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<u>"Regarding Nuclear Tests, I Can Say That If the US Resumes Them, It</u> <u>Will Get a Mirror Response From Our Side</u>"

S. Ryabkov

The calls of the western "peacemakers" to sit down at the negotiations table do not sound that realistic as we have observed some oscillations before, at least among US political commentators, over whether the collective West and its protégés in Kiev are moving in the right direction. But this has not resulted in any changes in the official course of Washington or the capitals of its protégés. It will take time to come to full realization by policymaking circles in "greater Washington" and, of course, the Biden administration, of the simple fact that the anti-Russian course, including its Ukraine dimension, is doomed to failure.

Americans have never viewed Ukraine as an independent value. The SMO has become a pretext for unleashing an irresponsible and wide-ranging sanctions, propaganda, political, and now also open war in its hybrid forms on a scale that Russia's enemies have never practiced before.

Our dialogue with US representatives on the second track - i.e., with political analysts - is not going very well, since they are unwilling to face the fact that Russia had, has, and will always have fundamental national interests. We have protected them and will continue to protect them.

There are no indications that if Mr. Trump won the upcoming election, anything would change for the better regarding the US approach toward Russia or that US policy toward Russia in general would become more sensible and responsible. Trump put far more sanctions on Russia than his predecessor Obama did.

The inertia of the American state machine and US policymakers' commitment to preventing a situation where Russia gains the upper hand will prevail, at least in the foreseeable future. This whole circus with the "agonizing" approval of yet another "financial band-aid" for the budget. At the very last moment and once again raise the debt ceiling by a few trillion dollars, shifting the current problems onto the shoulders of future generations of Americans.

There is no regular dialogue on nuclear arms control and reduction. Recently, however, the Americans have revisited the issue, signaling that it is probably time to return to it. We are not prepared to resume discussions outside the general context of bilateral relations, which are literally in ruins because of the US's extremely irresponsible course.

The Russian Federation has withdrawn its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This was done to put our international legal and political status on a par with that of the US.

We have repeatedly urged the Americans to reconsider their destructive approach. But for more than 20 years, successive administrations in Washington either sent encouraging signals or, like the Trump administration, simply took pride in the fact that they refused to join the CTBT.

Speaking of deglobalization our world may not be able to completely disassociate and live in isolation without communication, if only because of modern technologies and their all-encompassing scale. But practice shows that politically and economically, new walls and barriers may be built.

The world will actually become multipolar or polycentric. We believe that it is essential to move down the path of civilizational maturation and the formation of a model where the equality of states and mutual respect for each other's interests are of paramount importance.

BRICS is a very special and, in my opinion, unique community of states that has evolved from an experimental format into an essential and increasingly important factor in international affairs within a historically short period of a little more than 15 years.

Illiberalism in International Relations

A. Dugin

Realists believe that human is inherently flawed thus can only be restrained and regulated by means of a strong state. At the same time, nature of man is projected onto the state; therefore, the nation- state has its own interests. These interests take into account only their own state, what means that war is always a possibility. Realists believe that this has always been and always will be.

International relations are based only on a balance of power between wholly sovereign entities. If there are several truly sovereign powers, no supranational order can exist between them to which all would submit. Were such an order to exist, only this supranational authority itself would be sovereign.

Realists are opposed by the liberal school of international relations. The liberals in international relations believe that man can be changed by re-education and training from the predatory egoist into a reasonable and tolerant altruist who is willing to reckon with others and treat them with reason and tolerance. Whereas the realists believe that human nature cannot be changed.

State wise only liberal states can exist, since "democracies do not fight each other." Even these liberal states must gradually die out, giving way to a world government. Having forged civil society, they are abolished.

Another trend in international relations worth mentioning is Marxism. Here, the whole world appears as a single zone of social progress that will lead to the capitalist system becoming global – i.e., the eventual creation of a world government with the total hegemony of global capital that is inherently international. Human nature is based on class. Man does not live and does not think; it is the class within him that lives and thinks.

Marxists in international relations believe that history will not end with the creation of a world government and humanity without states and cultures. After this

class contradictions will reach a climax and a world revolution will take place.

At first glance, the theory of a multipolar world is about sovereignty – i.e., about realism but the bearer of sovereignty is the Civilization State, which unites entire peoples and cultures under a supreme umbrella – a religion, a historical mission, and a reigning idea. A Civilization State is a new, purely technical name for an Empire. Civilization States in the theory of a multipolar world thus simultaneously adopt elements of both realism and liberalism in international relations.

Russia has traditionally tried to establish a continental Eurasian power based on the values of collectivism, solidarity and justice, and Orthodox Christian traditions. Xi's "community of common destiny for mankind" or the Tianxia concept represent the scaled principle of the traditional Confucian ideal of the "Celestial Heaven" – the Chinese empire at the center of the world that offers surrounding peoples the Chinese cultural code as an ethical, philosophical, and sociopolitical ideal. The Islamic civilization also has its own unshakable principles and is focused on spreading Islam globally as the "last religion." India in recent decades has been increasingly turning to the foundations of its Vedic civilization and partly to the caste system, as well as to liberation from colonial models of philosophy and the affirmation and promotion of Hindu principles in culture, education, and politics. Civilizational projects are maturing on the African continent, primarily in the form of Pan-Africanism. The same is true for Latin American countries seeking to justify their differences from both the US and Western Europe.

Thus, the Russian, the Chinese, and the Islamic Ideas have a pronounced universal potential. They are followed by India, while Africa and Latin America have so far limited their projects to their respective continents.

The struggle between a unipolar world order and a multipolar one is therefore a clash of Ideas – between liberalism, which is trying to defend its dominant position on a global scale, and several different versions of illiberalism, which is becoming increasingly clearly manifested in the countries that make up the multipolar bloc.

<u>The Neo-Global World: Past Baggage, Present Challenges, Future</u> Prospects

D. Yevstafyev

This paper examines problems stemming from attempts to simultaneously construct a new architecture of international relations and overcome the destabilizing legacy of the largely US-centric system of late globalization.

Multipolarity was envisioned and understood by many major intellectuals of the late 20th and early 21st centuries as a system formed based on the realization of the impossibility of preserving unipolarity in politics and especially in economics, be it a US-centric or any other post-American unipolarity. It was an attempt to "engineer the future" on rationalistic, but primarily military-strategic and foreign policy foundations, taking into account the interests of at least the major global players institutionalized in the G20. Alas, this model was rejected by the US, which did not recognize or, rather, did not accept the impossibility of maintaining political dominance in the conditions of geoeconomic multipolarity.

We are now observing four vectors of the disintegration of the integrity of the globalization system, which define a certain "source code" of the neo-global world that in the strategic perspective will aim to restore the lost integrity: The disappearance of "flagship" actors in world politics, The crisis of institutions of the global world, The crisis of the system of global geoeconomic interdependence and the emergence of uncertainty in global economic systems, which will prevent us from confidently predicting the consequences of certain political and economic actions and Ideologization of the economy amid the crisis of the global- universalist model of social development.

The main contradiction of the modern world, the world of the period of global transformations, arises between global politics, where old formats of interaction dominate, and the global economy, which is increasingly determined by a new logic

and new mechanisms of intersystem interaction.

We can formulate three foundations of the neo-global world on which it can take shape as a geopolitical and, most importantly, geoeconomic system that would truly streamline global processes, leading to the emergence of a renewed "world order" with more stable norms of economic and political behavior:

First. Political acceptance and institutionalization of hybridity as a "built-in" property of the space of world politics and economics.

Second. Competition of development models as a latent driver of change.

Third. Structural reorganization of the space of the world economy.

Late globalization has led to the concentration of production in a relatively small number of industrial centers (China, India, and Indonesia; to a lesser extent Brazil, whose crisis as an industrial power in the 2000s and 2010s can be attributed to the erosion of the semi-periphery; and South Korea as an industrial-technological center that balances Japan and China).

The emergence of new industrial centers in their vicinity, within the same macro-region, even within the areas of the second and third technological conversions (Egypt, Iran, Vietnam, Malaysia), means these giants will be deprived not only of their relatively stable market position, but also of the possibility of charging the consumer extra. The restoration of the industrial-resource semi-periphery may also stimulate the political ambitions of a number of states, and this will have security implications.

Apocalypse of Our Time: Servants of the Devil Before the Court of History

K. Dolgov

Numerous lives were lost in the more than 200 wars and armed conflicts unleashed by the US. Almost 900,000 people were killed during wars unleashed by the United States after 2001, and over 38 million became refugees. Several decades ago people generally believed that the US and NATO brought peace, democracy, and freedom, today even the closest allies of the US have finally realized that the hegemon has ruined their economies and created insoluble problems.

