

Russia and Vietnam: 75 Years of Friendship, Trust, and Mutual Assistance

S.Lavrov

Keywords: Russia and Vietnam, Russian-Vietnamese relations, 75 years of diplomatic relations

RUSSIAN-VIETNAMESE relations have a long history and their own traditions: On January 30, 2025, our two states marked the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. This anniversary provides a good occasion to look back, to recap results, and outline plans for the future.

Relations between Russia and Vietnam have stood the test of time: They were tempered during the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese against French colonizers and American aggressors. We know and appreciate that our friends in Vietnam remember the assistance provided by the Soviet Union during the war and afterward, when the country had to be rebuilt.

A vivid testament to our careful preservation of shared history was the unveiling in 2023 of a monument in St. Petersburg to the first president of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh – a great friend of our country. The event was timed to coincide with the 100th anniversary of his visit to the city.

Building on this solid historical foundation, relations between our countries are successfully developing in the present day. In 2002, our leaders agreed to elevate them to the level of a strategic partnership, and in 2012 – to a comprehensive strategic partnership. Such an advanced status reflects the existence of close ties in all areas and an established atmosphere of mutual trust.

Moscow and Hanoi are firmly committed to creating an architecture of equal and indivisible security in the Asia-Pacific that corresponds to modern realities and is based on generally recognized norms of international law. Thus, we are alarmed by the attempts of some countries to establish a network of restricted blocs in the region.

Alongside mutually beneficial cooperation in science and technology, we are committed to continuing collaboration in the field of education. The practice of offering Vietnamese citizens federally funded instruction at Russian universities under a special quota from the Russian government has proven effective.

Today, our countries face new and increasingly ambitious tasks. These are posed by life itself and by the very logic of the evolution of international relations, which points to broad and bright prospects for equal and mutually beneficial partnerships between states – including Russia and Vietnam – for the sake of cocreation and joint development. We look to the future with confidence and optimism. Together with our Vietnamese friends, we will continue to work to realize the potential of our comprehensive strategic partnership for the benefit of our peoples and to strengthen a multipolar world and universal prosperity.

75th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between Russia and Vietnam: Continuing a Glorious and Heroic History

Bui Thanh Son

Keywords: diplomatic relations, friendship, strategic partnership, cooperation within the EAEU

ON JANUARY 30, 1950, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics became one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Over the course of three quarters of a century, despite all the twists and turns of history, the traditional friendship and multifaceted cooperation between our countries have served as a vivid example of strong interstate ties founded on the principles of trust, respect, and mutual understanding. No changes in international or domestic political circumstances are strong enough to affect the fraternal bonds of our two peoples, who stood shoulder to shoulder through the crucible of war for Vietnam's independence and reunification.

Amid the harsh conditions of the struggle for independence, this marked the beginning of close cooperation that continues to this day. In July 1955, after the final liberation of Northern Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh made his first official visit to the Soviet Union. The outcomes of this visit helped strengthen the sense of brotherhood and laid the foundation for multifaceted cooperation during the years of war for national reunification and the period of socialist construction in the north of Vietnam.

Friendship with the Soviet Union played a key role in the Vietnamese people's victory in the national liberation struggle and the reunification of the country. We could always count on its selfless assistance and the invaluable and effective support of the Communist Party, state, and people of the USSR, who were guided by the motto: "For all Soviet communists, solidarity with Vietnam was and remains a call of the heart and mind."

After the historic victory in the national liberation war in 1975, Vietnam embarked on peaceful construction and the development of socialism on a national scale. In this new stage of bilateral relations, the Soviet Union continued to provide

extensive assistance. Many of the facilities built with its support, which became symbols of friendship, are still in operation today.

In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new domestic and foreign challenges, relations between Russia and Vietnam entered a difficult period. Thanks to the efforts and resolute determination of both sides, all difficulties were gradually overcome, contacts were restored, and cooperation gained positive momentum. Political trust, mutual respect, the convergence of positions on many international and regional issues, and an alignment of interests helped strengthen [the countries'] traditional friendship and multifaceted interaction. Bilateral relations entered a qualitatively new stage.

A major milestone in the new phase of Russia-Vietnam relations was the first visit of President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to Vietnam in March 2001. Following this visit, a Joint Statement on Strategic Partnership was signed, defining the framework of cooperation between Russia and Vietnam in the 21st century.

Thanks to the tireless efforts of many generations of peoples and leaders over the past 75 years, and their deep trust and mutual understanding, relations between Vietnam and Russia continue to play an important role in the foreign policy of both countries. Following the Vietnamese proverb "When you drink water, remember its source; when you eat fruit, remember the person who planted the tree," Vietnam and Russia cherish the memory of the past, striving toward a bright future and the advancement of a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Reviewing the path jointly taken over these decades, we can confidently state that there is no force capable of hindering our traditionally friendly relations. As they continue to develop steadily, they are deepening and gaining new substance in the interests of both sides and with respect for the principles of peace, stability, cooperation, and prosperity.

Lessons of the Great Victory as Imperatives for Shaping a Just World Order

F. Trunov

Keywords: Great Patriotic War, Special Military Operation, deradicalization, just world order

IN THE current environment, the Russian Federation is striving to build a truly just world order. What are the main characteristics implied by this epithet? One of them is the provision of a sufficiently high level of security at the global and lower levels. This feature presupposes a high threshold for the use of force by states and nonstate actors (NSAs), and the ability to successfully and comprehensively resolve and prevent armed conflicts. Achieving these conditions is a priori impossible without the defeat of ultra-radical forces and the discrediting of their ideology. Among such actors are, first and foremost, international terrorist groups and Nazi/neo-Nazi regimes. Accordingly, deradicalization is a necessary condition for building a just world order.

Another characteristic is the proper representation of the interests and concerns of a wide range of countries around the world, especially those located outside the community of “Western democracies.” In other words, the emerging world order should not be Western-centric, but oriented toward the North, East, and South as well.

These two characteristics of a just world order are closely interconnected. The task of defeating and ideologically discrediting ultra-radical forces is extremely complex. In practice, only a very limited number of states can do this effectively and, most importantly, with lasting results. The Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, occupy a leading position on this list.

Russia’s role in fighting Nazism/neo-Nazism is exceptional in practical terms, as demonstrated particularly clearly by the SMO. On the eve of World War II and during its earliest stages, the Western democracies remained under the illusion that they could direct Nazi Germany’s aggressive ambitions away from themselves (toward the USSR) or at least delay the threat significantly. These dangerous delusions manifested themselves in the appeasement policy (1936-1939) and its

continuation – the “Phoney War” (from September 3, 1939 to May 9, 1940). In essence, both strategies amounted to tolerating and even indirectly helping to strengthen Nazi Germany.

During the Cold War, the victorious Western powers allowed the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to emerge within their occupation zones (in 1949) and later agreed to the rearmament of West Germany (de jure from 1955), utilizing its potential for the containment of the USSR.

The emergence and spread of these sentiments are by-products of the destruction of the truly just Yalta-Potsdam world order. Even during the Cold War, the US, the UK, and other NATO member states sought to downplay the Soviet Union’s role in defeating Nazism, thereby indirectly diminishing the perception of its dangers.

This have created a favorable environment for the revival of Nazism/neo-Nazism. This ultra-radical ideology has become widespread in one of the former Soviet republics (Ukraine), as well as some others. Such developments are especially significant as part of broader efforts to erase the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of the Third Reich – an achievement that was a crucial prerequisite for building a just world order.

By providing support – primarily large-scale military assistance – to Ukraine, the liberal democracies have in many ways repeated the fundamental mistake they made with the Third Reich prior to the spring of 1940. The Western democracies regarded Nazi Germany and now Ukraine, with its widespread neo-Nazi sentiments, primarily as a powerful tool for the containment of the USSR and the Russian Federation.

There is, however, a powerful obstacle to Ukraine’s transformation into a strategic monster – Russia’s SMO. Through the SMO, Russia is making a significant contribution to the security and defense of many countries around the world, including the peoples of Europe and the US. Conducting armed struggle against Nazism/neo-Nazism is extremely difficult, but Russia is consistently pursuing this path.

Historical Memory in the Context of the Emerging New System of International Relations

I.Selezneva

Keywords: historical memory, 80th anniversary of the Great Victory, international relations

THIS year, the world marks 80 years since the Great Victory over the embodiment of human evil – German Nazism. World War II claimed 60 million lives – an unimaginable cost. We owe an unpayable debt to the victors, our veterans, whose numbers are dwindling. We must preserve the values and moral and ethical principles embedded in the very meaning of Victory.

Today, the world is once again going through a difficult period. The dismal outcomes of the neoliberal phase are plain to see: The Yalta system has been dismantled, and international law effectively destroyed.

However, the transformational processes now underway in the world are inexorable. They cannot be stopped. Processes aimed at reforming the international system have already been set in motion. It is clear that the new system will be founded on equitable dialogue between states, indivisible and shared security, and, hopefully, a unified vision and approach to preserving historical memory.

The fact is that historical memory and shared cultural-historical heritage form an autonomous micro-region, representing a self-contained world with predominantly internal social connections. Within the context of this micro-region, each historical monument becomes just as important as territorial affiliation. Therefore, the destruction of monuments to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War constitutes an act of aggression. The Special Military Operation was a natural response to the West's intrusion into a historical and cultural space that, notably, has never belonged to the West.

