

If the Blind Lead the Blind

I. Kravchenko

Keywords: compilation, unwillingness to reflect, epistemic security, information competition, critical thinking

Thinking is turning into compilation, playing with templates. As a result, we are unwilling to analyze independently, falling into a pernicious dependence on suppliers of ready-made information products. Intellectual life withers as it waits at the trough for feed to be periodically tossed in. The instinct of foraging for information atrophies: People lose the ability to seek out and find nourishment for the mind, to select from what is available the highest quality and most beneficial. They simply consume whatever is provided. Yet such “omnivorousness” does not in the least enhance an individual’s social competitiveness. Its outcome is degradation and infantilism. An inability – and, most regrettably, an unwillingness – to comprehend what is happening, to correlate events, to draw conclusions.

Certain representatives of the global ruling class, unwilling to invest in reversing this trend, quite naturally seek to lead the bacchanalia. Any forces that control society may at first glance find the state of mental dependence and manageability of the individual advantageous; it guarantees the least costly transformation of the individual into a resource of the powers that be.

Another important point. In any country, the information space cannot be fully isolated. No matter how artificially it is closed off, it remains to some extent integrated into the global media environment. And here competition – harsh and unprincipled – has not been abolished. For every domestic set of “talking points,” for every homegrown “guidebook,” there will be thousands of others offering a

different version of “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” There are no guarantees that consumers incapable of critical thinking will not find the products of competing forces more appealing. And they may become batteries in someone else’s social engineering tools.

Among the new challenges facing humanity in this area, foremost is the malicious activity of “adversaries” who deliberately distort information in their own interests, and of “blunderers” who believe fake news and unwittingly disseminate it. Second comes the deficit of attention amid the multiplicity and speed of information flows, as well as cognitive distortions in the perception and comprehension of events. Third is the emergence of closed, “island” communities with firmly entrenched worldviews that reject any information that contradicts their views. Fourth is the polarization of views and the intensification of ideological rivalry between such groups. Finally, content-generation technologies and the growing number of intermediaries transmitting information from producer to consumer complicate the assessment of the objectivity of the primary source, leading to an erosion of trust.

Allowing such tendencies to run their course, and especially encouraging them and attempting to profit from them, is mortally dangerous to any state. The mass loss of intellectually developed and clear-minded individuals, not to mention the intellectual elite, will inevitably result in existential losses. The epistemic challenge will evolve into a direct threat to state security. No one will point the way out of the political deadlock into which strategists will be driven by sycophantic and short-sighted advisers. No one will help find a solution when the country finds itself in crisis.

Malicious ICT Practices as a Threat to the Stability of International Relations

V. Filipovich

Keywords: international relations, malicious use, information and communication technologies (ICTs), destructive practices, artificial intelligence, terrorism, extremism

THE modern world is becoming increasingly informatized and technologically advanced with each passing year. A wide variety of digital gadgets, computer devices, and innovative methods of information transmission have already firmly entered the daily life of every individual. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have objectively become determining factors in the development of all areas of social relations – economics, politics, security, international relations, and human civilization as a whole. They are rapidly transforming the contemporary world order, opening not only new avenues for cooperation but also diverse and only weakly monitored means of implementing destructive actions. With the emergence of the ability to train artificial intelligence (AI), malicious software attacks have become even more sophisticated and difficult to detect. At the same time, in situations where confrontation between individual states does not take the form of open military clashes, strategies aimed at achieving political and geostrategic objectives without the direct use of military force come to the fore.

Key tools to implement such strategies are ICTs, including AI systems. Their widespread dissemination, relative accessibility, and anonymity create a unique environment to exert constant, large-scale malicious influence that is difficult to trace to its source. Consequently, the use of ICTs for destructive purposes is currently becoming increasingly extensive and sophisticated, capable of undermining the foundations of national sovereignty and trust among actors in the international arena.

An active orchestrator of the aforementioned ICT strategies is, for example, the US, whose political doctrine has been developing a propagandistic and legal framework for carrying out so-called cyber operations, which in essence constitute aggression against other countries.

Amid current geopolitical turbulence, malicious hacking activity remains consistently high. For example, in 2025 the number of crimes targeting CII facilities of the Russian Federation increased almost fourfold. This was reported by the press service of the Office of the Security Council of the Russian Federation following a meeting of the Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission on Information Security, which examined issues of countering crimes committed using ICTs.

Russia's response to such actions has included strengthening legal liability for harm caused in the information field. For example, since January 1, 2018, Russian legislation has contained a specific provision establishing criminal liability for computer attacks and other unlawful interference with CII facilities of the Russian Federation.

Destructive use of ICT is also evident in foreign policy. Among the most well-known examples are the "Arab Spring" (2010-2012) and the change of power in Egypt in 2011, in which digital platforms functioned not as tools of direct foreign intervention, but as factors mobilizing protesters.

Russia, its allies, and like-minded states advocate the mobilization of the international community to build a robust global system of information security to respond to the aggressive policies of Western countries led by the US. As early as 1998, the Russian Federation was the first to officially call upon the international community within the framework of the UN to reach agreements in advance and take practical measures to develop a universal international regime for activities in cyberspace.

Multipolarity and Technological Paradigms: A New Architecture of the World Order by 2040

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Keywords: multipolar world order, technological paradigm, digital economy

THE current stage in the development of international relations is commonly characterized in Russian historiography and political science as a transition away from the unipolar world order that effectively emerged after the collapse of the USSR toward a multipolar one. Theorists associate the natural course of this process with the justified desire of independent states to strengthen national sovereignty and their legitimate right to independently determine their own interests. An additional impetus prompting them to act is the need to counter the neoliberal dictates of the collective West, which has grown accustomed to dominance in the international arena over recent decades and is unwilling to come to terms with the reduction of its political weight. That attitude on the part of the West is undermining the foundations of international cooperation and damages the entire system of supranational relations. This has nothing in common with the constructive agenda promoted by Russia in cooperation with interested partners.

The natural formation of a more just, multipolar world order provides developing countries with an opportunity to strengthen their positions in the international arena, increasingly confidently defend their priorities, participate in addressing transnational problems, and cope with global challenges. In proportion to the pace of the emergence of a multipolar world, “non-Western-centric” interstate groupings are gaining strength, where the principles of equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit prevail. This is particularly evident in the example of the Eurasian space and BRICS, the SCO, and ASEAN. At the same time, as these processes

develop, numerous research tasks and debatable questions arise: How many polarities/poles of the new world order can exist, and is their number limited? How is influence distributed within a multipolar system of international relations? How is a mutually acceptable basis for interaction formed? Is the factor of competition eliminated? How will the principle of indivisible security be ensured at the global and regional levels? Why multipolarity rather than, for example, polycentricity? And finally, the question of greatest interest to us in this study: When might the process of building multipolarity be completed? The answer to that question will undoubtedly be given over time and as scientific thought develops; however, some forecasts can already be made.

The challenge for states spearheading the formation of a multipolar world order is to seize the moment of this transition and assist like-minded partners in unlocking their potential amid the expected shift in technological paradigms and the ongoing digitalization of the global economic space. Based on the concepts of long waves and technological paradigms, this will take approximately 10 years, after which, having traced the interconnection between the shift in technological paradigms and the final phase of the formation of multipolarity, we may be able to determine whether a stable multipolar world order has been created under conditions favorable to its further viability.

The Ukraine Crisis as a Catalyst for Transformations in the EU's Energy Security Strategy

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Keywords: European Union, strategy, energy security, Ukraine crisis, natural gas, Nord Streams, diversification, energy crisis

THE European Union defines energy security as a combination of the following factors: uninterrupted access to affordable energy, including security of supply; maintenance of reserves; protection of critical infrastructure; and diversification of energy sources.

The purpose of this article is to identify the role of the Ukraine crisis in the transformation of the EU's energy security strategy, as well as to determine the main prospects for its further development.

The study employs a content analysis of EU legal acts and official documents, including strategies, regulations, and joint statements. The article analyzes the extent to which the Ukraine conflict shapes the EU's approaches.