The US is determined to continue robbing the peoples of the world, get hold of trillions of dollars, and remain the hegemon that determines the foreign and domestic policies of the whole world.

Americans consistently accuse Russia of aggression and all other sins. They never hesitate to tell lies and distort realities while consistently ignoring their own country as a true aggressor. They were the ones who in 2014 organized a fascist coup in Ukraine and replaced its elected president with a puppet.

In effect, a war is being waged against Russia involving not just the US and the EU but Slavic countries with close historical ties with Russia.

In World War II, very much as in 1812, practically all of Europe, including the Slavic countries, was fighting against us. Today, very much as before, all European and Slavic countries (except Serbia) joined the European Concert of the US, Britain, the EU, and NATO.

This should not be surprising: Europe has always disliked Russia and has constantly sought to liquidate or at least subjugate or weaken it as much as possible.

History teaches us that all attempts to forcibly capture and enslave Russia failed, so its enemies switched to a different form of struggle.

The Soviet Union was ruined, robbed - its economy, agriculture, education,

science, and culture destroyed. Russia, at that time a parody of a state, replaced the USSR. Vladimir Putin not only stopped the disintegration, but he restored Russia bit by bit.

They have revived ideological struggle against Russia, which they are portraying as an aggressor and a menace to the whole world. Everything related to it is prohibited as some sort of universal evil, as an epidemic to be suppressed by all available means. The West relies on its previous experience of the destruction of the Soviet Union.

It seems that the West has forgotten the lessons of history. All those who attacked Russia and tried to liquidate it were punished according to their deeds.

The imperialism of our day and its main "virtues" – unbridled racism, slaveholder ideologies and practices, unconcealed militarism, terrorism, shameless arrogance, contempt for other peoples and nations, and habitual irreconcilable hostility toward Russia – have made the Western world incompatible with all other peoples and states of the world.

As usual in times of trouble, Russia is composing itself and taking serious and urgent measures to protect itself, its people, independence and freedom, socioeconomic and political order, science, culture, and spiritual values. Today, when the world has reached the dividing line between life and death, everything depends on the desire, will, and real actions of every person and every nation.

Foreign Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool

Y. Sayamov

Russia is facing new major challenges in the area of foreign aid. In various periods of its history, Russia has been both a provider and a recipient of foreign aid.

Since the second half of the 20th century, foreign aid has turned into a global tool of influence and an effective means of implementing the foreign policy goals of states and the activities of international organizations.

In practice, however, aid is selectively provided based on the political, economic, and other interests of donors in recipients.

Western aid is sometimes imposed, although it should only be provided based on the consent, appeal, or request of the legitimate government of the recipient state.

Foreign aid becomes a kind of curse for the recipient country, corrupting governments and forcing them to carry out slavish reforms instead of necessary economic and social changes.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the US used the new opportunities that opened up as a result to expand the use of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. This allowed the US to significantly strengthen its control over the world's main financial flows and international credit organizations.

When Russia stopped following the lead of another country's policy and started to pursue a course of independent development, it was met with sharp opposition from the West.

Amid the confrontation, the West began to actively use foreign scientific and technical assistance as a foreign policy tool.

Humanitarian aid, previously interpreted in the West mainly as assistance in the context of natural, anthropogenic, social, environmental, and other disasters, began to be provided during a conflict as cultural, moral, and symbolic support for the recipient country; as mobilization of world public opinion in its favor; and for denigration of

the opponent.

It makes a lot of sense for the US to continue to support the war in Ukraine indefinitely, hoping to defeat Russia by someone else's hands.

The Americans have designed a large-scale geopolitical project to expand their influence in the world under the slogan of assistance to Ukraine in order to achieve several goals at once.

However, we can say that the political aspect of foreign aid is almost always conditioned by the donor's desire to expand its position and influence in the international arena. The economic aspect of foreign aid is determined by the goals of gaining access to markets and resources and ultimately achieving higher returns for the donor from the commodity- money relations with its recipients.

Russia uses foreign aid as a tool to bring states closer together and develop friendly relations and greater positive trade and economic interdependence between them as a factor of stability and development, essentially offering a better, selfless, and humane model of support for developing countries in the context of the formation of a new world order. A fundamentally different institution of international foreign aid of the future will have to leave negative practices behind and focus on development in the common interest of humanity's survival and progress.

International Information Security: Russia at the UN (1998-2009)

S. Boiko

December 4, 2023, marked 25 years since the adoption of the first Russian resolution "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security" at the 53rd session of the UN General Assembly. This resolution ushered in an era of Russian international information security initiatives at the UN.

Russia initiated the launch of a new mechanism at the UN platform to discuss topical issues related to ensuring security in the information field. The process was triggered by a letter that Russian foreign minister sent to UN Secretary-General on September 23, 1998.

Thanks to the Russian initiative, topical issues related to ensuring security in using ICTs, as well as the security of ICTs as such, became part of the agenda of the UNGA First Committee.

However, not all parties shared the Russian approach toward these issues. The Americans thus effectively destroyed the consensus that was achieved in 1998 by precluding the possibility of the Russian-proposed discussion at the UN on international legal regimes of ensuring information security and then even the discussion of international regulation principles related to this area.

Despite the US stance, Resolution A/RES/54/49 "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security," was adopted at Russia's initiative on December 1, 1999, at the 54th session of the UN General Assembly.

On June 21, 2001, pursuant to resolution A/RES/55/28, Russia presented its vision of international information security threats to the UN secretary-general, describing them as factors that jeopardized the fundamental interests of the individual, society, and the state in the information space.

Russia took another important step at the 17th meeting of the First Committee at the 56th session of the UNGA on October 30, 2001 presenting the draft resolution "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security," Russian representative stressed that the draft did not seek to impose any specific view or establish control over information and telecommunications systems, limit the free flow of information, or prevent access to information. Russia's proposal was supported by other delegations, which made it possible to adopt resolution A/RES/56/1914 by consensus on November 29, 2001.

From Russia's viewpoint, the main idea of creating a universal international information security regime could be the obligation of its participants not to resort to actions in the information space aimed at damaging information networks, systems, resources, processes, and infrastructure of another state; undermining political, economic, and social systems; and making a massive informational-psychological impact on the public in order to destabilize society and the state.

The UNGA resolution A/RES/58/32 "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security," adopted on December 8, 2003 included only consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security and possible joint measures to eliminate them, as well as analysis of international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems.

The determination to continue the discussion of key issues under consideration was confirmed by 177 member states voting for resolution A/RES/60/45 "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security". The only member state to vote against the resolution was the US.

However, practice has shown that the four-year hiatus was beneficial, since the rapid development of ICTs was accompanied by the equally rapid misuse of ICTs by criminal groups. Moreover, the threats of ICTs being used for hostile military and

political purposes became a reality.

International Information Security: Russia at the UN (2009-2017)

S. Boiko

The resolution "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security" ushered in an era of Russian international information security initiatives at the UN.

Thanks to Russia, a new mechanism for discussing current security issues in the information sphere was launched at the UN.

The second UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Communications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE, the "Group") began its work at its first session on November 24, 2009, in Geneva.

The adoption by consensus of Resolution A/RES/64/25 "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security" at Russia's initiative on December 2, 2009, positively influenced the chances of achieving future agreements in the course of numerous UN GGE discussions.

A distinctive feature of the 2010 UN GGE report was the presence of initial recommendations to develop confidence-building measures and measures to reduce the risk of misperceptions resulting from disorganization or disruption associated with the use of ICTs.

Looking back on 2010, when the work of the second UN GGE ended, it should be noted that in the context of the rapid growth of threats in the information field and the need to strengthen cooperation in combating them, the common understanding of the harmfulness of long interruptions in the activities of the Group objectively predetermined the decision to convene the Group in a new composition just two years later, in 2012.

That decision was enshrined in UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/65/41

"Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security," coauthored by 36 states and adopted by consensus at Russia's initiative on December 8, 2010.

Russia, together with its partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, introduced the "International Code of Conduct for Information Security" as an official document of the 66th session of the UN General Assembly.

Meanwhile, as time has shown, the question of the need for legal regulation of the use of ICTs, considering the specifics of these technologies, has never lost its relevance. On the contrary, it became the main obstacle to achieving consensus at the UN due to differences in approaches of Russia and its partners on the one hand, and the US and its allies on the other.

The general focus of the Group's work was supported by the consensus adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/67/27 on December 3, 2012, at the initiative of Russia.

63 states coauthored UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/69/28, adopted on December 2, 2014, on Russia's initiative. The resolution welcomed the start of the work of the UN GGE and authorized the Group to continue implementing the broad research authority provided for by its mandate.