Here we find a vivid and encouraging example – the Union State of Russia and Belarus. It is developing and moving forward, albeit with difficulty. There are serious challenges and problems, but the Union is evolving, and problems exist to

be solved. This requires proper and equal dialogue between partners – Minsk and Moscow remain such partners.

But there are also parts of Europe that have already been plundered. Incidentally, there once was an entire country there that played a significant role in the Victory over Hitlerism – Yugoslavia. A flourishing and developing country, it became the first victim of liberal experiments. It is time for us to clearly and unequivocally declare that the European Union is an organization created by neocolonizers and for neocolonizers. Its activities are aimed at destroying states, eroding and eliminating national identity, and have nothing to do with EU integration.

Today, for example, it is already obvious that neither Serbia nor Bosnia and Herzegovina will ever become EU members. The EU simply will not get around to them and prefers to keep them at a distance. The future of the “Yugosphere” lies in projects like the EAEU – in regionalization managed at the international level, which allows for the preservation of national identity and maximizes the integration factor for national development. At the same time, cooperation between Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Russian Federation has always been more meaningful and beneficial than their contacts with the EU.

Now that history is under constant threat. It is being targeted for erasure, retouching, sweeping under the rug. Yugoslavia, for which several generations of Serbs, Bosnians, Macedonians, Slovenes shed blood, has fallen apart. Then came NATO’s aggression against the Bosnian Serbs, followed by the bombing of Belgrade in 1999. And today, Serbia once again stands at a crossroads – whether to dissolve into the broth of Brussels’ neoliberal ideas or to preserve its unifying and life-giving appeal for all postliberal Balkan states.

Serbia still has a powerful and incomparable ally – historical memory. It is a potent unifying force that enables one to move forward and envision the future. It is no coincidence that our enemies – and they are common enemies – want to eradicate this memory from Russians, Belarusians, Serbs, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Macedonians, Bosniaks, from all of us.

The Battle Continues! Western Historical Revisionism and Preparations for a New War

D.Demurin

Keywords: 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, historical revisionism, discrediting the role of the USSR, struggle for historical truth

ON THE eve of the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the end of World War II in Europe, it is with sadness that we must acknowledge that the “war of memory” initiated several decades ago by European and American revanchists has achieved the objective clearly pursued by our enemies. Drawing on a deeply distorted historical perception and the ignorance of a significant portion of the European population, modern Western elites have done what would have been unthinkable just 10 or 20 years ago: By branding the victim as the aggressor in public consciousness, they have created the political conditions necessary to once again send their troops eastward.

For the first time since World War II, Germany has abandoned its decades-long self-imposed restriction on the permanent deployment of national military contingents abroad. This move is being openly presented as the implementation of plans to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank in order to counter Russia.

In this context, the tactical withdrawal of American troops from Europe should not mislead us. The Americans currently need these forces more in other regions. Moreover, there is a clear intent to more forcefully prod the Europeans toward independent action against Russia.

What should we do? First and foremost, we must follow the popular wisdom: “If you want peace – prepare for war!” And here, cynical as it may sound, the Special Military Operation is making us stronger, more experienced, more prepared; it prevents the advance of NATO military infrastructure to our borders and eliminates security threats emanating from the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR. Some historians and political scientists reasonably compare the SMO to the Soviet-Finnish war, including in terms of its impact on the modernization of the armed forces and the principles of warfare.

Second, we must, of course, continue the fight for historical truth. By this I mean, first of all, systematic efforts to declassify documents from Soviet archives – including those of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – on the role of Western countries in starting World War II, their actions aimed at weakening the USSR, and our active resistance to Western plans to dismantle international law and the system of international institutions established following World War II (the Yalta-Potsdam system of international security) and to “forget” the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

And third – and perhaps most importantly – we need to continue strengthening our sovereignty, developing healthy domestic foundations in the national economy, public life, culture, and politics. Russia, the Russian civilization, has always been strong – and it held attraction for our friends and allies because it offered its own unique view of global development, an alternative to Anglo-Saxon and Romano-Germanic perspectives, a universalist project.

The Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company as a Tool for Responding to Hybrid Threats in Gray Zones

D.Yevstafyev, N.Mezhevich

Keywords: gray zones, hybrid threats, international law

THE current stage of development in the Russian Federation and Europe shares a common characteristic: Everyone understands that the previous world order in both economics and politics is gone, and any talk of inviolability of borders – already meaningless after the destruction of Yugoslavia – has today become exclusively an academic discourse. At the same time, all sides acknowledge that a state of war constitutes absolute stress for all aspects of the national and state system, especially the armed forces, while hoping that the stress on their neighbors will be greater than on themselves.

Changes in international law and assessments of their pace are separate issues not considered here. For the purposes of this article, we proceed from the assumption that Russia's opponents are deliberately and with some success seeking out "gray zones" both in international law and directly along Russia's borders. It should be noted that such attempts are not historically novel, and this is not the first time Russian has sought adequate response mechanisms – one of which was the establishment in 1856 of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company (ROPiT).

Until 2022, the concept of gray zones was for Russia more of an academic construct in international relations theory than an element of political and military forecasting and planning. [Russia's] Special Military Operation [in Ukraine] radically changed the situation and compels a more attentive approach to developments in this area. In 2015, Michael J. Mazarr, analyzing gray zone conflicts as part of a project initiated by the Strategic Studies Institute, made a reasonably successful attempt to articulate the rationale for constructing gray zones as a tactical tool of grand strategy.

The scale and success of ROPiT's operations, combined with current external challenges, urgently require an assessment of available capabilities and the

adaptation of historical experience, unquestionably taking into account new technological realities and the already established experience of new-generation asymmetric wars.

The ROPiT played a major role in organizing foreign trade and passenger transportation, in supporting the activities of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society and other organizations. It quickly became apparent that the ROPiT also contributed to industrial development and, consequently, to the economic growth of the surrounding provinces.

A new ROPiT is significantly more than a maritime PMC – it is not only a fleet, but also a model for national territorial development, a mechanism for integrating foreign policy and foreign economic objectives in a flexible format that entails, from the outset, variability in both international law and informal “rules.” As the Russian foreign minister has noted, the “charm” of Western “rules” lies precisely in their vagueness: As soon as someone acts contrary to the West’s will, it immediately declares a “violation of the rules” without presenting evidence and announces its “right to punish” the violator. In other words, the less specificity, the more room for arbitrariness – in the interest of deterring competitors by unscrupulous means.¹⁸ The use of such methods compels us to seek effective formats for responding to threats that are new in form but traditional in substance.

NATO: Strategic Forecasting and Planning of Future Military Operations

Yu.Belobrov

Keywords: NATO, strategic foresight, strategic planning, horizon scanning, emerging and disruptive technologies

STRATEGIC forecasting and planning of future NATO military operations, carried out primarily by its military bodies with the involvement of governmental institutions, academic circles, and think tanks from member states, is viewed by the alliance's leadership and the governments of its leading member countries as a key area of NATO activity. Based on predictive analyses and recommendations, member states are adopting increasingly ambitious programs and strategic initiatives aimed at accelerating the development of advanced weaponry that uses emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT); they are also adopting plans for future military operations.

In forecasting future developments in the global and regional landscape, alliance strategists apply several methods, the principal of which is strategic foresight. This method is based on the desire to look beyond today's expectations by considering likely future development trends in order to determine their implications for current policy. An integral part of the foresight process involves "Horizon Scanning" (HS) methods, which entail anticipating challenges and planning military operations based on innovative developments.

Recommendations concerning the development and implementation of EDT in the military domain are developed using the HS methodology by the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO), which reports to the Military Committee and the Conference of National Armaments Directors. By forecasting technological challenges to the alliance, promoting innovation, and facilitating its integration into NATO's military capabilities, the STO plays a crucial role in maintaining NATO's scientific and technological edge in support of its core missions.

The most important document periodically issued by the STO is the Science & Technology Trends report, which covers a 20-year period. In the reports published

for the period up to 2043 – released in 2020 and 2023 respectively – a critical rise in geopolitical challenges to the alliance in recent years is noted, driven by the rapid and profound transformation of the global landscape. The reports predict intensified competition between NATO and Russia and China over the next two decades, resulting from the accelerated pace at which these rivals are integrating advanced military technologies.

NATO is already practically implementing these militaristic programs and plans to accelerate the buildup of its military potential on its eastern flank, having sharply intensified military activity near the Russian and Belarusian borders. The current level of Western aggressiveness toward Russia and its ally Belarus is unprecedented, surpassing even the most crisis-ridden periods of the Cold War.

The ambitious decisions made by the NATO Council in recent years, and their practical implementation, are – as openly acknowledged by alliance leadership – aimed at permanent hostility toward Russia and China. This strategy ensures the continued support of all member countries for the military alliance, the continuation of a policy of hard deterrence of Russia, and even the pursuit of its strategic defeat, as well as the intensification of military-political and economic pressure on China. To justify such reckless and dangerous actions to their own societies – including to the member states themselves – Russia has been declared “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security,” and China as a growing threat to their security.

