.

As some of the Russian experts think, the initial, and unjustified in many respects, enthusiasm about China expected to replace the West as an economic partner, has given way to some disappointment. Beijing failed to fully satisfy Russia's requirements for banking credits and investments. In 2016, much was being said about diversification of cooperation in Asia; Japan was selected as the best candidate and a partner easier to deal with than China.

In general, relations with Japan and their development remain one of the priorities of Russia's policy in the APR. Japan is an important trade and economic partner that may help Russia not only resolve its strategic task - an economic upsurge of its eastern regions - but to compensate, at least partly, for the losses caused by its contracted trade with the European Union.

## **RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC COUNTRIES: CAUSES OF THE CRISIS**

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CURRENT PROBLEMS in Russia's relations with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia stem from what are commonly called intercivilizational antagonisms. On the one hand, Russia is an immediate geographical neighbor of the Baltic countries, which for long periods were part of our civilizational, i.e. political, economic, cultural, and even ideological space.

On the other hand, the past few decades have made clear that those periods of belonging to the same state were unable to bring us together but, if anything, moved us away from one other. Forgotten antagonisms from the past came back to life, and new grievances and frictions emerged.

However, if one takes a closer look, relations between Russia and the Baltic nations have always represented clashes of civilizations, to use Samuel Huntington's language. They simply had ideological cloaks over them in the Soviet period. In effect, we have always been different. Yet despite these obvious differences, long periods of life in the Russian state gave the Baltic peoples the opportunity to make fruitful use of being positioned between Russia and Northern Europe.

But these geographical advantages, which had taken centuries to evolve, became useless overnight as the national elites that took power in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia after the collapse of the Soviet Union set themselves the goal of promptly severing their

countries' historical, economic and cultural ties with Russia, seeing the latter as a successor to the Soviet empire.

We believe that it was the wrong option to take at that historic juncture. Instead of trying to build good-neighborly relations with new, democratic Russia from scratch, the new Baltic rulers chose isolation from their eastern neighbor.

Unfortunately, the building of new Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian identities became an uncompromising nationalistic exercise, partly because of a sense of national pride hurt in the Soviet era and other grievances going back into the past. Russia was accused of having wronged the Baltic nations. Demands were raised that Russia give the Baltic countries official apologies and pay them compensation for alleged damages during the "occupation."

In Latvia, the Security Police have repeatedly arrested and searched the homes of Alexander Gaponenko, Yury Alekseyev, Iosif Koren, Valery Engel and other Russian-speaking community activists who have made objective historical assessments. They were cynically accused of "incitement to ethnic or racial hatred."

Over the last few years, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have slapped entry bans on various Russian scholars and experts for "unacceptable" ideological positions.

The Baltic countries were advised not to be hung up on former grievances but instead to shift their focus onto mutually beneficial trade, economic, cultural, and interregional cooperation with Russia. Moscow proposed that controversial issues from the past should be removed from politics and handed over to bilateral commissions of historians. There existed a Russian-Latvian commission and a Russian-Lithuanian commission of this kind. They had fruitful initial meetings, enabling the two sides to set guidelines for the joint study of the period between the two world wars. However, subsequently only the Lithuanians remained cooperative, while the Latvians were constantly seeking to politicize the activities of the Russian-Latvian commission and to assert their "occupation" logic and mythologized interpretations of pre- and post-World War II developments.

To sum up, Latvia and Estonia may abandon Russophobia and anti-Russian rhetoric and embark on the practical integration of their Russian-speaking communities in case of large-scale geopolitical changes such as the weakening of the global domination of the United States and the strengthening of Europe, whose major countries, primarily Germany and France, have no objective economic or political need for confrontation with Russia.

## **SERGEY TIKHVINSKY: DIPLOMAT, HISTORIAN, AND ORIENTALIST. ON THE CENTENARY OF HIS BIRTH**

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THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY of the birth of Sergey Leonidovich Tikhvinsky (1918-2018) is a good occasion to remember this outstanding diplomat and historian, the patriarch of Russian sinology.

Naturally, a biography of this leading figure in Russian historical science, a diplomat who took part in events such as the establishment of diplomatic relations with the newly created People's Republic of China, the drafting of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, and the normalization of relations with Japan is known in many details. It is difficult to add a new dimension to what we already know, but this article has a different purpose.