The Resolution A/RES/70/237 was adopted at Russia's initiative at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly on December 23, 2015. 84 states, including for the first time all the leading Western countries, acted as coauthors of the Russian project.

On October 12, 2017, at the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, of the next resolution, A/C.1/72/L.44 was adopted, initiated as usual by Russia and supported by all UN member states except for Ukraine, which abstained.

The UN GGE faced growing disagreements and failed to reach a consensus in 2017.

Russia once again took the lead in proposing a way out of the crisis as early as

the following year, in 2018, revitalizing the negotiation process on ensuring the security of ICTs and their use, and inviting all stakeholders to join it.

Why Traditional Values Matter

A. Drobinin

Russia, where three or four generations have seen several radically different political and ideological regimes, has opted for tradition-based development as its civilizational choice.

Today, the world has reached another turning point, and Russia has again come up against foreign attempts to block its development. One weapon used in these attempts is the neoliberal agenda of the West.

Neoliberalism is a complicated issue. To examine its value system, we can split it into four categories: economics, politics, society, and technology.

The main postulate of economics in neoliberalism is the dominance of the US dollar as a reserve currency and a means of payment in international trade. Another sacred cow is the expected openness of commodity and sales markets to Western capital, including speculative capital.

Economic neoliberalism affects the lives of ordinary people, too. Consumerism – the phenomenon of overconsumption and commodity fetishism that has emerged in the West based on the destructive practice of easy credit and aggressive marketing – has been spreading like a virus for many years.

Politically wise in Western countries, democratic procedures have long been nothing but ceremonial forms of government legitimization that have nothing to do with genuine transfers of power. In many countries, from Belgium to the US, top official posts have been held by the same political dynasties for decades.

Yet another neoliberal tactic is the distortion of the human rights concept by prioritizing political and civil rights while deemphasizing social, economic, and cultural rights.

Anti-Russian racism – the prevalent use of hate speech in discussions about Russia and Russians – has become regular practice. The constantly repeated notion of political correctness is forgotten in this case.

Neoliberal ethical, cultural, and social views and neoliberal interpretations of history have little to do with the perceptions of those who espouse traditional values.

What were marginal social phenomena until a while ago have become regular features of daily life in Western countries and threaten to pervert people's ways of thinking. They include the intrusive LGBT agenda, radical feminism, the cult of political correctness that assumes absurd proportions, and "critical race theory" – the doctrine that race is not a biological fact but a construct to justify the oppression of non-white people.

Western neoliberal ideologists persistently preach individualism, placing the "atomized individual" concept above all other social notions. They advocate personal self-improvement and self-transformation, including through the use of modern technologies. It is invariably insisted that only a tech-savvy person can be considered a progressive individual, although in practice, this notion is a smokescreen for a variety of commercial or political interests.

One way or another, the entire neoliberal agenda owes its existence to big money and is a means of advancing the interests of transnational corporations via political, economic, and social pressures. The West seeks to impose pseudodemocratic and neoliberal precepts that on the rest of the world.

Looking at these neoliberal practices from the outside, from Russia, we cannot fail to see the toxicity and moral untenability of the ideology on which they are based. We can see the risks that neoliberalism poses to its own supporters, too, although that is their choice, and they will have to face the consequences of it.

Russia and the West After the SMO: A New Level of Confrontation

A. Sidorov

The open confrontation between Russia and the West that had begun in 2014 reached a new level after February 24, 2022. It became a "hybrid" yet full-scale and bloody war waged by the West against us by the hands of the regime in Kiev. The West responded to the Special Military Operation (SMO) with unexpected aggression. More economic sanctions, harsh political pressure, and another bullying campaign in the Western media could have been expected, but not the freezing of gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Russian Central Bank and not massive supplies of lethal weapons to Kiev.

Russia, having launched the SMO, broke the mold of the world order in which it was to play the role of the eternally vanquished side in the Cold War and defended its right to security and national dignity.

At the same time, the new level of confrontation between Russia and the West is asymmetrical. The US-led NATO+ coalition is fighting against Russia, while Russia does not confront the West outside the SMO zone.

The self-imposed informal limits that Russia has evidently put on itself in the course of the SMO are part of its "asymmetric peacefulness".

Russia has not abandoned its previous strategy toward the West that it has consistently implemented after 2014, focused on not burning bridges or exacerbating disagreements beyond reasonable limits while always leaving room for compromise.

Russia remained Kiev's biggest trade partner until the beginning of the SMO. So long as the slightest hope remained of avoiding major bloodshed, Russia focused every effort on achieving that goal, which explains why the demilitarization and denazification surgery began too late and why it turned out to be painful and bloody.

In the context of the SMO, it has become obvious that the post-Soviet strategy of integrating Russia into the Western world failed. There are many who refuse to accept the truth that our enemies are determined to go to the end; they try to "break through" to the West; they hope that Russia would be reconnected to "progressive mankind."

We must change our policy to get out of the corridor of American scenarios. We must abandon the illusion that compromises are possible; this only protracts the SMO and causes more suffering and death. We rely on the wrong conviction that the foreign policy of our former and crafty Western partners is by default pragmatic and rational. In reality, it is ideologized and Russophobic.

The degree of Western maliciousness was underestimated largely due to the illusion that with the collapse of the USSR, the West and post- Soviet Russia would no longer have any ideological antagonism and their relations would be harmonious, conflict-free, and based on the principles of democracy and the free market.

The Communists in their day tried to build a classless society in the Soviet Union. The post-Christian West of our time is building a genderless society. On the whole, the large spiritual gap between Russia and the West that is widening in the context of the fighting in Ukraine is good for Russia, even if the SMO is very painful militarily, politically, socioeconomically, and psychologically. People may say that the anti-family, gender-related agenda is a private rather than political issue. In fact, it is more than politics; it is an irreconcilable philosophical disagreement related to human nature.

Current Russian military and diplomatic tactics with respect to Ukraine are focused on preserving the status quo in the expectation of wearing out the enemy, rather than on conducting active offensive operations, which may indicate a lack of consensus on the ultimate aims of the SMO.

The logic of the current confrontation with the West requires that Ukraine as we know it today be liquidated. This Russophobic, chauvinist, neo-Nazi project must be shut down. Later, most of its regions must join Russia, and the Russian identity of the vast part of their population restored. It will take many years to cleanse millions of hearts and minds of the nationalist and neo-Nazi poison. But there is no other way to avoid a deferred and much more exhausting and bloody war and to finally settle several key national security problems.

The US and Europe in the Ukraine Conflict: Why Europe Is Losing

P. Smirnov

Despite all sorts of sanctions against Moscow introduced by the US and its European allies and the gradual building up of their military presence along Russia's western borders during the previous period of the Ukraine crisis, Europe still had freedom of maneuver and diplomacy on the Russian track. Moreover, they and the Russian Federation were connected by certain common mechanisms that presupposed conflict settlement in the southeast of Ukraine.

Late in 2021, the EU more or less identically responded to what Russia proposed to the US and NATO as security guarantees.

The time that has already passed since the beginning of the SMO has confirmed the earlier conclusion that the EU that tried to transform Europe into a pole of economic and political influence in its own right was one of the main losers in the Ukraine conflict. This has become obvious in several areas.

First, the economic bleeding of Europe, especially of such engines of European integration as Germany, is intensifying.

Second, the European countries are losing their stocks of weapons and ammunition, sent to Ukraine as military aid, while American military companies have acquired an excellent opportunity to impose their products on European allies.

Third, Europe's claims to be an independent European defense identity as an alternative of sorts to NATO is seriously undermined by the need to mobilize military, economic, and financial resources to support Kiev.

Fourth, the situation that has taken shape after the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine requiring the involvement of the entire European resource has objectively devalued the political impact of the leaders of "old" Europe and increased the political weight within the EU of East European states.

Fifth, fighting in Ukraine has helped the US implement its geopolitical plans to

add "missing links" to the NATO chain in Eastern Europe, in the area directly neighboring Russia (the decision of Sweden and Finland to join NATO).

One of the factors is Washington's opportunities to manipulate the dependence of its European allies on Russian energy sources. However, the energy issue should be considered not only in the context of the confrontation with Russia, but also as an integral element of Washington's strategy to weaken Europe as an economic rival.

In the foreseeable future, as long as the Ukraine crisis remains vehement enough, the US can rest assured that Europe will not abandon the path of containing Russia.

Today, the states that are concerned about long-term European interests might sooner or later undermine European reliability as a loyal supporter of American geostrategy in Europe that confronts Russia and is expected to consolidate Ukraine as a tool of a proxy war with Russia.

