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SUMMARY.

A New Understanding of Strategic Stability

Roundtable.

Armen Oganessian, *Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs*:

A REPORT on the situation analysis that was presented on May 21, 2019 at the Russian Foreign Ministry has been prepared under the direction of Sergey Karaganov with the participation of several leading Russian independent and government experts on security and arms control policy. The report is titled, "New Understanding and Ways to Strengthen Multilateral Strategic Stability." This is an interesting study that raises a very important problem – the search for new approaches in new foreign policy realities. We could argue in detail or in general, but the time has come to respond to the challenges that we are facing.

Sergey Karaganov, *Dean of the School of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University - Higher School of Economics (NRUHSE)*:

THE IDEA of this report and a series of related papers originated several years ago, when we came to the conclusion that Russia's old foreign policy concept was no longer relevant, since its policy was not geared to the future. Our policy and national strategy are in a state where we may snatch defeat from the hands of victory.

Initially, the general thinking was that Russia should have some important national ideas. Without a national idea, a country dies sooner or later.

During the months that have passed since the report was released, I have not reviewed its conclusions although I am not quite sure about some of them because we have moved into an uncharted territory.

Dmitry Suslov, *Deputy Director of the Center for Integrated European and International Studies (NRU-HSE)*: THE GREATER PART of the Russian, U.S. or any other debate on strategic stability is a discussion of procedure, i.e., methods of ensuring arms control in ways that are the most effective in dealing with current problems. In our report, we proceeded from new challenges, not from the task of making old methods more effective (and that was our principled position). We can see that objectively, the threat of an armed clash between the great powers is growing. Relations between them are confrontational: the U.S. vs. China, the U.S. vs. Russia. The quality of political elites in the leading countries in the West is declining.

Today, that is not the case, taking into account the changes that have occurred in the geopolitical situation, drastic changes in military technology amid the multiplication, proliferation of types of weapons that we can use to inflict strategic damage on each other, as well as due to the toxic political situation between the nuclear powers, which does not allow, at least for now, the signing of any new arms control agreements. Therefore, there is neither the political will to develop a new agreement nor even a methodology as to what to agree on or what these agreements should be.

Priority should be given to averting any military confrontation between nuclear powers, to which end it is crucial to agree on basic rules of the game.

Yevgeny Buzhinsky, *Chairman of the Executive Board of the PIR Center*:

Strategic stability needs to have a basis. It is certainly wrong to equate arms control to strategic stability. However, this is a material basis for strategic stability. How to ensure stability? From my perspective,

there are two ways of doing that. The first is containment and mutual deterrence. This is a normal state between countries that are in or near confrontation with each other.

The second is mutual trust, transparency, openness, and predictability. However, that presumes somewhat different relations between states. At present, Russia and the U.S. are in a state of tougher confrontation than during the Cold War period. The famous remark “trust but verify” is very much alive and highly relevant today. You are proposing that rules of the game with the Americans be worked out. This task is unrealistic.

As a military man, I will say that in case of an armed conflict neither side would allow itself to be defeated. This means that escalation would be inevitable, as it is inevitable for a conventional conflict to grow into a nuclear one. The use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead to a global catastrophe.

Alexander Savelyev, *chief research associate, Ye.M. Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences:*

THE REPORT has underscored the problems that must be addressed without delay. The first is predictability and data exchange. Can we verify data if there is no treaty? We cannot. Our own legislation will not allow us to do that. Being a participant in negotiations, I know how reluctantly the parties exchanged data before the treaty was signed, data exchange being a precondition to the signing.

The second is equality. All complaints should be addressed to the Romans who devised Roman law. We had an agreement that lacked such equality. We had a provision recording our advantage on submarines and so on included in an international agreement. That caused a major stir in the U.S. Congress.

If we elaborate on the issue at hand, on each point, then another report would have to be written. At present, the term “strategic stability” is taken to mean very different things. I do not recognize any cyber weapons that can affect strategic stability. I do not believe that antimissile defense is a destabilizing system. This is my opinion and I adhere to it even though it may not be to everybody’s liking, especially when I compare antimissile defense with the hard hat of a construction worker who is told that his hard hat poses a threat to a brick wall.

Vasily Kashin, *senior research associate at the Center for Integrated European and International Studies (NRUHSE):*

CHINA is an important factor in the U.S.’s behavior. China has only once announced the size of its nuclear arsenal. The Chinese Foreign Ministry did that in April 2004, saying that China’s arsenal was the smallest among all official nuclear powers. Since then, China has not made a single statement regarding the quantitative size of its nuclear arsenal but talked only about minimal deterrence and the need to ensure its own defense against nuclear blackmail and attack. Information about China’s stockpiles of fissile materials is extremely unreliable, and the Americans themselves acknowledge that.

As a matter of fact, at the October 1 military parade, we saw three families of intercontinental ballistic missiles that are being manufactured and upgraded at the same time. No other country in the world has three families at once.

Until the Chinese reach the required level of military capability they will not talk. Nor will the Americans, because they will have to respond to the growth of the Chinese armed forces.

Oleg Stepanov, *Director of the Foreign Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation:*

The situation in the security stability sphere has been deteriorating for years. The negative dynamics have become very noticeable of late. As the report rightly notes, for the first time since the Cold War era, risks of direct confrontation between nuclear powers have emerged – what’s more, even if they do not have such an intention.

All of this comes amid the rather irresponsible behavior by some of our partners. They are essentially blocking expert dialogue channels and rapidly destabilizing the arms control architecture that took decades to create. On their initiative, treaty-based mechanisms for ensuring international security and strategic stability are being consistently dismantled before our very eyes.

Thus, in the very near future, it may so happen that we will completely lose international legal instruments to contain the nuclear arms race. Needless to say, such a scenario is in nobody's interests. We hope that sensible politicians across the ocean understand this.

Our stance on this issue is well known: Russia will be able to ensure its own security, as well as the security of its allies, under any scenario.

In the situation prevailing now, there is a pressing need for an intellectual contribution by experts in providing analytical support for the process of making foreign policy decisions.

Sergey Karaganov: WE HAVE NOT yet fully realized that with our policy to preserve our own security, we have in fact undermined the foundation of the West's 500-year political, economic and cultural domination. It takes getting used to a situation where they will no longer be able to dictate their terms to anybody in any area. We have ensured our security, thus changing the course of human history. The greatest contribution made by the USSR and Russia on a global scale was that we have ceased being part of the West and deprived the West and Europe as a whole of their global domination. Their biggest mistake in the history of the 20th century was that Hitler attacked us and they did not allow us to join NATO.

Dmitry Suslov: Our disagreements are not fundamental. Rather, they are instrumental. We are certainly not Bolsheviks. We are not proposing that everything be destroyed. The only thing that we are proposing to eliminate is the synonymy of the terms "strategic stability" and "arms control." We are not proposing that arms control architecture be destroyed, since it is already destroying itself. What's more, we believe that the New START treaty should be preserved for now. We believe that new talks and new agreements would be counterproductive.

Furthermore, as we analyze modern warfare, all Russian and U.S. experts say that if a war breaks out the first strike will be delivered with cyber weapons.

I do not understand why you think that multilateral nuclear deterrence is impossible. I agree that multilateral reduction is impossible, because parity is necessary here.

Alexander Savelyev: A NEW TREATY is necessary, and it will be signed.

Every country has different goals. Israel will not seek to contain Russia. Why should we contain India? But what about Pakistan, the U.S., France, Great Britain? The answer is "yes." We are closely collaborating with China, working together to put in place a missile early warning system. If we agree on data exchange, then strategic depth will instantly increase, and we will gain a clear advantage over the Americans. There is no nuclear deterrence as such. I believe that we will return to arms control because without it there will be no strategic stability in either a narrow or broad definition of the term.

Vasily Kashin: I WOULD LIKE to remind everyone that arms control agreements were signed with a good measure of certainty that existed in the political and strategic sphere. It is important to understand that it is difficult to sign such agreements because in the next decade, the situation may change in the most unpredictable way. There are two factors here. The first is the rapid development of nuclear weapons in Asia, above all in China and to a lesser extent in North Korea and India. This process could get out of control and assume bizarre forms.

The second is possible changes in the military sphere as a whole, related not only to cyber intelligence but also to artificial intelligence.

Another aspect is the development of autonomous weapon systems. It is important that there is a general recognition (by, among others, our U.S. counterparts) of the fact that autonomous weapon systems will change the military economy in its entirety.

Global Crisis as a Trigger of Geoeconomic Transformations: Challenges for Russia.

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In Lieu of an Introduction.

A GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS is a “slumbering reality” of sorts barely discernible in economic activity per se. Judging by the formal macroeconomic parameters, we are in the period of a relatively high global economic growth.

A combination of two factors, an effect of a more or less simultaneous appearance of trends of an economic and political crisis² and total erosion of the systemic global institutions, can be described as an important feature of the current global crisis.

The crisis’ depth might become unique – it might turn out that it is a crisis of the entire development model rather than a crisis of correlation of forces inside the model stemmed by a simple redistribution of shares of power in the system of globalization.

Main Trends of Global Transformations.

We have identified the following trends of global economic, in fact, political-economic transformations that may affect the practical aspects of Russia’s development.

- Appearance of new “nuclei” of global economic growth based on those of the economic “units” (mostly states) that ensured, with the help of various instruments of national sovereignty, control over the mechanisms of extraction, monetization and reinvestment of different types of rent. This process may be accompanied by degradation of the old “nuclei” of economic growth and changing geographic localization of the new ones. The Mediterranean, the traditional center of economic growth, may find itself in a risk zone because of the shift of the center of economic consolidation from Eastern Mediterranean beyond the borders of the traditional space of economic growth in the Persian Gulf.
- The crisis of the globalization institutions. This is the most obvious aspect: no more or less important international institution can be regarded as fully efficient. The WTO crisis is the most eloquent evidence of a negative synergy.
- The changing nature of the dominant elements of the development of the real economic sector; the paradigm of neurofication of social space⁴ outlined by the ideologists of globalization still exists even if there is an obvious trend toward a direct introduction of artificial intellect (AI) technologies in the real sector of economy. This may cause huge structural changes with unpredictable and highly substantial repercussions.

- Even if we do not follow the extreme scenarios of the fourth industrial revolution, we cannot but register that the world is moving toward a crisis of the “world factories” responsible for standardized production and consumption.
- The appearance of spaces of “new logistics” uncontrolled by the United States and its closest satellites will add sustainability to world trade and, at the same time, will create new seats of rivalry through noneconomic instruments among others.
- There is an increased demand for non-dollar mechanisms of mutual settlements in global and regional trade that should be protected against all sorts of politically motivated manipulations and “technological” defaults. There is an obvious demand in global economy for mechanisms of technological and operational protection against all sorts of manipulations in the global financial system or, put this differently, against domination of the United States in global finances.
- The crisis of social and cultural identities in the biggest postindustrial urbanized agglomerations leads to social instability, destruction of the old and emergence of new ideological concepts and constructs.
- In the midterm perspective, the potential of informational-political manipulations and the possibilities of retention, with their help, of “augmented reality” (AR) in political and economic processes has been considerably widened. This created the foundation for strategic informational manipulations, the methods of which were partially tested during the civil crisis in Venezuela.
- Multi-vectoral digitization and the risks of operational faults and their repercussions in complicated digitized systems.

