

International Affairs: Vol.68: №3, 2022

100 Years of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn

Keywords: 100th anniversary of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, Sergey Lavrov, Valentina Matvienko, congratulatory messages, Nikolai Patrushev, Sergey Naryshkin, Sergey Aksyonov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Vasily Nebenzya

IN MARCH, our journal turned 100. We thank our readers, colleagues, and friends for their anniversary congratulations, warm words, and confidence in the future!

Articles, interviews, commentaries, and essays published in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn [International Affairs] over these 100 years are a historical record of the foreign policy of our country and a chronicle of international relations. Some of the articles were prescient and are still relevant. Others highlight past events that can be lessons to us today and help address present-day crises and confrontations.

Congratulatory Message From Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

To Armen Oganessian, *Editor-in-Chief of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*

Dear Mr. Oganessian,

On behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and myself, I cordially congratulate you and the entire staff of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn on a remarkable anniversary: 100 years since the founding of the journal.

Over the past century, the journal has developed its own good traditions and become part of the close-knit Foreign Ministry team. Articles published in its pages have always been noted for their sound assessments and detailed analysis of key foreign policy problems.

Today, Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn continues to contribute to a holistic and comprehensive understanding of complicated processes taking place in the world arena. Importantly, the journal is open to publishing works by eminent scholars as well as young promising researchers. Moreover, there is persistent demand for the various scholarly and practical conferences held under the aegis of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn.

I expect that your editorial staff, drawing upon and enriching the experience of their predecessors, will continue to provide valuable informational and analytical support for the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I wish you and your entire team sound health, well-being, and new success in work for the benefit of our country.

S. Lavrov
March 20, 2022

Congratulatory Message From Valentina Matviyenko, Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation

Dear Armen Oganessian,

Dear Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn Team, Contributors, and Readers,

Please accept my heartfelt congratulations on the centenary of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn.

The past 100 years have been full of major historical events, and your journal has covered them very professionally.

Your articles invariably pique the interest of international relations experts and ordinary readers who want to keep abreast of trends determining the foreign policy of major world powers.

What has been published in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* during its 100-year existence is a chronicle of our diplomacy and a gallery of glorious names that we are proud of. But information is far from the only asset of an honest, truthful narrative. Such a narrative will also provide lessons that can help avoid repeating mistakes.

Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn is a very modern journal. Its contributors – politicians, scholars, diplomats, businesspeople, and, of course, journalists – never evade any issue, no matter how sensitive or acute. Their analysis is accurate and compelling. You respect your readers, encourage them to think, and do not seek to force your own viewpoint on them.

Today, the significance of your work is growing tremendously. The deteriorating international situation with its new and increasing challenges and threats makes objective high-quality information especially important. *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* is a recognized source of such information in our country and in the rest of the world. Your impeccable century-long work has earned you trust among readers. You still successfully compete with the most authoritative publications on international relations.

I wish you more achievements in advancing Russia's foreign policy agenda.

I am especially grateful for the journal's invariable patriotic position.

V. Matviyenko

Congratulatory Message From Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation

Dear Mr. Oganessian,

I congratulate you and the team of *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* on the centenary of the journal.

Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn is well known not only in our country, but worldwide. It has achieved a solid reputation as a source of reliable, objective foreign policy information. It has for a long time enjoyed recognition and prestige among politicians, diplomats, scholars, and a broad readership due to its insightful analytical articles, expert assessments, and balanced forecasts.

An important area of work for *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* has been issues of national and international information security. Annual conferences take place under the aegis of *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* that address key problems and challenges of world politics and are attended by prominent Russian and foreign experts.

Now that sanctions are putting unprecedented pressure on our country and attempts are being made to isolate and weaken it, the journal is playing an especially important role in advancing the national interests of the Russian Federation.

May *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* retain its vanguard positions, combining tradition and continuity with dynamic development, and always remain an example of responsible and honest journalism.

N. Patrushev

Congratulatory Message From Sergey Naryshkin, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation

Dear Mr. Oganessian,

On behalf of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, allow me to extend congratulations on the centenary of *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*.

Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn has always been among the journalistic elite of our country, but over the

past few years it also has become an inseparable part of the history of Russian diplomacy. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn is a source of important analysis that is interesting to a broad circle of Russian and foreign readers.

In various years, numerous brilliant diplomats, outstanding scholars, and famous journalists have collaborated with Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. All of them have been outstanding figures in your history and have made contributions to the glorious traditions of the journal that other diplomats are helping to sustain today.

The contribution that the journal is making to the advancement of Russian interests in the international arena is especially important in the current complicated international situation.

On this wonderful day, I wish you, Mr. Oganessian, and the entire Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn team further success, continuous development, loyal readers, and large print runs.

S.Ye. Naryshkin March 20, 2022

Congratulatory Message From Sergey Aksyonov, Head of the Republic of Crimea

Dear Mr. Oganessian,
Dear Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn Team,

Allow me to congratulate you on your wonderful anniversary, the centenary of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn.

The oldest foreign policy journal in Russia, Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn has become an indispensable source of information on and analysis of a wide range of international problems. The journal's work goes far beyond the format of a ministry publication.

The editorial policy of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn is marked by a broad approach and panoramic analysis, and reflects genuine interest in and respect for the history of our country. The journal has always set high scholarly standards for its contributors, which has made it a prestigious forum for debating the most significant issues of international relations, past and present.

Articles focused on Crimea hold a special place in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. They offer sound, well-substantiated, and professional analysis of all aspects of the reunification of Crimea with Russia and prove the groundlessness of the West's anti-Russian sanctions.

We also jointly hold annual conferences in Yalta on key integration problems in the post-Soviet space. The composition of their participants says a lot. The fact that foreign politicians, public figures, scholars, journalists, businesspeople, historians, and artists come to Russian Crimea is evidence of the unquestionable prestige of these forums, their international public and political role, and their ability to bring together Russian and foreign nationals sharing the same views to make optimum use of their scholarly, business, and other expertise to attain the main goals in today's difficult situation – political stability in the post-Soviet space and peace on our planet.

I am sure that our experience of cooperation will become a guarantee of further fruitful and extensive work.

I wish you, Mr. Oganessian, and your colleagues success, interesting projects, and new achievements. I also wish peace, health, and well-being to you and your families and friends.

S. Aksyonov

Congratulatory Message From Vyacheslav Nikonov, Chairman of the Board, Russkiy Mir Foundation

Dear Mr. Oganessian,
Dear Colleagues,

I sincerely congratulate the team and management of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn on the centenary of the journal. Your tireless work is an excellent example of devoted public service.

Your journal enjoys well-deserved prestige for its academic analysis of international developments and its comprehensive coverage of cultural diplomacy and key humanitarian problems.

It is especially valuable in our complicated times to safeguard and develop scholarly, philosophical, and cultural heritage. Now that aggressive Russophobia has become established in the West, defending humanitarian principles and championing mutual respect between nations is not only ideologically significant but also vital for millions of people and for the entire Russian World.

I want to especially stress your highly professional approach to the preparation of material, the promptness of your reporting, and the objectivity of your information. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn is unquestionably a reliable source of knowledge for its readers and an effective intellectual aid to young people who are training to be diplomats, journalists, or scholars.

The Russkiy Mir Foundation and Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn have a long track record of fruitful cooperation in media formats and in the formats of conferences of scholars and practitioners.

I am sure that our record of cooperation in maintaining Russian cultural and language traditions and in popularizing the role of the humanities and historical traditions will become a guarantee of future extensive work.

I wish you, dear friends, many years of creative work and new achievements for the benefit of our country. I also wish you all happiness, peace, and well-being.

Yours sincerely,
V. A. Nikonov

Congratulatory Message From Vasily Nebenzya, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

Dear Mr. Oganessian,
Dear Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn Team,
Dear Colleagues,

Please accept my warmest and sincerest congratulations on the centenary of your journal.

For a century, Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn has been helping diplomats by publishing key analytical material and objective information.

Thanks to the work of your team, the journal for many decades has been a prestigious source of information and analysis for diplomats in Russia and abroad.

Not only does Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn give the world public a perspective on key problems of international relations, but it is a source of information about Russia for foreign politicians, diplomats, and think tanks.

I know firsthand that many of the ideas expressed in the journal are considered by our foreign partners.

Your journal is a standard that we can turn to for credible expertise. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn is a unique venue for the perspectives of recognized professionals and experts.

May Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn always stay abreast of the times and have new contributors, both experienced and young, large print runs, and much success.

V. Nebenzya

An Era of Affairs in Russia and the World

Keywords: 100th anniversary of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, the Foreign Ministry, NKID, foreign policy, editorial

A CENTURY in the history of a country and even the world is a long time, especially in our day, when eras change within the lifetime of just one generation. Much of what seemed unshakable and eternal 100 years ago has sunk into oblivion, transforming into new political systems, states, ideologies, self-perceptions, and global perceptions. A great country – the USSR, which would have turned 100 this year – is no more. However, 15 independent states, which bear little resemblance to loving sisters, have appeared on the political map of the world.

“Publications in the journal *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* [International Affairs] make it is possible to follow the stages of domestic diplomacy – from the Genoa Conference and the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 to the foreign policy of the new Russia, including initiatives to create a new security and cooperation architecture in the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific regions, and other parts of the world, as well as its conflict resolution efforts,” wrote Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

People’s Commissar Georgy Chicherin wrote in the first issue of the journal in 1923: “*Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* is a political organ of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; it is intended to serve in its field the common foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Republic,” which in his words “is searching for the fundamental, most profound trends in the development of contemporary political and economic relations.”

Fyodor Rotshtein [Theodore Rothstein], who was appointed editor-in-chief in April 1923, said: “I am dreaming of turning it into a scholarly, academic journal on current policy issues.”

Unlike *NKID Vestnik* [Bulletin], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* was not mailed free to Soviet officials under the free-market conditions prevailing during NEP. It was sold at a fixed price inside NKID headquarters on Kuznetsky Most street, which was also the location of the journal’s editorial offices.

Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn in its first incarnation began to decline as NEP began to lose steam. Its last issue appeared in 1930, when an atmosphere of a “besieged fortress” reigned in the country.

Foreign policy was becoming a high-risk endeavor. A little while later, a significant number of NKID employees, including those who contributed to that journal, were blacklisted as “enemies of the people.” Their names did not begin to emerge from oblivion until the mid-1950s, when *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* was rebranded and relaunched. Another 20 years later, their names appeared in gold letters etched into a marble plaque in the entrance hall of the high-rise building on Smolensk Square [i.e., the Foreign Ministry – Trans.].

The journal recruited the finest Soviet journalists and academics.

In June 1958, the CPSU Central Committee appointed the foreign minister himself [Andrei Gromyko] editor of *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*.

That started a 27-year stretch when Gromyko held this high post and managed the journal, mainly from a distance. Starting with the July 1958 issue, the names of the journal’s editor and members of the editorial board were not printed in the journal. The position of *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* in terms of its editorial policy, authors, and the essence of its articles became more definite and, in a manner of speaking, serene. Here it was impossible to try to venture, even in a veiled form, so to speak, an opinion that differed even slightly from the official view of the Foreign Ministry or the government. That was also part of its charm and beauty. After all, *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* was not weekend reading, but a publication that expounded official policy accurately and earnestly. If the journal said it was so, then it

was so. It was useful for politicians inside and outside the country, and for experts and scholars to have an accurate source.

The November 16, 1987, meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat approved Pyadyshev, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, member of the USSR Foreign Ministry Collegium, Doctor of Science (History), as the journal's fourth editor-in-chief.

Many things changed during the early 1990s, a time of great upheaval. There was a different country, a different outlook on life both inside and outside the country.

Between 1985 and 2004, *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* worked under six (technically, seven) foreign ministers: Eduard Shevardnadze, Alexander Bessmertnykh, Boris Pankin, Eduard Shevardnadze once again, Andrei Kozyrev, Yevgeny Primakov, and Igor Ivanov. On March 9, 2004, Sergey Lavrov became Russia's foreign minister.

All ministers without exception have been attentive to the journal, clearly realizing that it can play a useful role in common efforts. We are certain that this attitude is shared by all members of the diplomatic service.

With aid and assistance from the Foreign Ministry, *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* became the first of our publications that US President Ronald Reagan met with.

Pyadyshev stepped down as head of the journal after 22 years in that post. In 2009, Armen Oganessian took over.

A fine new project proposed to Moscow political scientists was the "Golden Collection." The first lecture in this series was delivered by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

The journal is becoming a media holding of sorts and, keeping in step with the times, employs the latest in IT.

The journal's website responds promptly to what is happening in the world and attracts wide audiences. Videos about significant topics in current international politics are as popular as political talk shows on TV.

The editorial board regularly holds conferences, roundtables, and discussions on issues concerning the post-Soviet space, information security, and other important and pressing problems of today's international politics.

As it has for the past century, *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, the country's oldest scientific and political journal, continues to work efficiently and professionally, responding to current challenges together with the entire country, promoting Russia's foreign policy and demonstrating its peaceful and just nature, analyzing global processes affecting countries and regions, and providing a comprehensive picture of the world and its future outlook.

A New World Order: Current Geoeconomic Realities and the Need for a "Blank Slate"

Keywords: crisis of world capitalism, the collective West, "investment air," "blank slate," Washington's Russophobia

Dmitry Yevstafyev, Professor, School of Integrated Communications, Faculty of Communications, Media and Design, National Research University-Higher School of Economics, Candidate of Science (Political Science); estd1212@yandex.ru

THE CRISIS of the current model of capitalism is becoming especially stark against the backdrop of growing military and political tension in the world in which the use of military force has become a de facto legalized tool of interstate competition. The world is clearly entering a period of geoeconomics that relies on the use of force, while at the same time maintaining the classical agenda of late-stage globalization.

Today, the accumulated economic contradictions and disparities – primarily growing inflationary expectations and increased debt pressure – have become obvious even if softened by various methods, particularly the issuance of credits. The fact that so far no country, including China, has managed to launch a reinvestment cycle to create new technological platforms in key industries is becoming a problem. Nobody knows which of the two platforms – high tech or raw material – should be used.¹ The “growth by digitalization” model is already showing signs of fizzling out.

It seems that a considerable part of the American elite, not to mention the expert community, has already realized that the current situation cannot be maintained.

Today, two very important trends of practical – or visible, if you like – processes and decisions can be observed. The US is moving toward a strategy of selective globalism based on the gradual rejection of permanent allies and obligations in favor of ad hoc alliances (“coalitions of the willing”) in which partners are not only ready to shoulder a considerable share of the burden but also to accept the ideological component of America’s policies. A very specific system is emerging: for the US itself – pragmatism or even outright foreign policy cynicism; for the rest of the collective West – fidelity to ideological imperatives, some of them obviously ad hoc.