The main document defining the EU's approaches to energy security is the European Union Energy Security Strategy adopted on May 28, 2014. The adoption of this document was the EU's response to growing geopolitical risks associated with the deterioration of relations between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, the document preserved an economic rationale: The emphasis was placed not on a complete rejection of Russian gas, but on minimizing transit risks, in this case through Ukraine.

It should be noted that the energy crises of 2006 and 2009 – namely, disruptions in the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine – demonstrated the EU's vulnerability, but those disruptions remained warning signals rather than triggers of fundamental changes in Brussels' energy policy. The measures taken by the EU's

leadership were not strategic and were rather aimed at mitigating immediate threats. This is confirmed by the absence at that time of documents directly aimed at overcoming the Ukraine factor in the issue of Russian gas transit.

The deterioration of Russian-Ukrainian relations in 2014 prompted both the EU and its individual members to develop regulatory measures to prevent the heightened risk of supply disruptions through Ukraine. In practice, the EU combined two strategies: first, short-term measures to reduce transit risks, including stress tests and stricter rules for gas transit systems; and second, more large-scale infrastructure solutions, including projects designed to sidestep the Ukraine factor. However, a truly radical shift toward the politicization of the process occurred only after 2022.

The escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 compelled the EU to radicalize its approaches to energy cooperation with Russia. The previously discussed intention to move away from Russian gas has become more realistic, even if not in the immediate future, and the EU is taking steps in this direction. In practical terms, for Russia the situation unfolding in the EU threatens the loss of an important market and the disruption of national energy security. In particular, the Yamal fields will be partially left underutilized. The construction of the Power of Siberia 2 main gas pipeline, which could have redirected Yamal gas to China, has been delayed. Instead, preference has been given to a new branch of the Central Asia-China pipeline. In addition, Beijing's negotiating position is strengthening, as it has a wide range of suppliers and is in no hurry to make concessions to Moscow.

In the long term, out to 2030-2035, the European policy of decarbonization and finding alternative suppliers, including the US, Qatar, and African countries, indeed increases the likelihood of a further reduction in Russia's share in the structure of gas imports.

Russia's International Development Assistance

Amid New Geopolitical Realities:

Updating Objectives, Calibrating Tools

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Keywords: international development assistance, international aid, official development assistance, Russia, donor countries, partner countries, foreign policy

THE contemporary world dictates new conditions of existence for national economies and the position of states within the system of international relations. Perhaps these new institutional conditions have manifested themselves most vividly in Russia's economic and political practice, as the country has faced the need to almost simultaneously revise its approaches to and areas of interaction with countries around the world. It can be stated that in the short term this recalibration of ties during the "emergency period" was successfully accomplished. However, consolidating it over the long term requires just as much effort. Moreover, ongoing global changes leave no opportunity to pause and reflect, forcing transformation to be carried out on the fly, which puts newly formed governance frameworks at risk of repeating past mistakes and falling into old traps.

Concepts of development as such and ideas of progress are currently being reinterpreted in academic circles. Experts and practitioners are asking questions like: What should be the main parameters of national development models? Should the international community promote development? Are the development paradigms proposed by Western countries, either bilaterally or through international institutions, suitable for non-Western societies? The Western approach to institutions is well known and is criticized for attempting to transfer models of Western societies to non-Western societies without sufficient reflection. The task of Russian

scholarship at the present stage is to create alternative approaches adapted to the needs of non-Western societies, [including] societies of the Global South.

From the perspective of foreign policy practice, IDA represents a new form of soft power. Soft power entails “selling” one’s own national development model by “promoting” it to foreign societies, often without regard to their specific characteristics. Over the 40 years of the existence of soft power as both a concept and a practice, its limitations have become evident, including monologue rather than dialogue with foreign societies and a belief in the exceptionality of one’s own development model.

Thus, development assistance, unlike Western system of official development assistance (ODA) in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) logic and unlike soft power, presupposes that the donor state does not necessarily possess a single, unopposed vision of the optimal development model for the recipient. IDA is co-action – i.e., a joint search for best practices that contribute to the development of partner societies. Such an approach and substantive content could form the basis of a conceptual framework, if not an entire philosophy, defining the ideological thrust of a new development discourse in the Russian Federation. The proper calibration of tools of interaction with specific partner countries could become a worthy support in implementing this conceptual approach.

The Future of Transatlanticism

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Keywords: NATO, the US, European countries, allies, geostrategic situation, national interests, transformation

THE system of transatlantic relations, including military-strategic cooperation between the US and European countries based on their participation in NATO, is undergoing an evident transformation following the 2024 US presidential election and the coming to power of the Donald Trump administration. This refers to a certain shift in the focus of foreign policy interests toward a more rational US approach to the issue of allied solidarity; a refusal to follow or, at times, submit to the egoism and whims of Western European NATO members; and a greater orientation toward promoting national interests in other regions of the world rather than prioritizing them exclusively in Europe. Herein, it may be supposed, lies the emerging difference between the current American leadership and Democratic Party administrations, including the most recent one headed by Joe Biden.

At the same time, changes in the system of transatlantic relations that emerged after World War II and the creation of NATO have occurred before, following shifts in the global geostrategic situation, as well as their comprehension both in NATO headquarters and in the capitals of member states, beginning with Washington. Adjustments in the nuances of allied relations manifested themselves over a fairly long period of NATO's existence and within the broader conceptual complex encompassing the notion of postwar transatlantic solidarity, or the linkage between the US and West European countries.

The transformations in transatlantic ties during the present period, however, have their own distinctive features. The role of the Trump administration arguably

lies in the fact that it has for the first time publicly emphasized US national interests as the primary motivator of its foreign policy priority of revising the customary understanding of transatlantic ties. Moreover, Trump actively employs the factor of national interests to advance his domestic political agenda.

It seems that in the current context, the focus of Russian foreign policy as it relates to transatlantic relations should be based on the understanding of the high risk that the existing military-strategic balance will break down. This means Russia should prioritize relations with the US. It seems likely that only the acceptance by a majority of the American elite of a global balance in future foreign policy can keep both the system of Russian-American relations and the system of transatlantic alliance within pragmatic limits. This would prevent, *inter alia*, attempts to implement provocative schemes from European territory aimed at undermining nuclear parity between the two military superpowers.

Thus, the system of transatlantic relations between the US and its European NATO allies is changing. The Trump administration is *de facto* shaping a new foreign policy standard for the American approach to transatlanticism for the foreseeable future. Whether and to what extent this standard will take root, or whether it will once again revert to the traditional understanding of transatlantic unity – namely, the binding of the US to the priorities of a European regional grouping based on the European Union – will ultimately determine the prospects for the emergence of a new reference point in defining the geostrategic configuration of the world.

The Rational and the Irrational in Trump's Foreign Policy

F. Trunov

Keywords: Donald Trump, US, new world order, deals, Russia, the Ukraine issue, Afghanistan, Iran, China, containment, Western democracies, liberal democracies

DURING Trump's first term (2017-2021), the White House disproportionately more often terminated or suspended participation in existing international agreements than reached new deals. The US's withdrawal from formalized arrangements began earlier in the economic and environmental fields. Examples include the refusal to continue negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (with the EU) starting in January 2017 and the decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change, announced on June 1, 2017.

Toward the middle of Trump's first term, the US began abandoning its obligations under treaties in the field of control over weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The leitmotif of Trump's second term, at least in its initial stages, has been to achieve as many deals as possible – primarily interstate agreements. To encourage widespread economic agreements with the US, the 47th US president, already on February 1, 2025, raised tariffs on goods from Canada, Mexico, and China, and on April 2, 2025, on goods from most countries worldwide. In attempts to resolve armed conflicts, the US initially sought to emphasize its political and diplomatic capabilities as much as possible. If the White House failed to reach quick agreements, it sought to apply pressure.

The Trump administration's policy on the Ukraine conflict zigzagged noticeably in 2025. It is significant that Trump initiated bilateral telephone consultations with Russian President Vladimir Putin already in the first month of his term, which were followed by intensive in-person high-level bilateral meetings.