The current situation, associated with the strict need to integrate into American geostrategy, not only bleeds Europe dry economically but makes it a second-class political actor in world politics; it is pushed to the "backyard of history" amid the US-China rivalry that has developed into an axis of this policy.

It is growing much clearer that Washington's long-term strategy is nothing more than a desire to plunge Europe into the Ukraine conflict with an obvious understanding that the end will hardly be positive for Ukraine.

No matter how much Europe wanted to save its strategic alliance with the US and prevent Russia's geopolitical resurrection, it is objectively reluctant to support a hot conflict at its eastern borders. Indeed, doing so might turn Europe into a battlefield; this means that it will inevitably try to somehow facilitate a settlement of the conflict. Europe, former allies of the Soviet Union now claiming the role of America's "proxies," cannot ignore the fact that no effective security architecture in Europe is possible without Russia or set up against it.

International Efforts to Prevent the Political Reintegration of Crimea and Sevastopol Into Russia

V. Nemtsev, O. Moskalenko, N. Demeshko

The Black Sea region has become ground zero for the formation of the new world order, and no matter how one sees this region's geopolitical configuration, Crimea plays one of the principal roles in it.

Since the Crimean Spring of 2014, the West, primarily the US and Britain as the most powerful anti-Russian geopolitical actors, have been raising obstacles to the reintegration of Crimea into the Russian Federation.

Turkey is an independent geopolitical player and it cannot distance itself from the Crimea issue. While Ukraine has proven to be a proxy state over the nearly 10 years as it's Crimea policy and its foreign policy in general are manipulated by the West.

This article is an attempt at a systematic study of the international geopolitical, institutional, and informational mechanisms being used to prevent the reintegration of Crimea and Sevastopol into Russia.

The informational mechanisms consist of statements by influential politicians and public opinion leaders, and content from the media and research centers.

As regards institutional attempts to prevent Crimea's geopolitical reintegration into Russia, the activities of two bodies set up by Ukraine but de facto controlled by various international actors may be the best example. These bodies are: The Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine and The Crimea Platform.

Russia's extension of sovereignty to Crimea in 2014 and the consequent major enlargement of the country's range of opportunities in the Black Sea region and Mediterranean was met with hostility – economic, legal, informational, and institutional. In 2022, global and regional actors added a military dimension to this. The West (the US, Britain, EU countries, and their satellites), Turkey, and Ukraine are publicly united in refusing to recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea and in condemning Russia. Their position can be summed up as "Crimea is Ukraine," a motto antipodal to the Russian slogan "*Krymnash*" ("Crimea is ours"), which arose spontaneously in 2014. The battle between these slogans fully reflects the conflict between two geopolitical positions and two political philosophies, a conflict that is still going on nearly a decade after Crimea's reincorporation into Russia.

<u>Crimea's Return to Russia: A Comparative Analysis of the Political</u> <u>Reintegration of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of</u> <u>Sevastopol Into Russia (2014-2022)</u>

A. Irkhin, M. Pavlenko

This article sums up a study that aimed to identify and analyze models for the political reintegration into Russia of the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. At the time of its reunification with Russia in 2014, the Crimean Peninsula was a political entity different from all other regions of Ukraine.

The authors did a comparative analysis of the emergence, development, functioning, and powers of Russian bodies of government in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

The revision of the outcomes of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the establishment of state borders for the new independent states have represented a process of political reintegration – effectively the recovery of lost geopolitical space. It is a multifactor process that began with the reincorporation of the Crimean Peninsula into Russia and did not end in 2014 for the Republic of Crimea or the city of Sevastopol with the implementation of the legal norms of the Russian Federation and the adoption of regional laws and political institutions.

The study has shown that the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol possessed the following political factors in 2014 that made them very different from all other regions of Ukraine – i.e., the starting positions during the reintegration of Crimea were initially more favorable than for other territories of Ukraine, even at the start of the return of Crimea to Russia, although the pro-Russian movement in southeastern Ukraine was undoubtedly far more powerful in 2014 than in 2022.

In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the process of reunification with Russia in effect began in December 2013, when the local elite began to realize where Ukraine's "Revolution of Dignity" was headed. Subsequently, different systems of government developed in the two regions. Sevastopol, which became a federal city, eventually adopted a presidential system with direct gubernatorial elections and the positions of governor and prime minister held by the same person, while the Republic of Crimea adopted a mixed system with the head of the republic elected by its parliament but enjoying effectively presidential powers.

The ultimate authors of the political systems of Crimea and Sevastopol were federal government bodies, the president of Russia, and federal legislation that established organizational and functioning principles for the legislative and executive bodies, electoral systems, and, to a lesser extent, the party systems.

One effect of the Crimean Peninsula's reincorporation into Russia was the "Crimean consensus" – an interesting phenomenon that for several years to come ensured a new compromise among Russian elites and the rallying of Russia's various ethnic groups around the leader of the country. This represents the intersection of three longtime demands of Russian society: for a powerful nation, social justice, and a strong central government, which ensures that the first two demands are met.

Russia and China: The Path of Modernization, Stronger National Security, and Technological Self-Sufficiency

On October 19-20, 2023, the Fifth Russian-Chinese Energy Business Forum (RCEBF) took place in Beijing. This event is held annually in accordance with agreements reached by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping and under the auspices of Russia's Presidential Commission on Strategic Development of the Fuel-Energy Complex and Environmental Safety together with China's National Energy Administration.

A central event of the forum was a report by Igor Sechin in which he put forward his views on the current state of and prospects for the development of Russian-Chinese cooperation that continues to strengthen across the board.

Touching upon the theme of the degradation of the unipolar model of world order, Sechin reported that today we are witnessing the formation of new regional markets and the establishment of alternative trade routes.

A significant portion of the report was dedicated to the Russian "pivot to the East," in which China plays a key role and trade and economic ties between Russia and China are seen as a pillar of stability and growth.

The rapid growth of mutually beneficial trade relations between Russia and China is causing trepidation and drawing criticism from our competitors. This speaks to the correctness of the path we have chosen.

In his presentation, Igor Sechin said energy is the most important avenue of cooperation between our countries.

Speaking of energy security from a long-term perspective, it must be said that Russia is one of the few countries that makes investments in new energy projects a priority.

His report went on to state that the pressure being put on China and Russia by the West has served as a stimulus for us to develop our own regional markets. In conclusion, Igor Sechin stated that the nature of Russian-Chinese relations is an all-encompassing strategic partnership that has always been based on the principles of trust, respect, and consideration of each other's interests. Russia continues to aim to strengthen and deepen cooperation with the Chinese side along the entire added-value production chain in energy and related industries, including technology, equipment supply, and project financing.

The forum was attended by representatives of more than 100 Russian and Chinese energy companies and related industries and by around 400 people in all.

The Sixth Annual Russian-Chinese Energy Business Forum is set to take place in Russia in 2024.

<u>A New Fair World Order Formulated in Beijing: Results of the Third</u> Belt and Road Forum

V. Kozhemyakin

On October 18, 2023, the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation concluded in Beijing. One of its key events was the participation of Russian President Vladimir Putin. On the last day of the event, he held talks with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Speaking at the opening ceremony of the forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that Russia is interested in the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is "in line with our well- known proposal to form a Greater Eurasian Partnership as a space for cooperation and interaction among like-minded individuals.

The idea of the Belt and Road Forum to some extent coincides with the Russian concept of the Greater Eurasian Partnership – the creation of a free market among countries that trust each other across vast spaces, from the eastern borders of Europe to the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia.

There was no shortage of leaders and representatives from different states in Beijing. Moreover, this is evidence that all sanctions and attempts to isolate Russia led to nothing, and efforts to surround and isolate 'toxic' Russia are futile. All the efforts of the US, such as their countless attempts to persuade ASEAN countries to isolate Russia – none of them work

At the forum, Vladimir Putin stated that Russia strives for equal cooperation. During the negotiations between the president of Russia and the leader of China, close political and economic ties between Russia and China were confirmed. Additionally, Xi Jinping announced that bilateral trade between China and Russia has reached historic records and is approaching the target goal of \$200 billion

However, relations between Russia and China were not the only major focus of

the event. The personal negotiations between Putin and the leaders of the countries who came to Beijing are an unofficial significant outcome of the forum.

Also important in the context of current events is the question of how relations between Russia and China will develop, given the competition between the two countries.

At the same time we cannot talk about an official Russian-Chinese space, an alliance between Russia and China.

Nevertheless, despite the existing realities, President Putin, responding during the final press conference to a question about cooperation between Russia and China, noted that external factors and conflicts are common threats to the two countries that only strengthen their interaction.