Thus, a major challenge has been issued to Russia and China, one that demands carefully considered reciprocal actions by our countries to ensure the preservation of the military-technological and military-political balance on the international stage, and thereby to prevent the West from unleashing a global conflict.

US-Iran: Reset Impossible?

A.Frolov

Keywords: US, Iran, Iranian nuclear program, JCPOA, Iranian missile program, NATO allies, Russia, anti-Iran coalition, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel

EVEN during his election campaign, Donald Trump identified Iran as the third highest-priority country that America would confront. For nearly half a century, the US and Iran have been locked in a state of ongoing confrontation, and Washington has yet to figure out how to punish or, ideally, overthrow the regime in that country, since all measures taken – economic sanctions, political pressure, military coercion – have failed to produce the desired results. The US would like to strike Iran, but at the same time fears such a risk, which could lead to unpredictable events and consequences in the Middle East.

Today Iran presents itself as Israel's principal adversary – more so even than the Arab states – and in this it garners the sympathies of the Arab street. Its anti-American stance and willingness to confront the world's leading power resonate – sometimes quietly, sometimes openly – throughout the Muslim world. As a bastion of independence and sovereignty, Iran also positions itself as the center of the Shiite world. Any rapprochement with the US could call all of this into question. Whether the current Iranian authorities are prepared to take such steps is yet another question.

The Trump administration has made it clear that it will not allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons, which it considers a “red line,” and it has pledged to support Israel should the latter launch a strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. In response, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian declared that if such a strike occurs, Iran will build a hundred times more nuclear facilities.

For now, it appears that the American president is attempting to tackle critical issues head-on – evidently without fully grasping their complexity and multifaceted nature.

The Trump Administration's Tariff Policy: A View From Beijing

P.Sadykhov

Keywords: tariff policy, trade balance, value added, export-oriented economy, localization of export production, trade war

A PRIMARY goal of the new economic policy that US President Donald Trump officially outlined in his address to Congress on March 4, 2025, is to minimize the chronic US trade deficit, which significantly distorts the entire structure of the American economy and contributes to the country's growing national debt.

Although the objective of reducing the trade deficit is quite clear both to experts and to average citizens – who generally understand that trade wars are an outdated relic of the past – the move by the new American administration to double tariffs on imports from China has nonetheless shocked business communities around the world and dominated the headlines of leading global media outlets. Therefore, before moving on to an analysis of the emerging situation, we should address the theoretical side of the issue and reflect a bit on the topic of exports.

Undoubtedly, exports and the foreign currency revenue they generate are essential primarily for countries that lack hydrocarbons and other raw materials necessary for the functioning of the national economy and for meeting the basic needs of the population. It is through foreign currency earnings from exports that such countries acquire these raw materials on the global market and service their foreign debt. However, once this primary function is fulfilled, the exported goods, having left the home economic zone, fall out of the nation's economic reproduction process, while the incoming foreign currency revenue triggers the national printing press to issue local currency and buy up this very revenue from the exporters.

As for imports, especially industrial imports, they are more crucial for ensuring the seamless functioning of the nation's reproduction process, and disruptions in import supply chains are what pose the greatest threat to the economy. In other words, with imports the process is almost the reverse: A virtual asset in the form of currency leaves the country, while a real production or consumer asset enters

the country, supporting the livelihood of the population and the reproduction of real output. Although China has a solid trade surplus, it nonetheless has to buy up the excess export revenue entering the country with yuan, investing it either in production assets in Africa or in US Treasury bonds.

The logic behind the position of the Chinese authorities in the tariff standoff with the US is perfectly clear and has remained unchanged since the late 1970s, when China embarked on radical reforms at a time when Western economies were at their peak and the qualitative gap with socialist countries was particularly pronounced. In short, China at that time sought to integrate into the global market system not as its antithesis, but as an economy ready for innovative management practices aimed at meeting the growing material and spiritual needs of its population.

The situation is quite different now, as labor costs in China – especially export-oriented areas in the south and southeast – have risen significantly. It is no secret that China sometimes has to manipulate the yuan's exchange rate to maintain its traditional export markets, while the US is struggling with a growing current account deficit that exacerbates the national debt problem.

It must be acknowledged that not only does China not need the American consumer goods market, but the US will not suffer greatly either from reduced Chinese imports, as the American economy is driven by domestic demand. Therefore, China's retaliatory protectionist measures against American imports do not pose a serious threat to Washington. However, given the high labor costs in the US, American-style import substitution could impact inflation rates in the country – a risk that Washington fears most of all. Nevertheless, China is holding the line and has already taken reciprocal measures by raising import tariffs on American agricultural products.

The dispute between the two nations is largely conceptual and centers on the competition for global leadership. The real struggle lies ahead and will unfold over control of hydrocarbon supply routes to global markets, the development of the Arctic, landing on Mars, and other megaprojects. It seems that the bets are on the table, and China has accepted the challenge posed by the Trump administration.

The Primakov Doctrine: Origins and Start of Its Implementation

N. Makarov

Keywords: Yevgeny Primakov, multipolar world, multivector approach, pragmatism, nonconfrontational stance, unconditional priority of national interests

THE year 2024 marked the 95th anniversary of the birth of Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov. Much has been said in praise of the breadth of his personality and his invaluable contribution to strengthening modern Russian statehood.

In terms of foreign policy, we believe it is appropriate to speak of the Primakov Doctrine, which Yevgeny Maksimovich not only formulated but also successfully implemented in his capacity as minister of foreign affairs and later as prime minister of the Russian Federation.

The concept of foreign policy doctrines associated with the identities of their authors is not typical in Russian diplomacy – unlike, for example, in American diplomacy.

Even while serving as director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Primakov consistently maintained that Russia could not be considered the losing side in the recently concluded Cold War. Despite the extremely severe domestic and foreign policy consequences of the Soviet Union's collapse, Primakov firmly believed that Russia retained every opportunity to effectively defend its national interests in the new international environment. "Russia – with its enormous human potential, great history, outstanding contribution to world civilization, vast natural resources, and substantial achievements in fundamental science – cannot remain stuck at this stage. It was, is, and will remain a great power."

Unfortunately, in the early 1990s, then-foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev voluntarily chose to integrate [Russia] into the Western community in a subordinate role – at the expense of national interests and geopolitical positions in other areas of foreign policy.

In contrast to this logic, Primakov – during a presentation in November 1993 of the Foreign Intelligence Service's public report "Prospects for NATO Expansion

and Russia's Interests" – emphasized that "Russia is not indifferent to developments that affect its interests. Russia has every reason to correlate the course of these events with possible changes in the geopolitical and military situation. A renewed Russia is entitled to expect its opinion to be taken into account." The final word came from the Russian president's press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov, who stated that Boris Yeltsin "shares the intelligence service's view on the issue of NATO expansion."

Incidentally, in January 1996, now as foreign minister, Primakov immediately expressed his negative attitude toward NATO expansion, which he considered "counterproductive for lasting stabilization in Europe and potentially detrimental to the geopolitical situation for Russia."

Another distinctive feature of the Primakov Doctrine was its pragmatism and nonconfrontational nature – the aspiration to resolve disagreements based on compromise and a balance of interests.

The main obstacle to the full implementation of Primakov's foreign policy guidelines in the second half of the 1990s seemed to stem from domestic factors. These included domestic political instability, economic turmoil, and the resulting dependence on financial assistance from Western countries.

Russia's international standing began to strengthen significantly after Putin was elected president of the Russian Federation in 2000. Domestic political stability was achieved, steps were taken to reinforce sovereignty, and the country embarked on a path of dynamic economic growth. The issue of debt to Western creditors was resolved. All of this made it possible to significantly enhance Russia's foreign policy potential and create the necessary conditions for engaging in international dialogue on equal terms, particularly with Western countries.

The ultimate goal of all efforts by Russian diplomats, as Primakov bequeathed, remains the creation of favorable external conditions for the comprehensive domestic development of the homeland, its economic and technological advancement, and the improvement of citizens' living standards and quality of life.

Positive Effects of the Special Military Operation

V. Zayemsky

Keywords: SMO, Russia, US, Europe, Russophobia, proxy war

AS RECENT years have shown, the SMO has produced a number of positive effects for Russia.

The launch of the SMO resulted in a mass exodus of foreign businesses from Russia, but fortunately, our entrepreneurs were quick to fill the gaps. Equally positive is the strong drive to establish domestic production of many items that for decades had been imported from abroad.

As is well known, the SMO – launched to protect Russians and other residents of Donbass and to eliminate threats to our security – was necessitated by the fact that the collective West had ultimately committed itself to Russophobia, with all the ensuing consequences.

Official Russophobia in the West has reached unprecedented, grotesque proportions. There is no longer any hesitation in openly declaring the intent not only to inflict military defeat on our country, but also to destroy and dismember Russia

The SMO has effected an adjustment in Russian foreign policy. Based on this, our foreign policy priority has now become the development of friendly relations, first and foremost with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

It is important to mention that one of its valuable outcomes has been a societal delineation, as a result of which our society has split into decently patriotic individuals and those whose minds function solely as puppets of the West.