Today, the AI systems, introduced, on a priority basis, in the strategically important, including military, branches, are developed on the basis of national standards. “Nationalization” or even deglobalization through partial nationalization of the most promising technological spheres means that the movement toward disruption of technological universalism of the globalization system has begun.

The world has come to the threshold of a new architecture of global economy that emerges from the new mechanisms of extracting and reinvesting the rent and a new role of noneconomic factors in economic processes.

In Lieu of a Conclusion: Confirmation of Risks.

Financial efficiency of global economy achieved, among other things, at the expense of the de facto lowered social standards and the level of life in the countries of global geoeconomic periphery and semi-periphery is used to compensate for the internal unprofitability of American economy and its inability to maintain the consumption level needed to ensure social stability. Continued domination of the financial sector slows down global economy mainly from the point of view of slowed demonopolization of the investment processes “squeezed” into specific formats which does nothing good to world economy.

Nationalization of economic growth is not a purely economic process even if it pursues economic aims and relies on economic processes. These aims cannot be resolved within economic mechanisms with the help of economic instruments even if politicization of economic processes at the tactical and strategic levels has been much lower. In any case, nationalization of economic growth will always have at least political and military dimensions.

The emerging geopolitical situation presupposes a comprehensive response in the form of domestic and foreign policy decisions based on a new quality of management of the country’s social and economic development treated as an absolute priority.

Big Business in a Multipolar World.

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THE 20TH CENTURY went down in history as a century of ideologies and sharp confrontation of states belonging to different systems, the Soviet Union and the United States in the first place. The 21st century has already demonstrated a mounting geopolitical confrontation of great powers that drew international business interests into their whirlpool. It turned out that the main actors of world politics cannot agree on new principles of economic cooperation, free competition and respect for the spheres of interests – they have chosen the road of mounting worldwide tension.

America and China.

THE AXIS of geopolitical and geoeconomic confrontation is gradually shifting toward the relations between the United States and China. With Donald Trump in the White House, Washington no longer cherishes the illusion that it would transform China into a “manageable partner” in the system of global American interests. The U.S. has obviously missed the moment when strong state and private corporations, especially in the high-tech branches, rose from the soil of Communist China and its one-party system. Today, they determine the pace and trends of scientific and technical progress and have challenged the seemingly unattainable leadership of the United States.

The United States that lacks the courage to accept the natural course of history explains China’s breakthrough, of which Huawei is one of the examples, by branding it “the den of the technologic thieves”.

The Chinese, however, are ready to mutually acceptable reasonable compromises, but they will continue fighting for the world’s markets. Beijing has stated that there are no reasons to expect that China will be crawling to America in response to its threats.

Chinese Conquer the World.

VERY MUCH in line with the laws of geopolitics, the center of this struggle is gradually shifting from the backward peripheries to the Old World, its Western center. Washington was moderately worried while Chinese were pushing into Africa, Asia and the Middle East; they remained more or less indifferent when Chinese reached Latin America, Washington’s backyard. Americans were waiting for what they thought would happen sooner or later: either Chinese drive will fizzle out or they will be repulsed at least by some of the targeted countries.

American diplomacy invented a counterargument: The recipients of Chinese investments would, sooner or later, find themselves in “debt bondage” and deprived of their sovereignty. This comes from the superpower that never respected and does not respect the sovereignty and independence of others. Expansions differ – one’s own is justified while others should be rebuffed.

“100,000 Tons of Democracy”.

ENERGY and hydrocarbons form the sphere in which the ties between transnational business and geopolitics are especially clear: oil and gas resources and transportation routes, diversification of supplies and energy security figure prominently in the interests of all great powers and are responsible for their disagreements. They determine the fates of small states and, in the final count, the war and peace issues. Despite certain individual agreements, the world as we know it today, is still far removed

from a broad consensus on these issues. Today, it is plunged in the never-ending struggle of “all against all.”

sk. It seems that this is the main reason of excessive politicization of the oil and gas business that has become an instrument of geopolitical rivalry of the great powers in which the United States calls the tune.

The highly tense relations between Russia and the United States are explained, to a great extent, by clashes on the fuel market of fuels and the fact that the sides are so far not ready to arrive at a mutually acceptable global modus operandi.

Arms Business.

THE MARKET of armaments has developed into an arena of fierce rivalry for the simple reason that in terms of profit it is one of the most lucrative or even the most. Dominated for a long time by monopolies that imposed their prices, the market remained outside the sphere of normal price formation.

For Washington, trade in armaments is a commercial and a geopolitical enterprise, an important part of its strategy of world domination. Its military superiority allows it to keep other states in check and, from time to time, remind those who try to object or even protest who is the boss.

Today, Russian air defense systems S400 Triumph, NATO’s nightmare, according to Stern, are in the center of struggle on the arms market. Washington knows only too well that these latest defense systems have outstripped the outdated American Patriot systems of 1981 and deprived the Pentagon of its impunity if it uses its air force against the “guilty” countries.

The ministry of armed forces of China and its leaders responsible for the use of new weapon systems were the first objects of American sanctions imposed on them for buying Russian antimissile systems and Sukhoi Su15 fighters. As could be expected, Washington failed to wreck the deal.

The events in Syria that entered the period of political settlement after the fierce civil war became an important watershed in the history of the Middle East. Russia has greatly consolidated its positions in the region lost after the Soviet Union’s disintegration. The Arab media started talking about Russia’s return to this part of the world and about America’s “weakened” positions. Geopolitical shifts were followed by new chances to invigorate business relations with the Arab countries that anyway want to move away from their one-sided dependence on the United States on the arms market and widen the group of arms suppliers.

Stealing a March.

THREE DECADES of international business activity in the new postSoviet market environment taught Russia’s foreign policy how to bring together geopolitical and commercial principles. Russia has partially restored the foreign economic positions lost after the Soviet Union’s disintegration by switching from ideological to pragmatic rails.

Faced with the challenge of Russian businesses, its most competitive and most developed branches, on the world markets, the West showed no enthusiasm.

During the last thirty years, not everything was going on smoothly and successfully. Moscow had to pay for its economic naiveté and political shortsightedness of the 1990s; its inability to foresee the repercussions of the inevitable “asset recovery,” that is, overcoming the unfavorable results of the Cold War and restoration of its national identity as a great power with a glorious history.

Russia’s financial and economic interdependence with and its integration in the external world dominated by the United States would allow the West to expect that sanctions would change the vector

of Russia's foreign policy or even destabilize the country to bring it to regime change in line with the "color revolutions" pattern.

To a certain extent, the fact that Washington cannot resolve the important global and regional problems without Russia is the latter's asymmetrical answer to the American sanctions. The world is interconnected: if a state acts deliberately and consciously against the interests of other countries, it can hardly expect to be met halfway when it needs this.

The time of Russian idealism has passed; the logic of geopolitical confrontation and business rivalry, where is no place for the only hegemon, has its own laws. That's how a new polycentric world is being formed.

The Islamic Factor in the Middle East and North Africa: The "ReIslamization" Phenomenon.

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THE "LIMINALITY" and "reIslamization" phenomena¹ caused by the split in the ranks of the Islamic theological elite into the moderate majority (minimalists) and radically minded minority (maximalists) [Waghid, 2011: 58] came to the fore in some of the North African Arab countries and in many sub-Saharan countries with considerable Islamic populations. Radicalization of a part of the Islamic political elite betrays itself in a much greater political and military activity of Muslim maximalists and a much wider scope of activities of extremist Islamic organizations.

In Africa, activity of Islamic maximalists and their attempts at "reIslamization" of local societies are closely connected with local ethnic specifics, beliefs and traditions.

Jihad in any of its forms was and remains the ideological instrument of transformation of the world of war (dar alharb) into the world of Islam (dar alislam); in other words, it is an instrument of proliferation of political influence of the Islamic state. The political Islam concept is an inalienable feature of the genesis of Islamic community. Political Islam as a new or even extremist form of Islamic behavior can be accepted mainly as an interpretation of this phenomenon by contemporary political science.

Minimalists are convinced that it is the duty of any Muslim to defend himself against any obvious external threat. Jihad can be fought against global injustices; but it is not obligatory with the use of arms anyway. Maximalists apply the Islamic principle of justice to entire mankind therefore the armed ways to promote justice through jihad are obligatory everywhere for all Muslims and in all forms prescribed by Sharia.

Today, very much like in the Middle Ages, both interpretations are acceptable; the choice belongs to Muslims.

The jihad against "Western values," "educational jihad" and "armed jihad" have been declared and are gaining momentum. Begun as a movement of Afghan graduates of Islamic educational establishments later known as the Taliban, it acquired followers in Africa. This explains Boko Haram's other name, The Black Taliban.

The idea of developing Islamic education as an opposition to the "Western educational model" combined with the "armed jihad" concept is a powerful political weapon in the hands of Islamist maximalists. The minimalists who condemn the maximalist methods no longer pin their hopes on the

armed strength of the state: they know that the problem would not be resolved even if Boko Haram is liquidated. Maximalist extremists will set up similar or even more aggressive and politically more dangerous organizations driven by similar ideological principles.

Practically all Muslim states of Africa remain devoted to traditional tribalism, tribe loyalty and solidarity of clans and communities; loyalty to leaders of tribes is highly important. These phenomena were inherited from hoary antiquity when man could not survive outside a group of his closest relatives. This loyalty predated the earliest religious feelings and was of a mystical and sacral nature.

Contemporary neo-tribalism is a powerful trend of global dimensions; it is the quest for a collective form of existence which preserves individual rights and freedoms.

In the countries of the frontier zone of Central Africa with their mixed Muslim-Christian populations, "re-Islamization" has an inner-Islamic as well as Islamic-Christian dimension. The conflict between Islam and Christianity strongly affects the Central African Republic in which an official Russian military-civilian contingent of about 180 men has been present since 2018.

THE RE-ISLAMIZATION of sub-Saharan societies was stirred up, first, by the split of the Islamic spiritual elite into minimalists and maximalists in the countries of canonical Islam of the Middle East plunged into instability by the Arab Spring and, second, by the specifics of the so-called African Islam, its closeness to local folklore, its highly decorative and superficial nature.

Tribalism and neo-tribalism have created a favorable context for an inner-Islamic conflict by supplying both sides with allies and adepts. The sharp conflicts that undermine the state forms of social organization of Islamic Africa are intra-Islamic in the first place – the Muslim spiritual-political elites are highly polarized.

Secretary-General of OIC Yousef Al-Othaimen repeatedly expressed his concern with the fact that the West tries to tie together extremist and terrorist groups with Islam, a great religion of tolerance and peace. The OIC members actively promote antiterrorist cooperation with Russia and moderate Islam that preaches eternal values.

Formation of a Political Elite for Modern Iraq: American and Iranian Factors.

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THREE KEY EVENTS have changed both Iraq and the Middle East: the 1979 revolution in Iran, the Iran--Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, and the 1991 crisis in Kuwait. The latter led to a change in the domestic policies of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and introduced new variables to the dynamics of the government's relations with ethnic and religious groups (mainly Shiites and Kurds).

The occupation of Iraq in 2003 ensured the Americans' multifaceted influence on the process of elite formation.