China's idea aligns with Russia's ideas of creating an "integration contour" that would fully ensure the freedoms of labor, trade, and investments.

The Belt and Road Initiative: Economics and Geopolitics

V. Larin

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – the first and highly successful project of the Xi Jinping administration was designed to transform China from a regional into global power.

Today, the project is actively developing more by inertia than management. This loud response means that the initiative was well timed and well placed.

The initiative, introduced as the One Belt, One Road (OBOR), was identified with the Great Silk Road; this caused a lot of geographical confusion among its interpreters and even among those implementing it. Its real content can be described as China's maximally fast, secure, and economically profitable access to raw material resources and consumer markets of the Eurasian continent.

In the first years of the 21st century, it became obvious that under the pressure of internal and external factors, China was losing its "world's factory" status that had served as a driver of its own economy and the world economy to cope, the country needed wide access to world markets and rich sources of raw materials.

By the beginning of the second decade, the country had already acquired the ideology of a global power actively fueled by nationalist sentiments. It set a goal of becoming, by 2020, a "world power that relies on human energy, talents, and innovations,"

The Chinese initiative relies on unimpeded trade, financial cooperation, and people-to-people bonds, as well as a platform of international economic cooperation and global development. The "roads" and "corridors" that begin in China are expected to create a sustainable and contemporary transport and logistics infrastructure for its economic cooperation with Europe, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.

The Russian vector of the BRI has two dimensions: a land part (the Silk Road Economic Belt) and an oceanic part (Maritime Silk Road with the Northern Sea Route).

At first, the BRI was presented as a purely economic strategy. But life put everything in its place. Implementation of the BRI effectively promoted the "Chinese dream" and "community with a shared future" formula, paving the way for a series of Xi Jinping's global initiatives. One of the reports prepared for the Third Belt and Road Forum was titled "Practice for Building a Community with a Shared Future."

On one hand, China needed to create a positive and easily recognizable aura around its foreign economic policy projects. On the other hand, it needed to use its economic potential to create an image of a "responsible global power".

At first glance, the BRI did not help resolve accumulated economic problems. According to an analysis of general results of China's foreign trade, the BRI produced no noticeable effect. At the same time, Beijing has expanded its economic ties with Europe and the Middle East.

The increasing number of official and real participants of the Chinese initiative per se speaks volumes about its popularity and impressive results. Seeds fell on good ground. Many countries have come to realize that Xi Jinping's initiative is not merely a chance to deal with their infrastructure, economic, and social problems, but an attractive economic development model and an alternative and a challenge to the Western version of globalization.

The Third BRI Forum was less triumphant and much more pragmatic, even if attended by representatives from 151 countries and 41 international organizations. China used it to demonstrate the positive results of the BRI and clearly formulate targets and algorithms of its development.

China's leaders will continue improving transport and logistics corridors in Eurasia and building an open world economy. China will concentrate on innovational development, wider humanitarian exchanges, improvement of the mechanisms of international cooperation. The PRC president offered the world global modernization the road to which will be laid by continued implementation of the BRI.

Aspects of the Globality of Russian and Chinese Civilizations

Y. Sayamov

Civilization, as a category, has a range of meanings in both history and modern philosophy and politics.

Contemporary global issues of civilizational development are associated with the complex conceptual entity of a "civilization state." Among them today are the largest non-Western countries of India, Iran, China, and Russia, which are, essentially, civilization states that exert global influence, or globalities, as some researchers put it.

Since Russia and China are the drivers of the movement toward a new world order, it seems important to consider key characteristics of these globalities in their similarities and differences in order to find the potential and probable limits of their interaction on the world stage.

Russia and China both belong to the same type of civilization based on land power, with a share of thalassocratic characteristics derived from the possession of "sea power" capabilities.

Both demonstrate similar civilizational characteristics in terms of the stability of social ethics and family values, collectivism, rejection of the spirit of profit, and the desire for a strong central authority.

At the same time, the Russian and Chinese are with their own distinctions.

Russia is a multinational and multiconfessional country that has absorbed, in addition to Russian culture and Christian Orthodoxy, the spiritual heritage, traditions, and confessions of its peoples. Civilizational polyvalence, albeit to a lesser extent, is also intrinsic to China, whose cultural space extends beyond Confucianism, opening itself to other views and religions.

Despite all their differences, the civilizational foundations of Russia and China show similarities that are significant for the development of interaction. Christian Orthodoxy in Russia and Confucianism in China affirm a kind of code of responsibility for one's actions. The common feature is deep respect for the ruler, largely on a theological basis in Russia, where supreme authority is believed to come from God, and in China – mainly based on the cult of the state and state system.

A comparative analysis of the mental characteristics of the peoples of Russia and China shows that they are similar in their reverence for traditional values, with greater practicality in the Chinese and a certain perceptual sublimity in the Russian world.

Nevertheless, in Russia, the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of a higher goal in the face of new threats that must be countered is traditionally significant. The Russian civilization tends to look for causes and consequences in the outside world, while China focuses on internal reflection, pragmatically using the world's experience for its own successful development.

Common to the Russian and Chinese civilizations is the absence of any inferiority complex in relation to other civilizations.

Russia's civilizational initiative, its global vision for the necessary restructuring of the existing world order, seems to be urgently sought after and long awaited by the global community. Russia has already taken a fundamentally significant step by positioning itself as a civilization state. Next, it must elaborate the content of this concept and define its ideological and political guidelines; this would make Russia more understandable and appealing.

Russia and Yemen: 95 Years of Close Friendship and Cooperation

Ye. Kudrov

November 1, 2023, is an important date in Russia-Yemen relations. On this day in 1928, a Treaty of Friendship and Trade was signed between our countries. This document laid the groundwork for the development of bilateral political, trade, and economic ties.

In October 1962, right after the revolution of September 26, Moscow was the first country to recognize the new, republican Yemen – the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In subsequent years, our country provided large- scale assistance in modernizing Yemen's infrastructure and developing its industry.

In 1967, our country was also among the first to recognize the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), formed after the anticolonial struggle against British rule by the South Yemenis. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Aden was followed by intensive development of economic, cultural-humanitarian, military, and military- technical cooperation

Russia-Yemen cooperation, which has such a long and rich history, has continued to develop in the 21st century. We have maintained active political dialogue. Such regular "synchronization of watches" between the leaders of our countries invariably brings out the similarity of our positions regarding key issues on the bilateral and international agenda. These approaches were formulated in the Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Yemen back in December 2002. This document notes that our countries have close or identical positions on most global and regional problems. Russia particularly appreciates the fact that after the start of Special Military Operation in Ukraine, the leadership of the internationally recognized government of the RoY resisted pressure from Western countries and did not join the anti-Russian camp but took a neutral stance and continues to support our country at international forums on many issues.

During the dramatic years of 2015-2017, Russian diplomats tried not to leave Yemen until the very last moment. But despite a forced evacuation, Russian diplomats have for many years provided all possible assistance to Yemen's internationally recognized authorities and other parties to the conflict. After the of the Presidential Leadership Council, which took over from President Hadi, Russian diplomats attended its swearing-in ceremony in the city of Aden.

Unfortunately, a full-scale ceasefire lasted only six months, as efforts to extend it officially in October 2022 failed. Since then, this fragile truce holds largely due to direct Saudi- Houthi talks that started at the time.

Along with efforts to promote a Yemeni political settlement, Russia provides other assistance to the people of friendly Yemen who have struggled to survive for many years in an extremely difficult socioeconomic situation caused by the militarypolitical conflict.

A key component of Russian assistance to the RoY is higher and specialized secondary education, including quotas for free education in our country for Yemeni students provided by the Russian government on a permanent basis.

We are convinced that the doctors, engineers, and other specialists who have received an education of the highest quality in Russia will make a significant contribution to Yemen's postconflict rehabilitation, helping to heal the wounds of the protracted crisis and put Yemen, a country friendly to us, on the path of sustainable development.

Russia's Chance in Difficult Times

D. Rurikov

Transformations in the lives of individuals, nations, and global affairs typically unfold in the aftermath of crises or conflict events within specific countries, regions, or groups of nations. They are shaped by global or country-specific responses to these events. Nowadays, the Ukrainian factor may be a reason for the emerging changes. The circumstances that developed after the start of the Russian Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, quickly brought the Ukraine situation to the international level. This happened because of the actions of Russia, which chose the path of truly protecting its legitimate vital interests in the Ukrainian situation and, first of all, saving the lives and natural legal rights of millions of Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine.

Since February 2022, the increasingly hostile anti-Russian policy of the US and the West in Ukraine and other areas began to receive a practical, firm, and concrete rebuff from Russia. In response, the US and the West immediately moved from hybrid to "de facto" war with Russia and, by increasing their assistance to the Zelensky regime, tried to propagate their aggressive anti-Russian attitude throughout the world.