The SMO has become a necessary factor that not only symbolizes the protection of the Russian-speaking population but also brings great benefit to many different aspects of Russian life.

The West Does Not Realize That, in Historical Terms, It Is Losing Its Mind

Emmanuel Todd

Keywords: Russia, US, Europe, the West, events in Ukraine, historical amnesia

THIS war is to a certain extent artificial for Europe. It is largely the result of NATO's – i.e., the US's – actions in Ukraine, which forced Russia to launch a defensive military operation. Thus, if we imagine a Europe free from American presence, it is easy to picture peace. The real problem, in my view, is that the defeat of the West is not a victory for Russia. The real problem of the West, particularly the US, is its domestic crisis; we are witnessing America's decline, the collapse of the American economy, American power, and American culture, which is turning the US itself into a pole of instability.

The defeat of the West, which is essentially the defeat of the US and the European Union, opens up a revolutionary period. I believe that the Trump revolution is a product of America's defeat, since it was America that brought Ukraine to fight Russia.

A continuation or escalation of the war cannot be entirely ruled out, especially if Germany – de facto the dominant power of the EU – decides that a policy of industrial rearmament would be a solution to its economic problems. In that case, I think, since the power of German industry and all its satellites in Eastern Europe would become a problem for the Russian military industry, one could imagine an expansion and dramatization of the conflict.

To survive and withstand military competition from the West, Russia has had to rely on many other countries – the BRICS countries, primarily China, but also India and Brazil – in fact, on the entire part of the world that does not want to be ruled by the West.

I think Trump's main intention is to breathe new life into American industry, since globalization has destroyed a significant part of it. And this business with tariffs, protectionism, is very much in Trump's style. It is a response to the issue of

redeveloping American industry. I myself am a supporter of protectionism, so I understand Trump on these points.

The American leadership appears certain that it has lost the war in Ukraine. They know that their military industry cannot compete with Russia's military-industrial complex. They know that they need to exit the war. They are caught up in a domestic revolution with all kinds of dimensions – cultural, racial, political – which clearly interest them more than international politics.

The US cannot live without imports from the rest of the world. It is a country that lives off subsidies from the rest of the world.

Throughout history, the US has demonstrated that the agreements it signs are never final; when the president changes, they revise some commitments. Let me give an example: One administration signed the Iran nuclear deal, and then a new president – Trump – came to power and canceled it. Western countries – France and Germany – proved unreliable with respect to the Minsk Agreements. But France and Germany are not independent countries today. I mean that they are vassals of the US. Therefore, we need not imagine a world of chaos.

Russia Is Our Partner, Not Our Enemy

Gyula Thürmer

Keywords: World War II, struggle against fascism, Ukraine, Kiev, Crimea

EIGHTY years ago, World War II ended in Europe. There are hardly any people left from that generation. The world has also changed. Old wounds have healed. One would like to say that we have no reason to wage war over the past, but in reality, this is not the case. Even today there are those who, under the pretext of the past, inflict new wounds, condemning humanity to suffering and a new war.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union and other countries of the antifascist coalition defeated not only Germany. They defeated fascism, a monster born of 20th-century capitalism.

The USSR took up the fight against fascism from the very beginning, since fascism sought to destroy socialism. The Western powers hesitated at first and encouraged the fascist countries. After all, capital invented fascism as a means of overcoming the [Great Depression economic] crisis. But Hitlerite fascism took on a life of its own and became uncontrollable, which the capitalist democracies of America and Europe could no longer tolerate.

For the first time in world history, capitalist countries and a socialist state stood side by side to defeat a common enemy. But as soon as Hitler was defeated, everything was forgotten. Capital again set out to destroy socialism. The Cold War began.

What is the reality today? Russia is sacrificing thousands upon thousands of soldiers to eradicate fascism in Ukraine, fully aware that peace requires eliminating its root cause. Russia is doing this also because it lived through the hell of World War II and experienced the horrors of fascism firsthand. Russians do not want war, but they will not allow the colonization of Russia. They will not tolerate another genocide of the Russian and Belarusian peoples and will not permit the destruction of Russian civilization.

Official Hungary has not sided with the Ukrainian fascist regime. True, it has not spoken out against the banning and persecution of the Communist Party. It did not stand with the Russians when Kiev banned the Russian language. It did not support the right of the people of Crimea and Donbass to self-determination, although it was one of the first to recognize Kosovo's independence. But it has courageously defended the Hungarian minority in Ukraine.

The Hungarian government does not support the prowar advocates – the frenzied warmongers from the EU. It finds Trump's America more congenial, convinced that Trump will not allow a new world war and that improving relations with America will help solve domestic economic and political problems.

This is an understandable decision in the current global situation. But it is important that new Hungarian-American relations do not overshadow our pragmatic cooperation with Russia, let alone our strategic partnership with the PRC.

Global and Regional Forces in Contemporary Latin America

V. Davydov

Keywords: LAC, USA, PRC, RF, tariff war, reindustrialization, liberal globalism, Global South, CELAC, BRICS

WE LIVE in an era of high speeds. This is true in economics, politics, social dynamics, and certainly in international relations – and not just in quantitative but in qualitative dimensions. The Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC) is no exception. In fact, the region is feeling the intense interplay of interconnected global and regional trends, as well as a nascent – still tentative, yet objectively necessary – inclination toward détente along the Moscow-Washington axis. The question is whether it is capable of triggering shifts in geopolitical and geoeconomic practices along other vectors, including those that pass through Latin America.

The US tariff war carries not only the risks but the reality of destabilization in global trade and the entire global economic system. The trap is not only laid for US trading partners. It also holds serious risks for the initiator. It is clear that Donald Trump and his team are primarily concerned with the interests of their own country. The goal is to eliminate the foreign trade deficit, aiming to defuse the time bomb posed by the extremely high national debt.

At the same time, the objective is to restore incentives for locating production within the US by manipulating customs and financial regulations. In essence, this is a kind of import substitution, or more precisely, reindustrialization through import substitution. For this reason, Washington is pulling the economic blanket toward itself, ignoring the fact that this harms the economies of its partners – including those in Latin America. Thus, a long journey lies ahead to restore balance. This appears to be the pattern, including the presence of the PRC in the US market – without which the American economy would find it difficult to make advances in digitalization.

The LAC countries have entered a difficult and, one might say, fateful stage of development that will require the maximum mobilization of available resources and reserves. Along this path, cooperation with Russia will contribute to the discovery of additional opportunities.

American Studies in Russia: History, Current State, Prospects

N. Tsvetkova

Keywords: American technological expertise, academic institutions in the USSR, transformation of American studies in Russia, scientific and analytical centers of the Russian Federation

THE US continues to play a key role in global politics, and Russian-American relations, despite the growing polycentrism of the international system, remain a central axis of global stability. Understanding the logic of US foreign and domestic policy, the dynamics of bilateral relations, and Washington's long-term strategies requires deep and multi-layered analysis. At one time, Russian experts made a significant contribution to developing expertise that fostered the development of approaches to dialogue, competition, and the prevention of escalation. Their efforts contributed to creating mechanisms that made it possible to keep Russian-American relations within the bounds of strategic predictability, even during periods of acute tension.

Having developed over several generations, American studies in Russia has evolved from ideologically motivated research on the "main adversary" into a multifaceted academic field with a broad institutional base. Today, it is an interdisciplinary field that integrates research on politics, economics, culture, international relations, and law, oriented both toward theoretical development and practical applications in foreign policy and strategic planning.

Modern American studies in Russia is inevitably characterized by a high degree of integration with the state and public demand for understanding what is going on in the US. It includes real-time analysis, preparation of analytical materials, academic publications, and consulting for a wide audience – from government bodies to the academic community, businesses, and the media.

The field of Russian American studies has traveled a complex developmental path – from an ideologically driven Soviet school, through the transformational crisis of the 1990s, to the current diversity of research approaches and institutional forms. Despite objective difficulties linked to the crisis in Russian-American

relations, it retains its scholarly potential and relevance in the context of Russia's strategic interests.

The future of Russian American studies will depend on its ability to adapt to a changing international context, master new analytical methods, and effectively respond to the informational needs of the state, the business community, and society.

The development of artificial intelligence significantly enhances the tools of expert work. Traditional policy papers based on an expert's personal erudition are giving way to new formats in which document analysis using AI methods plays a central role. Under these conditions, the researcher's role shifts from simply accumulating facts to formulating relevant queries for AI, creating unique datasets, and verifying the results of information analysis about the US.

ISKRAN has begun creating a localized artificial intelligence model for processing data, generating scenarios, and performing tasks related to American studies by developing unique datasets (ai-iskran.ru). This specialized AI resource is an essential tool for in-depth research on US and Canadian politics, economics, and history. As early results have shown, artificial intelligence does not replace experts but expands their capabilities, enabling faster and deeper analysis of large amounts of information and the formation of well-grounded conclusions for both academic and practical applications.

Approaches to the Study of Digital Sovereignty in Contemporary Political Science

S. Shitkov

Keywords: state sovereignty, digital sovereignty, global digital transformation

AT THE current stage of technological development, sovereignty in the field of digital technologies is acquiring paramount importance. The growing attention to digital sovereignty is driven by the radical transformation of economic and technological systems, social relations, and political life brought about by the global digital changes conceptualized in Klaus Schwab's work *The Fourth Industrial Revolution*.