Beginning in the 1980s and growing into the 1990s, the exiled opposition was increasingly influenced and dominated by ethnocentric Kurdish and religio-centric Shiite political forces. Individuals in the opposition who considered the preservation of a homogenized and centralized version of Iraqi nationalism a necessity lost more and more ground to ethno-religiously charged political forces.²

Depending on the changing political situation, Iran continued to provide limited and necessary (in its opinion) support to various Kurdish forces in their opposition to the central authorities in Iraq.

Upon the establishment of the Americans' occupational regime in Iraq, a young cleric from the influential Sadr family, Mukhtada al-Sadr, called upon his supporters to take up arms against the invaders. His adherents created the "Mahdi Army," which cost the Americans the lives of hundreds of soldiers. The Sadrist movement subsequently became an influential force in parliament and represented the Shiite communities in the south and center of Iraq, the marsh Arabs and Sadr City (named in honor of the opposition regime and the father of Mukhtada al-Sadr, Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr, who had suffered at its hands).⁴ The Sadrists' military wing retained serious influence on the state's security system.

The formation of both the new political elite of Iraq and the security agencies turned out to be directly dependent on the American occupying forces, on Iran's policies and its ties with the movements that opposed Saddam Hussein. The dominant Shiite political forces turned out to be very diverse and heterogeneous, with different political interests and the serious influence of radicals.

The "Kurdish question" also appeared on the agenda. The Kurds' referendum on independence in the territories controlled by Erbil, held in September 2017, put Baghdad and Prime Minister Haider alAbadi in an uncomfortable position before the 2018 elections and strengthened his opponents in the struggle for power.

The U.S. and Iran sided with the central government, as they did on the issue of fighting IS. This prompted Baghdad to carry out a military operation to regain sovereignty and even regain control of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. This loss for the Kurds essentially signified the failure of the referendum and revealed a split in the Iraqi Kurdistan elite between the Barzani and the Talabani clans.

With the administration of President Donald Trump coming to power in the U.S. in 2017 and Washington withdrawing from the JCPOA in May 2018, a new round of confrontation began, putting Iraq in an uncomfortable position. The American sanctions against Iran that followed Trump's decision caused serious damage to the country's economy and jeopardized any agreements between Tehran and third countries due to the extraterritorial nature of the sanctions.

For Iraq, Iran continues to be a key country for receiving electric power. However, amid the need to replace Iranian oil on the world market – a task that Washington is working on – the role of Iraqi oil on that market is becoming stronger. If the Americans decide to adhere strictly to their policy, then sanctions may also be imposed against Iraq, which would lead to increased risks and instability.

The inadvertent symbiosis between the U.S. and Iran in Iraq, engendered by the convergence of their interests in that country, is gradually waning as the fight against IS becomes less of a priority. Even though the 2018 elections and the escalation of tensions between the U.S. and Iran created a new configuration of forces, Iraq remains dependent on these foreign players, and its political elite continues to rely on the muhasasa ta'ifia system that was employed there in 2003. In response to the Iraqi public demand for reform, the entrenched elite may sacrifice certain political representatives, but it will maintain its position without fundamental changes.

Anti-Semitism Among Muslim Immigrants as a Threat to Host Societies: The Case of Germany.

Alexander Nadezhdin, *Second Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Federal Republic of Germany*; 3039210@mail.ru

EXPERTS have for years been pointing to mounting xenophobic, antiimmigrant, and radical sentiments among the population of Europe. However, recently it is not only refugees and economic migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) who have been facing hostility but also Jews who have lived in Europe permanently and have been integrated into European society.

Despite German society's overall friendliness toward Jews and religious and ethnic tolerance, the German police record an increasing scale of anti-Jewish crimes.

Nongovernmental organizations claim that anti-Jewish crimes in Germany are far more numerous than police statistics record.

Law enforcement agencies say that there is a new trend in anti-Semitic crimes – more of them are committed by Muslims today than in the past, when the majority of perpetrators were German right-wing extremists.

Arab-Israeli Islamic expert Ahmad Mansour argues that the anti-Semitism of Germany's Muslim community is generally based on the following assumptions: "Jews were behind-the-scenes organizers of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have supreme power in the United States, are prone to deceit and manipulation, seek personal monetary gain, and are to blame for global financial crises."

The growing scale of anti-Semitic crimes committed by migrants has fueled public debates in Germany about migration into the country. There have been appeals for stricter penalties, including offenders' deportation to their home countries.

More and more Jews have been refusing to receive mail from their communities because of being afraid that neighbors who don't know they are Jews will find out they are.

A separate problem is the denial of the Holocaust, which is typical in the Muslim world. The German government has not addressed this problem in an adequate way. According to official statistics, about 23% of Germans are unaware that denial of the Holocaust is a criminal offense in Germany.

There have been appeals for more effective action to prevent the use of the Internet, social networks and messengers for incitement to extremist acts or for allegations of racial supremacy. The Halle synagogue attack highlights the need for this form of action better than much else does. The Internet has become a convenient channel for anonymous hate speech, which surged after shooting at a synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in October 2018 that claimed 11 lives.

Importantly, German anti-Semitism has an extra source today: if in the past, it was mainly rightwing extremists who hated the Jews and incited anti-Semitic attacks (there remain instances of this), today much of the country's anti-Semitism comes from Muslims. Some German Muslims openly insult, harass, or even physically assault Jews. They are supported by MENA refugees who arrived during the crises of 2015-2016 and try to justify their anti-Semitism by references to Israeli policies toward the countries they came from.

If the scale of anti-Semitic crimes keeps going up in Germany, there may emerge new threats in addition to such imports as ethnic or family clan crime rings, honor killings, ethnic or religious terrorism, and enclave building.

Italy, Our Privileged Partner.

Sergey Razov, *Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Italy*

Regrettably, they are affecting our bilateral cooperation quite seriously. I don't have at hand precise quantitative parameters of the damage done by the sanctions. In any case, it is running into billions of euros in opportunity losses. According to the Italian General Confederation of Agriculture, between 2014 and 2018, Italian exports to Russia fell by more than 3 billion euros.

The reason of such a drastic reduction in the volume of bilateral trade turnover is, of course, not only anti-Russian sanctions and our retaliatory restrictive measures, but also the general slowdown of the global economy and the sharp decline in energy prices over the past five years (with energy accounting for about 80% of our exports to Italy), changes in the correlation of currency exchange rates, which has reduced economic interest in imports from the euro zone, etc.

Our Italian counterparts point to growing losses sustained by Italian producers through the closure of certain Russian market segments to them, primarily the agricultural sector, and speak out in favor of lifting the sanctions as soon as possible. However, considerations of Euro-Atlantic solidarity and bloc discipline within the framework of the European Union, NATO and other organizations, of which Italy is a member, ultimately prevail.

Remember how, back in the Soviet days, they criticized us for applying the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" to the Soviet Union's relations with its allies. At present, Washington and Brussels are imposing collective decisions, which often do not respond to the national interests of NATO and EU member countries. As the Soviet-era joke went, "Collective farming is all voluntary: Those who want to join in, are welcome; those who don't, will be executed."

Rome firmly believes in resolving international problems by peaceful means through political negotiations, maintaining and expanding dialogue channels, including with Russia.

Italy has deep historical, primarily economic interests in Libya. Italy's Eni controls over 45% of Libya's natural gas and oil production. Italy did not initiate what NATO member states did to Libya in 2011. Italy, like other countries, is currently experiencing the negative consequences of such shortsighted aggressive actions – specifically, the disintegration of statehood, the ongoing civil conflict and migration flows from Libya going to, among others, Italy.

The issue of migration is a major component of domestic political debate in Italy. On the whole, Italian society is quite tolerant toward foreigners.

In August, Italy adopted a package of migration and security measures. The authorities now have the powers to prohibit the entry, transit or mooring of any vessel in Italy's territorial sea if they violate the migration law. The package also raises fines for the captains of ships with illegal migrants on board and establishes a fund for the repatriation of illegal immigrants.

As for our relations with Italy's key political figures, parties and movements, we seek to build equidistant (it would be more appropriate to say, equally close) relations with the forces represented in the national parliament, regardless of their political orientation, but of course, taking into account their willingness to develop ties with Russia. I believe that this approach responds to our country's long-term interests.

Russian-Italian relations have always been privileged. They have retained their quality and continue to develop steadily despite all difficulties.

As for what you described as problem areas in bilateral dialogue, perhaps I could recall the expulsion of two Russian diplomats in 2018 as part of a collective campaign by the West related to the "Skripal case" or the arrest, in August 2019, of a Russian citizen in Naples under a U.S. extradition warrant. But as you can see, such malignant episodes emerge not as part of Russian-Italian cooperation but are deliberately brought in from the outside.

Russia's Bilateral Agreements as an Instrument for Stronger Guarantees of Information Security.

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RUSSIA is a signatory to many multilateral cooperation agreements on international information security.

While these are all highly important agreements, and while they show consensus on general principles for building an international information security system, bilateral accords can also enable countries to develop very effective, very practicable information security mechanisms.

Russia's first bilateral agreement on information security was an accord with Brazil signed in Moscow on May 14, 2010.

It was the first document of its kind to formulate principal threats caused by the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in international conflicts for hostile purposes, against both civilian and military targets such as critical infrastructure facilities. The document also points out the possibility of use of ICTs for terrorist and criminal purposes.

The Russian-Brazilian agreement set specific tasks such as defense of critical national infrastructures, joint action in the formats of international organizations and forums, sharing of experience, personnel training, working meetings, workshops, and participation in various conferences.

Some of the tasks set by the Russian-Belarusian agreement are similar to tasks set by the Russian-Brazilian accord. One of them is to establish a joint monitoring and reaction system. To develop coordinated criteria for the evaluation of threats and principles of handling them, Russia and Belarus pledge to inform each other about their potential new laws on information security. A key part of the agreement is a plan to defend the two countries' critical facilities as those are increasingly in danger.

As a novelty, the Russian-Cuban agreement has a strong practical aspect to it – it makes provision for concrete mechanisms for cooperation and for exchanges of equipment and technologies. Hence, the accord not only reaffirms that Russia's position on international information security is identical to Cuba's but also reflects a trend for agreements of this kind to provide maximally concrete guidance for practical action.

A Russian-Chinese agreement signed in Moscow on May 8, 2015, deserves special attention from the viewpoint of Russia's information security policy. In this accord, Russia and China use new principles for assessing international information security threats as a result of cyberattacks that aim to inflict economic or other damage on countries, including by undermining their information infrastructures, and thereby would violate the sovereignty or territorial integrity of countries and endanger international peace and strategic stability.

On October 15, 2016, Russia signed an agreement on cybersecurity with another BRICS partner, India. This agreement, signed in Goa, reflects the closeness of the two nations' views on the cybersecurity issue and characteristics of their legislation. For this reason, the subject matter of the document is cybersecurity rather than information security in general.

Russia's next bilateral agreement on information security was an accord with Vietnam signed in Sochi on September 6, 2018.¹² The agreement states the concurrence of the two countries' views on the information security issue and forms the basis for the implementation of specific initiatives. The accord

states identical evaluations of principal threats by the two countries and contains what has become a typical set of cyber threats to be listed in Russia's bilateral agreements, including the use of ICTs to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, interfere in their internal affairs, inflict economic damage on them, carry out terrorist attacks, and commit crimes.