When we remember outstanding people, we usually focus on their activities at the height of their career, when they already hold senior positions. It seldom happens that a person's stature, scientific potential, and organizational abilities are already evident at the beginning of their career. Such is the case with S.L. Tikhvinsky.

Consular work in China had some specific features and occupied a significant place in the activities of Soviet diplomatic missions in that country. Vast numbers of former subjects of the Russian Empire who, as history would have it, were living in China required constant attention.

On the one hand, S.L. Tikhvinsky, like other employees of the Embassy and numerous consulates, had to protect Soviet citizens, who were often harassed by the Chinese authorities.

On the other hand, a significant part of the so-called white émigrés remained hostile to the USSR and its representatives in China. In this situation, Tikhvinsky tried to establish contacts with former compatriots, to ease the contradictions as far as possible, and to use the newly established ties for the benefit of both parties.

In that period, Sergey Leonidovich paid much attention to protecting the interests and strengthening the position of the Russian Orthodox Mission in Beijing, which was very influential among members of the Russian diaspora in Northern China and, in addition, had large real estate holdings formally owned by the USSR.

Tikhvinsky's willingness and ability to communicate with people from different social backgrounds and with different political convictions were quite unusual for the time, when a guarded and negative attitude towards members of the Russian diaspora abroad minimized contacts between Soviet diplomats and these Russians. In a sense, Tikhvinsky's notions - his understanding of the importance of contacts with compatriots, including those with opposite beliefs; reasonable use of such contacts for the good of one's country; and tolerance rather than isolation and intolerance of others - were ahead of his time, anticipating ideas about the creation of a Russian World, about the need to consolidate compatriots in different countries.

## **PRINCE GORCHAKOV AS A MIRROR OF THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF RUSSIA'S HISTORY: THE 220TH BIRTH ANNIVERSARY**

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PRINCE ALEXANDER GORCHAKOV, Chancellor and Foreign Minister of Russia (1856-1883), was the last of Alexander Pushkin's Lyceum classmates who lived long enough to become a moral and philosophical bridge between the romantic epoch of the Russian statehood as described by Derzhavin and Zhukovsky in their odes and the pragmatic and calculating era worthy of essays by Shchedrin, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He felt at ease in both contexts; as a young man, he was reproached for excessive punctuality, as well as systemic thinking that was ahead of his time; later, for the traces of romantic idealism of his school years. Some thought of him as a liberal too lenient toward Russia's enemies; others, a confirmed conservative of unshakeable imperialmonarchic principles. Even if he complained, from time to time, about disfavor of his bosses or even the czar, he made a splendid career as a statesman, reached the highest imperial posts and earned the highest awards.

Despite the subtleties or even changes of his viewpoints (rare for a noble czarist dignitary), he avoided a reputation of a reactionary or of an odious figure; he was never accused of aggressive obscurantism and similar sins. All Soviet historians of diplomacy, with all their dislike for the crowned double-headed eagle, invariably wrote of him with respect even if with a share of obligatory criticism.

The enigma of his diplomatic biography is worth scrutiny - the professional fate of a gifted diplomat at the era of deep-cutting international cataclysms who was deeply concerned with the safe sailing of the ship of Russian statehood.

Armed with the ideas of duty and honor, the brilliantly educated young diplomat began his service. He later wrote in his memoirs: "I started my career at 19 in the rank of a titular councilor under protection and leadership of Count Kapodistrias, later the famous president of the Greek republic... I was envied from the very first years in service."

The dignitaries close to the Russian throne had no kind feelings toward Gorchakov either.

Everybody who knew Gorchakov well agreed that he was most comfortable and very much at ease in the most civilized European cities. Early in the 1850s, he frequented them where he, an embodiment of educated Russia, added even more brilliance to the traditional dinners by quoting from Schiller, Byron and Goethe.

On the whole, Gorchakov wanted reforms: everything he said was clear yet not revolutionary. Peasants should be emancipated (without land); other changes, likewise, were very much needed. In polemics, as well as in documents for that matter, he was metaphorical, something that the public unaccustomed to an openness of top officials noticed and appreciated. Here is one of such comments by Gorchakov:

"During storms, ballast is jettisoned to allow the ship remain afloat; censorship is our ballast; it should be jettisoned to let the ship move freer."

This was the basic idea of 25 years of his ministerial services. It was met with enthusiastic applause of patriotically minded and enlightened public, as well as by fierce damnations from the same circles.