Particularly telling was the friendly tone of the talks between the two presidents, both one-on-one and as part of delegations, in Anchorage on August 15-16, 2025. However, in September and October 2025, Trump's position led to a certain stagnation and even deterioration in the negotiations. After telephone consultations with Vladimir Putin during which Trump raised the idea of immediate in-person talks in Budapest, he subsequently canceled them and imposed sanctions timed to coincide with EU sanctions – the first of his second term.

Trump's foreign policy is deeply thought out and not a set of chaotic, often random decisions, as it might seem at first glance. The second Trump administration is seeking to prevent the emerging world order from losing much of its US-centricity, as was characteristic under his predecessor. Therefore, it employs a broad set of tools.

The most widespread tactic was the rapid pursuit of deals favorable to the US, including with the aim of preventing the critical weakening of partners around the world. This proved particularly challenging for the Trump administration on the Ukraine track. The rational aspect manifested itself above all in the fact that upon returning to office, the 47th US president demonstrated an awareness that Russia was gradually but steadily moving closer to defeating Ukraine's military machine, significantly strengthening Russia's position as a constitutive element of the Global North. At the same time, Trump understood how dangerous the Biden administration's rapid escalation had been for the US and thus the need to return to full-fledged dialogue with Russia. The irrational aspect was Trump's desire to prevent the critical weakening of Ukraine.

Donald Trump and the Korean Peninsula

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Keywords: Korean Peninsula, North Korea's "patience-containment" strategy, Trump's North Korean policy (2017-2021), prospects for Trump's second approach to the Korean Peninsula issue

IN HIS first year in office, Donald Trump, a "tireless peacemaker," claimed to have stopped eight wars and crises. His list of issues threatening peace and security, one may assume, includes North Korea's nuclear missile program.

Both during the presidential campaign and after his reelection, Trump repeatedly expressed regret over the failed attempt to end the "North Korean nuclear threat" during his first term in office. Nevertheless, he warmly recalled the friendly relations that had developed at that time between him and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, praised his leadership qualities, and expressed hope for the resumption of trusting contacts.

A natural question arises: Will Trump step into the Han River, which connects North and South Korea, a second time?

Currently, North Korea, relying on its relatively high-level nuclear missile potential and its allied relations with Russia and China, recognizes that it is more secure than before. This gives Pyongyang grounds to act more confidently toward the US and, of course, South Korea. Although North Korea still reacts negatively to US-South Korean maneuvers and other evidence of intensified military relations between Washington and Seoul, the level of its concern and "warning of retaliatory measures" has noticeably decreased.

Pyongyang's position is stated as clearly and concisely as possible: US recognition of North Korea's nuclear status and the lifting of sanctions. What

remains unclear is what compromises the North Korean side would be willing to make.

The American position, if there is one, is known only from vague statements by Trump, the meaning of which is essentially: “Let’s talk, perhaps, about sanctions.”

Thus, there is not enough information about the intentions of the parties in the negotiations, if they do take place, to predict their content and development.

The US, while not openly recognizing North Korea’s nuclear status, would not insist on denuclearization but would propose a temporary freeze on North Korea’s nuclear missile program. In exchange, it would commit to refraining from visiting South Korean ports by American nuclear submarines and to halting flights of its nuclear-armed aircraft near the Korean Peninsula. It would also pledge not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea and not to grant Seoul permission to develop its own nuclear capabilities.

North Korea may agree to freeze the development of an intercontinental missile capable of reaching American territory and not resume nuclear testing.

A pessimistic scenario seems more realistic. Preliminary testing of the waters would likely reveal the parties’ unwillingness to make significant compromises, thus making any serious agreements impossible.

As a result, the status quo would be maintained on the Korean Peninsula, which currently appears to suit all parties.

Preserving and Supporting Languages of the Peoples of Russia in the Digital Environment and on the Internet

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Keywords: linguistic diversity, state support, erroneous Latinization, alphabet

PRESERVING and promoting the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation is an important task driven by both the cultural and strategic significance of linguistic diversity. Contemporary challenges associated with digitalization reinforce the need to create conditions for the functioning of native languages within new information and media technologies.

One reason for the decline in the use of native languages, especially among young people, is the limited availability of digital resources in these languages. The predominance of English on the Internet, in mobile applications, computer games, music, and film creates a linguistic environment in which native languages find themselves in the minority. This, in turn, influences language preferences and practices, particularly given the shortage of educational, entertainment, and informational materials in languages of the peoples of Russia.

All of us citizens of Russia are united by a writing system and by typefaces. Writing, the most important characteristic of a people's evolution after language itself, is the principal tool for transmitting knowledge, culture, and history, as well as one of the main means of communication. With respect to national languages that have a relatively short written tradition or have only recently transitioned from one writing system to another, the well-known linguistic term "newly written language" is used; this concept was adopted for national languages that acquired a new Cyrillic writing system during the Soviet period.

Today, we are witnessing an increasing number of linguistic initiatives that contribute to the sustainable development of indigenous peoples.

Attention should be paid not only to the importance of introducing symbols of the languages of the peoples of Russia into the .PФ domain zone, but also more broadly to efforts aimed at developing computer typefaces for the Cyrillic alphabet of all the languages studied. The development of online resources in any given language is impossible without the existence of computer fonts that include all the letters of that language's alphabet.

The level of use of national languages on the Internet is fairly high. The introduction of an expanded set of Cyrillic characters in the .PФ domain zone through the inclusion of additional characters from the languages of the peoples of Russia will increase the number of Russian Internet users, enable the development of media in national languages, and, more broadly, support the principles of a multilingual Internet, which are steadily and systematically advancing in the Russian Federation.

The Role of Global Media Culture in Dialogue With Compatriots Abroad

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Keywords: ideology, global media culture, mass media, propaganda, fakes, compatriots abroad

GLOBAL media culture constitutes an integral part of dialogue with compatriots living abroad, facilitating full-fledged communication through the formation of a shared information space. Access to Russian content, film archives, electronic editions of works by Russian classical authors, children's and educational literature, scholarly research, analytical materials, and other resources is fundamentally important to Russian citizens throughout the world.

At the same time, global media culture is playing a leading role when it comes to total disinformation, fake news, and the dissemination of not merely harmful but defamatory information about Russian people and Russia.

At present, not only Russian experts but also leaders of major world powers acknowledge that the Russian Federation, its citizens, and compatriots living abroad are being subjected to unprecedented sanctions and information pressure, as well as psychological and physical violence.

In conditions in which Western actors propagate Russophobic sentiments and organize systemic provocations, our compatriots have become the most vulnerable category of citizens.

In essence, Russian citizens residing in openly hostile countries with the most severe human rights situations are becoming hostages in the hands of Western terror.

Informational, mental, and cognitive (hybrid) warfare, in varying proportions, influence an individual's critical thinking, paralyze the will, and aim to eliminate everything Russian from the information space, as well as to sever the ties of Russian

people – our compatriots living abroad – with their national identity and their historical homeland, Russia.

For nearly 15 years, the Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad, as well as the legal assistance centers operating with its support, have been defending their lawful rights and interests.

Provocations and sanctions campaigns are systematically launched against the Foundation to block it, to deprive our compatriots of free professional legal advice and legal assistance, to cut off even this opportunity to protect the rights, honor, and dignity of Russian people. At the same time, those who dare to seek assistance from the Foundation are immediately marked as Russian special services operatives.

NATO's Development of Modern Approaches
to Scientific Research in the Context
of Its Updated Science and Technology Strategy

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Keywords: international relations, security, NATO, scientific and technological strategy, AI, IT, transatlantic cooperation, rearmament, European security, challenges for Russia

THE current international situation is characterized by increasing competition in science and technology (S&T), which necessitates a review of approaches to organizing and implementing scientific research in the leading military-political blocs. The adoption by NATO in June 2025 of an updated Science and Technology Strategy (hereinafter referred to as the Strategy) was the Alliance's response to the challenges associated with the rapid development of dual-use technologies. The introduction of a new system for managing scientific research programs, the restructuring of the Collaborative Programme of Work (CPoW), and the creation of Capability Coordination Groups (CCGs) reflect the Alliance's intent to more effectively integrate scientific advances into military development and defense planning. An important factor is the analysis of the experience of applying new technologies in modern conflicts, which makes it possible to adjust research priorities and develop effective mechanisms for responding to emerging threats.