At the same time, there are obvious attempts to introduce elements of noneconomic management into economic processes. “New environmentalism” is the most real example.

Radical environmentalism is well suited to becoming an ideologically packed development regulator on the global scale in part because it is eschatologically charged, to a certain extent, and can therefore be transformed not only into political slogans but also into a political and economic program⁸ that would determine mid- or even long-term mechanisms of managing rivalries of countries and coalitions of countries.

Environmental capitalism, too, is based on the use of “investment air” but relies heavily on real production processes (e.g., the production of environmentally certified equipment). This fundamental, strategic change in approaches to global economic development raises the need to form a primary space for implementing such a model. Considering contemporary realities, that space would have to first be made “blank” by political, economic, and possibly even military and political methods.

The most favorable option for the future development of the global economy that would minimize the negative repercussions for the core countries of world globalization (currently the US and its closest satellites connected with it by military and political obligations) would be for the parts of the world with significance in terms of resources or logistics to become a “blank slate” for their subsequent redevelopment. This scenario, however, is fraught with the threat of uncontrolled chaos.

The “blank slate” space is defined by the absence of economic and socioeconomic elements of sovereignty, even if certain formal political and legal elements are present. From this standpoint, the status of a “blanked space” (“trophy space”) can be applied to any more or less significant – from the perspective of economic geography – space (including spaces related to the “developed world” and even its postindustrial core) at the expense of which the rest of the world would be transformed.

Naturally, a key issue of the current policy has become the question of a new understanding of sovereignty that takes into account the increasingly complex dialectics of spatial and supraspatial

systems. The “blank slate” strategy, in turn, relies on abandoning the economic component of sovereignty, which does not contradict the liberal interpretations of globalization.

ONE characteristic of the last couple of years is the regular emergence of options for managed changes to the status quo in world politics. The problem is that the time for evolutionary transformations has passed; the system of global politics is now in an obvious institutional crisis that has led to a crisis of arbitration (dialogue) platforms in politics and economics. In fact, the model of transformations of the architecture of global political and economic relations, which is losing its consolidating potential through its partial disintegration, nullifying at least in part the previously formed system of obligations, is a more or less common scenario for the change of historical epochs.

The next crisis, according to most scenarios, will be global and social: Most states – or rather societies – of the contemporary world are involved, in one way or another, in universalist models of social development. A possible future crisis may remain manageable or partially manageable (in terms of limiting its escalation potential), but it cannot, in principle, be a local crisis – especially considering that it is part of the process of forming geoeconomic macroregions.

Either the collective West will be able to pull off a geoeconomic “blank slate” outside its borders (possibly by officially excluding one of its members) and achieve temporary stabilization based on managing the external crisis, or else the crisis will unfold inside the West and a “blank slate” will appear, including as a result of its destruction. Otherwise, we cannot rule out the possibility that social destruction will unfold inside the metropole of the global world.

IN TODAY’S world, the spaces that could be viewed as potential “trophies” are few and far between; it is even harder to find a full-fledged geoeconomic “blank slate.” Russia is not the most attractive option when it comes to integrated indices. It lags behind the EU countries and, in particular, the Mediterranean states, the oil monarchies of the Middle East led by Saudi Arabia, and the spaces of Southeast Asia.

The US assumed that it would have an almost totally free hand to wield its military power in most of the emerging macroregions – except for probably Northeast Asia, where China would likely dominate. Macroregions might appear in economics and possibly, but not necessarily, in politics. In the military sphere, the number of actors able to ensure their safety would be minimal. That is why a considerable part of the American political elite accepted the rejection of the radical interventionism of the early 2000s as normal. But given that Russia will be able to play the role not only of a partially industrialized raw-material periphery but, at the very least, a donor of security for Eurasia and, later, outside it, it is Russia and not China (which has commercial ties with the US), that presents the main danger to Washington. Because now the chances of turning Eurasia into a “blank slate” have been dramatically reduced.

NATO Aims to Turn Outer Space Into Its Own Fiefdom

Keywords: NATO, space, operational domain, militarization, warfare

Yury Belobrov, Senior Research Associate, Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Candidate of Science (Political Science);
yuriy.belobrov@dipacademy.ru

NATO’s military expansion knows no bounds. After claiming that their military and political interests extend practically all over the globe and that they have a right to military action anywhere in the world they like, the leading member countries of the North Atlantic alliance have set out to establish military and technological supremacy in outer space.

In subsequent years, NATO countries continued to integrate space projects into their military activities. NATO military experts claim that NATO operations and the alliance's construction of a European missile defense system are increasingly dependent on space capabilities and that therefore NATO will continue to step up its military use of space.

"While space can be used for peaceful purposes, it can also be used for aggression," it was declared. "Space is essential to the Alliance's deterrence and defense. Space underpins NATO's ability to navigate and track forces, to have robust communications, to detect missile launches, and to ensure effective command and control."

NATO strategists say that the main threats to the space systems and commercial space interests of NATO member countries include Russian and Chinese antisatellite actions. To counter that threat, the alliance relies on a deterrence strategy that involves taking measures to ensure the stability and survival of the bloc's space potential in the event of some "irrational" attempts by adversaries to attack its space objects.

NATO approved further steps to increase its space activity at its summit on June 14, 2021. At the meeting, held in Brussels, the alliance pledged to "accelerate [its] work to deepen and expand [its] use of space as an operational domain, including through the NATO Space Centre in Germany and the upcoming establishment of the Space Centre of Excellence in France." It also promised to strengthen its "space domain awareness and better integrate space in [its] activities, including training and exercises."

US analysts believe it is critical that NATO include space aspects in its key military exercises because, they claim, in a potential major conflict with Russia, NATO space assets and space-derived information would be one of Russia's first targets. It has been proposed that "consultative mechanisms between NATO, US Space Command, and the US Space Force" be set up, that NATO put diplomatic pressure on its member and partner countries that oppose the militarization of space, and that the alliance take control of the EU's Galileo global navigation satellite system.

The Pentagon proposes moving "across four lines of effort (LOEs): (1) build a comprehensive military advantage in space; (2) integrate space into national, joint, and combined operations; (3) shape the strategic environment; and (4) cooperate with allies, partners, industry, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies."

The US space strategy is undoubtedly a confrontational doctrine with major adverse consequences for the entire world, since it clearly enshrines America's claim to the absolute domination of space and lays the basis for a new kind of arms race in the area of space-based attack weapons.

Space is becoming one of the most rapidly developing fields of France's military policy.

France effectively follows the US in calling space "an emerging area of potential conflict".

Britain's National Space Council was instructed to develop the first national space strategy in 2021. The strategy is intended to enshrine an integrated approach to military and civilian space policy in the UK.

Germany does not want to fall behind. According to a US analyst, it "has been quietly, but surely, acquiring and operating national security satellites and other space capabilities that will contribute to overall alliance security."

The militaries of other NATO countries such as Italy and Spain are also developing space strategies and have space programs.

THROUGH the fault of NATO, the international community has come to a historic crossroads in the use of space: The future of humankind depends on whether space will be a place for peaceful cooperation or a new arena for fierce confrontation, an arms race, and armed conflicts. Averting the latter scenario is

no less important than preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, halting climate change, or stamping out the COVID-19 pandemic. But while it puts tremendous efforts into combating those undoubtedly serious dangers, the international community, including international and national nongovernmental organizations, does not fully realize the scale of threats posed by the military use of space and how vital it is to repel them. There is currently a very real need for a global campaign to promote a peaceful and secure outer space, and this requires much more intensive work in diplomacy and public awareness – work to make the world community see all the dangers of the militarization of space and the need to take action before it is too late.

A Diplomatic Remedy for the Global Medical Community: Information Security in Health Care as a Topic of International Negotiations

Keywords: information and communication technologies (ICTs), health care, critical information infrastructure (CII), COVID-19, pandemic, Open-ended Working Group (OEWG)

Oleg Shakirov, senior expert, Center for Advanced Governance, research associate, Institute of Current International Problems, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; o.shakirov@cpur.ru

IN MARCH 2021, most UN member states recognized the special importance of protecting health care infrastructure from cyber threats. A point to that effect was included in the final report of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, a negotiation format launched in 2018 on Russia's initiative. The report reflects progress achieved at the UN and in other formats during more than two decades of debate on cybersecurity and information security in general, but it was the first UN document to include a separate section on the health care aspect of international information security. The fact that the report was passed by a consensus vote is an indication of the importance of this issue.

ALTHOUGH different countries have different approaches to defending critical infrastructure, leading nations are unanimous in considering health care systems and medical research facilities an element of critical infrastructure that needs protection against cyber threats.

The information security of critical infrastructure has been an international topic for nearly two decades. UN General Assembly Resolution 57/53 "Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,"⁸ which was proposed by Russia and passed in 2002, became the first UN document to take up the issue.

The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI), which covers the period from the early 1980s to 2014, records five health care sector incidents.

Since the mid-2010s, incidents of this kind have grown in scale and number. They included ransomware cryptoworm attacks.

In 2020 and 2021, the coronavirus pandemic put the health care sectors of practically all countries under a lot of stress and made the information security of health services a much greater concern. Cybercriminals maliciously exploited fears about the spreading virus, launching phishing attacks and creating fake websites.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has come under numerous cyberattacks ever since the start of the pandemic.

WHILE the US and Britain were leveling accusations at supposed attackers, another approach was starting to take shape aimed at formulating rules for states. Public statements and specific proposals to that effect were made during OEWG talks.

On May 21, 2020, the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (ELAC) published a statement signed by more than 130 public international lawyers and listed rules and principles of international law that, in the signatories' view, protected medical facilities from harmful cyber operations.

TALKS in the OEWG format led to the conclusion that the voluntary rules, norms, and principles for the responsible use of ICTs that had been approved before, including the commitment to refrain from any use of ICTs that might harm critical infrastructure, should apply to health care facilities as a component of critical infrastructure.

In addition to reaching a common understanding at the regulatory level, states can contribute to health information security through practical cooperation.

Undoubtedly, Russia and other countries will continue to take their own national measures to ensure the information security of their health services. But the successful track record of the OEWG proves that diplomacy can do a great deal, too.

International Information Law as a Regulator of International Relations in the Field of Information and Communication Technologies

Keywords: international information law (IIL), information and communication technologies (ICT), emerging branch of international law, international information security law

Yury Yasnokirsky, Associate Professor, Department of International Law, Moscow State Linguistic University, Candidate of Science (Law); dmib@mid.ru

THE SITUATION in the information space is currently deteriorating – in fact, it is in a state of complete chaos. In this regard, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation on Information Security Andrey Krutskikh has rightly noted that there is an emergent need to create a certain set of “traffic rules” – i.e., a code of conduct in the international information sphere. International law is expected to play a regulating role in international relations. The issue of its applicability has been on the agenda of specialized UN agencies for more than a decade, starting with the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the UN Open-ended Working Group (both groups completed their work last year), as well as the UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security 2021-2025, created on Russia's initiative. The mandate of this group reflects the applicability of international law on the basis of UN General Assembly Resolution 75/240.

Since modern ICT are transboundary and global, there is a need for the emergence of international information law (IIL) – essentially, an emerging branch of international law with principles and norms that regulate international relations in the field of ICT and ICT itself among subjects of international law. The primary actors in such interactions are states, and secondary actors are international organizations – primarily the UN (although, as demonstrated in the course of negotiations in the new OEWG, some states are trying to change this state of affairs by actively involving nongovernmental actors in UN agencies in order to erode the role of states and the UN itself).

The principles that operate within the IIL framework include general principles of international law and specific principles of international information law.

We regularly invite the world community to go beyond the implementation of the 11 rules adopted as a result of the work of the relevant UN Group of Governmental Experts in 2015.

The issue of international information security has become particularly relevant. Potentially, once sufficient regulatory material has accumulated and the doctrine receives further development, international information security legislation could emerge as a sub-branch of international information law. Its scope may cover military and political relations and efforts to fight information terrorism and ICT crimes.

In conclusion, I would like to note that in the future, under certain conditions, IIL could turn into a full-fledged branch of public international law, including such sub-branches as international information security law, international procedural law in the sphere of ICT, an international attribution mechanism, and so on. It would be based on conventions related to international information security and ICT crime prevention.

Now Ukraine Will Have to Deal With Two Sovereign States: After All, the Ukrainian Side Derailed the Minsk Process

Keywords: Donbass, Lugansk People's Republic (LPR), Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), southeastern Ukraine

We are currently on an equal footing with our neighbors and with a fraternal republic. So the conversation began with our expression of gratitude to the Russian president for recognizing in such a difficult time the two Donetsk republics, which have been in a state of confrontation with Ukrainian nationalism for eight years now.

For us, this is a very important step toward stabilization in southeastern Ukraine. In addition, the [presidential] decrees on the recognition of the Donetsk republics and, as a result, the signing of treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Russian Federation, enabled us to ask for real practical assistance to curb nationalists who have for eight years been waging a war against us, killing Donetsk civilians.

In Lugansk and Donetsk, the situation remains complicated. Right after the recognition of the LPR/DPR, Ukrainian aggression escalated. We immediately felt the Ukrainian authorities' reaction to the recognition. The number of shelling attacks on civilian settlements in the LPR increased by dozens, if not hundreds of times.

The situation remains dire, since the people who are in fortified positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces realize that their only option for saving their lives is to fight to the death. And that is what they are doing.

Now Ukraine will have to deal with two independent, sovereign states: After all, the Ukrainian side derailed the Minsk process.

However, Ukraine is refusing to implement the agreements that were enshrined at the highest level. All this is happening with the full connivance of the Western countries that are in fact guarantors of the agreement. What is happening now is the result of the inaction of countries that have supported Ukraine's reluctance to implement the Minsk agreements.

Ukraine must return to its basic documents. Recall that the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine enshrines its neutral and nonnuclear status. Is Ukraine willing to return to the basic principles of its statehood? Possibly. In that case, an independent state of Ukraine would appear in the world arena. However, right now, Ukraine has knocked that foundation out from under it and shown its incompetence to the whole world.

Everything depends on the Ukrainian people. If they are ready and if they have the strength to cleanse themselves of the filth that has now flooded their political elite, then in the foreseeable future, the chances will be good. But that depends on the people.

So far, they have looked on in silence as Ukraine's political authorities violate all obligations. What's more, for eight years now Ukraine has been shelling Donbass, with people calmly continuing to watch everything from the sidelines, convinced that they would not be affected.

So if the Ukrainian people bring themselves to understand and empathize with what has happened in Donbass, and make a decision that would not allow the same things to happen again, then Ukraine could revive. And it would be a different Ukraine with a different political elite.