On February 27, 1883, he died in Baden-Baden and was buried in the Coastal Monastery of St. Sergius at St. Petersburg. The circle was completed: he had begun his ministerial career after the Crimean War and ended it after the Balkan War. The socialist camp and the Soviet Union for that matter fell apart according to what we can call the "anti-Gorchakov" scenario. Late in the 19th century, Gorchakov presciently foresaw that Russia's geopolitical interests would spread too far beyond the state's borders; that the people of the "leading nation" would become dispersed among Central Asian ethnicities; that Russian influence there would be lost; and that the discontent among the "vassals" of the socialist camp would become inevitable. This was the quintessence of his "honest service" to power, the country and his principles.

## **"I AM NOT THE FIRST WARRIOR, NOR THE LAST"**

**Author: S. Filatov**

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I am not the first warrior, nor the last, the Motherland's illness will be long. So pray for your beloved in the dawn. O my wife, fair and bright!

These lines by Alexander Blok open the two-volume set "I Am Not the First Warrior, Nor the Last"\* of a three-volume edition prepared for the 80th birthday of Vladimir Petrovich Lukin, a prominent domestic politician, diplomat and public figure. The book features the



best wishes and congratulations to the honoree from his numerous colleagues and friends and contain dozens of V.P. Lukin's public speeches, articles and interviews.

As you read this two-volume set, you find yourself in a kind of a time machine that casts the reader back to events of long ago that are interesting for the way the author assessed them as they occurred, following hot on their heels. After all, from the vantage point of today, the beginning of the 21st century, old crises are seen differently, considering that we know how they ended or how they affected global politics.

The two-volume set opens with a congratulatory message from Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Recently, Vladimir Lukin entered a new area of activity, becoming the president of the Russian Paralympic Committee, thus extending the scope of his professional interests and his commitment to sports. Since Western countries are currently exerting intense pressure on Russia, including in sports, the honoree's extensive diplomatic experience has proved very useful in waging battles with Russia haters.

The numerous aspects of Vladimir Lukin's sociopolitical activities, his human qualities and his achievements in various areas and official positions and capacities are noted in dozens of congratulatory messages that are published in the first volume. A mere enumeration of the names of Vladimir Lukin's friends who sent him their best wishes shows how wide his communication circle is and how close people from various circles - artistic, scholarly, political, etc. - have been to him throughout his life.

The scope of Vladimir Lukin's scholarly interests has always included China. Yes, everyone knows Vladimir Petrovich as a leading specialist and expert on the United States, but at one time he headed the Far Eastern policy section at the Russian Academy of Sciences' U.S. and Canada Institute, and China was his area of study.

The book also contains his recent interview with Rossiyskaya gazeta under the headline "The triumph of will? The triumph of honor." In a conversation with Yelena Yakovleva, Vladimir Lukin talks about the reasons for the intrigue around the Paralympics and the danger of the degeneration of the Olympic movement.

A special page in Vladimir Lukin's biography is his participation in Kiev talks just before the February 2014 coup in Ukraine. He offered an insider's view of the situation a year later in an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel.

Vladimir Lukin talks about himself, bringing together all chapters of his own life, and, as an octogenarian - with a sense of dignity and duty to the people and the country - he presents his two-volume set, where, line by line, he describes all stages of his way as a professional, patriot and warrior, who is not the first, nor the last.

## **RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY IN THE PAST CENTURY: REFLECTIONS ON A HISTORIC MISSION**

**Author: R. Reinhardt**

THIS YEAR, the second volume of the textbook "A History of Russian Diplomacy"\* was published. This publication is the logical conclusion of years of research and methodological work by the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, primarily the staff of the Department of Diplomacy, including many former diplomatic officials. It is important to note that despite the chronological bounds (1917-2017), quite narrow compared to the first volume, which spanned more than 1,000 years of Russian diplomacy, the second volume is marked by its focus on events and in-depth analysis of transformations in the domestic diplomatic service during the period under consideration.

It is possible to say that with some long-established traditions still alive, Soviet and then Russian diplomacy has undergone more significant changes over the past 100 years than ever before. The 20th century has been rather complicated with regard to national history in general and the history of foreign policy and diplomacy in particular. Nevertheless, despite its turbulence and the scale of accompanying sociopolitical, economic and cultural changes, it would be appropriate to talk about a kind of a timeless constant that is defined as Russia's historic mission as a country and state. In this context, in the narrow sense of the word, this is a historic mission of the domestic diplomatic service as a very important functional manifestation of the latter. This is a central theme of the present book.