On April 5, 2019, Russia signed an agreement with Turkmenistan that became the first bilateral accord on information security between Russia and a Central Asian state.

Between 2010 and 2019, in seeking bilateral agreements on information security, Russia held expert-level consultations and working meetings with member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Collective Security Treaty Organization, the United States, Western European, Central and South American, African, Southeast Asian, and other countries.

Russia continues to seek bilateral agreements on information security and has begun to negotiate draft accords with some countries.

To sum up, practical bilateral cooperation in seeking guarantees of information security, including cybersecurity, and coordinated joint action in various international formats is helping to create a solid global legal and organizational information security framework.

Historical-Cultural Background of Cooperation Between Russia and China.

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In the political context, the balance of power is seen as an argument in favor of Russia's turn to the East. In the economic context, Russia's expanded cooperation with the ATR countries (including the People's Republic of China) is explained, among other things, by their fast economic growth. In addition to the above factors of integration, new academic and political approaches to the assessment of the future relations between Russia and China emphasize the special importance of the problem of compatibility of their cultural codes.

Some of those who analyze their cooperation in the One Belt One Road project go beyond the simple numbers to warn Russia against a strategic blunder that might leave the Celestial Empire the only dominant force on the Eurasian continent and actually deprive Russia of its "European choice."

In the historical-cultural context, the Russian academic community, likewise, demonstrates cautious approaches to the future of Sino-Russian cooperation.

In the West, the closer relations between Russia and China are perceived as a threat to the Western world.

THEIR CULTURAL CLOSENESS rests on the main feature of their histories that determined the entire range of social relationships: they remained traditional societies for a long time, their development regulated, to a great extent, by traditions, customs and moral norms. Industrialized in the 20th century, they gradually developed into modern urbanized social organizations.

Collectivism and communality traditional of Russians and Chinese consolidated the special role of spiritual and moral principles as an important regulator of social order; the principle of rational profit

was pushed aside to concentrate on justice, virtue, mutual assistance. Similar historical and cultural foundations contribute to a very specific mechanism of social consolidation or “societal links” that differ a lot from the Western pattern.

Contrary to the highly optimistic Western assessments of solidarity, the results of public opinion polls reveal that the level of Europeans’ trust in national and subnational structures is gradually sliding down.

THE CONSERVATIVE NATURE of political modernization unfolding in both countries is determined by the desire to preserve tradition as the cornerstone of social development. Being distinct from the Western interpretation of modernization as overcoming tradition, social practice of China and Russia and its scientific interpretation point to the irrelevance of the Western experience of liberal democracy which, therefore, cannot be planted in the national soil of Russia and China, as well as to the tradition as an inevitable element of their social development.

As distinct from the institutional idea about power as a free choice of citizens that predominate in the West, the attitude to power in China and Russia is determined by the centuries-old tradition that associated the supreme order with the carrier of the “supreme truth” and the guarantors of public good.

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION, it should be said that the historical-cultural foundations of cooperation between Russia and China that are actualizing the non-Western development paradigm do not constitute the content of the commonly used yet outdated dichotomies: opposition of the traditional to the contemporary, of Western to everything else, and of the local to the global. Developing along their own and very specific cultural road, Russia and China are an open part of the planetary civilizational process.

The Eagle of an Unalterable Nature.

Jorge Arreaza Montserrat, *Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela*

SINCE ITS FOUNDING, Venezuela has been a country of solidarity, with the conscience of belonging to something greater, an immense nation, a power in the making that, had it consolidated itself legally, economically, and politically, it would have modified the “universal equilibrium,” the balance of power in international relations. Venezuela’s only military action outside of its borders was inevitably tied to its original right to self-determination as a sovereign people.

In contrast, the United States was and is an actor that, since its origin, proposed the imposition of a sole valid system of government: its own.

Although today we witness daily the unilateral practices of Washington’s domination, this is nothing new.

As professor Vladimir Acosta notes, this desire for domination has always been reserved for white Anglo-Saxon protestants, who at no time considered “dirtying” their blood and lineage by mixing with other peoples of this great continent. Two hundred years later, Donald Trump is a clear exemplar of this supremacist theory.

Washington assumed the capacity to determine if a government fits, or not, with its model of civilization, and whether it does, it allows it to exist or overthrows it by force. This U.S. vision for Latin America had its first manifestation in 1905 with the invasion and intervention of the customs houses of the Dominican Republic. During these years, they employed their “big stick” policy. Through military and economic force, they began controlling the principal strategic points in Central America and the Caribbean.

Latin America and the Caribbean have always been intervened militarily, economically and politically by the United States. John Dower gives a detailed compilation of this through information contained in declassified documents, as well as through rigorous research from intellectuals that are not exactly leftists.² His analysis shows the role played by different U.S. government in post-World War II conflicts and it presents striking data. Dower cites a study by John Coastword, who concludes that between 1948 and 1990, the U.S. government “procured the overthrow of at least twenty-four government in Latin America.

But its dominion was not limited to Latin America. During the Cold War, conflicts were carried out in the peripheries: Vietnam, Korea, Laos, Cambodia. After the fall of the Soviet bloc, in the final decade of the 20th century, the United States carried out a violent campaign to taking over the energy resources of the Middle East.

In a new stage of global aggression, the U.S. elite exercises a new modality of war against countries that do not bend to its designs: so-called economic sanctions, or coercive, unilateral measures. Inspired by medieval sieges, in which the aggressors surrounded castles to deprive them of the most elementary means of sustenance for survival, the U.S. government demonstrates its hegemony over the financial system to asphyxiate countries.

Sooner rather than later, Our Latin America and Caribbean will become a great power, it will occupy the role that history has granted and imperialism has denied, we will be a solid hub of power that will check and neutralize any foreign attempt at domination. Until that time, from Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and other places within Our America, we will stay strong, in resistance – yes – but also in an offensive for human dignity, for the right to be free, to be independent, the right to build, without interference, the system that gives us the greatest sum of happiness possible; the right to walk on our own feet, the right to Overcome.

The Republic of Crimea: Native Language Education.

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The preservation and promotion of linguistic diversity and the protection of native languages are an integral part of ethno-cultural development. The languages of the peoples of Crimea provide the basis for their ethnic self-identification, reflect historical experience, and serve as an instrument of socialization, expression, and transfer of ethno-cultural traditions.

Since 1926, Russian has been the predominant native language of the Crimean population. According to the 2014 census, 99.8% of the Crimean population spoke Russian, the official language of the Russian Federation.

In the republic, the right of citizens to receive preschool, primary general, and basic general education in their native language, including Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar, and the right to learn their native language have been established by law. The exercise of these rights is ensured by the creation of a sufficient number of appropriate educational organizations, classes, and groups, as well as conditions for their functioning.

In accordance with the principles of providing general education and language policy in the Republic of Crimea, the republican authorities, as represented by the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Education, Science, and Youth, have been working to create all the necessary conditions for the exercise

of Crimeans' rights to education in their native language regardless of their national, linguistic or ethnic identity. For this purpose, the republic's government allocates funds for publishing textbooks, training personnel, and developing curricula in the native languages of the peoples of Russia living in the Republic of Crimea.

In order to provide citizens with ample opportunities to exercise their rights to native language education, the Republic of Crimea has organized such education in different forms: education in one's native language (for the official languages of the Republic of Crimea); the teaching of official and native languages as separate subjects in the curriculum (required or elective); and the teaching of official and native languages as extracurricular activities.

After Crimea's unification with the Russian Federation, a task of paramount importance for the Crimean education authorities was to ensure, on the one hand, the continuity of the educational process, and on the other, its effective and painless adaptation to the standards in force throughout the whole territory of Russia.

In 2015-2017, work was organized to prepare, translate, edit, publish, and deliver 102 original and translated educational publications (textbooks, teaching aids, readers, programs, glossaries, etc.) in Crimean Tatar with a total of 142,028 copies. At present, education in Crimean Tatar is provided using new translated textbooks in 12 subjects: history, geography, social studies, and others.

In 2018, we organized the preparation of 15 original educational publications on the Crimean Tatar language and Crimean Tatar literature and on the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian literature for students of general education organizations.

In the last five years, Crimeans have defended ten candidate and doctoral dissertations, including eight on the Crimean Tatar language and literature, and two on the Ukrainian language and literature.

Based on free, voluntary, and informed choice by students (parents) of the language of instruction or languages as separate subjects, each educational organization issues local regulatory acts to determine the language or languages of education for the coming school year

General education institutions with Russian as the language of instruction also provide an opportunity for students to learn the official languages of the Republic of Crimea (Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian) and other languages (Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, and German) as separate subjects studied in depth, elective courses or extracurricular activities.

Thus, we can draw the conclusion that the creation of conditions for education in the native languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation living in the Republic of Crimea, for their study, support, and maintenance is a powerful factor in the development of the republic and, consequently, of multiethnic Russia as a whole. The basis for education in the official languages – Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, and other languages of the peoples of Russia – is provided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea.

The Vitaly Churkin Moscow International Model UN (CMIMUN) as a Russian Soft Power Instrument.

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THE VITALY CHURKIN Moscow International Model UN (CMIMUN),¹ a Russian version of model United Nations (MUN), a worldwide educational project simulating UN activities, is one of the most awaited key youth events at MGIMO University. Hundreds of secondary school and university students from Russia and about a dozen foreign countries simulate activities by various bodies of the United Nations – its principal and subsidiary organs, specialized agencies, committees, commissions, funds and programs, and UN-related organizations.

The structure of CMIMUN mirrors the United Nations' rank-and-file membership of 193 states and the UN apparatus. CMIMUN receives various forms of support from the UN Association of Russia,³ the UN Information Centre in Moscow, and other organizations that see CMIMUN not just as an educational game but as a full-scale movement bringing together active and talented young men and women who share the ideals and principles of the universal international organization.

The organization of CMIMUN meets very high standards, which are comparable to those of real-life diplomatic and political events, including multilateral summits, and this largely goes to the credit of selfless efforts by MGIMO students whose names remain unknown. Daily participation in CMIMUN helps students become experts in a specific UN field of activities such as peacekeeping, disarmament or human rights, teaches them high-standard explanatory and information skills, and gives them priceless experience of making records of large-scale events, something they may need in their careers.

The nature of CMIMUN largely explains its effectiveness. As simulation of conferences, CMIMUN not only quenches the thirst of young inquisitive minds for knowledge but also gives young people practical experience of participation in international decision-making, urging them to look for opportunities and limitations existing in it.

There is a tradition in CMIMUN that none of the participants is allowed to represent their own country. This tradition aims to broaden participants' outlook and provide them with better knowledge of various countries.

Since students involved in MUN will be builders of the future world, it is hard to imagine a more effective way than MUN for the United Nations to popularize its values and principles.

AS PART of the global MUN movement, CMIMUN is an effective Russian soft power mechanism – it helps explain Russia's position on principal global issues and on key UN agenda points.

Foreign participants often change their attitude to Russia during their stay in the country.

CMIMUN is not merely a part of MGIMO's curriculum but a large-scale new-generation educational project in which students are not only taught by MGIMO lecturers but also independently obtain and analyze knowledge.

knowledge. In simulating the representation of various countries, CMIMUN participants can see the way the United Nations works and can witness firsthand the mechanism of emergence of a polycentric world order that is replacing the so-called unipolar order – a relatively short period of the world's domination by U.S.-led Western countries, which have repeatedly taken unilateral action, bypassing the United Nations. Moreover, one way or another, practically all CMIMUN participants come to the conclusion that there is no reasonable alternative to the United Nations as the central coordinator of international relations,¹⁸ as a universal organization in terms of representation and as a body vested with unique legitimacy.