This analysis of transformations in the organization and implementation of NATO's research and development activities suggests the emergence of a new paradigm for the alliance's scientific and technological development, focused on ensuring technological superiority and enhancing the resilience and effectiveness of collective defense in the face of increasing instability in the international security system. The updated Science and Technology Strategy, adopted in 2025, defines

long-term priorities, mechanisms, and areas for the development of scientific research, emphasizing the integration of new information technologies, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity.

The interaction between European and North American Alliance members is becoming a multi-layered collaborative effort, requiring constant coordination of interests, optimized resource allocation, and the development of unified standards in scientific and technical policy. The specialization of European states and the development of a distributed network of research centers ensure the flexibility, sustainability, and effectiveness of NATO's scientific and technical policy and facilitate the development of a unified architecture for scientific and technical support for the rearmament and modernization of the armed forces.

For Russia, analyzing trends in NATO's scientific and technological activities allows it to identify new threats, develop effective countermeasures, and maintain strategic balance in the face of increasing international competition. The practical significance of this study lies in providing an objective basis for assessing the prospects for the development of NATO's scientific and technological potential and for formulating strategic decisions in the area of national security, thereby strengthening Russia's position on the international stage and ensuring sustainable development in the long term.

Republic of Djibouti: “Good Things Come in Small Packages”

A. Bregadze

Keywords: Republic of Djibouti, history of origin and formation, Russian-Djiboutian relations

THE Republic of Djibouti (Djibouti) is indeed a rather small state in northeastern Africa, covering an area of only 23,150 square kilometers and with a population of approximately 1.2 million people, approximately half of whom live in its capital, also named Djibouti.

Clearly, what makes the small country of Djibouti so valuable is its unique geostrategic location in the Horn of Africa. Specifically, the Republic of Djibouti is bordered by the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Mandeb to the east, Eritrea to the north, Ethiopia to the west and southwest, and the unrecognized Somaliland, whose territory is internationally considered part of Somalia, to the southeast. The Republic of Djibouti’s maritime border extends 370 kilometers.

The history of the formation and development of the Republic of Djibouti is full of turbulent events associated with the struggle for influence in this geostrategically important region among Arabs, Ethiopians, Portuguese, Turks, Italians, British, French, and others. The Russian Empire even attempted to establish a presence there.

In 1946, the colony received the status of an overseas territory of France. In 1967, it was renamed the “French Territory of the Afars and the Issas.” In a referendum on May 8, 1977, 98.7% of the population of this French territory who participated in the plebiscite voted in favor of independence, which was proclaimed on June 27, 1977.

Legislative functions are exercised by a unicameral parliament, the National Assembly, which consists of 65 members elected to five-year terms. The current

president of the National Assembly, Dileita Mohamed Dileita, long headed a government that included, as minister of foreign affairs, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, current Chairman of the African Union Commission, who was elected to this post on February 15, 2025, and visited Moscow in this capacity in early May of that year.

Djibouti has historically had significant Ethiopian and Yemeni diasporas, as well as a European community – primarily French, given France’s special historical role in the “development” of this territory. This explains the leading role of French in both domestic and international communication, alongside Arabic, since, as mentioned earlier, the region was dominated by Arabs before the French arrived. Indigenous peoples prefer to communicate with each other in their own languages: Somali and Afar. The main religion is Sunni Islam.

Currently, the Republic of Djibouti is home to military bases from France, Spain, Germany, Italy, the US, China, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. And apparently more are coming.

Clearly, the intensification of trade and economic competition in the Horn of Africa and the significance of the Strait of Mandeb are interconnected, as is the potential for further expansion of foreign military and political presence there. One can only hope that this will not lead to a military confrontation among the players present in Djibouti, who are forced to defend their interests in what is arguably the only way possible in today’s reality – i.e., by relying on their armed forces, while, of course, not neglecting the potential of diplomacy.

It must be acknowledged that, given the current situation in the Horn of Africa region and considering the overall international context, the Djiboutian leadership, led by President Guelleh, is maneuvering wisely, successfully protecting the interests of the country and thereby confirming the well-known Russian proverb “good things come in small packages.”

Contemporary Integration Processes
in the Post-Soviet Space

The 16th Yalta International Conference

The conference opened with greetings from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Sergey Aksyonov, Head of the Republic of Crimea.

Ukraine as a Mercenary State: Anti-Russian Nazism

Georgy Muradov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Crimea to the President of the Russian Federation

THE AUTHOR draws attention to the emergence of a phenomenon new to the modern world: state-sponsored mercenarism, in which the West acts as the initiator of a war against Russia while avoiding direct participation in it, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), led by their commander-in-chief, serve as well-paid mercenaries.

He emphasizes that the AFU are, in effect, NATO's mercenary troops, and the attack on Kursk Province on August 6, 2024, constitutes an undeclared war.

In this case, the mercenary forces include both the military organization (the AFU), hired through Ukraine's Supreme Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Zelensky and generously financed by NATO budgets, and the entire Ukrainian administrative apparatus, which exists solely due to loans provided by Western countries. NATO member states supply Ukraine with modern weaponry for conducting military and sabotage operations, train the AFU, provide international information and propaganda cover via controlled global media, and finance the political and administrative "cover" for these actions, acting on behalf of the "government of the state of Ukraine."

Furthermore, he underscores the urgent importance of addressing strategic issues related to working with compatriots residing in Russia's historical territories in the Baltic states and Kazakhstan, and potential measures for protecting them from repression and from the eradication of their language, culture, historical memory, and organizational bodies.

He emphasizes that anti-Russian hysteria in Western countries – and especially in the Baltic states – has long evolved beyond “discrimination” and “rights violations” into a much more dangerous form of anti-Russianism: anti-Russian Nazism, which, in our view, constitutes a new form of racism.

Key Trends in the Development of the International Situation
at the Current Stage

Keywords: international situation, “Trump Doctrine,” US, China, hybrid war, Russia, Ukraine

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The international situation remains generally unstable and difficult to predict, and its development is nonlinear. Nevertheless, with a high degree of probability, it can be said that global cooperation, as the predominant tool for advancing national interests, has for the foreseeable future receded into the past, giving way to interstate rivalry, competition, and confrontation.

Given these premises, tensions in international relations are expected to grow over the next two years. In our view, the main events will unfold around three key factors with high conflict potential.

The first is the confrontation between the so-called “Trumpists” and their opponents, both within the US and across borders.

On the domestic political front in the US, the intense confrontation between Donald Trump and the segment of the elite that supports him with their opponents in both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party itself, as well as in the state apparatus, is expected to continue.

On the external front, the rift between the US and the liberal-globalist EU/UK will continue.

The second factor is the strategic rivalry between the US and China. Washington, which views Beijing as its main geopolitical competitor, as early as the Barack Obama presidency (2009-2017) designated the Asia-Pacific region (or, as the Americans call it, the “Indo-Pacific region”) as a priority area of foreign and military policy.

Today, the US is rapidly taking practical steps to redirect forces and assets from the European and Middle Eastern theaters toward deterring the People’s Republic of China. In the Asia-Pacific region, there is active buildup of the military capabilities of the US and its European and Asian allies, including exercises, deployment of advanced weaponry, and stationing of troops along the perimeter of China’s – and to some extent Russia’s – borders.

The third factor is the West’s hybrid war against Russia. This is not a figure of speech, but a statement of the reality in which we have been living for at least three and a half years. By all indications, the confrontation is protracted in nature.

It must be assumed that the objectives of our opponents have, in principle, not changed. No one has abandoned the plan to “eliminate” the Russian Federation as a geopolitical competitor, an influential international actor, and one of the centers of the emerging multipolar world order.