The first official meeting was held to discuss our goals in implementing the treaty provisions, as well as our goals in advancing our relations, which will probably be followed up by new, additional legally binding obligations.

Practical steps to prepare the opening of diplomatic missions were also discussed, but [those discussions were] rather short on specifics. I hope that we will not have to wait too long, but a lot of work still lies ahead.

I am certain that International Affairs should take some credit for the results that have been achieved. Thank you very much for this opportunity and for your understanding and support.

State Politics of Memory in Ukraine After the Euromaidan

Keywords: Ukraine, politics of memory, state, Euromaidan, system of memory

Sergey Belov, Lecturer, Department of Russian Politics, School of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Candidate of Science (History); *belov2006s@yandex.ru*. Research conducted as part of the Development Program "Preserving the World's Cultural-Historical Heritage," Interdisciplinary School of Academic Education, Moscow University

THE POLITICS OF MEMORY is a necessary and very important tool used in shaping statehood, consolidating society around a set of stateforming ideas and interpretations. In practice, these are activities by the state and other interested parties to manipulate social groups by adjusting or changing their values and their images of the past. The symbols that are employed to this end are signs that are clear and easily recognizable within social subgroups, and that embody certain values/qualities, standards of behavior, or goals.

By appealing to ideas of a collective past, efforts are made to alter people's behavior in the present. As a rule, historical events are presented to the public in a simplified, uncontradictory and thus generally accessible manner – in the form of mythologemes. Myth is created by means of signs and symbols and by regular rituals that employ these symbols. Rituals recreate the past, fill it with emotional meaning, and allow participants to "re-live" particular historical events.

POLITICS OF MEMORY in Ukraine, like in any other state, does not pursue the goal of authentic reconstruction of the past based on historical data. The politics of memory is rather a component within

a set of practices by which the past (through its symbolic portrayal) gets used politically. The use of the past for political ends is a system of methods of manipulating people by referring to historical events, although these methods are not always designed to create an image of a collective past.

On a different note, it must be emphasized that updating (modernizing) the past as part of the politics of memory is largely inevitable. This is because the image of history is based on emotionally laden symbols whose meanings always change depending on the perceptions of the target audience. Along these lines, the image of the Red Banner of Victory or the emblems of Ukrainian nationalists are perceived differently by the war's participants and their great-grandchildren, simply due to the fact that they grew up in essentially different historical and socioeconomic conditions, and thus encountered these symbols in completely different contexts.

ONE OF THE main problems with Ukraine's politics of memory is the opportunistic way it has been implemented. Even though the nation has strategic priorities in this respect, to which each successive regime swears allegiance, we can see a systematic deviation from those declared priorities.

For example, there is a widespread opinion that ethnic Jews played a special role in the activities of the Bolshevik Party, the revolutions of 1917, the institution of Soviet rule in Ukraine, etc. As a consequence, the responsibility for all the accompanying negative events is laid at the door of members of the Jewish minority.

PROBLEMS related to the politics of memory also arise with the Ukrainian elite's choice of model for constructing their national identity. The latter is being crafted outside the paradigm of a civic nation, which centers around ethnic and linguistic affiliations. This process uses a cultural component based on folk culture – specifically its agrarian version.

An alternative to the history of World War II could be the events connected with the liberation struggles of the Ukrainian people in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the myth of the "freedom-loving Cossack." However, use of the symbolic legacy from that era has its limits.

ON A DIFFERENT note, we must point out the negative role of divergent views on national history among Ukrainian "Eurocentrists." Within this group, we can identify two segments. On one hand, there are the traditionalists, who have adopted an orthodox version of nationalism that views neighboring peoples as enemies, and is typified by religiosity and adherence to orthodox values.

UKRAINE'S political leadership is actually undermining its own strategy of politics of memory, which is built around rejecting the Soviet legacy and uniting all macrosocial groups around a new vision of their shared past and integrating it with a system of ideas about a common history with Europe. For the sake of pursuing some short-term goals, the Ukrainian establishment periodically refuses to fulfill certain points of its own strategy of memory.

As a result, the process of bringing it to fruition becomes fraught with serious contradictions. This political course can be characterized as effective in terms of securing the interests of certain groups of the elite in the foreseeable future. But sacrificing strategy for those short-term goals automatically reduces the effectiveness of Ukraine's politics of memory in the long run.

Book of Memory: Children

Keywords: special military operation to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine, LPR, DPR, Memorial: We Will Not Forget! We Will Not Forgive!, Gunned-Down Childhood in Donbass

Yevgenia Pyadysheva, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, International Affairs, Candidate of Science (History); pyadysheva@gmail.com

WITH each passing day of the special military operation of the Russian Army and the people's militias of the Lugansk People's Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), more evidence comes to light of genocide in Donbass committed by Ukrainian troops and of inhumane treatment of LPR and DPR civilians by [Ukrainian] nationalist volunteer battalions in the traditions of Nazi concentration camps. The picture of a war without rules and in complete disregard for international law that Ukraine was waging against some of its citizens is constantly acquiring new details.

Smokescreens created by Western propaganda and fake news are likely to dissipate, and the world will see the results of the atrocities and genocide that Ukraine was perpetrating in Donbass for eight years. Perhaps the tragedy unfolding before our very eyes and the determination of the people of the LPR and DPR to seek international condemnation of the Ukrainian fascist regime and its Western patrons will be a trigger for countries that have experienced NATO military invasions and the death, sorrow, devastation, and chaos they bring.

The book *Gunned-Down Childhood in Donbass*, published with support from LPR head Leonid Pasechnik, has become volume one of collected evidence of the killing of children in Donbass, where being a child has meant enduring airstrikes, shelling, and violations of rights enshrined in international documents that Ukraine has signed. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was shocked by the facts described in the book, a copy of which was presented to him by his LPR counterpart Vladislav Deinego during a meeting.

"A Flight Cut Short," the first of the three chapters of *Gunned-Down Childhood in Donbass*, contains photos of children killed by the Ukrainian regime and stories of the death of 35 little angels who will never grow up, will never see the spring sun, will never become moms or dads.

In fact, one needs a certain amount of courage just to open the book and start reading.

The second chapter, "Learning Your ABCs on a Front Line," is about an unbending desire to live, the simple joys of childhood, and a horror that made the hair of a nine-year-old boy go gray. The chapter contains stories about the everyday life of children in wartime Donbass, about a childhood amid mortar fire and air raids.

Conclusive video, photographic, and other evidence of crimes by the Kiev military and political leadership and Ukrainian troops and volunteer battalions was presented to a tribunal organized on the basis of a grassroots initiative. The tribunal heard testimony from witnesses, some of whom had been taken prisoner by Ukrainian forces and had been tortured. "But neither Ukraine nor Europe believed our accusations. In effect, we have been deprived of the right to be human and to be heard," says Soroka.

The West doesn't hear because it doesn't want to. It claims that it is Russia that is trampling on international law, which apparently does not apply to the population of Donbass.

How many more volumes of evidence of Ukrainian crimes in Donbass have to be published for the West to abandon its arrogance and imperious disregard for law and to begin to see the reality – namely, that the Ukrainian criminal regime has been murdering people in Donbass for eight years, and only the Russian Army can put a stop to it.

Reactions in Global Online Media to Russia's Special Military Operation in Ukraine: A Statistical Analysis of Media Trends

Keywords: Russia's special military operation, Factiva, Internet, media storm, media trends

This article presents findings of a study done by the Faculty of Communications, Media, and Design of the National Research University-Higher School of Economics as part of the research project "Transformations of the Picture of the World in the Global Online Media Space Under the Impact of the COVID-19 Epidemic."

Alexander Sharikov, Professor, Faculty of Communications, Media and Design, Higher School of Economics, Moscow; asharikov@hse.ru

RUSSIA'S special military operation in Ukraine has generated an enormous surge of activity in the world media. Such a reaction was quite expected; this sort of phenomena occur from time to time. In scholarly literature, they are put in the more general category of media trends – a category involving studies of changes in the nature of media content on a certain topic within a specific period.¹ This article examines reactions in the global online media to Russia's special operation and developments related to it. Our conclusions were based on how frequently Russia and Ukraine were mentioned in various segments of the Internet in February and March.

BEFORE going over the findings of the study, let us look at the general patterns of global online media trends. They follow some laws – one being the quantitative aspect of coverage. Based on agenda-setting theory,⁴ it is assumed that the number of news items on a specific subject reflects its significance in the view of media outlets. Consequently, a ranking of content items based on how frequently specific countries are mentioned in it would, in effect, be a ranking of the significance of those countries for the world media.

The February 24 surge was definitely a global media storm. Incidentally, it is not very easy for a media organization to sharply boost its output; it would need extra human and logistics resources to do that, so 11.5% is a rather large one-day increase. This means that large numbers of journalists were mobilized to cover what was happening in Ukraine. More media attention on one issue normally means less attention on others. In many countries, the coronavirus pandemic was the most remarkable victim of media de-prioritization during the special operation in Ukraine.

As for the proportions of positive and negative content, the US outdid both Russia and Ukraine in both respects. The proportion of negative content mentioning the US rose from 0.44% to 0.48% day over day, while the share of negative content that referenced Russia went down from 0.17% to 0.15% and the share of negative content that referenced Ukraine shrank from 0.55% to 0.23%.

The global media storm set off by the Russian special operation had a slight positive effect on Russia's significance for the world media: Day over day, the total amount of content mentioning Russia increased, the percentage of negative text items in English-language content decreased, and the proportion of positive items in it remained unchanged, with the modality balance becoming a little more positive. Ukraine showed a similar trend. Meanwhile, the percentage of negative items in Englishlanguage content mentioning the US grew, and the country's modality balance, though remaining positive, became less so.

Factiva, a US entity, complied with US foreign policy principles and did not use the DPR and LPR as names for geographical units, continuing to use Donbass instead. Moreover, most of the items mentioning Donbass were Russian-language content published in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and some other post-Soviet states. The media of the rest of the world showed practically no interest in what was happening in Donbass. Donbass was, as it were, invisible to the world media, which made no mention of any of the violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated there, including the shelling of residential areas.

As for differences in the amount of content mentioning Russia published during the week of February 14-20 and the amount produced in the week of February 21-27, Africa and Asia (excluding Russia) recorded the greatest increase, growing by a factor of 3.9, while the US and Canada showed the smallest difference, the two countries' combined content growing by a factor of 2.9.

Ukraine has a volatile record for the same quarter-century. In 1996, a mere 0.09% of text items published by the global online media made references to Ukraine.

Donbass appeared in the Factiva database as a geographical unit in 2004, denoting the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk in eastern Ukraine. That year, Factiva's database, which stores millions upon millions of text items, included only three items that mentioned Donbass.

Items in English mentioning Russia outnumbered those mentioning Ukraine or the US and grew in number by 35.2% in one day. On February 24, Russia was the most represented country in global online media content, being mentioned in 25.4% of items. Ukraine came in second (17.2%), and the US third (10.5%).

The media storm differed in character from region to region, which was borne out by a week-by-week statistical analysis.

Among G20 countries, in the week of February 21-27, Argentina and Saudi Arabia had the largest proportions of items mentioning Russia (19.2% and 15.0%, respectively), and Argentina and Mexico had the largest week-by-week increases in content mentioning Russia (by factors of 5.2 and 5, respectively).

Among European countries for which adequate information, including sufficient numbers of sources, was available, content published in Finland and Romania in the week of February 21-27 had the largest proportions of items mentioning Russia (41.5% and 33.9%, respectively). The media of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary had the largest week-by-week increases in numbers of items mentioning Russia (by factors of 23.3, 7.3, and 4.8, respectively). The former USSR had moved troops into those three countries.

Russia and South Africa: 30 Years of Diplomatic Relations

Keywords: African continent, struggle for independence, South Africa, apartheid regime, state and interregional ties, cooperation in combating the pandemic

Ilya Rogachov, *Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to South Africa;*
ruspospr@mweb.co.za

FEBRUARY 28, 2022 marked the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Africa. Over the years, relations between our countries have reached the level of strategic partnership. More than 80 bilateral documents on cooperation in various fields have been signed. Several intergovernmental mechanisms have been established and are currently functioning. Trustbased political dialogue has been established at the highest levels that is stimulating further progress in cooperation.

By the time Russians first set foot on South African soil, European colonization of the region had been going on for about 100 years.

The struggle of the colonial powers of Europe to divide Africa intensified in the second half of the 19th century. While in the 1870s only part of the continent had been seized by Europeans, by the early 20th century, the map of Africa was a patchwork quilt of colonies and protectorates.

Russia was one of the few countries that did not participate in the colonial partition of the African continent. Moreover, the sympathies of the forward-thinking part of Russia's population were on the side of African peoples.

While officially maintaining neutrality, Russia persistently, albeit unsuccessfully, pursued a political course of forming a union of European states capable of persuading Britain to abandon its attempts to settle its differences with the Boer republics by military force.

Russian public opinion expressed its ardent support for the Boers, who were fighting to preserve their independence. Russian donations were used to equip and send to South Africa a medical detachment of the Russian Red Cross and a Russian-Dutch hospital.

The Soviet Union and South Africa were allies in World War II. About 3,000 South Africans served in the British Navy. Many of them took part in the Arctic convoys, shipping allied assistance – weapons and military equipment, ammunition, and food – to the ports of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. We know of two war veterans now living in Cape Town who participated in the convoys.

Unfortunately, with the end of World War II, and especially after the establishment of the apartheid regime in 1948, the ruling establishment of South Africa consistently advocated curtailing bilateral cooperation with our country and obstructed the work of Soviet diplomats. At the initiative of the South African regime, Soviet diplomatic offices in the country were closed in 1956.

The contribution of our country to the liberation struggle of the South African peoples is well remembered and appreciated in South Africa

Domestic transformations in South Africa and the USSR in the 1980s and 1990s also found reflection in the countries' bilateral relations. The level of engagement between Moscow and Pretoria started growing rapidly. In December 1991, the Republic of South Africa became the first state on the continent to recognize the state sovereignty of the Russian Federation, and, on December 30, to recognize Russia as the successor state of the Soviet Union. On February 28, 1992, a joint statement was signed in Pretoria on establishing diplomatic relations at the embassy level. On that day, a new stage in Russian-South African cooperation began, and its status transformed dramatically.

Russia's cooperation with the countries of the African continent and, in particular, the Republic of South Africa, received a significant boost in October 2019 with the first-ever Russia-Africa summit, held in Sochi.

For more than a decade, Russia and South Africa have been successfully cooperating as members of BRICS. Our countries share a high level of mutual understanding on key international and regional issues. Russia and South Africa demonstrate a constructive attitude toward deepening cooperation in three key areas of the association's activities: politics and security, economics and finance, and humanitarian exchanges.