The Image of Russia and Its Evolution in the Country's Foreign Policy Strategy.

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There probably doesn't exist a country that doesn't care what it looks like in the eyes of the international community, how its leaders and their actions are perceived, how its home and foreign policy is assessed, and what reputation its people have.

Today, information is pivotal to whether an individual, a group of people, a company, a nongovernmental organization, a project, or an event is successful. Therefore, it is highly important to maintain a positive image of one's country – in today's globalized world, it depends in many aspects on recognition by other nations whether one's own country is successful economically, socially and culturally.

There were, in fact, two forms of international perception of Russia in the early 1990s. On the one hand, Russia was seen as continuator of the cause of the Soviet Union, as a totalitarian state seeking to force communism on the entire world and depriving its own citizens of all rights and freedoms. On the other, perestroika, glasnost, the liberal reforms of the late 1980s, and the subsequent breakup of the powerful Soviet empire led the West to see Russia as “a country that has defeated communism and stood ready to embark on a democratic path of development.”

The Russian leadership made every effort to ensure that the latter point of view take the upper hand.

In prioritizing relations with the United States and Western Europe, Russia loosened its ties with Eastern European nations that had been the Soviet Union's fellow members of the socialist community and with Asian, African, and Latin American countries. One reason was that Russia was afraid of being in the way of the West as it was advancing its own interests in those countries.

This willingness to sacrifice its interests for closer relations with former ideological adversaries did not enhance Russia's international prestige – it undermined it if anything

Russia's foreign policy changed in 1996, when Yevgeny Primakov was appointed foreign minister. Primakov didn't abandon the idea of good relations with Europe and the United States but put Russian interests at the basis of his line. Russia came to be seen internationally not only as a partner of Western countries but also as one of the centers of a new, multipolar world.

IN 2000, Vladimir Putin became president of Russia, and this should be considered the starting point of Russia's present-day domestic and foreign policy.

Russia's replacement of its national anthem in 2000 – its adoption of the tune of the former Soviet anthem – demonstrated to the international community that Russia was a true successor to the Soviet Union, that it wasn't going to disown its Soviet past, and that it laid claim to the status of a world power.

Hence, Putin's taking the helm in Russia and his domestic and foreign policy strategies came up against quite negative reactions from foreign countries.

The situation changed radically after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, which claimed more than 3,000 lives. That day, Putin was one of the first to offer condolences to U.S. President George W. Bush and assure him that Russia could give the United States all forms of support in fighting international terrorism.

This might have been the first time the West saw post-Soviet Russia as an equal partner. International ratings of Russia and Putin went up sharply.

Although Russia's image improvement efforts bore some fruit, foreigners on the whole continued to see Russia in negative light during Putin's first two presidential terms.

During Putin's third presidential term from 2012 to 2018 and his fourth term, which started in 2018, the world community has had mixed perceptions of Russia.

Tremendous numbers of foreigners who visited Russia were given a warm welcome and had a chance to learn more about Russian history and culture. This was likely to make them see the falsehood of the myths about bears, vodka, balalaikas, and the perpetually drunken, scruffy, and uncultured Russians.

The crisis in Ukraine in 2013 and the reunification of Russia and Crimea, based on a referendum of March 16, 2014, led to the international isolation of Russia and made it a victim of largescale Western political and economic sanctions that resulted in an overall economic downturn in Russia, making the ruble plummet, prices go up, and living standards go down. Russia's international image deteriorated sharply.

The first two terms of Putin and the presidency of Medvedev can be called a period of prosperity for Russia and a golden age for its international reputation. Russia felt completely confident as an independent state, its economy had improved, and largescale projects were launched to show Russia to the world "in all its glory."

The sharply negative attitude to Russia that emerged in 2014 remains the case. At the same time, Putin, despite negative comments about him, is considered a powerful and influential world leader.

The Russia-Africa Summit: A View from Benin.

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Albert Dyabin, *First Secretary at the RF Embassy in Benin, Candidate of Science (Political Science)*

THE FIRST Russia-Africa summit, which took place on October 23 and 24, 2019 in Sochi, was one of the most important foreign policy events of the outgoing year (the present authors had the privilege to attend this important international forum). Russia hosted a successful top-level meeting and established dialogue with an entire continent. The summit was attended by delegations from all 54 African states. Moscow took advantage of the occasion to deliver its message: "Russia is returning to Africa." And it is returning as a good old friend, as well as a reliable and time-tested partner.

However, it is important to remember that politically, culturally and civilizationally, Africa is a rather diverse and heterogeneous continent, where each country has its specifics and peculiarities, and that after its years-long absence, Russia will have to make considerable efforts to regain its niche on the continent.

Dialogue with Africa is certainly very important. The "African group" on the international arena is a cohesive and well-organized force capable of effectively impacting the global decision-making process, for example, through the mechanism of adopting UN resolutions. Africa has 54 votes at the UN General Assembly, and every country, whatever its size or gross domestic product, has the same one vote as the U.S. So, it is extremely important for Moscow to deepen a comprehensive dialogue with the "African group," with each African country, thus expanding the number of our supporters and allies at the UN, as well as other international organizations.

The positions of Russia and the majority of African countries on key international issues are similar or identical: Africa supports our initiatives at the UN.

According to the Russian side, there are also good prospects for cooperation with Africa in health care; geological exploration, prospecting and mining; nuclear and hydroelectric power engineering; and cooperation in the defense and technology sector.

The Sochi summit was attended by, among others, a delegation from a relatively small West African state, the Republic of Benin. The delegation was led by President Patrice Talon. What can Russia offer to the people of Benin, a country that has neither oil reserves like Nigeria, nor diamond deposits like Angola and South Africa, nor platinum deposits like Zimbabwe? Considering Benin's specifics, how should Moscow go about returning to this African republic?

The good memory of Soviet-Beninese friendship is still alive and working for Russia. At the same time, it is also obvious that the provision of comprehensive nonrefundable assistance as in the Soviet days is currently not possible, in particular, for financial and economic reasons.

At the same time, new horizons are opening up for expanding bilateral trade and economic ties that are beneficial for both Cotonou and Moscow. And this cooperation is gaining momentum: An agreement on geological prospecting and use of subsoil has been signed between Russia's Zarubezhgeologia and the Benin Ministry of Water and Mines.

Overall, the Sochi summit marked a new qualitative level in Russian-African cooperation. The main thing now is keep up the pace, maintain the momentum, working tirelessly and consistently to implement the accords and agreements that have been reached.

Russia Must Not Lose the Battle for Africa.

Irina Abramova, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Africa, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the RAS Presidium

Ten years ago, before the anti-Russian sanctions were imposed, we still wanted to become part of Europe, part of Western culture, and we viewed Africa as just a byproduct of our foreign policy and foreign trade relations. Now that the situation has changed, not only as a result of the sanctions but also as a result of changes in the configuration of global development, as well as the geopolitical and geo-economic configuration, when developing countries are essentially emerging as the main actors in the global economic space, the role of the African continent, among others, is growing.

So naturally, a geostrategic battle has begun. Russia must not lose the battle for Africa. Now is the best time for Russia to return to Africa. This has to do with the great influence that Russia has gained in the Middle East.

Over the past five years, we have doubled our trade with Africa – to \$20.4 billion. This is not much, but considering that it has doubled during a five-year period, it is not so bad.

Of course, to get our policy right, we should not look for competitors but engage with our partners. Yes, they are much better positioned, especially China, which, unlike us, has been expanding cooperation with Africa in recent years. Nevertheless, naturally, Russia should follow a very clear policy and promote cooperation in areas where it has competitive advantages, its principal advantage being the fact that it has inherited extensive Soviet experience in cooperation with its African partners. This experience is unique in that everything we did for Africa at that time we did for its own benefit.

Russia has always positioned itself as an equal partner for the Africans. Right now, the Africans are a little tired of their cooperation with China. Traditionally, they have a negative attitude toward the West, but on the other hand, they see Russia as a protector of their sovereignty. So this is just the right time for us to return to Africa.

Previously, we had cultural centers in each country. Today, only a few remain, mainly in North Africa. There are eight centers in Tanzania. This is almost nothing. Funding is scarce. Many African universities have Russian language departments, but we are unable to provide them with textbooks, not to mention teachers. Africans are even willing to buy their own instructional materials. In other words, there is a pressing need to get down to business and make up lost ground, but we will not be able to solve these problems in one year. Summit participants decided to meet every three years alternately in Russia and in Africa. In between these summits, a standing body will be established to implement the decisions of the previous forum and identify Russian-African cooperation areas.

We have very good competences in the energy sector and infrastructure. Russia's Rosatom state corporation is doing quite well on the African continent, building nuclear power stations.

Another important area is transport infrastructure. Incidentally, a contract for 1,300 modern Russian railway cars was signed with Egypt at the summit. We have very good prospects for developing the health care system, above all combating infectious diseases.

When it comes to IT, satellite communication technology and everything relating to digitalization, we also have impressive competences and a good head start that the Africans are very interested in.

We also have extensive experience and head start in energy, transport and agriculture – not only in grain deliveries but also in breeding new crop species on the ground, using the latest scientific achievements.

I am pleased that our institute was invited to help prepare the forum and organize its work. The institute's main mission was to provide assistance to the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Trade Ministry in their practical work with respect to Africa. We are still trying to do that, and I believe that our interaction, the fact that the experience and knowledge of our research associates were used within the forum's framework is very important.

As for individual countries, we should always remember that there is no equal development. Four major centers are emerging in Africa – countries with a large population. This is a global trend because the younger generation is active, expanding the market and requiring greater development. These centers are as follows: Egypt in the north, Nigeria in the west, Ethiopia in the east (the Americans placing a bet on it), and South Africa in the south.

Centralization in Africa is not possible. The cultures and peoples there are too different. The Africans understand very well that they can resolve many development problems only by pooling their resources, including production and economic resources.

I still believe that we should not focus on support only for companies. That is absolutely wrong. Large companies can finance their own operations. Africa is very interested in small and medium-sized businesses.

Who knew 50 years ago that China would rise so dramatically in the late 1990s? Regrettably, in our media space, Africa is associated mainly with poverty and backwardness. However, it is quite possible that in 20 or 30 years Africa will be in the same position as China.

The Cosmic Achievements of Diplomat Anatoly Dobrynin.

Kirill Terentyev, *Second Secretary, General Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*; Look.well@mail.ru

ANATOLY DOBRYNIN'S unprecedentedly long (24 years) mission as head of the Soviet Embassy to the United States and the fast scientific and technological developments in the sphere of space research can become the subjects of many articles. This article is limited by the period between the early 1960s when he was appointed Ambassador to the United States and the first Soviet-American "handshake in space" in 1975 that opened the road toward practical international cooperation in outer space.

Nikita Khrushchev skillfully used the enormous propaganda effect caused by putting the first Soviet sputnik into the orbit of the Earth on October 4, 1957 which marked the beginning of the space era in the history of mankind. The interconnection between the civilian space program and its possible military (missile) applications allowed Khrushchev to tie together potential cooperation in outer space with the disarmament issues.