The Role of the Ukraine Crisis in Shaping a New Architecture of Eurasian Security

Keywords: Ukraine crisis, Eurocentric security system, Eurasian security, OSCE, NATO, SCO, BRICS, EAEU, CIS, ASEAN

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Of particular interest from the standpoint of security along Russia's southwestern borders is the Ukraine crisis, which began in late 2013 with a wave of illegal armed demonstrations in Kiev in response to the then-president of Ukraine's refusal to sign an association agreement with the EU. This was followed by the 2014 coup d'état, which led to the outbreak of civil war in southeastern Ukraine. The self-proclaimed Kiev leadership, lobbying the interests of its "Western mentors," decided to abandon the country's nonaligned status and began the process of joining NATO, which – despite its promises not to expand eastward – had long been planning to approach the borders of the Russian Federation. These actions led to escalating tensions between the West, which promotes a NATO-based world order, and Russia, for whom such a world order constitutes a threat to national security.

For 11 years, the Ukrainian state, fully controlled by the West, has been waging war and, according to Vladimir Zelensky, is prepared to continue doing so "to the last Ukrainian," while its sponsors are doing everything they can to weaken Russia. Our opponents are biding their time, waiting for the protracted military conflict to weaken the Russian economy, increase social tensions, and ultimately provoke a political crisis and societal division.

In the context of Eurasian security, it is important to draw attention to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This interstate regional organization should primarily focus on issues of peace, security, democracy,

and human rights in Europe and Central Asia. However, today it has become a politicized organization that fights not against conflicts, but against Russia. This is because the EU and NATO countries view the OSCE platform as a means to implement their allied agendas and aggressively promote their positions, rather than to conduct an equal dialogue and comprehensively examine current issues. The Russophobic attitude of the Western majority hinders work in a consensus-based format. The Ukraine issue is approached on this platform from a one-sided perspective. Since 2022, the Russian Federation's full participation "on the margins" of the OSCE has been effectively paralyzed due to the "efforts" of the Western bloc.

Today, the issue of forming a framework for equal and indivisible Eurasian security without the military presence of external powers is widely discussed at various international venues. It was raised on the sidelines of various summits: BRICS in Kazan, the SCO in Astana, BRICS in Rio de Janeiro, and the SCO in Tianjin. At these international meetings, the degradation of Euro-Atlantic institutions was noted. Therefore, most countries in the world share Russia's position that the security system must be multipolar and inclusive, and must not allow one country to ensure its own security at the expense of others.

The Ukraine crisis has contributed to global geopolitical transformation. The Eurocentric security system is unacceptable in the context of building a multipolar world based on the equality of all states. Present-day realities demonstrate the need to abandon ineffective institutional frameworks for ensuring security on the Eurasian continent. The idea of building equal and indivisible security in Eurasia, articulated by President Vladimir Putin, has served as an impetus for practical steps in this direction and has energized regional integration, intensifying cooperation on the sidelines of the SCO, EAEU, CIS, and ASEAN.

Ukraine on the Path to a Multipolar World Order

Keywords: Ukraine, Global Majority, Global South

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The fact of emergence of a new multipolar world order is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. For instance, from 2000 to 2024, the share of the five BRICS founding countries in global GDP by purchasing power parity grew from 17.4% to 34.1%, while that of the Group of Seven declined from 44.5% to 28.8%. There is no getting around this statistical evidence.

However, the available recipes for organizing and regulating global relations in this new era lack innovation. In general terms, the prevailing views can be summarized as follows:

Fight for hegemony and exceptionalism, and deter competitors by all means short of nuclear war. This is the Western approach.

Reform the UN and other international institutions so that they more tangibly serve the interests of the Global South and East. This is the position of the Global Majority.

Both approaches, in practice, face strong resistance and fail to achieve their intended outcomes. The West's ability to impose its will on others has been waning for many years (a fact starkly confirmed by the Special Military Operation). At the same time, the Global Majority's demanded reform of the architecture of global governance has also stalled.

This situation increases the risks of further decline, fragmentation, and collapse of the familiar system for organizing and regulating international relations.

Russia's Strategic Victory: Paths and Opportunities

Keywords: the West as a coup instigator, inclusive capitalism concept, alternative economic model

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UNDOUBTEDLY, Russia needs only victory – the stakes have become too high. On the altar of victory have already been laid the suffering of the residents of Novorossiya and Malorossiya, of Kursk and other regions of Russia, vast resources of our Fatherland, serious collective efforts by the armed forces and the home front, and most importantly – human lives. Under the current conditions, victory cannot be tactical. Victory can and must be strategic.

And here, key questions arise: What constitutes a strategic victory for Russia? And over whom must it be won? The Kiev regime? That quasi-state formation that has become a tool of war in the hands of its handlers? And could, for example, a hypothetical statement by the collective West declaring its noninterference in Ukraine's internal affairs and a refusal to admit Ukraine to NATO be considered a strategic victory? What is such a security guarantee worth to Russia today? What about the sanctions against Crimea and Russia as a whole, and the damage inflicted thereby? And what about Russia's frozen gold and foreign currency reserves?

Today, it can be stated unequivocally that the collective West is responsible for provoking mass repressions against the Russian and Russian-speaking population on the territory of the former Ukraine and for inflicting colossal damage on Russia – human, social, and economic. It is therefore natural that, in the event of restoring official, including business, relations with the West.

Thus, under the current circumstances, Russia needs a strategic victory over the West. Of course, not a “hot,” military victory.

Russia – as the bearer of what we might call a communal civilizational code – already possesses a powerful nonmilitary weapon capable of delivering a strategic victory over the West. Its name is the solidarity economy. The only question that remains is whether the political will to implement it will emerge.

Humanity and War: Some Lessons From the Ukraine Crisis

Keywords: Ukraine crisis, humanity, war, European security

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THE history of humans as a biological species, throughout both biological and civilizational development, has been filled with conflict and aggression directed against their own kind. This is unsurprising, as we are one of 20 eusocial species of living beings – characterized by a clear hierarchy and division of social roles (and the second among mammals) – and possess an extraordinarily high level of intraspecies aggression compared to other species. Unfortunately, as research shows, war is inherent to the biological nature of humans – and of primates in general. On average, throughout human history, one in every 50 people has been killed by another human. But humans are not only biological beings; the entire history of civilization can be seen as a succession of attempts to rise above our animal state. Periods of peace and humanity have grown longer throughout history, but, sadly, they are never eternal. Intolerance toward others and differing viewpoints still outweigh altruism. And the words “stranger” or “foreigner” have always been – and remain – synonyms for “enemy.”

One would think that the creation of weapons of mass destruction in the 20th century would have horrified humanity with the prospect of total annihilation,

curbing the primal aggression barely restrained by the thin veneer of civilization, and prompting a search for peaceful coexistence and nonconflictual development. In fact, the peaceful pause of roughly 70 years was unprecedented in European history and gave rise to hope that war as a tool of conflict resolution was a thing of the past.

The Ukraine crisis has become the most vivid in a series of conflicts from the late 20th to early 21st centuries instigated by the West in its quest to become the “queen of the global anthill.” Western countries played a key role in creating the conditions for this crisis – by fostering among Ukraine’s authorities and population a sense of national superiority, shaping the image of almost all neighbors as enemies, and, as a consequence, inciting the desire to eliminate foreign elements on territory they had received through the will of others.

Today, the main threat to peace comes from those forces in the West that seek to obstruct the objective process of the emergence of multipolarity, view it as a challenge to their global dominance, and refuse to relinquish – without a fight – the privileges in politics, finance, and trade that they seized back in the colonial era and now attempt to retain through neocolonial methods under the banner of a so-called “rules-based order.” In simpler terms, this is a system in which a gentleman feels entitled to change the rules of the game mid-play whenever they no longer suit him.

So, what does Russia want? We want to ensure that all countries in our shared macro-region have firm guarantees of secure development, and that none is subjected to the threat of destructive external interference. We are interested in establishing dialogue on this subject. We believe it is essential that the countries of Eurasia resolve all issues related to security and economic development independently – without the destructive involvement of extra-regional powers. It is vital that all countries on our continent possess solid guarantees of safe development and cooperate with each other without intrusive oversight from the West.