In December 2021, in accordance with agreements between the presidents of Russia and South Africa, a joint Russian-South African science mission was held to study the clinical and epidemiological features of a new coronavirus infection caused by the Omicron variant. During the meetings, the whole range of issues related to countering the coronavirus was discussed, including organizing laboratory testing and epidemiological monitoring, studying the genetic characteristics of the infectious agent, providing medical care for patients with COVID-19, and so on. As a result of the mission, a scientific cooperation road map between Russia and South Africa in this field was drafted for 2022-2024.

The Russian Embassy in South Africa is also working on strengthening the legal framework for bilateral humanitarian cooperation. At present, the South African side is considering several important

documents, including a draft bilateral intergovernmental agreement on the establishment and operation of informational and cultural centers.

Tajikistan and Russia: 30 Years of Sustainable Strategic Partnership and Alliance

Keywords: Tajikistan, Russia, 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations

Davlatshoh Qurbonali Gulmahmadzoda, *Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Tajikistan to the Russian Federation*; tajembmoscow@mfa.tj

THE YEAR 2022 is a momentous one for the Republic of Tajikistan and the Russian Federation: On April 8, our countries marked the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Russia are based on longstanding traditions of solid friendship, mutual respect, and support. Over the past three decades, relations between our countries have developed steadily, expanding and acquiring new substance. Many important events have taken place during these years, and a sound treaty framework has been established.

Our countries are bound together by close and fraternal ties, friendship between our peoples, and our cultural heritage. The state of these relations is determined not only by the existence of certain pragmatic interests, but also by the historical background, the experience of cooperation between our peoples, and civilizational and cultural factors. This is why Russia has held a key place in the system of our country's foreign policy priorities since the early years of Tajikistan's national independence.

From the early years of independent statehood, cooperation between our countries assumed a new form in accordance with its key principle: interaction between two sovereign countries with the preservation of national identity, history, and language, as well as cultural and religious values.

In the past 30 years, we have signed more than 300 interstate, intergovernmental, and interdepartmental agreements and treaties on cooperation covering all important areas, including political, military, military-technical, economic, tourist, scientific, technological, cultural, and humanitarian.

An official visit by the president of Tajikistan to Russia in April 2019 was a major event in the history of bilateral relations. Along with a political declaration by the presidents of Tajikistan and Russia, 15 documents on cooperation worth a total of about \$500 million were signed based on the results of that visit. Thus, in 2019, our countries reached a number of breakthrough agreements on trade, economics, finance, energy, industry, transport, communications, science and education, culture, tourism, healthcare, sports, and labor migration, as well as defense and security.

Regular contacts between the ministries of foreign affairs of the two countries, which have already become traditional, are developing steadily. Since 2008, annual programs of cooperation between our ministries of foreign affairs have been signed at foreign ministers' meetings. Under these programs, the foreign ministries hold consultations on a wide range of issues related to the bilateral agenda and cooperation between the two countries in international organizations.

Migration is high on the agenda of bilateral cooperation. The main issue is social and legal protection for Tajik citizens temporarily working in Russia. A significant achievement was the signing in 2019 of an intergovernmental agreement on the organized recruitment of Tajik citizens for temporary work in Russia. A new package of migration agreements is now being prepared for signature.

Tajik-Russian cooperation on education is expanding. Tajikistan takes great care to maintain and develop the Russian language in the country.

Tajik-Russian interaction in multilateral organizations is telling. Our countries have a long and positive record of close cooperation at the United Nations, actively assisting each other in committees and subsidiary bodies of the UN General Assembly in order to support each other's international and global initiatives. We are grateful to our Russian friends for their appreciation of the global water initiatives of Tajikistan's president at the UN.

Tajik-Russian relations are steadily developing and expanding in view of present-day realities. The nature and prospects of our cooperation give us reason for optimism about the future of bilateral relations as our joint efforts take them to a new and more enhanced level of development in accordance with the interests and potential of our states and peoples.

Imperial Chutzpah in World Politics as a Factor in International Relations Today

Keywords: world politics, international relations, imperial chutzpah, US

Yury Sayamov, Head, UNESCO Chair on Global Problems, Faculty of Global Processes, Lomonosov Moscow State University; y.sayamov@yandex.ru

IMPERIAL chutzpah as a phenomenon of international relations has been known since antiquity. It stems from the fact that, as the great Ancient Greek philosopher Thucydides put it back in the 5th century BC: "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must". Throughout history, the phenomenon of imperial insolence has invariably manifested itself in world politics and diplomacy as a destructive factor that has provoked wars, conflicts, and other calamities. However, one-sided gains and preferences that states on the road of imperial insolence expected to acquire (and did acquire) by disregarding the legitimate interests of other peoples and international security turned out to be fairly limited in the context of history and, in the final analysis, contributed to the downfall of the empire. Imperial arrogance, as embodied in American foreign policy, should never escape our attention and deserves very serious analysis. As an important factor of international relations, it should be resolutely rebuffed by any state that cherishes its sovereignty and seeks to preserve it.

Prominent American historian William Blum, in his book *America's Deadliest Export: Democracy – The Truth about US Foreign Policy and Everything Else*, characterized US actions on the world stage as "chutzpah of an imperial size" [2]. John Bolton, who represented the US at the UN and served as US national security adviser, minced no words, saying that Americans should "be unashamed, unapologetic, uncompromising American constitutional hegemonists," so that their senior decision makers could be free to use force unilaterally. He also said that because of its unique status, the US could not be legally bound or constrained in any way by its international treaty obligations.

The phenomenon of American imperial chutzpah is deeply rooted in American history. It developed under the strong influence of the hubris of the British Empire, which was guided by the ideology of global domination and its strong conviction that Anglo-Saxons were destined, chosen, and called to be the world's rulers. Having survived for several centuries, the idea of AngloSaxon predestination surfaced even in Winston Churchill's famous Fulton Speech (1946), which marked the start of the Cold War. Today, it serves as the basis of US claims to world leadership.

If the policy of self-isolation or independence of a particular country does not suit the US, that policy must be ended by seeking "openness," appealing to human rights, and acting, if necessary, from a

position of strength. On the other hand, if in the opinion of the US a state is acting too independently on a global or regional scale, it must be restricted: sealed off by an “iron curtain” as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War, branded as a rogue state like North Korea and Iran, or pressured, mainly in the form of economic sanctions (which have been applied against Russia under various pretexts) and military force, which was used against Yugoslavia (1999), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011).

Since the American Civil War, Washington has been using brinkmanship as a foreign policy tool in the expectation that the opponent would concede at the last moment in the interests of self-preservation, thus giving the US one-sided advantages. The practice was actively used during the Cold War.

Dwight Eisenhower threatened to use nuclear bombs during the Korean War; Richard Nixon did the same when trying to force the Soviet Union to abandon its support of Vietnam. Both were forced to back down. The Americans, however, won the “nuclear poker game” twice: John Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Ronald Reagan, who scared dim-witted Gorbachev.

The destruction of its main geopolitical rival and the entire opposing social system – an incredible success that the US was not even counting on – reinforced in the American establishment the extremely dangerous delusion about America’s right to rule the world at its own discretion from a position of strength and dominance.

The second stage of consolidation of America’s foreign policy began with William McKinley’s presidency, at the turn of the 20th century, when the US confirmed its intention to rely on aggression, wars, and territorial acquisitions.

The “big stick policy” was complemented by “gunboat diplomacy,” which is still realized in the form of “aircraft carrier diplomacy,” to increase the level of military presence of the US and its political pressure in various regions of the world.

The Cold War doctrine became President Truman’s doctrine, which was presented in 1947 as a “response to Soviet expansion” but was in fact part of America’s policy of expansionism and establishment of military bases around the world. It laid the basis for the notorious “containment policy” of Russia that is still very much alive.

The doctrine President Richard Nixon formulated in 1969 was about “redistributing responsibility and initiative among Free World nations”; it would ensure American interests by force and “redistribute responsibility” and costs. This manifested itself in the “Vietnamization” of the lost war in Vietnam, the “Arabization” of the fight for oil in the Gulf through the involvement of Saudi Arabia, and shifting NATO and “joint defense” costs to allies regardless of whether they wanted to be involved or not.

Driven by that temptation, President George Bush formulated the concept of establishing a new world order that in essence meant the monopoly of one state on political and economic leadership and governance.

Having accepted Moscow’s support in its struggle against international terrorism, Washington in words spoke of Russia as its partner but in actions used its solidarity to consolidate its positions in the post-Soviet space by deploying military bases there and moving NATO closer to Russia’s borders.

It has been claimed that Obama somewhat improved America’s image in the world. But the media, including in the Muslim world, as well as public opinion polls showed that American claims to global domination and the role of world police officer were being more and more resolutely rejected as American arrogance, unacceptable interference, and infringement on sovereignty and human rights.

The Trump Doctrine, which his administration defined as “principled realism,” formulated its aim as “Make America Great Again.” Trump’s “America First” slogan brought to mind unpleasant historical analogies with Germany that had started two world wars, but it nonetheless clearly articulated the goals

of the new president. Trump said that America must not be a sucker. In politics, as in business, it must invariably strive for profit.

Trump's reelection bid split America more or less in half. The victory of Joe Biden, the Democratic candidate, raised doubts in half of the American population, and was marked by a powerful social crisis and public protests.

Recently, the administration approved America's strategy in the Indo-Pacific, primarily aimed at preventing China's development and its rapprochement with Russia (which is already a fact). Biden is the third American president in a row to describe Asia as the main priority of the US.

For the first time in the nuclear era, the US has pledged to supply Australia, an AUKUS member, with the technology of nuclear powered submarines. China called that decision dangerous and a threat.

Lies, very much like imperial chutzpah, are another inevitable component of America's foreign policy.

Only the awareness of an existential threat can stop the deeply amoral American establishment that spouts lies and double standards. Feeling safe beyond two oceans, the American political class is raising the pressure in the global cauldron that is already on the verge of exploding. The 9/11 attacks that destroyed that illusion of unassailability have been practically forgotten, and America's dim-witted generals and politicians are again devising aggressive plans. The US and the "collective West" are threatening Russia. Amid the degradation of the West and its de facto loss of independence in decision-making, Russia should talk only to the American puppeteers who control NATO, the EU, and the "collective West" – if it is still even possible to reach any agreements with them. If not, the street thug who has gone too far should be brought to his senses by military-technical means. There is no other option. Things have gone too far; Russia has sought mutual concessions with the West far too long and not found them.

India's Foreign Policy: New Challenges and Opportunities

Keywords: coronavirus, India, QUAD, China, rivalry, US, Afghanistan, Russia

Sergey Velichkin, *Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Candidate of Science (History)*;
velichkins@mail.ru

INDIA traditionally sets high expectations for its diplomacy. This is to be expected in the country of Chanakya and Jawaharlal Nehru, and it is very encouraging. After all, throughout its 75 years of independence, India has been a significant actor in world affairs, supporting peace and cooperation. To Russia, India is a friend with whom there have never been quarrels, many of our key interests overlap, and significant mutual understanding has been achieved.

Today, the primary challenge for India, as well as for the whole planet, is the coronavirus pandemic.

Russia was one of the first countries to offer assistance to India at the start of the second wave. On April 28, 2021, a day after President Vladimir Putin's phone call, two planes delivered 20 [metric] tons of emergency aid – equipment and medical supplies – and on May 25, nine more tons were delivered. This was the fulfillment of the agreement on "strengthening cooperation" in combating the pandemic, reached by telephone at the highest level in March 2020. Back then, India supplied COVID drugs to Russia within a month.

As is well known, according to the declared "foreign policy for the middle class" and the "America first" logic, the Biden administration announced that priority was to be given to producing vaccines for use in the US. This has hindered access for other countries, including India, to raw materials for their own

manufacture vaccines. Washington also blocked India's and South Africa's request to the WHO to temporarily suspend intellectual property rules related to COVID-19 vaccines.

This is a kind of fork in the road of "vaccine diplomacy." It seems that the American summit initiators urgently needed a "substantive" anti-China security event, in contrast to Trump's rhetoric. However, not all members were prepared, after 10 years of the amorphous existence of the QUAD, to accord it the status of a direct military alliance against China. India, for instance, clearly saw cooperation in the fight against the pandemic as more relevant.

Overall, the Washington QUAD Summit could feasibly be called a success of Indian diplomacy, which has advanced its vaccine production and trade and strengthened its presence in the Indo-Pacific region (a long-standing independent strategic goal for India, closely linked to the development of trade and economic ties with the ASEAN countries and the Far East) without assuming any obligations that would tie its hands. It has avoided a military escalation and achieved progress in "containing" China.

OF COURSE, one theory is that all the problems there are the "result of China's growing aggressiveness." That opinion is being assertively promoted by the Americans, using the full power of their information warfare apparatus. However, as follows from the numerous noisy brash statements of Washington and its allies, they see the manifestation of this "aggressiveness" in events in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Japan, for example, is uncompromising on the issue of the ownership of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands [28]. But how is this directed against India?

In other words, we are talking about rivalry. And if it is to be considered in the geopolitical context outlined in key Indian foreign policy documents and in Jaishankar's conceptual book *The Way of India*, then we are talking about a rivalry of two centers of the emerging multipolar world.

WHAT is happening in Asia today is the flailing and convulsions of the US experiencing the double grand collapse of its geopolitical strategy, prescribed with brazen self-confidence by the unforgettable Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book *The Grand Chessboard* (1997).

The infrastructure of geopolitical confrontation with China is being created with a vengeance. The US is not at all concerned that the establishment of the AUKUS partnership and the QUAD security dialogue with the participation of Western countries erodes the universal formats of the Asia-Pacific region that exist under the auspices of ASEAN. Moreover, whatever India's antibloc principles may be, the initiators of today's game have their own plans for Delhi.

Now that India considers a sharp increase in the spread of concrete threats of terrorism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan a real possibility, not to mention the strengthening (much closer to home) of the positions of their geopolitical rivals, many are wondering whether the US is in fact taking the interests of their country into account.

All this leads a number of Indian analysts to conclude that the country "intends to continue to balance geopolitically between the two forces," which are, according to the Hindu newspaper, the SCO and the QUAD [13]. In our opinion, a lot will depend on the continuation of efforts to find a balance of interests of the world's leading powers sharing the same region. India is also paying close attention to that issue.