Since the beginning of the SMO, the Ukraine situation has also been used by the US and its allies to launch an unprecedented sanctions war against Russia in an attempt, along with military goals, to inflict critical financial and economic damage on Russia.

However, in the case of Ukraine, "untied hands" did not bring the desired victory to the West.

The sanctions war against Russia not only failed to live up to its authors' expectations but even led to unforeseen negative consequences for its initiators. Instead of weakening Russia, it only intensified the financial, economic, and social

crises in the Western countries. On the other hand, it contributed to the establishment and strengthening of various economic ties, beneficial to Russia.

Initially, Russia's actions in the Ukraine situation surprised many. However, today, several countries in the Global South perceive the new international situation that has emerged, with Russia playing a leading role, as an opportunity to shift toward a more just and humane multipolar world order.

Changes toward such an order will not be easy, of course, and will require time, considerable effort, and resources. Much will depend on states willing and able to take the lead in this process. In addition to Russia, China, and Iran, an intent to improve the world order is evident in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Multilateral and bilateral meetings of political leaders from this circle show that movement toward change could become a reality.

At the same time, we must bear in mind that our goal is not to create fundamentally new foundations for international relations but to bring today's relations into fuller compliance with the well-known norms of international law that are officially in force but, unfortunately, often ignored by the US and its allies.

Russia's victory in the Ukraine conflict – denazifying and demilitarizing Ukraine and ensuring Russia's security interests in the region – would contribute to the improvement of the current world order and movement toward a fair multipolar and multicentric world.

Obviously, in the event of a Russian victory the West will continue to use the Ukraine issue to pursue its strategic goal of undermining Russia. The current authorities of the US and European countries will most likely never change their approach.

This is well understood in the Kremlin, which is confident that the West will continue to seek new options for putting pressure on Russia and does not exclude the possibility of sabotage.

Asia in Washington's Sights: Prospects of the IPEF

G. Yeliseyev

On October 27, 2021, US President Joe Biden announced a new international integration project: the Indo- Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. The media and the academic community now refer to it as the IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework).

In fact, IPEF is a "framework platform of business cooperation" expected to tie the Asia-Pacific countries closer under America's economic and trade leadership.

On May 23, 2022, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Agreement was officially launched in Tokyo. The new economic strategy was not intended to return the US to the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement initiated under President Barack Obama, it was impossible to avoid parallels with the previous attempt at establishing American economic hegemony in Asia. The two projects can and should be compared to reveal the differences between Joe Biden's framework agreement and Barack Obama's Pacific ring.

The most obvious part of both projects: the list of countries involved. So far, 14 states of the Indo-Pacific region have joined.

The IPEF (like the TPP before it) has an open doors policy with respect to new members; this time, however, there were no even veiled hints that America would like to see other great powers join this economic project.

There is another, no less important difference between the two projects: Canada and Mexico, traditional and very important economic allies of America are not present in the IPEF.

Moreover, the IPEF in principle does not presuppose lower tariffs for member countries. On one hand, this protects the American market from an influx of competitive goods from the APR; on the other hand, this deprives the US of a chance to become a locomotive of the new agreement. The IPEF countries will discuss four blocks of subjects defined as "pillars" in the new document rather than a classical trade agreement as a single document. All of them will discuss four individual "pillars" and sign each of them, yet they will not be obliged to be involved in all of them. The following four concepts were offered as IPEF "pillars": fair and resilient trade, supply chain resilience, infrastructure, clean energy, and decarbonization, tax and anti-corruption.

The Biden administration expects to acquire a powerful integration organization that, according to US officials, represents 40% of global GDP and 28% of global trade in goods and services. But it is obvious that the IPEF is not strictly an integration project but devised to address several tasks at once. On one hand, it seeks to repeat Barack Obama's "pivot to Asia" under a new heading to restore America's lost positions in the region. On the other hand, the IPEF is clearly intended to make American imports and exports independent from China, yet the US is offering the countries joining the new agreement none of the standard economic concessions or preferences that typically come with such agreements.

Elements of the EU's Blue Economy: The Digital Environment

M. Kolesnikova

The EU has entered a new phase in the development of maritime governance. Its main task today is to build a universal digital environment for a sustainable blue economy as an advanced form of regulating the maritime economy.

The Union's work of building such an environment has stimulated the development of legal, organizational, technological, and information solutions for the blue economy.

The European Commission is going to launch an information platform to facilitate the construction and functioning of the digital environment.

The information platform, which would provide data on marine-based and marine-related industries, is being created in the context of the digital transformation, which is becoming a priority area of the EU's efforts to become the economic regulator of the World Ocean.

Among other things, the digital transformation is to ensure the oversight and control of an unlimited numbers of companies, research clusters, logistical centers, and transportation management bodies.

Planning the construction of a blue economy in the EU is based on a step and level approach involving step-by-step research, practical testing, and, if necessary, prompt adjustments to decisions at every level.

The EU's promotion of its management solutions and individual initiatives is generally aimed at consolidating its positions in the international maritime economy and subsequently legitimizing its status as the global maritime economic regulator.

In our view, the economic preferences and mutually advantageous conditions emerging in the new digital environment may stimulate non- EU countries, primarily those with access to waters bordering the EU, to integrate into the global governance system that the EU is trying to build. This may pose challenges and threats to Russia tied to resource and/or communications restrictions imposed on Russian marine-related entities. Therefore, Russia should step up political and diplomatic efforts to enlarge its role in international organizations in order to be able to monitor the decisions that are being made, decide whether they would be in line with its interests, and make necessary changes to its maritime policy.

Legal Prospects for the Technological Sovereignty of the EAEU in Light of the EU Protectionist Experience

M. Entin, A. Vadov

The EU member countries are free to legislate on the creation, commercialization, and application of technologies, while the mission of the EU as an organization is to provide general legal support for their technological development.

As the basis for building an innovation economy, the EU put forward the Innovation Union initiative.

To achieve those goals, the EU was to adopt a "multiannual framework programme". The latest, ninth framework program, named Horizon Europe, was adopted in 2021. It rests on three "pillars": Excellent Science, Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness, Innovative Europe.

The main purpose of framework programs is to support high-risk projects, and this support continues until the projects can independently attract large investments in the market. On the other hand, with the exception of its automotive and health care segments, the European market cannot offer any R&D investment large enough.

EU legeslation on the commercialization of inventions is a mixed blessing. If an invention has not been open to investment in the EU market for a year after its creation, the European Commission may order the inventor to publish it on Horizon Results. And all EU digital platforms are required to comply with the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act, which, as stated earlier, are protective in nature.

Moreover, there are too many agencies in the EU overseeing science and technology affairs, which over-bureaucratizes the R&D financing system and creates difficulties for researchers seeking grants or other financial or nonfinancial support instruments.

The EAEU has set priority scientific and technological goals [6] and is planning to stimulate R&D to achieve them. It has been proposed that long-term projects or

energy- or resource-saving technology programs should be financed with investment instruments offered by the Eurasian Development Bank and the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development.

The EAEU does have an industrial R&D agenda [5] but plans no financial stimulus for industrial research other than revenue that inventions might be expected to bring. Industrial R&D projects are financed solely by their executors or by governments interested in them.

As a funding channel for investors such as government agencies, companies, or nongovernmental organizations, the EAEU has set up so- called Eurasian technological platforms. They provide communication in the scientific and technical field and create promising technologies in certain areas.

Eurasian technological platforms are free to include provisions in their founding documents that would vest them with extensive powers to facilitate and stimulate research and promote, commercialize, market, and help apply inventions.

There is no adequate supranational legal mechanism in it to stimulate research and control the development, application, and commercialization of technologies. When developing regulations in the field of science, technology, and innovation, the EAEU would benefit by borrowing from the experience of the EU, but not wholesale. Direct copying of existing EU legislation in relevant areas would be of little help, as it would also mean copying red tape and redundant formalities.

The similar EU mechanism has been an effective barrier to brain drain. However, in borrowing ERC, EIT, or EIC experience in building its own mechanism, the EAEU should take account of the aforementioned over- bureaucratization of the EU's R&D support system and its costliness – problems that the EAEU would be able to avoid.

Diplomacy of Dialogue Structures: The Roscongress Foundation

D. Stolkov

The diplomacy of dialogue structures is a significant tool in the humanitarian aspect of Russia's foreign policy that focuses on creating a positive image of Russia by promoting its achievements in the fields of culture and science and strengthening the position of the Russian language.