From Military Alliance to Bloc Confrontation:
Western and Russian Narratives on the Start of the Cold War

Keywords: Cold War, Soviet Union, US, strategy, narrative, national interests

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IN 2025, our country not only celebrated the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory, but also reflected on the onset of the Cold War. Its commonly accepted symbolic start date is Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton on March 5, 1946, while the symbolic end is considered the Gorbachev-Bush summit in Malta on December 2-3, 1989. However, in the 21st century, the US proposed an alternative chronology: In 2007, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton suggested establishing a "Victory in the Cold War" medal bearing the inscription "In Recognition of Your Service" and featuring different dates: September 2, 1945-December 26, 1991 – i.e., from the end of World War II to the dissolution of the USSR.

This candid assignment of dates appears to be the most honest and accurate. It seems that the most significant outcome of World War II was its immediate transformation into the Cold War, albeit initially without an official declaration. There was no pause – one war flowed directly into the next.

It is worth noting that Great Britain had been planning for war with the USSR since the time of Operation Unthinkable, the final version of which was approved on May 22, 1945, with the first draft prepared as early as 1943. In the US, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1945 approved a strategic concept for the defeat of Russia, which was further developed into a plan for the strategic bombing of 20 major Soviet cities using nuclear weapons.

The study of Western narratives of the Cold War is becoming particularly relevant in our day, in the fourth year of the SMO. From the vantage point of 34 years of post-Soviet history, it can be stated with confidence that the US waged the Cold War not only against the Soviet Union but also against historical Russia, which at that time lived under the “shell” of the Soviet system. It seems that precisely because the objectives concerning Russia were left unresolved, the Cold War did not end with the dissolution of the USSR, but was continued by the US and the collective West against the Russian Federation – its legal successor and continuator.

It is evident that in relation to post-Soviet Russia, US strategic objectives largely mirror the stratagems of the Cold War era, albeit in a far more radical form. If the dismantling of the USSR was regarded in Washington as an extremely desirable but virtually unattainable “maximal program,” and the goals considered practically achievable were the mellowing and liberalization of the Soviet system, then after 1991 the US concluded that objectives such as the breakup of Russia on the model of the USSR, the elimination of its nuclear potential, and the establishment of control over its natural resources were entirely feasible.

It seems that the current confrontation between Russia and the collective West, like the classic Cold War, will also be a war of attrition and will most likely drag on for years and decades. It will not end even after Russia achieves its objectives in the SMO in Ukraine. In our view, this confrontation will continue until the collective West – united and held together by rigid bloc discipline since the end of World War II – disintegrates under the weight of growing internal problems and contradictions, exacerbated by external pressures.

In a future polycentric world order, the West should not be represented by a single monolithic bloc but by several competing poles, none of which should pose an existential threat to Russia. Such a configuration could serve as an initial “image of victory” in the second Cold War imposed on our country.

The Philosophy of War: Then and Now

Keywords: just war philosophy, SMO

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WHY do officials rarely refer to the SMO as a war? Because there is no philosophical justification for the just war that Russia is currently waging.

There are at least two reasons for this. First, the Russian government has not commissioned philosophers [to provide such justification]; the government is focusing instead on the patriotic component of the SMO, quick propaganda messaging, the financial appeal of signing a military contract, social protection for the families of SMO participants, and effective medical rehabilitation. This comes at the expense of analyzing the deeper causes of the current conflict.

The second reason is the oppositional stance of Russian philosophical institutions, which are funded by taxpayers but remain “distant” from the needs of society.

The global academic community has already developed key concepts for the philosophy of just war from a legal standpoint:

Three basic stages of evaluation (the jus triad):

Jus ad bellum (the right to go to war) – criteria for the legitimacy of initiating hostilities: just cause (self-defense, protection of victims of aggression, humanitarian intervention); decision made by a legitimate authority; probability of success (realistic assessment of chances for victory); proportionality (balance between ends and means); right intention (absence of hidden aggressive goals); last resort (all nonmilitary means of resolution have been exhausted).

Jus in bello (right conduct in war) – rules of warfare: proportionality in the use of force in each operation; discrimination (distinguishing between combatants and civilians); prohibition of indiscriminate violence and indiscriminate weapons

Jus post bellum (justice after war) – principles of postwar settlement: proportionality in demands on the defeated; restoration of rights and sovereignty to the losing side; fair punishment of guilty parties.

Criteria for the moral justification of war:

Self-defense as a primary and indisputable basis (both individual and collective). Humanitarian intervention in cases of mass human rights violations (genocide, ethnic cleansing). Restoration of justice. Defense of allies – fulfillment of treaty obligations to partners. Catastrophe prevention – preemptive action against a clear and imminent threat.

Restraining principles:

The principle of proportionality: The expected benefits of war must significantly outweigh the inevitable losses. The principle of discrimination: strict separation between military targets and civilian assets/individuals. The principle of necessity: use of force only where absolutely unavoidable to achieve a legitimate aim. The principle of humanity: minimization of suffering, adherence to international humanitarian norms.

Helping to comprehend the nature and conduct of modern wars is a major scholarly challenge for psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychotherapists. This would make it possible to offer a moral evaluation of the ongoing SMO, its methods, the philosophical and social meanings of Victory, and the tasks of postwar recovery. The Russian academic community still has time to develop a philosophy of just war.

The Role of the West in the Development of Anti-Russian Ideology in the Post-Soviet Space

Keywords: West, anti-Russian ideology, post-Soviet space

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THE global risks arising from the instillment of anti-Russian ideology on the territory of the former Soviet republics pose threats to the stable development of Russia and the international community as a whole.

In most cases, they stem from a single root cause – distorted interpretations of historical and legal events or the implantation of artificially created facts – to serve the interests of Western countries and their satellites, both in the post-Soviet space and globally, in pursuit of their neo-colonial plans.

The events of recent years in Ukraine clearly confirm the existence of a Western doctrine toward Russia, its population, and Russian people living beyond its borders.

For example, on the territory of Ukraine, [ethnic] Russians are forcibly being reprogrammed into Ukrainians, who are simultaneously being indoctrinated with hatred toward Russians simply for being Russian!

The destruction of the powerful state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the collective West led to the emergence of a number of independent states on its former territory. Nationalists, under Western guidance, were openly involved in the creation of some of them.

The current situation in Ukraine did not arise by chance; it was prepared over not just decades, but centuries, and reached its peak in the post-Soviet period. The ideological foundation for eradicating the Russian civilizational platform in this

region was laid even before the fall of the Russian Empire and the end of World War I, with the main goal of destroying Russia as a state, and the Russian civilization and culture as the cohesive, monolithic foundation of the state.

The present-day periphery, like nearly all other fragments of the Russian Empire and the USSR, has been assigned the role – at a minimum – of a conduit for Western ideas directed against Russians and Russia.

They are being woven into the matrix of deep Western consciousness, but, as the experience of liberated territories shows, the overwhelming majority of the population has preserved the centuries-old cultural code of previous generations, which serves as a civilizational compass enabling them to make the right choice.

Today, in the post-Soviet space, after the republics of the USSR gained independence, the imposition of anti-Russian ideology in these territories has led to risks and threats that require constant monitoring to develop preventive measures. A prerequisite directly contributing to Russia's national security is the development of these states within a shared political orbit with Russia.

To prevent and eliminate Russophobia in the former Soviet republics, it is necessary to: restore Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space for mutually beneficial development – from the humanitarian sphere to the economy; make full use of all instruments of influence – from “soft power” to economic sanctions and other measures to localize risks and threats; in the case of Ukraine, to achieve nothing less than victory in the SMO, with any further dialogue conducted solely on Russia's terms.

Contours of Britain's Policy in the Post-Soviet Space

Keywords: defense strategy, Global South countries, Britain and Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Central Asia

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AS THE ideological foundation of its foreign policy, the Labour Party has proclaimed the concept of “progressive realism.” Keir Starmer’s Cabinet understands “realism” to be an objective assessment of Britain’s capabilities and the international environment – not just for the purpose of building power, but to serve progressive goals. These certainly include the defense of democracy and global economic development, as well as combating climate change. Notably, these progressive goals are linked to concrete practical steps being taken by the government: Support for the Kiev regime, opposition to Russia, and relations with the Global South are, in a way, interconnected.