France Before the 2022 Presidential Election

Keywords: Macron, reforms of the president, the EU Council, AUKUS, Russia-France relations, La République En Marche (LREM)

Vladimir Chernega, *Chief Researcher at the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Science, Russian Academy of Sciences, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Doctor of Science (Law);*
vladimir.tchernega@free.fr

THE NEXT presidential election in France, scheduled for April 10 and 24, 2022, should tell us whether there will be a change of leadership in the country or whether Emmanuel Macron will remain president. The situation today is fundamentally different compared to the previous election on April 23 and May 7, 2017, when Macron, although littleknown among the general public at the time, was able to win primarily on account of his astute slogans. He positioned himself as a “modernizer” of the economy who would free private entrepreneurial initiative that had been stifled by excessive state regulation and create conditions for the country’s timely joining of the “digital revolution.” At the same time, he criticized capitalism, which had reached its final stage, for focusing too much on financial capital and too little on people.

IN 2017, Macron took over a country that had for years been experiencing growing economic hardship and social tension. Undaunted, Macron immediately set out to implement his promised reforms.

But Macron’s key achievement was delivering on his promise to create conditions for economic modernization – in particular, providing greater freedom to employers and encouraging entrepreneurship. In addition to easing state regulation of economic activity, reducing taxes on companies and capital, and allocating subsidies for innovative start-ups, the new decrees and legislative acts have limited the role of trade unions and enterprise committees in regulating labor relations. Employers have gained more opportunities to use temporary employment agreements. Measures were also taken to encourage new investments in the economy, including the repeal of the so-called solidarity tax on wealth (it was replaced by a tax on real estate assets). According to Macron, this is supposed to reduce capital flight and ensure that wealth is used inside the country.

The president paid special attention to developing the digital economy. Between 2017 and 2019, it grew from 53.9 billion to 153 billion euros.

Another target of Macron’s reforms was the education system, which he said perpetuated social disparity since it did not eliminate inequality of opportunity. This was especially true of people of migrant, particularly Muslim, background, who often dropped out of school, got involved in street crime, and became a target for preachers of militant Islamism. Regular youth riots in suburbs populated predominantly by people with migrant roots revealed the severity of the problem, as did Islamist terrorist attacks committed by those born and raised in France. The issue concerned not only inequality, but also the internal security of the country.

The socioeconomic measures originally not included in his plans – in particular, a special bonus of 1,000 euros for employees who receive less than three times the annual value of the French minimum wage (the Macron bonus), the indexation of pensions, and a further increase in social benefits for the poor and other vulnerable groups – have certainly helped boost the president’s growing approval rating. The guaranteed monthly minimum wage was raised twice in 2021, reaching 1,258 euros.

Nevertheless, the overall socioeconomic situation in the country did not encourage optimism and did not lead to a significant reduction in discontent.

For Macron, who had to serve as a crisis manager, the pandemic could have turned into a personal disaster: Had he proven a poor manager, he would have lost his chances for reelection in 2022.

A positive role was played by the France Relance recovery plan until 2022 that the government launched in October 2020 with a budget of 100 billion euros in addition to the 470 billion euros allocated earlier to support businesses and workers.

The social consequences of the pandemic also turned out to be not as serious as the president and the government had feared. According to opinion polls, many French people believed that during the pandemic crisis, the authorities managed to avoid the worst-case scenario.

IN HIS BOOK *Revolution*, published in 2016,⁸ Macron outlined his basic concept of French foreign policy, which he still largely follows today.

Public opinion polls show that a significant part of the population is nostalgic for the “sovereign greatness” of France.

After the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, Macron clearly advocated maintaining a demanding dialogue with Russia in order to preserve the prospect of resuming cooperation. Calling Russia a “European country” with which France had many ties, cultural in particular, he made it clear that there is no alternative to such a dialogue.

The meeting immediately revealed the key general difference between Macron’s foreign policy course and that of [former president] François Hollande – the former’s greater pragmatism.

By definition, NATO is able to support Macron’s military integration project only to the extent that it contributes to the increase in the defense budgets of EU member states, the anti-Russian mobilization of countries that are not part of the alliance, and the development of the military infrastructure that its forces could use. Macron’s assurances that “European autonomous defense” will ease the burden on the US but at the same time not be an alternative to NATO, are unlikely to reassure Washington and pro-Atlantist circles in the EU.

France’s “sovereign” diplomacy faced an even greater test in the IndoPacific region, where Macron has been establishing an alliance with India, Australia, and Japan, directed against China. The AUKUS agreement essentially called the French strategy into question.

Most French experts, however, believe that Macron was able to bring new dynamism to the country’s foreign policy, including by establishing a balance between values and interests that corresponds to international realities. This assessment increases his reelection chances.

The rise of the “greens,” most of them espousing left-wing views, is also noticeable. The division of political forces into two camps, thus, has not gone away. But whereas the left is still fragmented, republicans, the main force of the center-right, were able to unite around Valérie Pécresse, the presidential candidate from The Republicans, a right-wing Gaullist party. At the same time, on the extreme right, columnist and polemicist Eric Zemmour has rapidly risen to popularity with his tough anti-immigrant, nationalist, and sovereigntist positions. He advocates France’s withdrawal from the integrated structures of NATO and its greater independence from the EU. Notably, Zemmour places the bulk of the responsibility for the current confrontation between the West and Russia on NATO, which seeks to “surround Russia”; and he criticizes the sanctions against Russia.

In the meantime, Macron’s chances are estimated to be quite high. Nevertheless, some French experts, considering the high level of social discontent in the country, believe that Macron’s victory is by no means guaranteed.

The Impact of Pressure Groups on US Missile Defense Policy

Keywords: US missile defense policy, US Congress, military-industrial complex, research institutes (foundations), missile defense programs, pressure groups

Vasily Klimov, *Junior Research Fellow, Section of Military-Political Analysis and Research Projects, Center for International Security, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences*; vasily-klimov@mail.ru

AN INFLUENTIAL group of supporters has formed around expensive military projects, including missile defense projects. This group actively promotes the interests of both individual manufacturers and the program as a whole. The fact that information on US military policy is openly accessible to legislative and executive authorities, research centers, and the media reduces the power of unilateral lobbying in the interests of the military-industrial complex and individual state agencies.

THE US CONGRESS wields impressive influence on the military policy of the country. It approves military programs and their budgets and expresses approval or criticism of proposed missile defense initiatives. Changes in policy largely depend on the position of the majority party in both chambers – the Senate and the House of Representatives. Republicans traditionally support the deployment of missile defense systems to protect US territory as well as US allies and partners from various types of possible nuclear missile attacks. They consistently oppose any contractual, financial, and technological restrictions on the development of missile defense capabilities.

In May 2001, when George W. Bush announced his course to abandon the 1972 ABM Treaty and his intention to begin deploying the National Missile Defense System (NMD) under the pretext of needing protection against accidental strikes from third countries, many Senate Democrats openly expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that the president had failed to inform them about his plans that directly affect a key aspect of national defense policy. In their speeches, members of the Democratic Party expressed their concern about the possible consequences of such a decision.

The situation began to change after the Democrats managed to take control of both chambers of Congress in 2006. George W. Bush's missile defense policy subsequently came under the scrutiny of the Democratic majority. It was able to postpone the European deployment of the missile defense system. In 2006, Congress blocked Bush's decision to create a third missile defense area in Europe consisting of 10 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland and an X-band radar station in the Czech Republic. This development was positively received in Russian political and expert circles.

Soon, during Barak Obama's presidency (2009-2016), the country entered a period of "democratic alliance" between the administration and Congress. Gradually, the oversight powers of Congress were restored.

Generally, in the course of the missile defense programs' existence, American Congressional legislators took into account the programs' impact on strategic relations with Russia (and before that, with the USSR). Until 2014, the Democrats maintained "missile defense cooperation" with Russia, including radar information exchange.

However, since Crimea's reunification with Russia in March 2014, the position of the Democratic Party has changed dramatically.

Starting in 2017, the new administration of Donald Trump and the Republican control over Congress once again led to an increase in total missile defense spending. From 2018 to 2021, even the administration's initially ambitious requests for the Missile Defense Agency were increased further by Congress.

US Congress discusses military programs in the context of Russian-American relations and takes Russia's possible response into account.

However, solutions to the vital problems that directly affect the fundamental security of the US and Russia (which undoubtedly include reducing strategic offensive weapons and limiting missile defense

systems) should not depend directly on the level of military and political tension. A significant segment of the US political elite understands that agreed-upon restrictions in this area constitute an essential component of strengthening and maintaining national security, and this fact gives cause for cautious optimism.

IN THE US, military contracts are awarded based on a fairly well-established competitive system that is constantly improving. The system takes into account many selection criteria, such as the cost of production and expected labor, the company's production experience, and its military product acceptance results (for example, antimissile test results). Such a system provides a high level of competition in which manufacturing companies vie for every military contract. This is especially true for more expensive and technically complex military development.

Traditionally, defense companies use lobbying opportunities and relevant special lobby groups to influence executive and legislative authorities and obtain lucrative military contracts. Lobbying is legal in the US and subject to a number of federal regulations.

Members of Congress also have other reasons to support big defense contractors. According to a 2021 Sludge study, at least 47 legislators and their families own shares in military-industrial corporations totaling between \$2 million and \$6.7 million dollars.

THE INFLUENCE of research centers and think tanks on US military policy follows traditional channels of interaction between the administration and the research and expert community. This refers primarily to professional expert research carried out at the request of interested executive departments and Congressional committees. Even though there are an impressive number of academic centers in the US that perform expert evaluations for the government, the degree of their involvement in the political process depends significantly on the party that currently occupies the White House.

For example, in late 2021, a group of experts from the Carnegie Endowment, with help from subject matter experts from various countries, prepared a report titled "Reimagining Nuclear Arms Control: A Comprehensive Approach," which contained recommendations for restoring the broken arms control process, taking into account developments in missile defense. This report is an expanded version of the Carnegie Endowment's analytical note prepared for the Biden administration amid its consultations with Russia on strategic stability.

Unlike the Democrats, Republican administrations rarely turn to think tanks for professional expertise on military security issues. If there is a need to obtain analytical materials on missile defense problems, for example, they prefer to involve such well-known institutions as the Heritage Foundation and the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance.

LIKE other expensive military programs, US missile defense policy is shaped by major lobbying pressure from the military-industrial complex. The involvement of leading research centers and the broader expert community in the decision-making process creates additional opportunities both to set rational goals for missile defense programs and to optimize the process of creating missile defense systems. Only broad discussion in US legislative bodies with wide involvement of the qualified expert community can create opportunities for a critical assessment of the needs of the military-industrial complex and optimization of military policy, including in the area of missile defense.

There Is Always a Way Out: A Look Back at Russia's Membership in the Council of Europe

Keywords: Council of Europe (CoE), European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), human rights and democracy issues, NGOs, “divorce” of Moscow and Strasbourg

Anton Grishanov, senior researcher, Institute for Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Secretary, Russian delegation to PACE (2019-2021), Candidate of Science (Political Science); a.grishanov@dipacademy.ru

TWENTY-FIVE years after Russia joined the Council of Europe (CoE), Moscow's relations with this organization, which had long been in a serious crisis, came to an end. First, our country's participation in the key bodies of the CoE – the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) – was imperatively terminated. Then, according to a new, hastily implemented procedure, Russia was fully excluded from the Council, although by that time the Russian Foreign Ministry had already announced its decision to withdraw from the organization by the end of the year. The exclusion was done defiantly, even mockingly. The story of Russia's turbulent and often tense interaction with the CoE has reached its sad, albeit logical conclusion.

There are, nonetheless, useful lessons to be learned from this story, as from any other.

Our European counterparts, elated after their hypothetical “victory” in the Cold War, were categorically unwilling to engage in equal and constructive cooperation with the new member states of the Council of Europe.

The PACE factor certainly played an extremely negative role in what happened and deserves separate consideration. On one hand, many observers often tend to overestimate the weight of PACE in European and international affairs due to the public, pretentious nature of its work. The roots of this unbalanced approach lie also in the political mentality of the Russian elites of the 1990s, who viewed PACE as a key platform for Moscow's integration into the European community of nations.

Being generally figures of much higher rank and status (our delegation included ambassadors, professors, doctors of sciences, generals, etc., highly respected in Europe and the world), Russian representatives rebuffed them patiently and with facts, including during regular commission hearings that routinely devolved into a one-sided farce. But such a waste of energy and intellectual resources has become increasingly unjustified over the years, especially given the foreseeable outcome of the consideration of every anti-Russian initiative in the Assembly.

Russia's participation in the CoE gave this organization – not the most significant in geographical terms – a global scale. In the past period, the borders of the Council passed along the Central Asian steppes, the Bering Strait, and the coast of the Pacific Ocean. It is not surprising that it is against this backdrop that the issues of human rights and democracy not only in the European space, but also in the most remote corners of the world, as well as on the planet as a whole, have increasingly begun to appear on the agenda of the CoE. The period of Russia's membership in the Council that has presently come to an end was marked by the real flourishing of this organization, and that is exactly how historians will remember it.

Of course, Russia's willingness to use the tools of the ECHR, which has played a positive role in the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens of our country, is indicative. Already at the end of its membership in the CoE, Russia formulated and filed an unprecedented lawsuit by the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation against Ukraine on numerous human rights violations in that country (unfortunately, in the present conditions, proceedings will not be completed). We have proved to numerous skeptics and critics that we take our obligations responsibly and are serious about building a rule of law state. For the Russian legal system, this specific and important experience is invaluable and will continue to bear fruit for a long time.

Finally, Russia managed, in one way or another, at various times, to create within Council bodies ad hoc coalitions with constructively minded EU politicians who were willing to understand and accept our country without excessive claims and expectations.

Even in recent difficult years, Russia has periodically been able to find sympathizers and partners among Assembly members, including its current president, Tiny Kox.

However, in all likelihood, the “divorce” of Moscow and Strasbourg was not a single, exceptional event, but an inevitable consequence of the general collapse of European institutions in their original form and the return of the region’s thinking to the days of bloc confrontation. The OSCE, due to internal disagreements and bureaucratic problems, has proved extremely inefficient at the current stage and needs to be reformed (but the collective West has neither the strength nor the desire for that).

We have undoubtedly been unable to finish what we started and to leave behind the fundamental differences that have been poisoning Moscow’s participation in the CoE, to varying degrees, almost from day one. But this historical phase itself, the very attempt to build harmonious relations between Russia and the rest of Europe, to construct the proverbial common European house, deserves, despite all reservations, respect and a positive assessment. When the shells stop exploding, when the atmosphere of hatred begins to fade into the past, and when anti-Russian propaganda clichés give way to healthy reflection and sober analysis, then it will be possible to objectively assess the potential that has been accumulated over these years. And to return – whether in the CoE format or some other format that would take into account the mistakes and flaws of the recent past – to building a mutually beneficial and honest dialogue for the benefit of our peoples.