In a context where the digital space has become an arena of geopolitical conflict and the level of digitalization is a significant factor determining a country's position on the international stage and the range of foreign policy options available to it, the academic community has shown increased interest in the issue of digital sovereignty.

Research in the field of digital sovereignty is closely tied to the analysis of technological sovereignty, which refers to a state's ability to pursue an independent policy in the realm of high technologies. Furthermore, many scholars associate digital sovereignty with information security. A separate concern is the problem of digital interference as a violation of state sovereignty.

Digital technologies are developing rapidly. A current trend in recent years has been the formation of metaverses, the advancement of virtual and augmented reality technologies, and the widespread proliferation of cryptocurrencies. In 2022, rising tensions surrounding Taiwan's independence raised the issue of autonomous chip manufacturing within the country as a critical element of technological and digital sovereignty. After the start of Russia's Special Military Operation in Ukraine in 2022, Western Internet platforms refused to provide balanced and objective information about Russia and were blocked in [our] country, demonstrating the importance of having autonomous Internet platforms and content as components of

information sovereignty. Under these conditions, the concept of digital sovereignty as an inherently nonstatic, dynamic category appears highly relevant.

In recent years, intrusions into the information space of various countries by both state and non-state actors have become increasingly common. The motives for such interference – ranging from information gathering and influence over a country's information policy to disruption of information infrastructures – are often difficult to determine. In the literature, this phenomenon is referred to as the “digital security dilemma” and is widely discussed in the works of both Russian and foreign scholars.²² Overall, such a situation contributes to the destabilization of international security, heightening mutual distrust among states and pushing them toward unilateral actions in the information sphere. This, in turn, underscores the need for international cooperation in the field of information security based on the principles of respect for state sovereignty.

Genesis and Prospects of Germany's Arctic Policy

Ye. Kirilina

Keywords: Germany, Arctic, foreign policy, energy policy, genesis, research activity, doctrinal documents, priorities, prospects

THE Arctic, which for many years remained primarily within the sphere of interest of the eight Arctic states, is now experiencing a period of escalating geopolitical competition. This is driven by a range of factors, the most significant of which are the region's vast natural resource reserves, the uncertain legal status of Arctic maritime routes, and potential actions by Western states aimed at weakening Russia's position in the region. As the Arctic's strategic importance grows on a global scale, issues related to this region have long since extended beyond the exclusive domain of the Arctic states. Countries located far from the North Pole, including China and India, are actively engaging in the struggle for influence in the Arctic. In this context, the example of Germany is particularly noteworthy, as it has in recent years demonstrated a significant shift in its geopolitical strategy. The beginning of this shift was marked by Chancellor Olaf Scholz's address to the Bundestag, which introduced the concept of *Zeitenwende*. This fundamental change is reflected in a number of key policy documents, including the Foreign and Security Policy Concept for Integrated Peace Engagement, the National Water Strategy, the Future Strategy for Research and Innovation, the Strategy on China, the German National Security Strategy, and the Defense Policy Guidelines.

Naturally, this reorientation could not leave the Arctic region untouched. Within a relatively short time, Germany has developed and published three important documents concerning Arctic policy, indicating a serious and deliberate intensification of the Federal Republic's focus on the region. This activity culminated in the publication of a new document in 2024 devoted entirely to the Arctic. This underscores the need for a thorough analysis of Germany's motivations, the directions of its Arctic policy, and the potential prospects for its implementation.

Today, non-Arctic states, including Germany, are joining the race for influence in the Arctic. The genesis of Germany's Arctic policy can be traced back to the 19th

century. By undertaking large-scale research expeditions, the country sought to strengthen its geopolitical influence and assert its ambitions in the region. However, compared to past years, Germany's current Arctic policy has acquired more strategic significance. In 2024, a new doctrinal document – Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines – was published. An analysis of this document makes it possible to identify the main vectors of Germany's Arctic strategy, which include ensuring security in the Arctic, protecting the Arctic's unique ecosystem, conducting scientific research, expanding Germany's economic activity in the Arctic, and active participation in international organizations. It should be noted that nearly all areas of Germany's Arctic policy in one way or another go against Russia's interests.

The implementation of Germany's ambitious plans and prospects in the Arctic directly depends on dialogue with Russia. However, the current state of relations between Germany and Russia in the Arctic cannot be described as constructive cooperation. As long as Western countries – and Germany in particular – pursue a policy of confrontation toward Russia, projects aimed at addressing problems in the Arctic region will not be fully implemented.

The Crisis of Culturalism, or the Averintsev Case

A. Shchipkov

Keywords: S.S. Averintsev, the humanities, Christian culture, the Church, the false Church, culturalism.

THE Western world adopted the current European model of development under the influence of Enlightenment ideas. Today, Russia is changing this model, declaring the existence of a different civilizational tradition that is distinct from Protestant modernity. This entails a reassessment of values, rules, and norms of everyday life. The inflation of outdated values, rules, and norms will inevitably bring about the collapse of unfounded expectations, and generate existential frustration and a sense of ideological vacuum, which may ultimately result in the blurring of the image and erasure of the identity of the so-called “Western person.”

Russians are familiar with this condition: It emerged during our own identity crisis in the late 1980s. At that time, Russian society found itself trapped in the globalist “pan-human” universalism and experienced the effects of moral, cultural, and social disorientation. Today’s state of affairs in Russia is perceived by many as the beginning of an exit from this dead end, a time for “gathering stones.” But the processes of restoration are linked to a number of important conditions, including an analysis of the systemic mistakes of the past.

The most important figure among intellectual authorities was Sergey Averintsev – a scholar who, perhaps more than any other in the humanities, possessed the highest degree of sacredness, or, as we might say today, symbolic capital. His Poetics of Early Byzantine Literature caused a real stir, since autocratic Byzantium had traditionally been disparaged both in Europe and among Russian Westernizers since the time of Pyotr Chaadayev.

The most important themes of Sergey Averintsev’s scholarship are Byzantine symbolism, the literature of the West and the letters of the East (their differences), the “mutual illumination” of epochs, the “semantic hierarchy” of culture (that which stands “above discourse”). And of course, the synthesis of the pagan and the biblical, the Greek cosmos and the biblical olam.

Intellectuals and humanists can hardly be reproached for falling out of real history. Sergey Averintsev remains an outstanding scholar regardless; his discoveries in the history of culture remain significant.

But it is impossible to find correct solutions while remaining within an erroneous paradigm. It is necessary to make an exodus beyond its boundaries. Today it is time to look at cultural development with a different eye, to reassess what seemed indisputable in the 1980s and 1990s, to overcome stereotypes – all the more entrenched because they were nourished by the knowledge and intellectual power of such talented and exceptional scholars as Sergey Averintsev. And that will be the best tribute to his memory.

But the rethinking of ideas and the reassessment of values must be done in time. Setting off into the future with outdated conceptual baggage, we risk sliding into yet another round of our identity crisis.

BRICS Scientific Diplomacy in the Context of the Outcomes of Russia's 2024 Chairmanship and the Expansion of the Group

N. Strigunova, O. Karpovich

Keywords: outreach, BRICS, BRICS+, global challenges, global dialogue, diplomacy, artificial intelligence (AI), world order, multipolar world, scientific diplomacy, BRICS chairmanship

SCIENTIFIC diplomacy is playing an increasingly important role in the current geopolitical environment, which is marked by a sharp rise in political and economic risks and crises. The intensification of sanctions pressure on Russia and its allied states (with more than 28,500 sanctions imposed on Russian companies and individuals); the escalation of political and military conflicts in various regions around the world; the rise in tensions and crisis of trust in all areas of political life; and the increasing complexity of macroeconomic factors all contribute to the growing demand for constructive tools and mechanisms capable of generating positive impulses and acting as catalysts in shaping a multipolar world based on mutual respect for interests and equal development of all states.

One such effective tool is scientific diplomacy, whose potential continues to expand despite all the political and economic obstacles imposed by Western countries. Moreover, it remains a functional tool in global politics and demonstrates its relevance even when, due to deteriorating international conditions, other forms and mechanisms of diplomacy temporarily lose their effectiveness.

It is important to continue working with BRICS partners to further develop initiatives introduced during Russia's BRICS chairmanship in the fields of scientific diplomacy and personnel training, with the maximum involvement of the new member countries, as well as the inclusion of scientific organizations and universities from across Russia. At the same time, it is vital to transfer to the BRICS platform the best practices and initiatives in scientific diplomacy that have been developed with Russia's participation in other multilateral. To this end, it is advisable to hold joint scientific conferences and roundtables as an outreach effort with the aforementioned international organizations and forums.

CIS Antiterrorism Center: 25 Years United Against Terrorism

Ye. Sysoev

Keywords: 25 years of the ATC, CIS, OSCE, fight against terrorism

JUNE 2025 marks the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the CIS Antiterrorism Center (CIS ATC). The decision to create the Center was made during troubled times for countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In 1999, Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk were shaken by bloody terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of more than 300 civilians. That same year, in southern Kyrgyzstan, clashes occurred between government forces and militants of the international terrorist organization Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The same terrorist organization carried out a series of bombings in Uzbekistan.