The Labour government is developing a new package of doctrinal documents, among which it has already made public the Strategic Defense Review, the National Security Strategy, and the Defense Industrial Strategy. Britain intends to build alliances on the principle of “NATO first,” but not “NATO only,” developing bilateral relations and mini-lateral alliances – particularly in light of the Trump administration’s desire to shift primary responsibility for security onto European countries. Keir Starmer’s government demonstrates continuity with the Conservatives’ anti-Russian course.

In the view of the British government, Russia is a long-term, generational threat to Europe, and long-term confrontation requires securing support from the rest of the world. As Fiona Hill, one of the authors of the Strategic Defense Review, stated, the SMO has become a proxy war of the “Rest” against the West. However,

Britain's geostrategic interest also lies in diversifying its imports of raw materials and critical minerals, the list of which is provided in the Strategic Defense Review (based on the Critical Minerals Strategy). Accordingly, London must promote its interests in resource-rich countries not only in terms of military security but also economic security.

The countries of the Global South are dissatisfied with Britain's self-interest and the collective West's overall disregard for their needs. The Starmer government intends to attract non-Western countries to its side not by demanding their full, unconditional support for the West's position on Ukraine, but through modest measures: asking Russia to withdraw its tanks and return "abducted" children.

Accordingly, the Labour government, which is prepared to support the Kiev regime until full victory is achieved, has set out to attract allies in earnest. The method – progressive goals such as promoting democracy, economic prosperity, development of transport infrastructure, and combating climate change – means assisting Global South countries in solving their problems, provided the finances allow. The same applies to the specific case of policy toward the newly independent states formed after the collapse of the USSR. There is not yet a unified policy toward these states, but Britain is already taking concrete action.

Russophobia and Ukrainophilia in Media Persuasion Strategies:

A View from Italy

Keywords: Italy, Russophobia, Ukrainophilia, media, war, “Western values”

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IN ITALY, we are witnessing a harmful intensification of Russophobia, which has recently reached such a level that it seems to be turning into sheer Russophobic panic: “Russia is the enemy,” “Russia wants to destroy us.”

For the government and the mainstream media, it seems that the only priority is to stir up anti-Russian sentiment, even anti-Russian panic among the Italian people. Yet to understand the absurdity of this “priority,” one must first look at how people live in Italy.

The outskirts of Italian cities have turned into slums, the health care system is in total disarray, social services are increasingly absent, public transportation on secondary routes resembles that of Third World countries. Jobs are scarce and poorly paid. The new generations have no future (at least if they are Italian).

But what are the priorities of the Italian government? Social welfare, health care, prosperity, jobs? No! The main goal is to convince Italians of the necessity of war with Russia. Obviously because Russia is a dictator and an aggressor. This persuasion campaign is methodical and carried out daily through the mainstream media.

The authorities are repeating the strategy used during COVID: First there was the virus, now there’s Russia. Indeed, with the start of the Special Military Operation, COVID disappeared in Italy, and media attention shifted to Russia.

Returning to the relentless propaganda campaign conducted by the Italian media, given that, despite claims of inevitable attacks, Russia is not attacking Italy, they devise truly sophisticated communication strategies that are classic examples of news manipulation: deliberate use of images and selective choice of words or verbs based on their semantic impact.

But this is “blind Russophobia” – we no longer have the tools to interpret this obscurantist drift through the lens of the social sciences. We must take a step back and return to the original meaning of the term “phobia,” a pathology in psychiatry. Russia continues to be viewed as “absolute evil,” but we do not see a parallel reaction from Russia: There is no “Italophobia” in Russia. In fact, any Italian who travels to and knows Russia understands perfectly well how deeply Russians love Italy and its culture. Russia and Italy boast centuries-old traditions of closeness – in art, music, and literature.

European Integration Projects as a Threat to the Union

State of Russia and Belarus

Keywords: geopolitics, Russia, Belarus, Union State of Russia and Belarus, European Union

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A DIALECTICAL view of international relations allows the Union State of Russia and Belarus to be seen as a paradox. It is simultaneously a union of two sovereign states and a single state, albeit still under construction. The Union State simultaneously addresses the task of reintegrating the post-Soviet space through economic integration across the Eurasian region and functions as a crucial factor in the post-Soviet space in the context of European security.

The most important thing to remember about any European integration projects for the post-Soviet space is that there has never been a place for Russia in them. And they have always strived to include Belarus.

The EU developed and launched a number of integration programs, the main ones being the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which worked most actively with Russia's closest partners within the CIS.

Thanks to the ENP and the EaP, a process of reforms based on a Western model was initiated in several post-Soviet countries – Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova – albeit not simultaneously. The westernization of Belarus failed immediately due to a rejection of European interference in its domestic politics. The ENP and EaP partially institutionalized the EU's presence in the post-Soviet space, which stimulated integration in the EAEU format.

The cooperation of three countries – Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania – within the framework of the LT and EaP creates the foundation of an anti-Russian group of East European states that competes with the Union State's geopolitical projects.

European integration in the post-Soviet space threatens the Union State with geopolitical isolation and a narrower maneuvering space for Russia and Belarus. The growing military threats from the West reinforce NATO's eastern flank and increase the burden on national budgets

The success of Western projects would reduce Russia's ability to serve as a center of power and an economic pole for its neighbors. Furthermore, Western success would signify the strengthening of transatlantic unity and a decline in the strategic value of the Union State – which for us is of vital importance. We must not allow this.

Deradicalization: New Opportunities for CIS Countries to Pool Efforts

Keywords: interstate cooperation, terrorism, CIS, combating radicalism

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Even though more than 30 years have passed since the collapse of the USSR, the post-Soviet space continues to exhibit a broad array of commonalities and areas in which efforts are being united and cooperation is deepening. Among these, the joint response to common challenges and threats remains a constant. Nothing unites people like a common enemy, a shared threat. This truth has been tested by time on numerous occasions. The recognition of a shared threat – one that requires a collective response – eliminates disagreements and promotes greater interest among states in cooperation and unification.

International terrorism and extremism have usually figured among the security threats that give impetus to interstate cooperation. Undoubtedly, this remains true – evidenced by the activities of interstate coordinating institutions such as the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO RATS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian group on combating money laundering and financing of terrorism (EAG). Issues of counterterrorism and counter-extremism are usually discussed at a dedicated section of an annual international academic and practical conference put on by Moscow State Linguistic University and the CIS ATC.

However, today, the agendas of many international and national security platforms increasingly include issues related to countering radicalism and preventing the radicalization of citizens.

Governments began taking measures to shield their citizens from the destructive influence of terrorist propaganda. This included monitoring and

removing radical content from social media and other online platforms; developing counter-narratives to expose the manipulation of radical propagandists; conducting media campaigns (such as student initiative competitions) to raise awareness about the dangers of radical ideologies; and implementing strict controls on travel to countries bordering terrorist activity zones.

After ISIS was suppressed, thousands of family members of former Islamic State militants ended up in Kurdish-controlled POW camps such as al-Hol and Roj. In response to the UN's call, many countries began implementing programs to repatriate their citizens – primarily women and children – from these camps. CIS countries became leaders in this effort.

This activity not only posed a number of complex, previously unencountered challenges for CIS countries, but also opened new opportunities for cooperation. Let us try to understand what this is about. By taking on the commitment to repatriate their citizens, each country began to develop its own approach to working with returnees – encountering hidden pitfalls and uncovering gaps in the process.

To facilitate the exchange of best practices, thematic conferences, seminars, and roundtables were initiated under the coordination of international organizations.

The discussion platform organized by the CIS ATC, bringing together practitioners and academics, made it possible to view the problem more broadly. On the one hand, it became clear that states are dealing with different forms of radicalization – political, Islamist, Nazi, and criminal. Accordingly, the work of reversing these processes would also appear to require different approaches. However, based on the presentations of experts, there are numerous areas where joint efforts can be applied.

The New War and the Security Structure of Russia's Borderlands

Keywords: Russia, SMO, Ukraine, the West, security, Russian borderlands

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UNCERTAINTY regarding the timing and prospects of peace agreements in the context of the Ukraine crisis persists. Against the backdrop of Russia's apparent readiness for peace talks, the West is preparing for a slow escalation and the exhaustion of its existential adversary through a protracted war – by striking infrastructure, imposing sanctions, engaging in socially subversive activities, and committing acts of terrorism.