As one of the high officials of the Central Office of the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union responsible for the relations with the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin was directly involved in the correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy. An analysis of their correspondence related to space research – the letters with which they exchanged on the occasions of epochal importance, Yuri Gagarin's orbital spaceflight of April 12, 1961 being one of them, – testify that in general the sides were ready to discuss the possibility of joint exploration of outer space.

It should be said that these positive signals of the readiness to study the Universe together existed in the environment of confrontational sentiments shared by both superpowers.

These were the starting positions of Anatoly Dobrynin's mission in Washington which lasted for many years. The young ambassador was fully aware of America's fast technological progress; it seems that he intuitively knew that the United States would inevitably catch up with the Soviet Union in space race. This served the basic point of his diplomatic activities in this sphere.

Anatoly Dobrynin invariably supported all Soviet delegations to the United States.

The Caribbean Crisis of the fall of 1962 radically changed Dobrynin's professional approaches: "He knew only too well that it was highly important to be an active link or sometimes directly involved in a confidential channel of communication at the top level for a responsible dialogue between the leaders of the two countries. Sometimes it was practically the only road that did not allow the 'cold war' to develop into a 'hot' war or a protracted dangerous conflict."

Early in the 1960s, cooperation between the two countries was fairly limited; it did not correspond to the impressive national space programs of the two great powers yet offered a platform for bilateral contacts, joint research and experiments.

At first, Lyndon Johnson, appointed President after the tragic events in Dallas, relied on the main points of his predecessor in the Soviet-American dialogue that rested on the disarmament issues.

By 1966, cooperation in space research practically stalled but hopes did not disappear. On October 10, 1966, Lyndon Johnson and Andrei Gromyko met in the White House; the American leader said that he wanted to sign several bilateral agreements in various spheres, including space research.

There is a widely shared opinion that Neil Armstrong's historic space flight to the Moon in July 1969 marked a Uturn toward a fullscale cooperation in outer space. The sides became firmly convinced that the united efforts of two strong space powers would lead to deeper international unity, that space

technologies and discoveries would be used to address mankind's most urgent problems and that the costs of R&D in outer space would be shared.

Today, when the Russian-American relations are far from perfect, the well-coordinated work of national teams at the International Space Station (ISS) is a good example of mutually profitable and trusting cooperation. Jeffrey Kluger, the author of an article on the new space race in the Time magazine, confirmed this: "In 2015, a suspected ammonia leak in the American portion of the station required astronauts to hunker down in the Russian segment until the all-clear was sounded."³⁵ Mutual support and openness typical of cosmonauts and astronauts breed healthy optimism and inspire to overcome the barriers that do not allow us to build up constructive relationships between Russia and the United States, to expand the dialogue in different spheres on the basis of equal relations and respect for the interests of each other.

The Fate of the Fatherland: 1618.

Archimandrite Macarius (Veretennikov), *Professor, Moscow Theological Academy, Doctor of Science (Theology)*; office@lavra.ru

THE 17TH CENTURY began as a time of trials for the Russian people. Contemporaries spoke of it as the Time of Troubles, or Smutnoe Vremya (smuta in Russian literally means "turmoil").¹ This term went down in the history of Russia and Russian historiography as a definition of the time when, in the late 16th century, the ruling dynasty ended. For the first time in its history, Russia acquired elected czars and impostors. This was the prelude to foreign (Swedish and Polish) interventions, as a result of which the Russian state lost part of its territories.

Invaders were talking about "assistance" to the suffering Russian people, but their "assistance" turned out to be a grave threat to Orthodoxy, Russia's statehood, its national principles, and territorial integrity.

To stop the chaos and restore at least a semblance of order in the country, a group of seven boyars (Semiboyarshchina) selected Prince Władysław (1595-1648) as the candidate to the Russian throne. Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski who took orders from Polish King Sigismund spared no effort to impose the Polish prince on Moscow. Patriarch Germogen conditioned his agreement to the coronation of the Polish prince by his conversion to Orthodoxy.

An important landmark on the road to peace in Russia was the Treaty of Stolbovo. In 1615, the Pskov people successfully defended their ancient city against the Swedish troops led by King Gustav II Adolf (1594-1632), and their bravery forced him to start peace negotiations that went on for a year. The peace treaty between Russia and Sweden was signed in February 1617 in the village of Stolbovo on the river Syas not far from Tikhvin.

From the very beginning, the Polish King Sigismund III Vasa (1566-1632) was in no hurry to dispatch his young son to Moscow. This gave Russians a chance to restore their statehood: they drove the Poles out of the Kremlin, convened a Zemsky Sobor that, having elected Mikhail Romanov a new Russian czar, started a new dynasty on the Russian throne. The Polish king, however, refused to recognize the elected czar of Russia. As could be expected, in spring 1617, Prince Władysław (over 20 by that time) moved on Russia with his army to regain the Moscow throne. The march took a lot of time; it was practically a year later, in 1618, that he crossed into the territory of the Russian state.

⁶ The prince was not strong enough to capture Moscow; he asked for help and was supported by Hetman Pyotr Sahaydachniy with 20 thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks.

Researcher Maria Makhanko has written: “We cannot exclude the possibility that the icon of Michael the Archangel on the Pronya found on the eve of the cardinal changes in the relations between Muscovite Rus and its eastern neighbors was interpreted as ‘sainthood of the ancestors’ and divine blessing.”²⁸ Moscow, the first Russian capital, in which the Cathedral of the Dormition is the main holy place, is the Home of the Blessed Virgin; the town of Mikhaylov is therefore the Home of Michael the Archangel.

Historian Sergey Platonov said the following about the Time of Troubles: “Religious feelings that had reached incredible heights and intensity spilled into the lives of common people in the forms of miraculous apparitions in which all those who had seen them and those who had only heard of them believed”³⁴ and continued: faith and piety of the Russians had consolidated during the Time of Troubles. “Deep and ardent faith consoled the shattered souls, strengthened their patience and lifted them above their petty feelings of fear and greed and prepare them for feats and sacrifices.”

Defeated at Moscow, the prince moved up north. He attacked the Holy Trinity St. Sergius Lavra which beat him off, according to an eyewitness account of cellarer Avraamy (Palitsyn). The defeats at Moscow and the Lavra led to peace talks even though the Hetman wanted to continue fighting.

On the way back, Hetman Sahaydachniy plundered the outskirts of Kaluga; he wanted the prince to continue his war against Moscow.

In 1619, however, the king demanded to cut down the Cossack army, to discontinue naval attacks at Turks, etc. Historian Mikhail Grushevsky wrote in his time: “This was a base ingratitude of the government of Rzeczpospolita” to the Zaporozhian Cossacks.

The story of the courageous people of the town of Mikhaylov is very close to the story of how people of Pskov defended it in 1615 against King of Sweden Gustav II Adolf. It is not only a story of fighting but also of the intercession of “men of God, miracleworkers of Pskov.”

The truce of Deulino put an end to the fighting in Russia and brought peace to the suffering. It helped restore the statehood of the plundered country. The stories that came down to us from Old Rus testify that our people demonstrated courage and heroism during the Times of Troubles.

Moldavia and the House of Romanov During the Russo-Turkish Wars

(1710-1812).

Yury Bulatov, *Professor, Department of World and Russian History, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Science (History); mo@inno.mqimo.ru*

ONE of the most important events in the development of Russian-Moldavian relations took place in the early 18th century in Istanbul where Russian Ambassador and resident of the Russian intelligence in Istanbul Pyotr Tolstoy met Dimitrie Cantemir, member of the Moldavian intellectual elite.

In his secret reports, Pyotr Tolstoy informed the Russian czar that Prince Cantemir had vast connections in the upper echelons of power of the Ottoman Empire, including the sultan who completely trusted him. Based on this information, Peter I instructed the Russian intelligence to persuade this member of the old Moldavian family to cooperate with Russia.

The Moldavian interlocutor of the Russian ambassador began to regularly inform the Russian intelligence about the plans of the ruling circles of the Ottoman Empire, secret intrigues of Western

diplomats in the Turkish capital, the changing moods in the court, etc. Confidential conversations with Dimitrie Cantemir allowed Tolstoy to fully evaluate his pro-Russian potential. He spoke willingly and sincerely about what was going on in the world.

The Turks knew nothing about these secret contacts which allowed Russian agents from the first days of the Russo-Turkish War (1710-1711) to support, with the help of interested people, the appointment of Dimitrie Cantemir Hospodar of Moldavia. Having filled the post, he started seeking a personal meeting with Peter I to conclude a secret military-political alliance against the Porte.

In the last clause of the Diploma and Points treaty, Peter I instructed Cantemir that, when the Russia army entered the territory of Moldavia, the local elite, the army and the Moldavian people should be brought to oath of allegiance to the Russian state.

In the early 18th century, the socioeconomic development of Russia and Moldavia differed a lot: while Russia lived in the system of extra-economic compulsion, or serfdom, it had been liquidated in Moldavia under Hospodar Stephen III the Great (1457-1504).

The military-political alliance of Russia and Moldavia confirmed by the Treaty of Lutsk turned out to be a personal union between Peter I and Cantemir in the struggle against the Ottoman Empire. The call of the Moldavian hospodar to an armed uprising did not inspire the majority of the local people. The miracle of transformation of Dimitrie Cantemir from the official appointee of the Turkish throne into the national hero of Moldavia didn't happen. Such things needed time, something that neither the Russian army nor the Moldavian rebels had.

Having signed the Treaty of the Prut in July 1711, Peter I left Moldavia with what had remained of his army; the Moldavian volunteers who under Cantemir had fought on the side of Russia did the same. In Russia, Cantemir received princedom, became a senator and the closest advisor of the Russian czar. It was under Peter I that the tradition of appointing noble Moldavians as advisors to the czar began.

The results of the Russo-Turkish war of 1710-1711 allowed the Turks to establish a de facto occupation regime in the Moldavian Principality. Determined to uproot free thinking and contain the spread of liberatory ideas among Moldavians, they disbanded the Moldavian army that united supporters of independence. The Turkish sultan announced that he had no confidence in locally born Moldavian hospodars. After the Prut Campaign of Peter I, Moldavian hospodars were appointed from among the Phanariotes (Greeks who lived in Phanar, a quarter in Istanbul close to the residence of the Greek Patriarch of the Orthodox Church) who were loyal followers of imperial policies.

On the wave of criticism of the Phanariotes and their methods, the so-called Russian Party was gaining popularity. The pro-Russian group of the Moldavian elite regularly informed the public about the most important international events including the Russo-Turkish war of 1735-1739 which strengthened the solidarity between the Great Russians and Moldavians in their common struggle against the Turkish oppressors.

Russia's prestige among the population of the Moldavian Principality was rising in the course of a military confrontation with the Ottoman Empire under Catherine II (1762-1796). At the initial stage of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, when in September 1796 the Russian troops led by Pyotr Rumyantsev entered Yassy, the local clergy and boyars headed by Metropolitan Gavriil, gathered the city's population in the local cathedral to vow allegiance to Empress Catherine II.

Even though after the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774, Turkey had recovered Bessarabia, Moldavia and Wallachia (earlier occupied by Russian troops), Russia acquired the right to defend the interests of the Danubian Principalities in front of the Turkish sultan and observe how Turkey respected their autonomous status within its possessions.