The book not only lists or describes the most significant stages of Soviet and Russian diplomacy during the past century, but, more importantly, provides in-depth assessments of diplomatic successes and failures on the world arena in both a historical and contemporary dimension.

As for the book's format and its style of presentation, they measure up to the high standards that were set in the first volume. It provides notable characterizations not only of Foreign Ministry chiefs during the period under consideration, but also of prominent domestic diplomatic figures, whose contribution to upholding the country's national interests has far from always received balanced, objective assessments in both scholarly literature and school textbooks.

Notably, all the three parts of the book are dovetailed, harmoniously complementing each other. As a result, consecutive reading provides a holistic picture of the evolution and development of domestic diplomacy over the past 100 years. At the same time, the textbook can be used as a reference book on specific historical stages. As in the case

of the first volume, the multiple options for using the book both for self-education and in the classroom testify to its universal and didactic value.

For all the satisfaction resulting from the completion of years-long efforts in preparing and publishing the book, regrettably, it has to be said that time is inexorable not only with regard to historical eras and countries, but also to individuals. Many of our colleagues who took an active part in developing the concept of the two-volume edition are no longer with us. First and foremost, these are professors at the Department of Diplomacy: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary V.V. Samoilenko (1947-2018.), Candidate of History, co-author of the first volume; Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary P.F. Lyadov (1934-2017); and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary A.I. Stepanov (1930-2018), Doctor of History, head of institute and the department in 1990 through 1992. Their life and their years-long work are an example of honest and selfless service to Russia's national interests in public service, research and teaching, and embody the most important qualities of a diplomatic officer - i.e., high professionalism and love for the homeland. The memory of our colleagues will remain in our hearts, while their life sets an example for the next generation of young people, whom the two-volume textbook on the history of Russian diplomacy will hopefully help choose a diplomatic career or corroborate the choice they have already made.

### **"THE BRAVEHEARTED QUEEN"**

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NATALIA KULISHENKO'S "The Stalingrad Story of the English Queen"\* is a biography of a remarkable British royal: Elizabeth, the Duchess of York, Queen Consort and the wife of King George VI of England, crowned in 1937.

Elizabeth, the daughter of Scottish Earl Claude Bowes-Lyon, was born on August 4, 1900, and lived to be over 101. Elizabeth witnessed both world wars, having been born at the turn of the century. During World War I, the 14-year-old Elizabeth helped care for wounded soldiers at a hospital that had been set up at Glamis, her family's ancestral castle. During this time, she suffered the loss of her older brother at the front, the despair of her mother, and learned to take responsibility for her family.

The first Russian biography of Queen Mother Elizabeth has been published in a second edition, indicating genuine interest in Natalia Kulishenko's book, "The Stalingrad Story of the English Queen." The book has five sections, each of which is devoted to a specific period of the monarch's life: from her rise in the shadow of the crown, to the English queen being made an honorary citizen of Volgograd. The author skillfully weaves the telling of the monarch's family story with the telling of a plot worthy of a detective novel against "unfit-to-be-king Edward," who decided to marry a twice-divorced American. Kulishenko also captivates readers with a storyline about one of the

members of the "Cambridge five" - Sir Anthony Blunt, an adviser to the queen who was also a Soviet spy.

The author says one of the highlights of working on the biography was making the acquaintance of Ambassador Yury Yevgenyevich Fokin, who met with the queen mother on several occasions and had extensive conversations with the monarch.

In the foreword to the book, Yu.Ye. Fokin shares valuable information about Queen Mother Elizabeth's role in strengthening Russian-British relations.

One chapter of the book is titled "Great Britain's Secret Weapon," which is what both Britons and England's foes called Queen Elizabeth during World War II. Following her husband, King George VI, in the early days of the war, she urged the nation to show fortitude and "serve our country in her hour of need."

The author engagingly uses the actions of well-known personalities to set the scene of the initial days of the Second World War in England.

N.A. Kulishenko's book contains many interesting stories about the defense of Stalingrad from Nazi attacks. Among them is the sniper duel between Vasily Zaitsev and his German opponent. Many defenders of Stalingrad and prominent figures of the country have been made honorary citizens of the hero city Volgograd. In 2000, the Queen Mother Elizabeth of Windsor joined their number for her outstanding achievements in getting UK residents to help Stalingrad during the Second World War and for helping to develop friendly ties with Russia.