As early as January 2000, during a meeting of the CIS heads of state, an exchange of views took place on organizing efforts to counter international terrorism, in light of the results of the OSCE Istanbul Summit held in November 1999. As a result, the security councils of the Commonwealth countries, together with the Council of Heads of Security and Intelligence Agencies (CHSIA), the Council of Ministers of Internal Affairs, and the Council of Defense Ministers, were instructed to develop a targeted program to combat international terrorism and extremism.

Six months later, on June 21, several documents were adopted at the next meeting of the CIS heads of state in Moscow, including the decision to create the Antiterrorism Center and the Program of the CIS Member States to Combat International Terrorism and Other Manifestations of Extremism for the Period Until 2003. In October 2002 the CIS Council of Heads of State decided to establish a CIS ATC branch for the Central Asian region, based in the city of Bishkek.

At its inception, the ATC was tasked with a key objective: to establish a solid organizational and legal foundation to ensure coordination and cooperation among competent authorities in combating terrorism and extremism. This objective was successfully achieved through focused efforts.

The rise in international tensions and the expansion of the geographical scope of terrorist threats have necessitated new forms of coordination and cooperation, [including] the involvement of international organizations and representatives of civil society in counterterrorism activities.

Looking back, one can note with satisfaction that over 25 years, the ATC has fulfilled its mandate, emerged as a vital integrative mechanism, and secured a respectable place among relevant regional and subregional organizations. Despite geopolitical turbulence, the CIS has not only preserved but strengthened its capacity for coordination and interaction among the competent authorities of its member states in combating terrorism and extremism.

The ATC's achievements are the result of meticulous work by its international team. The ATC continues to evolve to meet modern challenges. Fully aware that the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts depends on international cooperation and the pooling of efforts, the ATC intends to further expand its network of partners and to develop new forms of interaction. Only through joint efforts can this global threat be effectively countered.

Trajectories of Russia's Oil Industry: From the Gas Pump to Outer Space

Yu. Shafranik

Keywords: energy, energy prices, oil industry, petrochemicals, sanctions

IN our era of active and often dramatic changes in global economics and politics, one could extensively and productively analyze all possible developments in the global energy market resulting from the actions of various global players.

But whatever we might say, the final and most important question for Russia is the price of oil. I'll take it upon myself to make the following forecast: Of course, there will be price fluctuations, but the average price in 2025 will not fall below \$72 per barrel. Only major wars could produce more radical results.

Any US actions affect the global economy and politics, and actions inevitably provoke counteractions. The balance and capabilities of all players are known, and sharp tensions between Europe and the US on gas issues will certainly drive up gas prices on the European market. We may see some increase in gas export volumes, particularly LNG. But not in the tens of billions of cubic meters. That is not something we can rely on.

All wars begin because of politics, although there are economic precursors. A prime example is the 1917 revolution, which destroyed the state and the entire economy. Few people thought about the factories, steamships, the unemployed, the children.

The same happened during the collapse of the country between 1989 and 1991. I felt acutely that it wouldn't end well, which is why I went into politics at that time. And sure enough, during those years political decisions were made that plunged the country into chaos and economic collapse.

What is possible with the US is a set of mutually beneficial projects. Up until 2010, we had signed many agreements with the Americans – there were commissions between Russia and the US, including an energy commission – but by 2012, a different policy began to emerge. America made a tremendous leap; it nearly tripled its oil and gas production. It became the largest producer of energy resources.

In America, ideology, psychology, philosophy, and actions are built around extreme pragmatism.

Iran is a country where Russia and the US could cooperate. A US-Iran-Russia political-economic alliance involving neighboring countries looks attractive. A corridor could be created that would uplift the region. The guarantors would be the US, Iran, Russia, China. We would also achieve stability. That would be a beautiful outcome.

But if perfect integration among the key players – which is unlikely to be achieved – does not materialize, then after our experience with the Nord Streams, we must ask ourselves whether we can protect the pipelines running through that vast corridor. If we have doubts about our ability to protect a new pipeline, after failing to protect the Nord Streams, then it would be better not to take the risk and instead focus on implementing specific, localized projects.

The US will act in ways that are beneficial first and foremost to itself. If Japan, China, or India, for instance, are willing to pay more for American LNG than Europe, then the gas will go there, not to Europe. Europe will have to compete for gas on the international markets – possibly even EU countries competing among themselves. That's the only reason Europe might not receive American gas. I don't believe the US would deliberately halt or even limit LNG supplies to Europe.

Orders of the Red Star for India

Rana Chhina

Keywords: World War II, Indian Army, Transcaucasian Front, “aid convoy,” PAI Force

INDIA played a significant role in the defeat of the Axis powers during World War II. By the end of the conflict, the Indian Army had grown into one of the largest volunteer forces in the history of warfare. Indian divisions took part in combat both on the Western Front – fighting the Italians in North and East Africa, and the Germans in Africa, Italy, and France – and in battles against the Japanese in Burma, Malaya, and other parts of the world.

As for involvement in the battles waged by the Soviet Union, India played an important role in the delivery of aid convoys to the USSR. These were part of a military operation known as the “Persia and Iraq Force,” or PAI Force. As a contingency, Allied forces were deployed in Persia and Iraq. Fortunately, the Red Army was able to defeat the German forces at Stalingrad, which was a turning point in the conflict.

As part of the PAI Force, the Indian Army played a key role in delivering aid convoys to the USSR, which supplied the Red Army in the Caucasus. These deliveries included ammunition and other military supplies.

The aid convoys transported tens of thousands of tons of supplies to the Red Army between November 1942 and March 1944. Deliveries stopped only when the situation at the front had completely turned in favor of the USSR and its allies.

The World Financial Order: How Moscow-Washington Contacts Got Started
(Based on Materials from
the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation)

A. Baklanov

Keywords: new international economic order, Bretton Woods system, Russian-American relations, Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Hakimov Club Russian-Saudi Strategic Interaction and Analysis Group

THE sweeping actions taken by Donald Trump, global in their consequences, aimed at correcting US trade balances and enhancing the financial stability of the American economy, led to increased tensions in global markets and complicated the operations of financial institutions.

There is a more positive view toward in engaging in contacts and negotiations to develop a new, more predictable and stable global financial and economic system.

Once again, the fundamental framework of our relations with the US is being determined, including in the financial sector.

In this context, Russian representatives must assess many factors related to negotiation strategies and tactics with a partner as difficult yet important to us as the US.

This includes questions regarding the extent of the American side's readiness to compromise, to modify its pre-prepared demands during the negotiation process. Finally, of critical importance is the Americans' actual ability to honor the agreements reached.

A significant factor here is knowledge of precedents and established behavioral patterns of US representatives in the political and diplomatic arena. Our experience in this area has been accumulated mainly in matters related to arms reduction negotiations and regional conflict and crisis situations; we are much less familiar with the approaches of US representatives in finance, global economics, and trade. In these areas, their involvement has mostly been limited to rather ambiguous, drawn-out negotiations on issues arising during Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization and in discussions on aid to developing countries within specialized UN agencies.

The American strategy regarding the USSR was to draw Moscow into the negotiation process in a subordinate role. Polite treatment of the Soviet representatives was accompanied by a lack of interest in considering the proposals of our delegation, particularly those aimed at preserving the USSR's autonomy in making decisions on the establishment and maintenance of its independent financial system.

Also of major concern to Moscow was the virtual absence of any significant external allies or partners willing to support Soviet arguments and proposals.

The main lesson from the negotiations between Soviet representatives and the Americans appears to be that Washington regards finance as the foundation of the entire system of global international relations and is prepared to put up the stiffest resistance in the fight for its hegemony in this domain. Efforts to influence the US position in this area are unlikely to succeed, even if supported by skilled diplomacy and seemingly the most compelling arguments.

The success of our country in securing its interests in politics, economics, and finance depends on many factors, including the development of a policy that fully takes into account historical experience and an understanding of the established patterns of conduct of our negotiating partners. In light of this, it is important to continue research into the origins of US policy and that of other leading countries on key global development issues.

The Sarkozy-Gaddafi “Corruption Pact”: A Brushstroke in the Portrait of French Democracy

D. Mikhailov

Keywords: Sarkozy, Gaddafi, war with Libya, trial, corruption, Fifth Republic

ON JANUARY 6, 2025, a new trial began against former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who this time stands accused of illegally financing his 2007 presidential campaign, organizing a criminal conspiracy, concealing funds obtained through criminal means, as well as corruption and money laundering. A verdict may be issued in late September 2025. If convicted, the politician faces up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up to 375,000 euros.

Back in March 2018, based on a “critical mass” of information that had become public regarding behind-the-scenes dealings between Sarkozy’s entourage and the Gaddafi regime, French law enforcement launched a criminal investigation into the “hyperactive Sarko” on suspicion of “passive corruption.” In 2020, the evidence collected was sufficient to formally charge the former French president with creating a criminal conspiracy. On October 6, 2023, the politician – who had been showing excessive and not always legal interest in the progress of the investigation against him – was suspected of bribing a witness. At present, the charge brought against Nicolas Sarkozy explicitly includes, in addition to all of the above, “the creation of a corruption pact with Muammar Gaddafi.”