The International Legal Status of the European Union

Keywords: European Union, legal status, integration, international intergovernmental organization, international law, “soft confederation”

Denis Podolsky, *Third Secretary of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Geneva;*
den_podolskiy@mail.ru

INTEGRATION processes that are actively unfolding in the modern world cover a variety of areas of state activity. The most important role in stimulating these processes is played by international organizations, which act not only as an organizing principle, but also in a certain territorial form, facilitating the unification of the economic, political, and cultural potential of member states. One such interstate formation, widely known in the world and the most advanced in terms of integration, is the European Union (EU).

Theorists and practitioners of European integration still do not have an unequivocal answer to the question of what the EU is in terms of international law: Is it an international organization, a new form of a state, a confederation, or something else? In other words, despite its rapid development and significant role in the world, the EU still does not have a definite legal status.

THE DIFFICULTY in establishing the legal nature of the EU lies primarily in the fact that it unites both independent international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and public authorities – the latter being more typical of a state entity. In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon gave the EU the international legal personality that both sovereign states and IGOs have in the modern world. Finally, one cannot ignore the fact that the structure of European integration institutions is hierarchical.

In legal doctrine, the concept of a “federation” as a state-legal phenomenon describes distinguishing features of individual states, and not of international legal entities or unions of states.

In the realities of today's Europe, not a single state is yet ready to give up national independence in favor of a single "European identity." Opinion polls of the population of EU member states in different years show that the residents of Denmark (51%) and Great Britain (61%) would support the exit of their states from the European Union (Great Britain has already done this). Only slightly more than 50% of the population in both Italy and France are in favor of remaining in the Union. 68% of Spaniards would answer "yes" in a referendum on leaving the EU.

Consequently, one of the reasons for the uncertainty of the EU's status lies in the unwillingness of the population of European countries to coexist not only within an economic union (as they do at the moment), but also within a single political union (a federation). The transformation of the draft of an EU Constitution into just another treaty that forms the legal basis of this formation suggests that, despite the presence of many features that make it possible to associate the EU with a federal state, it cannot be considered as such, neither at present nor in the foreseeable future.

ANOTHER type of state structure that can be considered in the interests of determining the political and legal status of the EU is a confederation.

It should be noted that the desire of researchers to associate the EU with a confederation is not inherent, but appears mainly in the context of a search for a special, previously nonexistent model of a "decentralized federation."

External features of the EU also give it the semblance of a classical confederation. But they only work if the previously identified federal features of the EU are completely ignored.

THE DEVELOPMENT trends of the European Union, which emerged in the middle of the 20th century, were mediated by a series of treaties, the content of which increasingly shifted over time from economic issues to the creation of unified governing bodies and the formation of common domestic and security policies. Later, however, the development of the EU proceeded in a format that cannot be identified using existing state legal definitions.

The EU status is similar to an international intergovernmental organization due to features such as its establishment on the basis of a treaty drawn according to the norms of international law, its powers being limited by the will of member states, the decisions of its governing bodies having to be ratified by the member states, etc.

Considering the crises constantly present in relations between the EU countries (political representation, the spread of ideas of nationalism, economic stagnation, etc.), it seems most appropriate to qualify the international legal status of the EU as an international intergovernmental organization, although it has fairly specific features in comparison with other similar international legal entities. The following points distinguish the EU from an international organization in its traditional form: (a) its legal personality is determined by a series of treaties that establish the boundaries of interaction between states in particular areas, rather than a single act that establishes the organization; (b) the EU has built a system of governance institutions with their own powers, having the right to make decisions that are binding on member states; (c) acts have been approved that are capable of serving as the single source of law for all member states; (d) an autonomous Community budget has been formed, which is financed through a system of taxes and fees, rather than contributions from member states; (e) its own currency system has been created; (f) a single EU citizenship has been introduced that is derived from national citizenship; (g) its own territory is formed by the territories of member states.

It seems that current trends in the development of the EU point to its migration toward a single statehood, if not a federation (perhaps in a special form that has not existed before). The contradiction here is that the higher the level of political integration, the less chance united Europe has of preserving its national identity and ensuring its political independence, which is much talked about, but which

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov says the EU has already “99% stopped trying to preserve”. Conversely, the scenario where EU members emphasize their state independence reveals the “nonuniformity” of their positions on many issues of international law and foreign policy.

The Confrontation Between Qatar and Saudi Arabia as a Determining Factor in the Paradigm of Regional Relations

Keywords: confrontation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar diplomatic crisis, regional hegemony, regional differences, system of regional relations, Muslim Brotherhood, Al Jazeera

Igor Yegorov, Postgraduate student of the Department of Oriental Political Science, Institute of Asian and African Countries, Lomonosov Moscow State University; egorov. igor.rtl@mail.ru

THE PARADIGM of international relations in the Persian Gulf in the 20th century was determined by the interests of major players: the US, Great Britain, the USSR, etc. At the same time, relations between the oilproducing monarchies of the region, for all their complexity and ambiguity, remained in the background. After the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the early 1980s, opportunities emerged for a serious integration process that could lead to the creation of a single economic space with a single currency and common governance structures. However, for a number of reasons – among which we will identify economic ones (similarity in export structure), dynastic ones (ambitions of the ruling families), and geopolitical ones (the desire of the US as the world hegemon to rule according to the “divide and rule” policy known since antiquity) – centripetal trends have given way to centrifugal ones.

Despite all the consonance with current world processes, the system of regional relations in the Persian Gulf deserves special attention and is in many ways a unique phenomenon in terms of its development. For example, within 10 to 15 years, the microstate of Qatar managed to grow from an ordinary member of the GCC into a regional sub-hegemon¹ that in 2020 began to aspire to the role of GCC leader [15], encroaching on Saudi Arabia.

When analyzing the relations that are developing between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, it is important to note that the Qatar diplomatic crisis and all the events that followed it, including the economic blockade and ongoing “proxy” conflicts in a number of states in the Middle East and North and Central Africa, were, rather, the natural culmination of a chain of historical events and growing differences between two countries. The conflict has its roots in 1995, when Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani came to power in Qatar following a bloodless coup.

Qatar has played a key role in alleviating tensions between the ruling regime of Sudan and the Darfur rebels in 2003, as well as between the government of Yemen and the Houthi rebels in 2008.

The victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2012 caused panic in Saudi Arabia. Not only was Qatar the first to recognize the legitimacy of the new President Mohammed Morsi, but it also took several important financial and media steps to support him.

In addition, it should be noted that the Muslim Brotherhood’s universal and understandable Islamist message, which Qatar actively propagates, poses a real threat not only to Saudi Arabia’s regional positions, but also to the survival of the royal regime.

Proceeding to the second area, the creation of the Turkey-Qatar-Iran axis, we note that Saudi Arabia had been actively hindering this process even before the Qatar diplomatic crisis, but it was that crisis that accelerated the formation and crystallization of this fragile but extremely powerful alliance. Before

talking about its influence, we should note that Saudi Arabia was unprepared for the new political reality.

The Qatari-Turkish alliance was also active in Syria, where it sought to strengthen and support the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood so that it would replace the Bashar al-Assad regime.

Perceiving Iran as an important ally in guaranteeing its national security in the Persian Gulf, Qatar is ignoring statements about the danger of Iran's influence on Shiites, even though it has its own Shiite minority, which makes up about 10% of the population.

IN GENERAL, we can conclude that the four main areas of Qatar's foreign policy activities are the basis not only of the strategic conflict between Doha and Riyadh, but also of the entire paradigm of regional relations within the GCC and in the Persian Gulf, exerting significant influence on the entire Middle East and North and Central Africa. The acute economic crisis and dramatic drop in hydrocarbon prices triggered by the coronavirus pandemic exacerbated the financial and political confrontation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia on the territories of many Arab states (including Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen), the media confrontation between the Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya TV channels, and the competition for American support in 2020. At the same time, Saudi Arabia again found itself in a much less advantageous position due to its large population, to which Riyadh has significant social obligations.

Qatar, on the contrary, is having the easiest time enduring the crisis and is even achieving new tactical successes.

the prospects for the development of the paradigm of relations among the countries of the Persian Gulf, and above all within the GCC, could be described with some confidence as resembling a sine wave, were it not for a number of possible "black swans,"⁶ the risks of which are already quite clearly visible in the near future – namely, the dynasty crisis in Saudi Arabia, the increasing political instability in the US, the lengthy recovery of the world economy in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, and a number of other factors. The consequences of those events (which may have a synergistic effect) seem to go beyond any more or less reasonable forecasts.

Revenues From Oil and Gas Should Be Invested in Our Future

Keywords: oil, gas, LNG, coal industry, Russian energy industry

Yuri Shafranik, *Chairman of the Board, Union of Oil and Gas Producers of Russia, President, World Politics and Resources Foundation*

I like forecasts and risk making them. Recall, for example, that in 2008, about six months before the fall in oil prices, we sent our written forecast to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economics, and the forecast proved to be correct, although not everyone agreed with us. In 2020, prices fell to \$25 owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. We projected an increase to \$45 by the end of the year, and that was what happened.

This year, the price rose higher than predicted, fluctuating around \$100. This is causing market saturation. Prices are affected by high demand in the marketplace. Money should be "put to work," and it goes into oil. But these activities are largely speculative. I think that by late 2022 and early 2023, there will be a downward adjustment, with average prices dropping to about \$72. Prices above \$60 are quite good for us, and even \$50 is acceptable.

We must not allow a single ruble to be wasted. Ruble revenues from oil and gas should be invested in our future.

We have told Europe many times: Work with Russia, sign contracts. The unlearned lesson of Fukushima is repeated again and again. After the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan, the country needed more liquefied gas. Qatar suppliers terminated their contracts with Europe overnight and redirected their tankers to Japan, because prices there were five times higher than in Europe. Were it not for additional gas supplies from Russia, Europe would have faced a collapse. At year-end, however, it was claimed that we had exceeded the agreed amount.... The Europeans were indignant at becoming more dependent on Gazprom, because, instead of supplying, say, 23% of [Europe's] gas, Russia had supplied 27%. This is not even funny. In Europe, everything is fine, except for a pragmatic, professional, politically unbiased approach.

There is no need for anyone in the world, especially in the Asian market, to worry about a gas shortage. It is only a question of price and volume.

We in Russia are not afraid of competition. The trouble is that it is politicized and taken to the point of antagonism. Sanctions are a graphic example in this respect. But we will end up with gains anyway.

We carried out a big reform that no one in the world has done before. The effect is colossal: The industry is no longer subsidized, it has become cost effective, and the right solutions to transportation problems have been found. But that is all we have done. We have about seven years ahead of us to take the necessary measures. If we do not, the coal industry will encounter major difficulties by 2030. The sector needs a new reform.

I think that Russia has recently formulated its environmental agenda in more precise terms. I am involved in this process and I see that the choice of focus areas is reasonable enough.

Today, we use only 10% of our oil in the chemical industry, while our target is 70%. This also applies to hydrocarbon liquids associated with oil and gas production.

There is yet another problem. In the past 20 years, Europe, Canada, and America have far surpassed us in terms of energy efficiency. We have a lot of work to do in Russia.

Words like decentralization, decarbonization, and dehumanization are currently in vogue. I would replace them with words like coexistence, coordination, and codevelopment of innovative technologies and the resource base. Instead of having a centralized or decentralized energy system, we need their coexistence.

So our future lies in coexistence, coordination, and codevelopment of innovative technological solutions with the environmental resource base and with resources inside the earth. As a multidisciplinary energy specialist, I am an optimist in this respect. But all of this can be realized only under the following conditions: clearly defined goals, targeted action, and tangible results.

FAO Declares 2022 a Year of “Extraordinary Efforts”

Keywords: FAO, SDG 2, 2030 Agenda, FAO Liaison Office in Moscow

Oleg Kobayakov, *Director, Liaison Office with the Russian Federation, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)*

FAO's main mission is to help free humanity from the scourge of hunger. But the mandate of this oldest intergovernmental organization (it is a week older than the “greater” United Nations) is not confined to this. The development of agriculture (including forestry and fisheries) and rural areas is listed among the goals proclaimed in the FAO Constitution. The current reality has added new areas of activity, but the

purpose is essentially the same: to eradicate hunger and ensure food security for all human beings, whose number is already close to 8 billion.

FAO's biggest current concern is the state of the world's soil and water resources. These ecosystems are stretched to the breaking point. A third of productive soils are degraded. Climate change has accelerated salinization and alkalinization processes, causing huge losses estimated at \$27 billion. Moreover, the agricultural intensification patterns used today are often unsustainable. In other words, to put it bluntly, we are eating away our resources, because we consume 60% more of them than the planet can sustain.

More than 80% of the world's topsoil – the primary productive resource for all of humanity – is currently at risk. Threats to soils should be considered in the context of the task of ending hunger and ensuring food security.

Almost a third of all food produced is lost on the way from field or farm to table. This applies to all countries, both developing ones – where primitive methods of food production, processing, and storage are still widespread and are compounded by poor sanitation and transport problems – and highly developed ones.

The pandemic has set us back significantly. Statistics show that in 2020, the number of undernourished people in the world was 811 million, or 161 million more than in 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic has also highlighted the interconnectedness of our world, of its main environments – humans, domestic and farm animals, and wildlife.

“Superbugs” are a big problem even today. According to the WHO, millions of people in the world die from drug-resistant infections each year, and their number keeps growing.

This is a burning issue for Russia. About 12% of all agricultural lands are not being used. There are many reasons for that, including water and wind erosion, salinization (in southern regions with steppe, dry steppe, and semi-desert zones), and soil waterlogging. This leads to a decline in soil fertility and inefficient use of low-productivity lands.

Russia has solved its food problem: A policy designed to strengthen the domestic agricultural sector and increase its financing has enabled the country to become self-sufficient in staple foods and to once again, as it did a century ago, in the early 20th century, emerge as a global breadbasket.

There are few people left today who are skeptical about the need to transition to a low-emission economy and achieve carbon neutrality. Russia is one of the world's top five countries in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, but it has tremendous resources for neutralizing the greenhouse effect.

FAO calls for a paradigm shift in agri-food development. We have reached the red line.

FAO sees Russia as a strategic partner and a donor. Our office shares the positive experience we have gained at FAO, as well as FAO's best practices and policy recommendations, with all members of Russia's agro-industrial complex as part of our information and outreach activities.

FAO has declared 2022 a year of “extraordinary efforts.” These efforts are necessary to take decisive steps to support the global agricultural sector and move toward eradicating hunger on the planet by 2030. We intend to make progress in four main areas: better production, better nutrition, a better environment, and a better life for all.