The 75th Anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising.

Viktor Parkhimovich, *Assistant Professor, Doctor of Science (Technology)*; vparkhimovich@gmail.com

ON AUGUST 29, 2019, Slovakia celebrated the 75th anniversary of the start of one of the most powerful European anti-Nazi insurrections of World War II, the Slovak National Uprising (Slovenské národné povstanie), which lasted from August 29 to October 28, 1944. August 29, Slovak National Uprising Anniversary, is one of the country's main national holidays. It is marked with events and ceremonies such as commemorative rallies and the laying of flowers at memorials in Bratislava, Banská Bystrica, and other parts of Slovakia.

Those acts of remembrance show a profound sense of indebtedness to patriots who perished to win freedom for future generations of Slovaks.

IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT to understand the meaning of the uprising to Slovakia without a story about developments that preceded World War II.

Soon after the emergence of the First Slovak Republic, its government's reign of terror and support for Nazi Germany sparked domestic discontent, and in 1942, a partisan movement began to form. Communists, including those infiltrated by the Soviet Union, played a significant role in it, although some historians deny this, claiming that a large proportion of it were not communists but supporters of the Czechoslovak government in exile.

ON AUGUST 23, Tiso, unable to defeat the partisan movement, asked Adolf Hitler for help. Germany responded by moving troops into Slovakia and, in effect, occupying the country. When the uprising began, part of Tiso's army went over to the side of the insurgents. The insurrection brought together members of more than 30 ethnic groups – besides Slovaks, there were Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Jews, and others among the rebels. Some of the insurgents were former inmates of concentration camps and volunteers from various countries, mainly the Soviet Union, France, and Poland.

The headquarters of the uprising was located in Banská Bystrica. On August 30, the insurrection leaders urged Slovakia's population to take up arms against the German invaders and Slovak collaborators. The appeal was very successful, and the rebel forces grew considerably.

The Soviet Union was helping the rebels. In September and October, it airlifted 796 tons of weapons and ammunition to them, supplied them with food and other aid, and sent in groups that organized partisan units. The Soviet Union also provided 20 fighter aircraft that formed the 1st Czechoslovak Independent Fighter Air Regiment.

The military superiority and combat experience of the Germans and unsuccessful attempts by the Red Army to gain access to the Dukla Pass spelled defeat for the uprising – within two months, it was crushed. On October 27, the Germans marched into Banská Bystrica.

On October 30, the Germans celebrated their victory with a military parade and on November 3, took the uprising leaders prisoner.

AFTER quelling the uprising, the Germans launched punitive measures – public executions, mass killings of civilians, deportations of hundreds to concentration camps. Collaborationist forces were methodically destroying anything that partisans could use as shelter, for instance mountain huts.

Yet the partisan movement was not wiped out. Moreover, on November 23/24, Slovak and Soviet partisans made a breach in the frontline through which it became possible to evacuate civilians and wounded fighters [3, pp. 764-830]. Taking advantage of the increasing proximity of the frontline, the majority of Slovak partisan units maneuvered themselves out of the German-imposed blockade, evading contact with German army and punitive forces.

The Slovak National Uprising was a highly significant event because, up until it began, the Soviet Union and the anti-Hitler coalition had considered Slovakia an ally of Nazi Germany. The insurrection made clear that a large proportion of Slovakia's population was against the country's pro-Nazi government. In 1944, Germany occupied Slovakia because the majority of the Slovak military did not recognize the collaborationist government and supported the uprising.

Slovakia has changed a great deal in recent years, having become a rapidly developing country with a growing economy. But Slovaks remember the heroes of the 1944 uprising, who gave their lives for the free future of the country.

Slovakia has many memorials of the uprising. They include a memorial and museum in Banská Bystrica and Slovak National Uprising Square in central Bratislava.

The 30th Anniversary of the December Insurgency in Romania.

Vladimir Lapshin, *Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary 2nd Class.*

CIVIL UNREST in Timișoara in December 1989 became the detonator in the explosive sociopolitical situation that had taken shape in Romania by the end of the 1980s. Nicolae Ceaușescu reacted in a resolute and uncompromising way – the disturbances had to be suppressed at any cost.

Radical changes had been launched by a reformist government in Hungary, the communist party was having its leading positions watered down in Poland, and protests had begun against communist rule in Bulgaria after the removal of Todor Zhivkov. Hungary was the main source of worry. Nationalist sentiments that were spreading out there could easily spill over into Romania, and that would be a disaster.

In the morning on December 19, First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Kovalev summoned the head and two deputy heads of the Foreign Ministry's European Socialist Countries Department and myself as head of the Romania section and said that we should draft a Congress of People's Deputies' statement condemning the Romanian leadership for trying to quell the demonstrations in Timișoara.

The first official Soviet reaction was a brief statement by the Congress of People's Deputies that came out on December 23 and didn't go further than stating "resolute support for the just cause of the Romanian people" and "traditional feelings of friendship and goodneighborliness and a desire for close cooperation in the interests of peace and socialism." By December 23, Ceaușescu and his wife Elena Ceaușescu had fled Bucharest.

Milea's death was a key point in the Romanian revolution. There exist two explanations of his death. According to one of them, it was a suicide: a man sincerely loyal to Ceaușescu and trusted by him had failed to put down a revolt against him.⁸ Having to order fire against unarmed fellow citizens rather than foreign invaders drew him into a psychological conflict that he couldn't cope with. The other theory is that Milea was assassinated – Ceaușescu ordered him to be killed as a traitor who had refused to entirely accomplish a mission of suppressing demonstrations entrusted to him.

The minister's death faced Ceaușescu with the problem of finding the successor. There was no time for a careful search, and Ceaușescu chose someone whom he knew and who happened to be around. It was General Victor Stănculescu, who became the last defense minister of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Remarkably, it was Stănculescu who, three days after his appointment, was the main organizer of the execution of Ceaușescu, his former commander in chief.

After Ceaușescu left Bucharest, developments began to accelerate at an unbelievable speed. Demonstrators were filling the streets. However, remembering the night before, everyone feared action from Ceaușescu supporters. Demonstrators who had seized control of the CC building got hold of the large arsenal of weapons that remained inside. There were also raids on Patriotic Guards depots of weapons to be used by militias in case of a foreign invasion.

The Soviet Union had two urgent tasks to deal with – defending the personnel of the Soviet Embassy and other Soviet institutions in Romania and their families and making contact with the new authorities. After Ceaușescu ran away and the rebels played havoc with the CC headquarters, the Romanian security guards vanished from the embassy and other Soviet facilities in a puff of smoke, and Moscow was pondering how to shield them from all those eager to go in. By then it was clear that the ordinary communication channels between Moscow and Bucharest wouldn't do as there were too many problems that needed urgent solution – the lives of all Soviet citizens who were posted in Romania depended on this.

It was decided to evacuate the Soviet personnel's wives and children. But by that time the Bucharest airports were closed and the nearest frontier, the border with Bulgaria, was a little less than 80 kilometers from the city. We contacted our consulate general in Ruse to find out whether evacuation by car was possible.

The evacuation started on December 25. The first attempt at departure from the Gara de Nord terminal in Bucharest was a failure – an armed skirmish broke out on one of the platforms. It was impossible to figure out who was firing at whom, but bullets were whizzing past impressively. The next attempt was successful – a train with evacuees accompanied by an embassy official left the terminal safely.

Forming the new Romanian government wasn't an easy process. The slogan "The army is with us" did reflect the real state of affairs up to a point but, besides soldiers, there were quite many armed civilians on the streets. Television played an important role. It was broadcasting from two studios. Those didn't coordinate their news with each other but, due to Stănculescu's efforts, were broadcasting to the entire country.

Overall euphoria over the victorious revolution and hatred for Ceaușescu determined the public atmosphere in Romania in those days. But government had to be put in the hands of people who were recognizable but didn't have their reputations tainted with links to the toppled regime. Most of them were intellectuals – poets, writers, film directors, especially figures who were considered dissidents in the Ceaușescu era, such as Paul Goma. But everyone realized that they wouldn't cope by themselves.

Late in 1989, as a member of the Foreign Ministry lecture club, I was invited to speak about the Romanian events at Dzerzhinsky Club for the KGB propaganda service. As I was speaking, it struck me that I had never had an audience so silent before. I was looking at the faces of my listeners and it seemed to me that all of them were asking themselves, just as I was, the same question, whether we were destined to go through something similar.

It was hardly possible to foresee at that point that all that had been said then had little to do with what very soon became reality. We ceased to be either neighbors or allies. The Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved, and Romania joined NATO and the European Union, bodies that have completely different rules. There remain extensive opportunities for economic and cultural cooperation between Russia and Romania. There has been much in our shared history that is worth remembering. All this brings us together. Whether the two countries will be able to safeguard and build up this cooperation depends on their future generations.

Ambassador's Notes.

Tatyana Lavrova, Doctor of Science (History)

V.S. LAVROV received his last appointment as Soviet ambassador to Turkey, where he worked from 1983 until 1987.

Intergovernmental agreements on natural gas supplies to Turkey (1984) and a 25-year contract for Soviet gas supplies, which was signed in 1986, became a real breakthrough.

In May 1987, first Soviet gas was delivered to Turkey. Soviet gas deliveries (under the agreement, beginning in 1993, their volume was to be about 6 billion cubic meters a year and possibly more) laid a solid foundation for developing economic cooperation between the two countries, which had a positive impact on the development of Soviet-Turkish and Russian-Turkish relations.

During those years, scientific-technical cooperation and cultural ties developed in accordance with programs that were signed every two years.

In 1987, V.S. Lavrov retired.

Below are two brief sketches from the notes of Vladimir Sergeevich in his capacity as the first Soviet ambassador to Kenya.

A Plot Against Nyerere.

THIS HAPPENED in the spring of 1966, when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was holding a summit conference in Nairobi. The conference was being attended by, among others, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, an energetic leader, who had become the country's head of state shortly before that. Many observers pegged him as a "leftist socialist-minded" new-generation African leader.

One morning, I received a telegram from Moscow saying that a plot was being hatched against Nyerere. I was instructed to personally inform him about that.

I decided to take a risk. Based on certain observations at the hotel, I had a rough idea where Nyerere's suite could be. I walked up to the fourth floor. There was no one around. As I walked down the corridor, a security agent suddenly emerged from a side door. He was about 20 steps from me. I kept walking, saying in English: "I am the Soviet ambassador." No sooner had I taken a few steps toward him than he pulled out a gun and shouted, "Halt!"

Anyone who is familiar with the way a presidential security service works knows: These people do not joke and have rather strict instructions on how to act in such situations. However, I had no options, so I took another step forward. The bodyguard shouted once again, "Halt!" and pointed his gun at me.

At that moment, a door opened and an English woman of about 40 came out. I told her that I was the Soviet ambassador and had an important message to deliver to President Nyerere. She told me to wait and left. She returned a few minutes later and said that the president would receive me next morning at 10 a.m.

Movie Star, Governor and Clouds Over Kenyatta.

IN EARLY 1964, I found myself in the heart of the African continent – Kenya, a country of beautiful scenery, landscapes, magnificent wildlife, and the spectacular diversity of flora, the pearl of East Africa.