In addition, the diplomacy of dialogue structures facilitates the search for potential solutions to global problems. This process involves not only government officials but also other interested parties. One undisputed advantage of expanding the number of agents of international communication is the involvement of highly specialized subject matter experts, which contributes to a deeper understanding of an issue.

The diplomacy of dialogue structures plays a key role in economic cooperation. International events serve as a platform for negotiations between trade and economic partners, both Russian and foreign, leading to subsequent agreements.

Even though the global coronavirus pandemic challenge has been overcome, health issues remain a priority when building ties with Russia's partner countries.

The accelerated digitalization of various aspects of public, political, and economic life has been another upshot of the pandemic. Technology has become actively incorporated into diplomatic practices.

The Roscongress Foundation was established by order of the Russian president in 2015 based on the SPIEF Foundation, created in 2007. Roscongress not only participates in international forums organized by other actors but has its own major platforms attended by representatives from all over the world.

In addition, the Foundation regularly takes responsibility for events held in the context of Russia's chairmanship in major international organizations and associations, with regional forums on their "sidelines" – with states of the EAEU,

BRICS, SCO, ASEAN, and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, the Islamic world, Africa, and Latin America.

Economic issues are a common theme at discussions at Roscongress Foundation events amid the deglobalization of the world economy and the reconfiguration of the economic order.

The largest event of the Roscongress Foundation is the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).

In 2023, over 200 events took place across thematic and industry platforms, as well as under the auspices of the SPIEF industry program. The forum was attended by over 6,000 business representatives from more than 3,000 companies representing 75 countries and territories.

Today, the development of new forms of communication to identify mutual interests occupies an important place in the foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation. The dialogue of cultures at various levels – individual cities and regions, contacts among representatives of civil society, the expert community, and young people – serves as an additional tool for promoting Russia's national interests. The advantage of diplomacy in dialogue structures is that it acts as a platform for uniting various tracks of diplomatic interaction.

Cultural Diplomacy Practices: A Case Study of the Salzburg Festival

N. Kuzmina

The Concept for Russia's Humanitarian Policy Abroad affirms that it is a key national interest of Russia to familiarize the global community with the cultural heritage of our multiethnic nation. Thus, "the opportunity to present abroad outstanding examples of musical, theatrical (including opera, ballet, and drama), circus, and pop art, as well as the song and dance of the peoples of Russia, as widely as possible" is officially recognized as a fundamental tool for promoting Russian culture.

However, the promotion of Russian culture abroad in unfriendly states faces numerous difficulties due to the current aggravation of geopolitical relations, the degradation of the international situation, the escalation of global tensions, and the increased sanctions pressure. Existing cultural diplomacy practices are called upon to overcome emerging obstacles.

The Salzburg Festival is a striking example of the popularization of Russia's cultural heritage. The artistic management of the festival, despite all the pressure, continues to insist that Russian culture was, is, and will be a vital part of European culture.

We can safely say that the Salzburg Festival helped to address two large- scale tasks facing Austria after the collapse of the empire. It contributed to the process of forming the values of Austria's new nation-state identity and raised the country's prestige in the eyes of the world community.

At the present stage, it is advisable to officially support the participation of representatives of Russian culture in the activities of the Salzburg Festival. Analyzing Russia's cultural influence in contemporary global politics, researchers emphasize that "performers not associated with the established military-political situation should be involved in cultural information projects. Cultural figures should avoid making

categorical statements on political talk shows and, if possible, should not be invited to such events. Mass media and communication channels should focus on highlighting positive examples of our cultural impact abroad and successful collaborative projects with foreign cultural figures."

It is indeed important to implement Russia's cultural diplomacy strategy in a way that redirects the focus in the information field away from individual manifestations of "cancel culture" and toward increased emphasis on the participation of Russian artists and the performance of Russian works in foreign cultural diplomacy practices, since this aligns perfectly with Russia's national interests.

The Military Dimension of the Catastrophe in Gaza

P. Tebin

The events of October 7 dealt a major blow to the IDF's reputation, but the importance of this failure should not be either exaggerated or downplayed. The existing situation today is the result of a whole series of factors: mistakes made in Israeli intelligence, Hamas's thorough preparation, and accumulated socioeconomic changes both in Israel itself and in the Gaza Strip.

History teaches that even an initially successful surprise attack often will lead to failure in the end, and a blitzkrieg can turn into a long-drawn- out meat grinder.

Some of the most interesting aspects of the October 7 Hamas attack from a military viewpoint are the combination of the concentration and mass use of various combat assets, as well as the decentralization and diffusion of both Hamas forces themselves and their vectors of deployment. Another aspect is how Hamas integrated the actions of drones and strike groups with efforts across the informational domain and cyberspace.

The current escalation is an obvious blow to America's Middle East policy and for American geopolitical strategy as a whole. The US is focusing a significant portion of its Navy on the Eastern Mediterranean Sea with the clear goal of not allowing the conflict between Hamas and Israel to escalate into a large-scale regional war.

Over the last few years, the US has somewhat decreased its involvement in the Middle East, drawing upon its forces there to increase its efforts in the European and Indo-Pacific regions. Now this policy is inevitably going to be revised.

Some point out the benefits for Russia: diverting the US's and Europe's attention and resources from Ukraine to support Israel. At the same time, it should be understood that further exacerbation of the regional situation also threatens the interests of Russia itself. A sharp deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in the

Middle East, new waves of refugees, and the outbreak of hostilities could affect Russian interests in Syria, create conditions ripe for international terrorism and for Islamist groups in the region.

The "Water of Life" and "Water of Death" of History

A. Oganesyan

In August 1876, the Balkans, and especially the Bulgarian people, continued to bleed, the number of victims numbering in the tens of thousands killed and tortured. However, the European powers did not go beyond indignation and verbal rhetoric. Russia was the only country that moved from words to deeds. Popular support for Bulgarians, Serbs, and Montenegrins swept the whole country.

It was in those days that Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov uttered a phrase that is still relevant today: "We cannot join collective actions that are devoid of honesty, dignity, and effectiveness." St. Petersburg's position was formulated in sharp form: In the event of a refusal, Russia would break diplomatic relations with Ottoman Turkey.

The conference took place in December 1876, and the Turkish government solemnly promised to introduce a constitution equalizing the rights of Christians and Muslims of the empire.

On April 12, 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey. The main goal, as it was stated in a secret instruction to the Russian ambassador in London, was to put an end to the constant crises in the East.

Following its military service and having assumed temporary leadership of the ruined country, Russia assisted in the revival of statehood in Bulgaria for two years, establishing a judiciary and local government, drafting a constitution, creating a regular Bulgarian Army and Navy.

Today there is no lack of arguments about "grateful" and "ungrateful" Bulgaria, but I am sure that it is not so easy to erase from the hearts of ordinary Bulgarians the memory of those who freed them from a 500-year yoke.

Certainly, attempts to distort or conceal the true history of the struggle of the Russian and Bulgarian peoples with the Ottoman yoke were all too apparent in the past, too – especially the recent past. Any falsification or oblivion is history's "water of death," and what it kills is not the past, but the present. But history also has a "water of life" – anything that revives historical memory, which is inseparable from historical conscience, thanks to those who are aware of and are experiencing our yesterday as our present and our future.

Excerpt From the Book Not Peace, but a Sword

Bishop Nestor (Donenko)

In his memoirs Archpriest Viktor Mikhailovich Kiranov writes a story about sufferings of orthodox bulgarians under the Turkish yoke.

In 1830, in order to escape the Mohammedan persecution and oppression, some Bulgarians fled Turkey for Russia and settled in the southern part of Bessarabia. The oppression of Christians in Turkey is cruelly painful, absolutely inhuman – the Turkish yoke was unbearable.

The stories told by authors grandfather, priest Stefan Kiranov indicate that his great-great-grandfather, priest Protasiy, lived in Turkey in the village of Imoklary of Adrianople County for about 150 years and died in 1773. It is clear from the notes that in the last years of his life he was respected by the Turks, because many came to him to ask about what he remembered from the life of the people, considering him an eyewitness to many events and using his stories as material for compiling history. Protasiy's son, author's great-grandfather, priest Kirill Protasyev Kiranov, was born on January 18, 1736. Fulfilling the will of his father, he agreed to be ordained a priest on March 9, 1759.

Given the lack of literacy among Christians, the number of priests was extremely small; according to written testimony left by my ancestors, hardly one priest was to be found in 20, even 30 villages.

Turks burned down villages, tortured men and, after taking all their property, killed them, took away women and girls, deprived them of their innocence, and placed them in harems.