Historic Endeavors: On the 90th Birthday of Igor Rogachev

Keywords: Rogachev, Soviet-Chinese relations, three obstacles, negotiations on territorial disputes, normalization, Russian-Chinese relations, strategic partnership

Kirill Barsky, *Russian ambassador-at-large*

IT SOMETIMES happens that history itself evaluates what a specific individual has done. A case in point is Igor Rogachev, a renowned Soviet and Russian diplomat who played a tremendous role in bolstering our country's positions in the Asia-Pacific region (APAC) and in reforming the former Soviet Union's, and subsequently Russia's, relations with China, where he served as the ambassador of the Russian Federation for 13 years.

Rogachev's entire life was focused on Asia. Igor Rogachev devoted his whole career to studying China, improving our country's relations with China and other Asian nations, and attempting to help solve APAC problems. It was a career of challenges and triumphs.

Throughout it, Rogachev insisted that relations with China and Asia in general should be an important part of the foreign policy of our country and that the latter should be deeply involved in APAC affairs and closely cooperate with APAC countries.

Igor Rogachev followed in his father's footsteps, and the challenges he faced were no easier than the ones his father faced. Today, it has become possible to fully appreciate the historical scale of Igor Rogachev's achievements.

In my view, the past four decades of our relations with China can be split into at least three milestone periods: developing a policy to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations (1980-1984); preparations for a historic Soviet-Chinese summit (1984-1989); and struggles over the character and future of Russian-Chinese relations (since 1992). Rogachev made indisputable contributions to the work done during each period.

BESIDES being a brilliant diplomat, Rogachev was an excellent mentor. He developed and trained numerous diplomats. He used his extremely rich experience, polite advice, and personal example to develop sound work and moral principles among his subordinates. Although a very demanding leader, Rogachev never departed from his trademark style – sincere friendliness, wit, and subtle self-deprecating humor.

Ten years after his passing, Rogachev remains with us in the incredibly rich and diverse legacy he left behind: our country's political achievements, dynamic Russian-Chinese relations, his book *Rossiyskokitayskiye otnosheniya v kontse XX – nachale XXI veka* [Russian-Chinese Relations in the Late 20th and Early 21st Century], other works written by him, conversations recorded by journalists, and, of course, the memories of those who knew him. We China specialists still quote him to back up our thoughts. We enjoy quoting his pet words and phrases.

Amid today's tense international situation, strained relations between Russia and the West, and the catastrophic deficit of trust between key global political players, one puts even more value on trusting partnership and strong friendship between nations. One realizes more clearly that it is the mission of a diplomat to help build such relationships, promote cooperation, and create a favorable international environment for one's country. Rogachev is an example of meeting extremely complicated diplomatic challenges despite any difficulties.

Averell Harriman: Oligarch in the Diplomatic Service

Keywords: Averell Harriman, Lend-Lease, Second Front, 1941 Moscow Conference

Ivan Kravchenko, *Adviser of the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia*; kravt-iv@yandex.ru

EVERYBODY at some point gets a chance to prove their mettle. This is not a stroke of luck, but a tough challenge and difficult choice for everyone at their own level: in wisdom or simplicity, strength or weakness, health or infirmity, wealth or poverty – to choose to follow the straight and familiar path or to scale new heights. Only those who rise to the challenge leave their mark in history. William Averell Harriman was one such person: He sought out challenges and accepted them with boldness and determination. He never retreated from or skirted them.

Born into the family of railroad baron Edward Henry Harriman, one of America's richest men, he not only increased his family's financial might but also made a splendid political and diplomatic career. His life was closely connected with our country: From 1941 to 1943, he was special envoy of President Roosevelt; from 1943 to 1946, he served as the American ambassador to the Soviet Union.

He was not our friend, unfortunately. Such friends are valuable. His friendship would have saved several divisions on the front line and would have fed thousands in the rear. Nevertheless, he did do something positive for the Soviet Union. He did a lot to establish allied relations between the USSR and the US and facilitate Lend-Lease deliveries.

No matter what we think of him, we should acknowledge that Averell Harriman was an avowed statist, a wise and far-sighted politician, and a subtle and effective diplomat who knew how to protect the interests of his country. He was a larger-than-life figure who deserves respect – a strong and worthy adversary. To win, we should study his methods.

“Young Harriman was not satisfied with his work in the railroad company. He was not satisfied with his father's policy, who never poured his money into other sectors. Averell invested large sums in shipbuilding, aviation, banking, and mining in several foreign states.”

The Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) noted that “unlike other industrialists, Harriman paid a lot of attention to labor issues at his railroads. He said that in the railroad industry, mutual understanding between owners and workers was much easier to achieve than in any other industry.” Harriman was seen as the most liberal among the biggest American industrialists. During the New Deal, the most “troublesome” period for American businessmen, Harriman said that “a compromise between Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue can and should be achieved.”

Harriman, who by the start of World War II and industrial mobilization in the US had already consolidated his position on the economic and political Olympus and had discovered new and broader horizons, began to dedicate more time to civil service. In late May 1940, he was appointed chairman of the industrial materials division of a commission set up to manage military industry.

This was a golden age for the US. The impressive and fast rise of Nazi Germany pushed aside or even removed from the international scene the UK and France, two colonial empires and US rivals.

Averell was right: Stalin was an extremely tenacious bargainer. There was no other choice. The allies had product items on their side of the scales; human lives were on the Soviet side. Each undelivered tank or aircraft meant hundreds of lives lost at the front. Each figure in the list meant life or death. Harriman complained that it was impossible to satisfy Stalin's demands that were steadily growing.

The course of the war demanded Harriman's greater involvement in political issues: the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Lend-Lease program, the heroic defenses of Moscow and the first

counteroffensive of the Red Army, the attack at Pearl Harbor that forced the US to join the war, the First Washington Conference (“Arcadia”), the defeats in the Pacific, the surrender of Singapore, and the defeat at Tobruk.

Stalin knew what Churchill and Harriman would bring; he knew that the results would be bleak, and that it would be impossible to “bend” them. There was no choice but to accept their refusal with dignity. He had to take the blow, save face, and continue moving unwaveringly in the chosen direction. Molotov said later: “Of course, we did not believe in a second front, but we had to push for it. We pulled them in: You can’t, but you promised.... We had no other way to help our army and our victory. This required a lot of patience.”

Stalin coped with this task, displaying strategic farsightedness and remarkable diplomatic wisdom. Not only that, but he managed to convince Churchill and Harriman that they had outplayed him.

Soviet-Afghan Relations on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War

Keywords: Afghanistan, Soviet-Afghan relations, the border issue

Yury Bulatov, *Doctor of Science (History), Honorary Professor, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; kotenevam@yandex.ru*

THE NADER dynasty that had ascended the throne of Afghanistan in 1929 was guided by the behests of emir Abdur Rahman Khan, who had fought for international recognition of his country’s sovereignty and called on those who shared his views to develop relations with states that had no common border with Afghanistan.

In the lead-up to World War II, the ruling circles of Afghanistan followed the emir’s doctrine and eagerly enhanced relations with the Axis Powers: Germany, Italy, and Japan. Russian researcher Roman Akhramovich wrote: “The Afghan government sought to maintain a balance between the political and economic positions of the warring imperialist states so as not to give any of them a chance to occupy a dominant position in the country.”

Kabul capitalized on disagreements between rival groups to get loans on beneficial terms and credits against goods, acquired industrial equipment and armaments at lower prices, etc., and was quite successful in this respect. Ahead of World War II, for example, Afghan leaders reached several agreements with the Germans and the British.

Germany, however, was the favored partner. Under a trade agreement between Afghanistan and Germany signed in August 1939, the Germans were expected to provide a credit of 50 million golden marks for 10 years at 5.5% interest. The Third Reich assumed obligations to supply Afghanistan with armaments and industrial equipment and to export from it all sorts of raw materials: fleece, caracul, dried fruit, etc

As could be expected, this raised concerns in the Soviet Union.

In March 1936, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed a protocol on extending the Treaty on Neutrality and Non-Aggression for another 10 years. Relations between the two countries, however, became more complicated. Afghan merchants were regularly arrested for espionage at the Termez and Kerki border points. In 1938, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Afghanistan to Moscow Abdul Hussein Khan was deported from the Soviet Union for anti-Soviet activities.

In 1937, the Afghans proposed that the border issue be discussed to bring more clarity. Faiz Muhammad Zikria, Afghan foreign minister at the time, had already discussed the issue with Anthony Eden, his

British counterpart, a year earlier. The sides had agreed that according to the fundamental principles of international law, the Soviet-Afghan border should run along the thalweg (line connecting the deepest part of the riverbed) of both rivers and in the middle of their non-navigable parts. Incidentally, that position was by no means new for the Soviet Union. During Soviet-Afghan talks in 1928 in Moscow, the Soviet Union proposed signing a bilateral convention on the principles of equal use of the water of border rivers that divided the territories of both countries. But the outbreak of civil war in Afghanistan in 1928 hindered the implementation of that project.

During the Moscow talks, the Afghan side began raising new grievances. The Afghan representatives insisted that its statements and proposals be considered and included in the final versions of joint documents on land and water borders. For example, they proposed including in the joint decisions of the Moscow talks provisions on the guaranteed right of the Afghan population to use for economic purposes the water resources not only of the Amu Darya and the Panj but also of the Kushka and Murghab Rivers. The Afghan delegation wanted to invite Turkish specialists as arbiters during redemarcation and the establishment of border markers at the Pamirs section of the Soviet-Afghan land border. In the end, the Afghan government asked the Turkish government, without consulting the Soviet side, to send Turkish topographers for border demarcation.

At the negotiation table, the Kabul representatives did not try too hard to support their claims about a new state border line. It turned out that they were betting on resolving the problem through force.

After the failed talks on a new border with the Soviet Union (1939- 1940), the Afghans never missed the chance to note their uncontested right to the islands in the Amu Darya and Panj Rivers to the right of the thalweg in their correspondence with the Soviet Embassy in Kabul. The Soviet Embassy replied that all islands in the Amu Darya and Panj Rivers belonged to the Soviet Union and that Soviet border guards not only had the right but were obliged to visit these islands.

After Germany's perfidious attack on the Soviet Union, the agreement on trade turnover between the USSR and Afghanistan for 1941-1942 was not signed. Vostokintorg could no longer buy anything in Afghanistan independently because the Afghans agreed to offer their goods to foreign countries only through barter transactions – mainly in exchange for petroleum products and sugar. The Afghan side refused to sell anything to the Soviet Union for hard currency.

Trade between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan de facto ended. It seemed that the sides had come to a dead end in the course of talks, but this managed to be avoided: The Soviet leadership found original solutions not only for normalizing relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, but also for consolidating them.

A Cross and a Five-Pointed Star: Yugoslavia's Memorial Policy and Burial Sites of Red Army Soldiers and Officers (1944-1991)

Keywords: Red Army, World War II, burial sites, monument, memorial policy, Yugoslavia, USSR, liberation

Milana Živanović, *Research associate at the Institute of Contemporary History of Serbia, Doctor of Science (History)*, milana.zivanovic@yahoo.com

AFTER the end of the Jassy-Chisinau operation that liberated Romania and Bulgaria in September 1944, Red Army units reached the border of the former Yugoslavia. On September 28, a major offensive began that resulted in the liberation of Belgrade on October 20. The offensive was followed by military operations to cross the Danube River and take and hold the bridgehead, known as the Battle of Batina

(the biggest battle in Yugoslavia during World War II), and then battles on the Strymian Front, which was broken in April 1945.

Through joint efforts, the Red Army and the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (PLA) liberated almost the entire territory of Serbia, as well as parts of Croatia and Slovenia, with Soviet forces making a very significant contribution.

Recent studies show that about 300,000 Soviet and 40,000 Yugoslav soldiers participated in the Belgrade operation (from September 28 to October 20, 1944), and around 90,000 Soviet and Yugoslav soldiers were involved in the operation to cross the Danube and expand the bridgehead.

The first burial sites of Red Army soldiers and officers appeared immediately after fighting for the liberation of settlements, towns, and cities in Yugoslavia – in eastern and northeastern Serbia – ended in early October 1944. The dead were buried where they were killed or in city or town centers, parks, school yards, or local cemeteries.

It was the first postwar monument in Belgrade – notably, in memory of Soviet, not Yugoslav soldiers. From a political and ideological perspective, the purpose of organizing the burial of Red Army soldiers and erecting a monument in the heart of the Yugoslav capital was to legitimize the new national authority in the liberated territories, as well as to reaffirm the alliance between the Soviet and Yugoslav regimes and to demonstrate outside support, considering that the system of government in Yugoslavia had not yet been determined.

In October 1944, monuments to Red Army soldiers and officers began to be erected on a large scale in Belgrade and parts of Serbia where Soviet fighters had died in battles.

It is important to note that monuments were erected not only in Serbia, but also in areas of Slovenia and Croatia where Soviet soldiers had laid down their lives in battles. Two memorials were built in those two republics.

In November 1947, a majestic monument to fallen Red Army soldiers was unveiled in the village of Batina, in eastern Croatia. The central section of the 35-meter structure, designed by Yugoslav sculptor Antun Augustinčić, was an impressive obelisk with the Victory sculpture on top of it. It was the main, preeminent memorial in honor of Red Army heroes until 1948.

In the initial postwar years, Soviet burial sites were maintained mainly by local residents, townspeople, war veterans committees, the Union of People's Liberation War Veterans, women's antifascist fronts, and youth organizations.

The Soviet-Yugoslav conflict affected not only bilateral political and economic relations, but also memorial policy.

Following the adoption of the Information Bureau resolution, the authorities stopped laying wreaths at the monument in Batina: It had lost its commemorative significance. The medallion with an image of Stalin on the monument in the city of Murska Sobota was replaced with an image of Lenin. The logo of the Slovenian newspaper Glas Naroda also changed. Until December 1949, the same monument was depicted on it, but then a star appeared on the logo above Mount Triglav.

However, the adoption of the resolution did not significantly affect the fate of Red Army burial sites. Despite the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, Soviet burial sites were not destroyed.

Some of the monuments were dismantled for various reasons – for example, for urban development purposes. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Army and the municipal authorities demanded that the tombstones of Soviet soldiers in the downtown area be removed. In one instance, the authorities argued that the "Yugoslav fighters and heroes, whose contribution is greater than that of the Soviets

and who should therefore have been buried in the city center, were buried in a cemetery.” Some of the tombstones were relocated to the cemetery.

Between 1944 and 1991, over 400 Soviet military burial sites appeared across Yugoslavia: mass and single graves, monuments, cemeteries, tombs, and a small number of memorial plaques. Most of them have been preserved, and even despite the falsification of World War II history that started with the outbreak of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, Soviet burial sites were not demolished. Monuments were dismantled as part of major commemorative projects, such as the building of the Cemetery of the Liberators of Belgrade and other memorials in the 1960s. The Union of War Veterans and municipal and city authorities took care of the graves. However, some cemeteries were and unfortunately still are in a deplorable state. Some of them have been restored with assistance from the Ministry of Labor, municipal authorities, institutes for the protection of cultural landmarks, and Russian embassies in the former Yugoslav republics.