That was a rather sharp turn in my diplomatic career, since I had not dealt with African affairs before. However, looking back over the years, I am really grateful for that assignment to Africa as the first Soviet

ambassador to the newly independent African state because it provided a wealth of impressions at the official and personal level, unforgettable meetings, exciting events and professional successes.

In the early summer of 1964, the Soviet film *The Tale of Fiery Years* premiered at one of the best cinemas of Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. Lead actress Zinaida Kiriyyenko arrived from Moscow for the premiere. At that time, screening a new film from the USSR was an important cultural event for the country, and the premiere was attended by Malcolm MacDonald, the governor-general of Kenya,¹ members of the Kenyan government, members of parliament, many prominent Kenyan business people, and cultural figures. The governor-general was particularly impressed by Zinaida Kiriyyenko's performance.

Jomo Kenyatta was indeed an outstanding leader of the Kenyan people, and his large figure, expressive eyes, excellent rhetorical skills, polished over the years of legal studies and political struggles, made a strong impression on others. During several meetings that I had with him, he invariably came across as an interesting interlocutor. Still, the deliberate modesty of the British diplomat looked a bit affected.

At the time *The Tale of Fiery Years* premiered, I received a telegram from the Soviet Foreign Ministry saying that according to information in Moscow's possession, the British were hatching a plot against Jomo Kenyatta. The telegram asked what I knew about that. It was rather strange, because if I knew something about that I would of course have duly informed Moscow. However, a question was asked, and I had to reply.

I decided to invite Zinaida Kiriyyenko and Malcolm MacDonald to a private lunch at the embassy and try to sound out the British governor's stance. MacDonald accepted the invitation.

During our conversation, I tried to sound out MacDonald as to what he, as well as the rather large British community that remained in Kenya, thought about the current situation and Jomo Kenyatta's activity.

It became clear that Kenyatta as prime minister not only suited the British but that they would support him all the way. I said that much in my telegram to the ministry in response to the query from Moscow.

Jomo Kenyatta, who later became the first president of independent Kenya and governed the country until his death, had overwhelming influence and authority in Kenya and commanded great respect in Africa.

Toward the Future: The Concept of the Path.

Remembering Pyotr Palievsky.

Alexei Nalepin, *leading research associate, A.M. Gorky Institute of World Literature, Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Science (Philology), Laureate of the State Prize of the Russian Federation, Merited Artist of the Russian Federation.*

Armen Oganessian, *Editor in Chief of International Affairs, Merited Cultural Worker of the Russian Federation, Member of the Union of Writers of Russia.*

PYOTR VASILIEVICH PALIEVSKY, literary scholar and critic, well known in Russia and beyond, passed away in Moscow on October 8th, 2019, at the age of 87. For more than 60 years, Palievsky worked at the A.M. Gorky Institute of World Literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences. His foremost areas of research interest included literary theory, world literature, and Russian classics.

Midway through World War II, Palievsky, along with his parents, his younger brother, and two younger sisters, were taken to Germany as forced laborers and imprisoned in Seebach, a labor camp in Gmünd,

Austria. Yulia Palievsky, his sister, recalls: "In the camp, Pyotr worked at the sawmill, where he nearly lost his leg in an accident; the scar from the injury was a permanent reminder. Once the war ended, the prisoners liberated from the camp found themselves dirtpoor, and we children had to beg for food from the local farmers. For a few months, Pyotr was able to attend a school in the area, where his academic abilities immediately became clear – in fact, the teachers often set him as an example to the other students."

It fell to Palievsky to live through the demise of a country that had once seemed undefeatable and indestructible. The contradictions of that era of great loss and great achievement were in one way or another reflected in Palievsky's work.

The analyses of culture and society proposed by Palievsky were uncompromising. In his work, he identified certain core principles that only a scholar of the humanities "with the mindset of a philosopher" could see.

Palievsky made a considerable contribution to defining and analyzing a number of sociophilosophical issues. The writer S. Semanov noted, "His stance against 'scientism,' particularly against Marxist ideas which proposed the complete subjugation of human thought and activity to science, became a notable phenomenon in the world of philosophy."

In his epistemological pursuits, Palievsky focused on examining intrinsic differences between literary imagery and logical and other analytical forms of expression and developing an original theory of values that corresponded to permanently changing artistic criteria (Russian Classics, 1987; *The Development of Russian Literature from the 19th to Early 20th Centuries*, 2016).

In his writings, Palievsky sought to save Russian readers from, as he called it, "the McDonald's of the soul." He urged his audience to examine how a text on closer look can turn out to be more than a simple means of communication, but rather a window into an immeasurably deep, more complex, realm. Well-equipped with a knowledge of the main Western European languages, he approached world literature not as an aesthetic dogma, but as an inexhaustible, fluid element that could never be fully appreciated from within the constraints of only one discipline.

Palievsky continuously turned to scholarship in Russian literature throughout his career. His range of interests was very wide: Pushkin, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Chekhov, Bunin, Bulgakov, Sholokhov. Western scholars noted that the novel *And Quiet Flows the Don* displayed a classic Sholokhovian "merciless realism."

In the mid-1960s, Palievsky devoted enormous effort to the publication of Mikhail Bulgakov's novel *The Master and Margarita*. Prior to his involvement, the work was circulated only in personally printed copies, known as "samizdat," but thanks to him, it formally "premiered" in the November 1966 issue of the literary magazine "Moskva," which was permitted to publish it only with certain cuts.

Margaret Mitchell, Aldous Huxley, and, of course, William Faulkner were Palievsky's touchstones in the world of Western literature. They provided a base for his most definitive works, which centered around the irreconcilable opposition between realist and avantgarde literature: "art can be made and manufactured from forms that only the bravest, 'most outstanding innovators' can begin to extract."

According to Palievsky, "Faulkner was that very kind of 'wild' talent. But he did not retreat or submit, and though he did get entangled many times in the nets of the trade, he invariably tore through them and departed even further.

In 1982, after significant effort and struggle, Palievsky managed to get Margaret Mitchell's novel *Gone with the Wind* published in translation. Palievsky wrote in his foreword.

In his work Palievsky cautioned against “that dire threat advancing on humanity, specifically on the financially secure, carefree ‘golden billion.’” “Invisible death starting from within,” wrote Palievsky, “as a result of the rearrangement of life following the technical model, then the split between life and its hidden sources, declared fictional, and finally its displacement into a rapidly growing functional cage or shell. In sum, this is the product of the natural and necessary development of civilization.”

When it came to sociohistorical perspectives, Palievsky insisted on the necessity of the union between socialism and faith. He organized two seminars on the topic in Capri in 1989 and 1990, as well as an international discussion hosted at the Institute of World Literature.

Our remarkable contemporary Pyotr Palievsky’s hard work and individuality will doubtless only continue to unfold and acquire new meaning in the future.

Historical and Current Media Development Trends in the BRICS Countries.

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The strengthening of the BRICS countries’ positions in the international arena, as well as deepening cooperation among the BRICS countries, on the one hand, and cooperation with their regional and global partners, on the other, is opening new opportunities in many spheres of public life, including in science and information technology. That is evidenced in particular by the establishment in Russia of the National Committee for BRICS Studies (2011) and the BRICS School, an international research and education program.

BRICS experience shows that the expansion of the media space requires not only state-of-the-art technological equipment but thorough and deep knowledge of the countries’ media specifics and relevance in their national and global dimensions. In this context, the publication of the monograph “BRICS Media Systems: Historical Genesis and Operational Features,”* written at Moscow State University’s school of journalism by a team of authors (N. Tkachyova, G. Filatkina, T. El Bakri) and edited by Prof. E. Vartanova, is very important.

The comprehensive approach toward analyzing BRICS media systems that was used in the monograph is highly relevant in several respects, including a review of various media research procedures, theories and concepts related to media transformation and impact in the present-day world. Special attention is paid to the notion of “media system” that was used as a “unit of analysis.”

The analysis of theoretical matters in Chapter 1 undoubtedly helps a deeper understanding of problems related to the evolution of media systems in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The chapters devoted to those countries’ media systems reflect both the historical genesis of the media and the specifics of their operation as a system.

The monograph offers a comprehensive analysis of several segments of the media system, including successful broadcast media outlets, struggling press outlets and digital media in innovative sectors. The authors come to the conclusion that there are indications of a “new stage in the transformation of the Russian media system” (p. 82).

The monograph’s solid theoretical basis, the consecutive analysis of the BRICS media systems and the informative materials contained in the appendices have allowed the authors to make several important conclusions. First, with regard to the national specifics of the BRICS media systems, taking into account a wide range of impact factors, including historical, sociopolitical and sociocultural. Second, the media processes that to some extent or other are present in all the BRICS countries and are related to the remaining impact of television and the dynamic development of media technology and audio visual and

online media outlets. Third, the classification of processes characteristic of the global media that could produce a reaction in the BRICS countries different from that in Western Europe or North America.

Overall, it is important to note the monograph's high theoretical and practical value and relevance. On the one hand, it closes the gap in media studies and on the other, can provide a good foundation for identifying new trends in the development of media systems and ways of using them in the BRICS countries' media and ICT sphere.

Russia and Geneva: The Intertwining of Destinies.

Andrei Vavilov, *Honored Worker of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Science (History)*

I AM HOLDING a new book by Natalya Beglova. It is a wonderful book! I have long been following the author's work and have always been amazed by the versatility of her talent as a writer, which she undoubtedly inherited as a precious gift from her father, Spartak Beglov, a journalist and writer on current political and public issues.

And now there is a fundamental work, "Russia and Geneva: The Intertwining of Destinies,"* which has probably absorbed everything that Beglova has learned about Switzerland during the many years that she has lived, worked and traveled around the country she has come to love – with a focus on historical ties and the intertwining of the destinies of the two peoples and their famous representatives.

The title speaks volumes about the book: It is about the deep historical and cultural roots of bilateral relations between Russia and Switzerland. The history of Swiss-Russian relations dates back many centuries. As a rule, analyses of that history are centered around Swiss people who have influenced the historical, political, military, architectural and other aspects of the life of the Russian empire.

The book's main goal is to show that the interpenetration of cultures is much wider and deeper than is generally believed. There is every reason to say that Russians and Russian culture have also left a noticeable mark in the life of Switzerland as a whole and Geneva in particular.

Facts, names and human stories of great writers and less prominent persons are presented in an engaging and lively way, sometimes from an unexpected angle.

The author demonstrates a profound knowledge of history acquired, among other things, because of thorough and painstaking work in the archives. The book "Russia and Geneva: The Intertwining of Destinies" is a good and pleasant read. The narrator's language is precise, elegant and sometimes unusual. You want to reread some passages because this is a kind of an encyclopedia that offers a good cross section of European life. Natalya Beglova's book is not one that is nice to read and to be put back on the shelf. You want to have it at hand as a valuable handbook, dictionary, a collection of reproductions of works by great artists, and a family album, leafing through it again and again. The book is richly illustrated: Carefully selected ancient prints go hand in hand with the author's own photos (Beglova is an accomplished photographer).

This book is a present to readers who are interested in Switzerland and Geneva in particular. The city is usually described in superlatives: It has the highest fountain, the most beautiful view of Mont Blanc, the best chocolate, the most reliable banks, and the most democratic system of government.

The fruit of Natalya Beglova's labor (hard and painstaking, by her own admission) will be a source of great pleasure to the readers who take interest in history.