The events underlying the criminal case took place between September 2005 and March 2007. At that time, Nicolas Sarkozy held the post of minister of state, minister of the interior and land planning in the government of Jean-Pierre Raffarin. Key episodes under judicial review include a one-on-one meeting between Sarkozy and Gaddafi on October 6, 2005; subsequent secret negotiations between trusted associates of the French politician and senior representatives of the Libyan regime, during which, according to the prosecution, an agreement was reached for Muammar Gaddafi to finance Sarkozy’s 2007 French presidential campaign in the amount of 50 million euros; and, finally, the actual receipt of the aforementioned funds from abroad by the French politician, followed by their use for electoral purposes.

The aim of this article is to familiarize the Russian audience with the details of this political scandal, which illustrates not so much the moral qualities of Nicolas Sarkozy and his close associates (the guilt of the accused has not been proven at the time of writing), but rather the overall extent of the corrupt degradation of the political regime of the Fifth Republic – a system many still regard as a model of democratic governance.

Harbinger of the Cold War: Foreign Policy Aspects of the Russian Orthodox Church's Activities in the First Half of 1945

V. Eiriyán

Keywords: Russian Orthodox Church, Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, Great Patriotic War, late Stalinism, Cold War, religious policy

THE topic of church-state relations in the years 1943-1953 has attracted scholarly attention for decades, and the general issues surrounding the interaction between the Soviet state and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) can be considered well studied thanks to the research of numerous specialists. Nonetheless, it would be premature to claim that all gaps in the ROC's history during the Stalinist period have been filled. In particular, the significant issue of the ROC's foreign policy agenda, in our view, has been studied in a rather fragmented manner. We would venture to suggest that this is due in part to the fact that scholars tend to analyze the events and processes of the Stalin era primarily through an ecclesiastical lens, whereas understanding the role and significance of the Moscow Patriarchate of the ROC (MP ROC) in implementing the USSR's foreign policy is inconceivable without a comprehensive investigation within the context of international relations.

In this regard, the author aims to reexamine phenomena that have already been partially explored by Russian scholars from a different angle, and to trace trends that could help more clearly delineate the nature of church-state relations during the period in question, as well as to define the role of the ROC in fulfilling the goals set by the Soviet leadership on the international stage.

Russian authors acknowledge that a key objective of Stalin's leadership in "reviving" the ROC was the foreign policy priorities of the USSR, among which was the improvement of relations with the West to expedite the opening of the Second Front.

At the same time, Russian experts on church history make certain points that raise questions in the context of the wartime and international situation: For example, in discussions of the use of church institutions to implement geopolitical

plans, one can encounter claims that the outcome of the war had become clear as early as “spring 1943”.

In this connection, it is worth recalling that the situation was not clear even by late spring 1943, as evidenced by at least one political step taken by the Soviet leadership: the dissolution of the Comintern on May 15, 1943. In military terms, it is important to point out that major battles still lay ahead, including the Battle of Kursk, for which Soviet command was preparing intensively, and the crossing of the Dnepr River.

This article focuses on the foreign policy aspects of the ROC’s activities in the first half of 1945, a time when the Allies were nearing the end of the military campaign while simultaneously seeking to write the rules of the postwar international order. A key issue on the agenda was the shaping of the future global system, and under these circumstances, a premature rupture with London and Washington was not part of Stalin’s plans. As a result, one could hardly expect the MP ROC to adopt hardline rhetoric before the escalation of bipolar confrontation had begun.

“Serving the Soviet Union!”

D. Subbotin

Keywords: Great Patriotic War, veterans of a great country

ONE job of consular missions abroad is locating veterans of the Great Patriotic War, siege survivors, Afghan war veterans, and other categories of distinguished individuals and arranging the presentation of orders and medals to them.

These ceremonies are usually timed to coincide with commemorative dates and take place in a formal setting. But there are exceptions. The author shares one such occasion that left a lasting impression on him.

Being the Consul-Counselor at the Russian Consulate General in Odessa, whose consular district included four provinces: Kirovograd, Nikolayev, Odessa, and Kherson, his assignment was to present a certain veteran of the Great Patriotic War the medal “For the Capture of Königsberg”.

Upon arrival at the address he was greeted by the veteran’s daughter and her adult granddaughter. The woman lay in bed in a small but clean and cozy room, barely moving, and seemed to me somewhat indifferent to the people around her and to the situation itself. He awarded her with the medal.

The thing that happened next shocked him. She pulled off the blanket covering her and, on thin, trembling legs, stood up from the bed as steadily as her strength would allow. Straightening up, she transformed, for a moment, from a hunched and frail old woman into a true soldier, devoted to her Motherland. “Serving the Soviet Union!” she said in a quiet quavering voice, syllable by syllable.

It was clear that her strength was fading; she wouldn’t be able to stand much longer on her own. It was as if she had poured all of her remaining inner energy into those brief words that meant so much to her – words tied to that great country that no longer exists on modern maps, but to which she, like thousands of other veterans scattered across the former USSR and far beyond its borders, living out their difficult final years, remained faithful.

Remembering Our Heroes: On the Continuity of Historical Memory Across Generations of Russian Diplomats

N. Fomin

Keywords: activities of the Council of Veterans, memory of the Great Patriotic War, new names, passing the torch to the younger generation

THE year 2025 is the Year of the Defender of the Fatherland. Defender – singular, not plural. This phrasing forms a quantum of memory in our consciousness. It invokes simultaneously the memory of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, the soldiers and commanders of the Special Military Operation (SMO), and the deeply personal, familial memory cherished by every Russian citizen. Serving as a reminder are the names we read on memorial plaques and gravestones, and today – beneath the photographs of young Russian men fighting in the SMO. They appear in dress uniforms, bearing insignia of their service branches and state decorations.

All of this is in harmony with the program marking the 80th anniversary of Victory in the 1941-1945 war. For veterans of the diplomatic service engaged in the patriotic education of young diplomats, it is an opportunity to emphasize the continuity of values in the defense of state interests.

The pivotal situation currently unfolding in international relations has exposed fundamental problems – a kind of catharsis in how the thinking segment of Western society perceives its own responsibility for having toyed with tolerance, extending even to attitudes toward the Nazi past. This has culminated in acts of open glorification, such as those taking place at the official level in the Baltic states and in Ukraine.

In light of current developments, young diplomats must be well versed in the arsenal of tools and hybrid technologies employed by Russia's opponents in the arena of political discourse. After all, the attacks are directed at the constitutional foundations of the existence and development of our state and society.

The list of confirmed heroic acts by our senior comrades could contain dozens more names. All of them are worthy examples of courage and unwavering commitment to duty.

The militia fighters were not conscripted through mobilization orders. They went to war “like everyone else.” Only later were they distinguished in memoirs, with emphasis placed on their profession as peacemakers. At the time, they were driven by a clear understanding that their presence was essential.

Most veterans today are the children and grandchildren of those militia fighters. We all stand behind those who met the enemy head-on. In the brutal sequence of wartime events, it will never be known which action, step, or charge proved decisive for the common Victory. The Council of Veterans will continue its efforts to convey to younger generations the meaning of “sense of duty” and “personal responsibility.”

Those diplomats who survived the war and continued their service later held important positions within the MFA, making significant contributions to the advancement of the state’s foreign policy interests.

The Personnel Service of Russian Diplomacy: From Rus to the Present Day

A. Ivanov, V. Kruzhev, M. Laguto, O. Rudnev

Keywords: Personnel Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Posolsky Prikaz, Collegium of Foreign Affairs, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 111th anniversary of the First Department of the MFA

IN JUNE 2025, the Personnel Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs marks an unusual anniversary. On June 24, 1914, the “Law on the Establishment of New Institutions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Staff of the Central Institutions of this Ministry” was adopted, establishing the First Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where personnel issues in addition to financial and administrative matters were brought to the forefront.

It is impossible to determine exactly when the personnel service of our foreign policy agency first emerged. During the period of fragmentation of the Russian lands, foreign policy was determined by the princes. Accordingly, they also handled personnel matters. As the Grand Duchy of Moscow developed, it came to border Polish, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Crimean, and other territories. This increased the demand for knowledge of these lands and their languages. Moscow princes began to bring in intermediaries from other countries for state service. Despite the expansion and intensification of international contacts, no specialized body was responsible for foreign relations until the reign of Ivan III: Such matters were handled personally by the sovereign and the Boyar Council. Likewise, personnel matters were also under their direct supervision.

The ministry's personnel service of today is a complex, multitiered agency responsible for the full life cycle of diplomatic personnel. It conducts candidate selection and recruitment (through competitive hiring for vacancies, including testing, interviews, and assessment of professional qualities), training and development (offering professional development courses), performance evaluation (with regular assessments based on established criteria), and career advancement (through a transparent system of selection and appointment to leadership positions).

It should be noted that the history of the MFA's personnel service is a vivid example of the evolution of Russia's civil service. From the tsarist era to the present day, the ministry's personnel service has played and continues to play a key role in the development of Russian diplomacy.