In telling the "Stalingrad Story of the English Queen," N. Kulishenko provides detailed context for the events of the Second World War.

A separate chapter of the book is devoted to Elizabeth II, since the fate of the new monarch was closely intertwined with her mother, the author explains. Not only that, but the mother-daughter relationship most clearly manifests the character of the elder Elizabeth, who essentially became her adviser. Although she constantly wore a disarming smile, it did not prevent those who knew the Queen Mother from calling her "an iron hand in a velvet glove" (p. 162). The author cites many examples of how tough Elizabeth could be with close and distant relatives. But what is interesting is that the Queen Mother could with her smiling gaze "hide" the royal family behind her back during critical days for the monarchy. And on many an occasion, Elizabeth's will played a decisive role in the fate of royal family members.

## FOUR HYPOSTASES OF GENERAL DE GAULLE

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A NEW EDITION of De Gaulle, a highly popular work of prominent Russian historian Marina Arzakanyan was published by the Molodaya gvardiya Publishing House in the Zhizn zamechatelnykh lyudey (Illustrious Lives) series. There is no need to talk at length about its hero: General de Gaulle, one of the greatest political figures of Europe of the 20th century, is well known to the educated Russian audience. A talented military commander, the savior and leader of France during World War II, the founder and first president of the Fifth Republic - this is a far from full list of his heritage. He is described as the "last great Frenchman" who belongs to the pantheon of the great sacred figures of French history: Jeanne d'Arc, Cardinal Richelieu and Napoleon Bonaparte. This explains the never slackening interest in his personality and his life.

Marina Arzakanyan hardly needs detailed representation: she is one of the outstanding Russian experts in the history of France, Doctor of History and Leading Researcher at the Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, with over 80 works to her name.

The first edition of the book under review appeared over ten years ago, in 2007. Later, it was reissued under a new title Velikiy de Gaulle: "Frantsia - eto ya!"<sup>1</sup> (Great de Gaulle - La France, c'est moi!). The reviewed publication is its enlarged edition enriched with recently declassified materials related to the history of World War II. Published in 2015 on the site of the Foreign Ministry of Russia, they became accessible to a wide circle of researchers. On the whole, Dr. Arzakanyan has brought together between the two covers a huge amount of information ranging from the general's personal notes and archival materials from the Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) to contemporary sources recently brought into circulation, including the memoirs of Gaullist Alain Peyrefitte (1994), declassified materials related to the correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill (1999), memoirs of Philippe de Gaulle, the general's son published in 1997 and 2004, diaries of Soviet Ambassador to Britain Ivan Maysky (2009), etc.

In the Foreword to the reviewed edition, the author identified its aim as recreation of the life and activities of the "greatest Frenchman of the 20th century" year by year to show him as a politician and a common man (p. 7). The book plunges the reader into public and political life of France of the first two-thirds of the 20th century. It is brimming with facts related not only to the milestones of the general's life but reveals his attitude to events indirectly related to France. Such were the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the Prague Spring of 1968, etc. The sections of Bibliography and Chronology of de Gaulle's life

supply professional historians and common readers with a lot of useful information and the photographs enliven the pictures painted by the author.

Structurally, this edition, as well as the first one, consists of four parts related to the four stages of the general's life that consecutively revealed his four hypostases.

Dr. Arzakanyan has paid a lot of attention to the environment in which the future president grew, the way he was educated and the ups and downs of his personal and professional life. She has convincingly demonstrated that from the early childhood de Gaulle associated himself with the history of France, he learned to identify the true needs of his country, to rise above private interests, to develop political realism and shoulder responsibilities. Here is a telltale episode. As a young man he studied

Dr. Arzakanyan has given enough space to de Gaulle's private life and the tragedy of 1948 when his daughter Anne died at 20. To commemorate her memory, he set up the Fondation Anne de Gaulle and a private hospital for handicapped young girls at Milon-la-Chapelle (Yvelines) (p. 140.) He gave up smoking in the same year and confirmed his reputation of an iron-willed man.

Having turned the last page of the book, the reader will undoubtedly agree with what the author has said about the general: "His indefatigable work for the benefit of his fatherland has forever made his name part of its history" (p. 250). Dr. Arzakanyan has revealed his far from simple nature and character while gradually moving the reader to the conclusion that his political heritage should be assessed from a distance, something that the general predicted in his time.