Author's other grandfather, Father Mitrofan Kiranov, suffered greatly from a local Turkish official in 1819 for exposing a widower who was married four times and a widow who was married five times. The Turk ordered his servants to beat the priest with gnarled sticks until, as the Turk said, the rules of the Church would allow him to

marry them. Father Mitrofan did not live long after these beatings, which destroyed his health, and he soon passed into Eternity.

Author's father-in-law, priest Stefan Gruev, was a priest in the village of Chemlekoy, in Akkerman County. Knowing the fate of priests, Gruev for a long time did not agree to be ordained and hid from the bishop's messengers who were looking for him in order to take him to the city by force and present him to the bishop for the stated purpose. The calamities and oppression he suffered at the hands of the Turks are too numerous and diverse to describe them.

The Turks wanted to persuade one of my closest relatives on my mother's side, priest Vasily Chetin, to accept the Mohammedan faith. When priest Chetin refused the Turks' proposal, they shot at him as Father Chetin was telling his parishioners about the life of St. George in Turkish. The bullet missed, however he spent his whole life suffering from the Turks.

Author's father, priest Mikhail Kiranov also suffered from the Turks in numerous ways. He spent most of his life in Turkey on horseback in forests, valleys, and gorges, and came home only at night and for a short time, only to retreat again to secret places not to be caught by the Turks.

The disasters that described by the author and that happened to his ancestors, relatives, and parents, who lived in the villages of Imoklary and Dranov in Turkey, are nothing more than a drop in the ocean compared with all the misfortunes and sufferings of the Orthodox Christians in Turkey.

The calamities and sufferings that befell Bulgarians in Turkey in other villages at that time were no less cruel and inhumane. That is what prompted many Bulgarians to move from Turkey to Russia in 1830.

"On the Edge of Power"

A. Oganesyan

The film "Patriarch Tikhon: In Power on the Edge", directed by Igor Prokopenko, was presented at the 18th "Won Together" film festival on November 4, 2023.

The film about Patriarch Tikhon is just as relevant today as calls for civil reconciliation, to push aside enmity, and to finally suppress the war between the "reds" and the "whites" in society. There is a more or less widely accepted opinion that the most shocking facts and episodes should be buried, that the wounds caused by a tragic confrontation that has ruined lives and futures would be healed if forgotten.

Prokopenko relied on carefully studied archival documents to gradually reveal the dramatic life of holy hierarch Tikhon, drawing us into those alluring, even tempting days. The filmmakers managed to plunge the viewer into practically physical awareness of the approaching darkness that would swallow all and everyone and occupy human souls. Patriarch Tikhon rebelled against their attempt to kill the souls of believers and deprive them of their religion and trust in the Church. He faithfully followed the commandment: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matthew 10:28).

The director has made an important contribution to further understanding this complicated and highly contradictory period of our history that still stirs up irreconcilable assessments.

This film did not reduce the very complicated past to a monochrome picture. At the same time, its producers did not succumb to the latest relativist model of history.

Prokopenko, of course, is not indifferent to his hero and the drama of his life but objectively studies various accounts that clarify the personality and the feat of Patriarch Tikhon.

<u>The Colonial Question in Soviet-Portuguese Relations: 1960s to Early</u> <u>1970s</u>

D. Yermolovich

After World War II, relations between the Soviet Union and Portugal were rather tense, mainly due to the anti-communist nature of the António de Oliveira Salazar regime in Portugal and its position during the war.

By the 1960s, the Soviet Union had come to believe that it could gain an advantage in the Cold War by winning over to its side the countries of the Third World.

By 1960, the colonial issue had become quite acute for Portugal. After Portugal became a UN member in 1955, the secretary-general of the organization sent a request for information to the Portuguese government regarding the situation of the population in the colonies and other dependent territories. The Portuguese government replied that it had no colonies, recalling that according to the 1950 Constitution, the African colonies were considered overseas territories of Portugal and thus an integral part of the nation. Portugal, together with its colonies, was a single multinational, multiracial, and multicultural state.

Africa became a priority of Soviet diplomacy under Khrushchev, who began to consider the Third World countries as allies in the struggle against capitalism.

On December 14, 1960, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, calling for an end to colonialism.

Taking advantage of the favorable international situation and counting on the support of international public opinion, on the night of December 18, 1961, India occupied the Portuguese territories in Hindustan, Goa, Daman, and Diu. Prior to this, the Indian government had repeatedly offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the issue, but Salazar rejected all such proposals.

Portugal filed a complaint with the UN so that the organization would condemn the actions of the Indian government. However, the resolution was blocked by the Soviet Union, while the Western countries supported it. Moreover, Portugal's

Events subsequently took off. In February 1961, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) began armed struggle in Angola, and in July 1962, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde took up arms in Guinea-Bissau. On September 25, 1964, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) declared a general armed uprising in the country.

The Soviet Union sided with the Portuguese colonies with the start of the national liberation movements there, providing them with all kinds of support, including in the UN. All contacts with Portugal were suspended.

A number of Portuguese politicians and military officers attempted to blame the defeat in the colonial war on Soviet aid to the national movements. Essentially, such arguments were either an attempt to justify the failure in the eyes of the Portuguese public or part of foreign policy propaganda aimed at hyping up the Soviet threat in Africa.

The US took a different stance on the Portuguese territories in Africa, despite its declared anticolonial policy. In the case of Portugal, the Americans were guided by the principles of political realism and the interests of American capital invested in Portuguese colonial possessions.

The Soviet Union's policy toward African countries was an important part of the global strategy in the struggle between the two superpowers. World public opinion favored rapid decolonization, and the Soviet Union managed to lead this movement. The Soviet Union primarily provided political and moral support to the national liberation movements in Africa. It did not intervene directly in the conflict during this time.

Henri Dunant: Tutti Fratelli (All Brothers)

Y. Basenko

Swiss businessman Jean-Henri Dunant was the ideologist and founder of national Red Cross societies and the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC).

Dunant was born on May 8, 1828, into the family of a successful merchant. At the age of 26, Dunant left his hometown and took a job at a branch of a Geneva bank in Algeria. There, in 1858, he founded the Financial and Industrial Company of Mons- Djémila Mills but had to travel to France to sort out land and water rights. The trip proved unsuccessful, and as a result, in 1859, Dunant decided to appeal directly to French Emperor Napoleon III, who at that time was with his army in Lombardy.

In Italy, he found himself by chance on the field of a battle that had taken place on June 24, 1859, at Solferino, during which Austria had been defeated and retreated from disputed territory. Henri was shattered by the awful picture of the battlefield.

Dunant's business trip to Northern Italy failed, but he proposed establishing a special committee to train volunteers to tend to the wounded; later, he proposed an international agreement to regulate activities of "societies for the relief of the wounded."

In February 1861, five influential citizens of Geneva organized voluntary societies for helping the wounded that later transformed into the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Dunant was appointed secretary. Thanks to his efforts, an international conference was convened in Geneva in October 1863 that formulated the basic principles of the work of the Red Cross.

On August 22, 1864 the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, which embodied the ideas of Henri Dunant and the results of his activities was ratified.

The Geneva Conventions and the Red Cross, two brainchildren of Henri Dunant, were tested by the Austro-Prussian war of 1866. In 1867, Henri Dunant, who had abandoned his business to focus on social work, declared bankruptcy. He was forced to relinquish his post of secretary of the Red Cross and leave Switzerland.

He moved to France and remained there until 1874, and despite his financial problems, did not abandon his varied humanitarian activities. During the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 and the Paris Commune of 1871, he sought to play the role of an intermediary between the warring sides.

Bankruptcy plunged the founder of the Red Cross into many years of poverty and homelessness. Until 1886, he was a tramp who wandered Germany and Italy, lived on alms, and sometimes stayed in houses of friends. In 1895, a Swiss journalist, having seen Henri by chance, informed the world that the founder of the internationally known Red Cross organization was alive and eking out a bare existence. His fame was restored: By his 68th birthday, he received letters from all corners of the world – in particular, from Pope Leo XIII. He also started receiving financial aid, including from Russia.

In 1901, he became the first laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize, which he shared with Frédéric Passy, a French state and political figure and outstanding pacifist. Being unwell, Henri could not attend the ceremony.

Henri Dunant died on October 30, 1910, and was buried in Zurich. His burial is marked by a burial stone with a bas-relief showing a kneeling man giving water to a wounded soldier. May 8, his birthday, is World Red Cross Day and Red Crescent Day. The highest award of the IRCC is the Henri Dunant Medal.

Today, humanitarian Red Cross organizations do much more than "ameliorate the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field." In various corners of our planet, men and women remain true to Dunant's ideas and continue his humanitarian mission to extent unbiased and indiscriminate assistance to those who suffer, irrespective of their race, gender or class, language, religion, ideology, political convictions, or social status.