As a sign of high recognition for the MFA's contribution to the implementation of Russia's state policy, on October 31, 2002, the Russian president established the Day of the Diplomatic Worker, celebrated annually on February 10. By Presidential Decree of July 9, 2010, the MFA's heraldic insignia was instituted, and on July 12, 2012, the Russian president issued a decree establishing the flag of the MFA of the Russian Federation.

In 2025, as part of celebrating a significant milestone in the history of the personnel service – the 111th anniversary of the First Department of the Ministry, which handled personnel matters – a commemorative badge was created, and an anthem for the department was composed. In addition, beginning this year, the MFA of Russia will observe the MFA Personnel Worker Day on June 24, in order to preserve traditions in this area of diplomatic activity and to honor veterans of the Personnel Department.

Uncharted Paths of the Chaco War

A. Kusayev

Keywords: Russia, Paraguay, White émigrés, White Army officers, Chaco War, General I.T. Belyayev, Russian Orthodox Church

For a long time, a collective mass grave of “soldiers unknown in Russia” was the Orthodox section of the Southern Cemetery in Asunción [Paraguay], where the remains of 36 White Army officers – participants in World War I, the Civil War, and the Chaco War – are buried, having found their final resting place in a distant land of the Guaraní Indians.

Modern Paraguay traces its origins to 1811, when a group of local officers seized the barracks located in the capital, then occupied by troops of the Spanish Empire, which held uncontested dominion over the region. The 1811 revolution was only the first step in the formation of the Paraguayan nation, which would go on to endure numerous trials, including wars, political and economic crises, and periods of dictatorship and hardship.

By a twist of fate, it was Asunción that would become one of the centers of White émigré life in Latin America. Despite all the difficulties and substandard conditions of life in Paraguay itself, our compatriots found a new home there and generously repaid the hospitality of the Paraguayans who welcomed them. In particular, the many settlers from the Russian Empire who established themselves here played a significant role in the formation of the Paraguayan state, the development of culture and education, and the Chaco War. The latter held existential significance for their new homeland and will be the focus of this study.

The Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia (1932- 1935) was the bloodiest conflict in Latin America in the 20th century, once again falling upon the shoulders of the young Paraguayan nation.

Paraguay was significantly inferior to its bellicose neighbor in both the quality and quantity of armaments and the number of troops called to arms. The constant turnover of instructors training the Paraguayan troops only added to the difficulty. While the Bolivian authorities modeled their army on the German military system,

in Asunción they vacillated between neighboring countries on the continent and the French.

In this context, the arrival in Paraguay of highly qualified Russian officers – seasoned veterans of World War I – proved all but indispensable to the success of Paraguayan arms. It is noteworthy that nearly two decades after the end of World War I (1914-1918), fate once again brought together on the battlefield Germans – commanding the Bolivian forces – and our compatriots, who had taken up arms in defense of their new homeland. The key difference between them was that the Russians who had ended up across the ocean, although still dreaming of returning home, did not regard Paraguay as a temporary station, while their German counterparts did not take the conflict personally and offered their services to the Bolivians strictly as mercenaries.

Over the course of the war, our compatriots demonstrated extraordinary heroism, earning undisputed respect among their new brothers-in-arms.

In the National Pantheon of Heroes, where the remains of Paraguay's most illustrious sons are interred, a memorial plaque has been installed bearing the inscription "Eternal Memory." Beneath an Orthodox cross are listed the names of several Russian officers who stood in defense of the country. Eight streets in the Paraguayan capital are named in honor of A. Weiss, N. Goldschmidt, S. Salazkin, V. Kanonnikov, N. Blinov, G. Butlerov, V. Malyutin, and B. Kasyanov. In the Bronze Hall of Fame at the Paraguayan Officers' Assembly, among the celebrated military figures of the past, are inscribed the names of dozens of White Army heroes.

Witnessing the carelessness with which history is treated in various parts of the world today, one cannot help feeling deep respect for the people of this South American country, who so carefully preserve the memory of foreign-born men who became truly their own.

Russian-Swiss Relations in Swiss Documentary Cinema

M. Kireyeva

Keywords: Russia, Switzerland, Russian-Swiss relations, documentary cinema

THE historical ties between Russia and Switzerland run deep, and despite periods of strained relations – up to and including complete rupture – interest in Russian history persists in the Confederation, especially in those episodes that connect our two countries.

On April 9, 2017, around 200 passengers waited at Zurich station to board a train heading toward Schaffhausen. Before departure, an impassioned speech in German about the need to return from Europe to Russia was delivered by a noticeably overweight Vladimir Ulyanov. The deliberate seriousness of his performance was periodically interrupted by treacherous chuckles from members of the crowd.

The performance Zurich-Petrograd, One-Way Ticket was staged by the Basel-based theater troupe Thorgevsky & Wiener, with the Swiss Federal Railways providing the stage.

About 25,000 Swiss citizens emigrated to the Russian Empire for temporary or permanent residence from the late 17th century until 1917.⁵ The pace picked up with a decree by Catherine II. The Empress sought to populate with foreign settlers the vast Russian lands that lacked cultivators, and this initiative was supported by Alexander I: Recruitment campaigns were first launched in Germany, and then in Switzerland.

A group of scholars from the University of Zurich, led by Prof. Karsten Heuercke, spent over 20 years researching the topic of Swiss emigration to Russia. Their study covered the period from 1701 to 1945.

The Swiss came to Russia to work and earn a living, while citizens of the Russian Empire went to Switzerland to escape censorship and persecution, to nurture ideas about remaking the world and achieving justice. Switzerland was willing to provide refuge to dissidents and the persecuted.

In the 19th century, the Confederation became a haven for socialists, communists, and anarchists from all over Europe and Russia. One of the most important provisions of the Swiss Constitution of 1848 was freedom of the press. Law-abiding, democratic, and tolerant Switzerland – paradoxically – became a convenient base for the preparation of Russian terrorism as early as the mid-19th century.

In the early years of Soviet power, more than 200 Swiss citizens emigrated to the new Russia. These were primarily leftist intellectuals who shared the ideals of the Communist Party, as well as members of the Comintern. They wanted to participate in building a new just society in Soviet Russia, with the aim of later spreading this experience throughout Europe, for the communists dreamed of a world revolution. The most notable example: Between 1923 and 1927, a group of artisans and workers led by Lenin's associate Friedrich Platten attempted to establish a model agricultural commune in the Syzran district (now Ulyanovsk Province).

These facts are little known to the general public, but they are essential for an objective understanding of the historical relationship between the two countries. They can provide greater insight into the potential challenges of building diplomatic relations today – especially since, as documentary films show, Switzerland remembers its history well.

With the Homeland in His Heart: Dedicated to Seyitniyaz Atayev

R. Muradov

Keywords: Turkmen prose writer, participation in WWII, credible eyewitness accounts, writer and director Atayev

THE Turkmen prose writer, commentator on international affairs, public figure, winner of the Makhtumkuli State Prize of the Turkmen SSR, and honored elder of the people Seyitniyaz Atayev (1924-2010) belonged to the generation of writers who entered literature in the postwar period. His work comprises short stories, novellas, novels, screenplays, journalistic articles, translations, and scholarly studies. Everything he wrote about he had experienced firsthand. A veteran of the Great Patriotic War, a direct participant in bloody battles, and an eyewitness to the reverse side of the greatest tragedy in human history, Atayev devoted his life and his work to a passionate struggle for peace, exhorting his readers and listeners that such a thing must never be allowed to happen again – anywhere, ever.

Seyitniyaz Atayev came to literature as a mature individual, with life and creative experience. He had something to say to the world, and he could not remain silent: The burden of all he had lived through demanded expression in literary form. It was a time when poignant war prose was emerging, taking a special place in the development of both Soviet and German literature in the second half of the 20th century.

His stories contain credible accounts of war, its aftermath and impact on human lives, the soldier's duty, and episodes both tragic and comical that often coexisted at the front.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Seyitniyaz Atayev hosted a Turkmen language television program titled Stories of Heroism. Like Konstantin Simonov and Sergey Smirnov, he held hundreds of meetings with war veterans, collected extensive documentary material, restored the names of many unknown heroes, and helped reunite comrades-in-arms who had not seen each other since demobilization many years earlier.

Television led Atayev to major cinema. At the Turkmenfilm studio, he produced documentary films such as Baghdad Meetings and Turkmen Gate to Delhi, which enriched Turkmen film journalism. Atayev was the screenwriter of the full-length feature film There Is No Death, Guys!, based on the plot of his early novella General Mamed of Anau.

In 1999, Seyitniyaz Atayev's gripping novella Teresa was published in the literary journal Ashgabat, and later released as a standalone book. He wrote it at the request of Polish friends, directly in Russian, as that made it easier and faster to translate into Polish without using an intermediary text. Once again, it is a story about war.

He devoted much of his time and energy to public service, as a constant participant in all sociopolitical and cultural events held in the republic. As a veteran and disabled soldier of the Great Patriotic War, he frequently visited military units, border outposts, schools, and universities; met with preconscription youth; shared his memories; and spoke about his comrades-in-arms from the turbulent years of his youth.

Seyitniyaz Atayev lived to the age of 86. Until his very last day, he worked at his desk – or more precisely, at his computer – sorting through his vast archive and preparing new publications.