Natalya Beglova’s New Book: How the Swiss Paradise Myth Was Born

Keywords: Natalya Beglova, Russia, Switzerland

Sergey Garmonin, *Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Switzerland*;
rusbotschaft@bluewin.ch; embassy.bern@mid.ru

NATALYA BEGLOVA’S new book *How the Swiss Paradise Myth Was Born* [in Russian] has an intriguing title. Myth? Paradise? The answer comes on the first few pages: Beglova explains why Switzerland came to be thought of as a fantasyland. She set out to trace the history of idealizations of Switzerland – perceptions that took shape in the late 18th century and have, with minor changes, survived to the present day. Switzerland has the image of a land of scenic natural beauty and an ideal social system, a country whose people have harmonious personalities and live happily in union with nature and God.

To get to the origins of this myth, Beglova turns to literary and documentary sources: novels, notes, poems, diaries, and letters written by people who lived in Switzerland or visited it. She puts her research into a specific timeframe – the mid-18th to the early 20th century – as that was when the key features of this image of Switzerland and its people took shape.

Much of the book deals with the Russian co-authorship of this idealized image of Switzerland. Nikolai Karamzin, an outstanding historian, properly introduced Russians to Switzerland. His *Letters of a Russian Traveler* made Switzerland known and loved in Russia. It was not just an ordinary description of another country by a visitor, but an account of different values, a story about a different way of life, a society where it was not some abstract national interests but the interests of each individual that were paramount. The prosperity of society was conditional on the happiness of the individual, and the individual could not be happy without being free.

Nikolai Gogol, Leo Tolstoy, Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Alexander Herzen – this is by no means a complete list of famous Russians who, as Karamzin and Zhukovsky did before them, went to Switzerland to discover a land of miraculous beauty and see people living in harmony with nature. But Beglova makes the important observation that, while the magnificent scenery did not fail to impress any of the Russian travelers, many of them felt that seeing Switzerland as an Elysium was going too far. Increasing numbers of Russian visitors found little reason to support Karamzin’s myth that Switzerland was an Arcadia, a land of never-ending bliss.

The book casts new light on places in Switzerland where Russians have traveled or lived. Beglova meticulously selected and studied information about each of those individuals. She took great care to choose letters, diaries, and archived papers to quote from.

The book is lavishly illustrated with photocopies of old prints, many of which come from Beglova's own collection, and paintings by Swiss and Russian artists. They show some of Switzerland's most beautiful locations that have long attracted travelers from all over the world.

Many readers probably remember Beglova's book *Russia and Geneva: A History of Close Ties* [Rossiya i Zheneva. Spleteniye sudeb], which was published in 2019 and explores the deep historical and cultural roots of Russian-Swiss relations. *How the Swiss Paradise Myth Was Born* in a sense continues the 2019 book and will be a good read for those who want to know more about Swiss history and culture, and about historical ties between Switzerland and Russia.

Contemporary Consular Activities of the Russian Federation

Keywords: consular service, law, privileges, notarial acts, visa, consular registration, consular legalization, memorial work, readmission, compatriots, information technologies, international passport

Olga Torshina, *First Secretary, Embassy of Russia in Belarus, Candidate of Sciences (Law);*
articles@interaffairs.ru

THE CONSULAR service of the Russian Federation is an integral part of diplomatic work. Today, Russia's consular service requires consular officers of all ranks to demonstrate a high level of competence in law, technical knowledge, business etiquette, and the ability to communicate with all categories of visitors.

The professional development department at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia offers programs to prepare diplomats for work at consular missions abroad. The training is conducted jointly with the Consular Department of the MFA of Russia and mainly using its facilities. Practice showed that there was a need to come up with new instructional material.

As a result of painstaking work supported by the Diplomatic Academy and the Consular Department, a textbook titled *Contemporary Consular Activities of the Russian Federation* [in Russian] was published by Prospekt in 2021 with a print run of 1,000 copies. Its author is Lev Klepatsky, Candidate of Science (Philosophy), Professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the MFA of Russia, Honorary Worker of the MFA of Russia, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, First Class (retired).

The textbook is intended for diplomats working or preparing to work at Russian consular missions abroad, as well as for college and university students majoring in international relations. It consists of a preface, seven chapters, a conclusion, and a list of references.

I think it is reasonable that Chapter One looks at the history of the consular service in Russia.

Chapter Two focuses on the legal and regulatory framework of consular activities. It should be noted that the legal framework of the consular service has changed significantly in recent years.

The third and longest chapter identifies the main areas of consular work. In their day-to-day work, diplomats perform a set of consular functions related to consular registration, matters of citizenship, issuance of passports and birth and death certificates, repatriation, etc.

Several pages are devoted to describing the geography of Russia's consular relations with the countries of the CIS, Asia and Oceania, the European Union, and the countries of America, Africa, and the Middle East.

One of the chapters examines in detail the consular protection of the rights and interests of Russian individuals and legal entities and its main forms.

In Chapter Six, based on a large body of factual material, the author considers the legal basis of state policy and the program for work with compatriots, the main government authorities responsible for this work, the organization and holding of world congresses of compatriots and thematic global conferences, and the activities of the World Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad. The author draws attention to the role of diasporas, which have become a notable phenomenon in world politics with a significant impact not only on domestic political, financial, and cultural processes, but also on relations between states.

It is very significant that in one of the chapters the author shows another major function of consular missions: economic diplomacy.

This textbook, which reveals the content of Russia's multifaceted consular activity in its historical and contemporary dimensions, will undoubtedly be useful to diplomats preparing for work at Russian consular missions, as well as to college and university students majoring in international relations.

Soviet Russia's International Activity During the Interwar Period

Keywords: Soviet Russia, international relations, international conferences

Marina Arzakanyan, Chief Research Associate, Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of World History, Professor, Doctor of Science (History); arzakanian@mail.ru

THE INTERWAR PERIOD was one of the most significant periods for the foreign policy of the young Soviet state. After the end of World War I and the Civil War, as well as after the foreign intervention, the Soviet republic was going through what was probably one of the most difficult periods in its history. After all, it had found itself in de facto isolation and nonrecognition by other countries.

The book *The Soviet State at International Forums of the 1920s and 1930s* [in Russian] by Irina Aleksandrovna Khormach, a well-known Russian historian specializing in Soviet foreign policy and international relations, Doctor of Science (History), is devoted to that key narrative in the history of international relations in the 1920s and 1930s.

The book contains five sections arranged thematically and chronologically. The author's stated goal is "to analyze the 12 most significant forums related to various areas of international relations during the interwar period and to show how the Soviet Union's participation in those forums influenced the foreign policy formulation process" (p. 8).

Section 1, "Russia and the World's Political Configuration after World War I," is devoted to the Paris (Versailles) Peace Conference of 1919-1920, even though Russia did not attend it. Section 2, "The Soviet State at International Economic Conferences in the 1920s and 1930s," examines forums in Genoa, The Hague, Geneva, and London. Section 3, "Conferences Regarding the Regime of the Black Sea Straits," is concerned with international meetings in Lausanne and Montreux. Finally, the titles of Section 4, "The USSR at Disarmament Conferences," and Section 5, "Fighting the Impending Aggression," speak for themselves.

Another important topic discussed in the monograph is the series of conferences on the status of the Straits – the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles. That maritime area has since ancient days been of major geopolitical and strategic importance. Since the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, there had been constant fighting for control and use of the Straits. Khormach provides excellent background on the issue, based on domestic and foreign historiography.

A major asset of the book is that it has a detailed index of names, so readers can easily find out how Soviet and foreign political figures and diplomats contributed to a certain international forum during the

interwar period. As a matter of fact, the text provides a good overview of their political profiles. For example, readers can learn about the concrete proposals of well-known Soviet diplomats, such as Maxim Litvinov, Georgy Chicherin, Leonid Krasin, Ivan Maisky, Valerian Dvlgalevsky, and Nikolai Krestinsky. They can also see “portraits” of all prominent Western politicians of the 1920s and 1930s: Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, David Lloyd George, George Curzon, Georges Clemenceau, and Raymond Poincaré, among others.

Khormach’s monograph makes a substantial contribution to the study of RSFSR and Soviet foreign policy during the interwar period, as well as to the history of international relations in the first half of the 20th century. It will certainly be useful to a broad readership, from arts and humanities students to eminent scholars.

Legacy of the Time of Troubles

Keywords: special military operation in Ukraine, Russia and NATO, East European countries

Oleg Karpovich, *Vice-Rector, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*; iamp@dipacademy.ru

Anton Grishanov, *senior researcher, Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*; a.grishanov@dipacademy.ru

THE CRISIS in Ukraine and negotiations on the European security situation that preceded it prompted many diplomats, analysts, and ordinary observers both in Russia and in the West to revisit the history of the issue.

Recent years saw considerable reflection in the American expert community on the reasons for the growing confrontation with Moscow. Works such as *Who lost Russia?* by Peter Conradi and *No place for Russia: European Security Institutions Since 1989* by William H. Hill, highly acclaimed by the academic community and the media, told in detail about Washington’s mistakes in building a “new order” in Europe (which subsequently collapsed with a crash) without taking Russia’s concerns into account. The most explosive among works of this kind was the monograph by Professor Mary Elise Sarotte of Johns Hopkins University (Russian readers are familiar with her previous work *Collapse*, translated into Russian) titled *Not One Inch*. The title refers to the unfulfilled promise made by James Baker to Mikhail Gorbachev not to expand NATO to the East. Its publication in late 2021 touched off active discussion on the pages of leading American publications, forcing readers to look at the chain of events that led to the current situation from a new angle.

The hypocrisy, arrogance, and political myopia of Western (primarily American) leaders are shown to the reader in all their glory. And while the author’s attempt in the conclusion to answer the question “What is to be done?” seems slightly naïve (and, after February 24, 2022, somewhat irrelevant), she does a wonderful job reflecting on “Who is to blame?” The scrupulously described sequence of events and decisions, starting with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany and ending with the consequences of the bombing of Yugoslavia, leaves no doubt that it was the “collective West” that missed the historic opportunity to build a single pan-European house from Lisbon to Vladivostok and now has to deal with the consequences of its short-sightedness.

One of the tricks used by American diplomats was the perfunctory suggestions that Russia should join the queue of other candidates for membership and achieve compliance with the “high standards of the alliance,” while Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were admitted to the EU as early as by the end of the decade without any significant preconditions (the membership action plan did not yet exist), despite their major financial problems. Russia was given a consolation prize in the form of participation

in the Partnership for Peace program, the significance of which, as shown in the monograph, quickly diminished due to the desire of the former Warsaw Pact member states for speedy and direct integration into NATO.

By the mid-1990s, in this environment, a major lobby for NATO expansion emerged in Congress. Even if the US president wanted to slow down this process, the “hawks” in the Republican Party (whose leaders, according to Helmut Kohl, had forgotten that “Russia remains a big and important country”¹⁴) were doing all they could to consolidate momentum on bills for assistance to [NATO] candidate countries.

It is truly painful to read the author’s dispassionate narrative about the humiliated pleas of the first and last Soviet president to the West to send the next installments that could save the Union from destruction (when nobody in the US and Europe was going to save it anymore) and about the escapades of the first president of the Russian Federation during his international trips and the critical decisions taken under the influence of certain specific habits, which Foreign Ministry officials then unsuccessfully tried to reverse. Sad pages of recent Russian history also played a significant role in how events unfolded, especially the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in 1993 and the start of the First Chechen War, which discredited the country’s leadership in the eyes of foreign observers.

The book *Not One Inch* is not without its flaws: Toward the end of the book, Sarotte includes several unjustified attacks against President Putin (for American authors, such attacks have become akin to the mandatory references to the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin in Soviet monographs). Although the author does provide a critical analysis of the bombings of Yugoslavia (done without a mandate from the UN Security Council) that became a turning point, she does so only in the context of their detrimental effect on dialogue with Russia and ignores the immorality of this act of NATO aggression and the deceitfulness of the arguments that were used to justify it.

And yet here, for the first time ever, a full and well-reasoned alternative is provided to the generally accepted answer to the question: “Was the crisis in relations between Moscow and the West that followed in the wake of the expansion of the alliance inevitable?” Of course it was not inevitable.

Today, Russia, the US, and Europe are reaping the fruits of the mistakes and misconceptions of those years. The attempt to accelerate the “end of history” directed the latter down a more dramatic and unpredictable path, and a return to the “period of optimism” of 30 years ago, for which Professor Sarotte¹⁸ expresses nostalgia in the final lines of her work, now definitely looks like a pipe dream that has given way to a harsh and brutal reality.

Russia’s Approaches to International Information Security

Keywords: international information security (IIS), information and communication technology (ICT), Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG)

Sergey Savin, *Attaché at the Department of International Information Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*; dmib@mid.ru

THE SURVEY *International Information Security: Russia’s Approaches* [in Russian], published in 2021 by a team of authors of the Center for International Information Security and Science and Technology Policy at the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry, is a comprehensive and outstanding academic study and a successful attempt to research and systematize the logic of the almost 25-year international political process of building the security contours of information and communication technology (ICT).

The study examined a significant number of specialized sources and literature, including normative legal acts, official documents, interviews, media materials, statistical data, comparative tables, graphs, as well as statements by political figures and experts directly involved in the negotiation process.

Section 1 assesses threats to international information security (IIS) as a factor affecting strategic stability. It posits that the fast-tracked digitalization of the economy under the emergency circumstances of the coronavirus pandemic has increased the technological dependence and vulnerability of individual states and the world as a whole in the face of information security threats.

Section 2 and Section 3 give careful consideration to the history of Russia-initiated negotiations on IIS at the UN, covering its current status and development vectors.

Section 4 of the survey is devoted to alternative approaches to ensuring IIS.

Section 5 details the main substance of Russia's proposals for negotiations at the UN on the entire range of IIS issues and examines Russia's regulatory framework and strategic planning documents.

Section 6 is devoted to the Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies 2021- 2025, whose mandate was stated in UN General Assembly Resolution 75/240 (adopted on December 31, 2020) and acknowledged by consensusbased Resolution 76/19 (adopted on December 6, 2021). It assesses of the Group's prospective areas of activity, the parameters and specifics of its functioning, and the main issues on the agenda. Special attention is given to the application of international law in the information sphere.

Overall, this survey will be interesting and useful to a wide range of experts and members of the academic community. The issues addressed require further consideration, in-depth analysis, and systematization the more quickly the IIS negotiation process and situation develop.