This war is already underway. It is a long-term, remote war (carried out with drones), with strikes deep into Russian territory that target infrastructure and terrorist acts from within.

Ukraine is being outfitted as the Western frontier. It is a large, developed territory, restructured to confront Russia already today, and it is intended to be preserved in this sociopolitical and mental-cultural condition.

In response to this threat, starting in 2014, Russia has formed a border zone that includes the reclaimed territories – Crimea, Donbass, and Zaporozhye and Kherson Provinces. The confrontation within the hot phase of the Ukrainian crisis has also turned several “old” provinces into part of the borderlands – Kursk and Belgorod Provinces, and to this should be added the enclave on the Baltic coast – Kaliningrad Province.

Such a security structure for the borderlands is already being created. With the start of the SMO, the Russian General Staff initiated the BARS project (Combat Army Reserve of the Country) – a volunteer military formation for preparing and

training reservists. The incursion into Kursk Province confirmed the necessity of such units.

The supply of BARS units by their regions of formation means that governors, local authorities, and other engaged entities are directly involved, and a resource support system is being established.

Russia is responding to the Western Ukrainian frontier with restraint and the deployment of cutting-edge weaponry, new methods and modes of warfare, and the setup of an external security framework in the form of the borderlands, where local authorities bear responsibility for security on a par with the military and work in close coordination with them.

In conclusion, let us turn to Russia's strategic restraint. Convincing options for responding to the West's escalation and direct involvement in supporting Kiev have yet to be found or activated. For now, all responses to Western challenges are being directed at Ukraine. Meanwhile, the countries that are direct participants in the Ukraine crisis continue to feel safe. Moreover, the hysteria over the "Russia threat" and the provocations merely serve to justify the anti-Russian course, support for Ukraine, and the militarization of European countries.

Communication Regimes of Central Asian Countries **Under Changing Conditions**

Keywords: communication regime, Central Asia, Digital Silk Road, digital sovereignty, external influence, technological dependence

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THE concept of communication regimes is used to analyze and forecast the development of domestic and foreign policy communications. Its potential is particularly high under conditions of information and cognitive wars. We define a communication regime as a system of norms, rules, traditions, institutions, and tools that regulate communication channels and information content. Communication regimes of Central Asian countries are becoming an object of close attention from both domestic political and foreign policy actors. Domestic political forces seek to ensure the manageability of communications within the country, while foreign policy actors seek to influence them by establishing norms and rules that are desirable for themselves. Understanding that the countries of Central Asia differ from one another, in this article we nevertheless focus on common aspects characteristic of all countries.

The communication regimes of Central Asian countries are transforming under the influence of a complex set of external and internal factors. On the one hand, the region finds itself at the intersection of the strategies of Russia, China, Turkey, Western countries, and the states of the Persian Gulf, each of which employs its own tools of influence. On the other hand, domestic trends (a young demographic structure, digitalization, educational mobility, and shifts in the value orientations of

the younger generation) increase the receptivity of the communication environment to external impulses and, in the longer term, may alter its internal configuration.

Risks to the communication regimes of Central Asian countries are associated with information and technological dependence, whereby external platforms and algorithms can determine the rules of communication, moderation, and data governance. Competition among major narratives (from the pan-Turkic integration agenda to the concepts of the Russian World or Islamic justice) shapes not only new discourses, but also new lines of division within societies. Generational value shifts and the socialization of young people in digital and media environments lead to the formation of attitudes and norms that differ from those of previous generations and, in their own way, influence the perception of external and internal narratives.

The response measures of Central Asian states (the development of regulatory frameworks, laws on digital sovereignty, measures to counter disinformation, the creation of national platforms and regional cooperation mechanisms) indicate an aspiration to retain control over the communication space and its rules.

In the long-term perspective, the sustainability of communication regimes in Central Asia will depend on the ability of states to combine the development of their own digital infrastructures and regulatory standards with flexible foreign policy and regional cooperation. The formation of proprietary platforms, algorithms, and human capital, as well as the promotion of local value-based narratives, will be an important condition for preserving the information and technological sovereignty of the countries of the region in the context of intensifying external competition.

Victimization of Historical Memory in a Number of Post-Soviet Countries:
Main Goals, Objectives, and Countermeasures

Keywords: post-Soviet space, historical memory, victimization, Russophobia

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TODAY, the struggle to preserve historical truth about events of the past is acquiring civilizational significance. Before our very eyes, Nazism with a pronounced anti-Russian orientation is returning in a number of European countries. One aspect of this policy is the revision of key historical events, in which the central theme is not only the distortion of the truth about the Great Patriotic War, but also its complete replacement with the concept of World War II. Recently, a systematic offensive against shared historical heritage has been observed, and the front line of confrontation has moved deep into the post-Soviet space. There, among other things, it is worth noting the systematic work of various Western NGOs that are seeking to form a distorted set of ideas about the historical past, in which one of the key elements is the traumatization of collective memory.

The symbolic nature of contemporary Russophobia and anti-Russian narratives is very closely intertwined with national mythmaking. Some former Soviet republics that relatively recently gained state independence began to construct their own national identity, distinct from the Soviet one. In this complex and multifaceted process, a special place is occupied by the “national myth” – a heroic narrative about events of the past that is intended, and in some cases indeed able, to consolidate a people.

The goals and objectives of manipulators of historical memory are quite extensive. The organizers pursue an important goal: In addition to manipulating the

consciousness of young people and forming false notions of identity among the younger generation through the substitution of historical facts and symbols, the aim is to create a “new person – a compliant person,” free from reflection on a shared historical past. To this end, the mental and informational space is subjected to consistent and systematic cleansing of any alternative chain of events and information different from that produced by the puppet master manipulators.

In addition, a frequent objective is the construction of an artificial (illusory) national identity through targeted mythmaking and selective interpretation of historical events.

The main actors serving as conduits here are various Western organizations closely affiliated with unfriendly governments. They systematically work to sever the historical, humanitarian, and economic ties of post-Soviet states with the Russian Federation. An important element in the formation of a new memorial space in the former republics of the USSR was the emergence of such organizations as institutes of national memory, created in the late 1990s and early 2000s following the model of similar organizations existing in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

Nevertheless, there is confidence that jointly and with the assistance of the National Center for Historical Memory under the President of the Russian Federation we will be able to defend historical truth and, in historical territories, intensify the struggle against falsifications of historical memory. Certain existing memorial sites convey false value-behavioral meanings and should be completely dismantled. It is important to note that the majority of such memorials are not monuments of cultural heritage and are not registered as such. Educational and methodological materials that distort historical truth should be removed from secondary and higher education curricula, and instruction should be based on up-to-date materials.

Soviet Policy for Consolidating Peoples During the War Years

Keywords: mass evacuation, national unity, propaganda, mass repatriation, role of the Mongolian People's Republic

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THE need to consolidate the Soviet peoples around the leadership in the face of German aggression emerged at the first threatening stage of the [Great Patriotic] War, when well-known problems in this respect arose in the European part of the USSR. And, of course, it was necessary to strengthen the rear, particularly with regard to Central Asia, since the enemy's plans envisaged the formation of a fifth column from the South and Southeast. This latter problem was partially resolved by the joint deployment of Soviet and British troops to what is now Iranian territory. Two factors played a very important role here: first, the mass evacuation to the East of industrial enterprises and scientific, educational, and cultural institutions; and, of course, the policy and activities of the Soviet leadership aimed at strengthening ties among the peoples of the USSR.

This made it possible not only to continue the policy of industrializing the Central Asian republics; to develop coal, oil, gasoline, and rare earth production there; to generate electricity; and to send back in the opposite direction weapons and food needed by the front (in Uzbekistan alone, more than 2,000 combat aircraft were produced), but also to unite people in the face of the looming threat.

National unity was also ensured within the Red Army itself. About 35 million people served in it. In the late 1930s, all national military formations were disbanded, and formations and units became multinational. However, national military formations subsequently began to be introduced, though not everywhere. This measure served primarily propaganda purposes, designed to show that all peoples

were fighting a common enemy; in reality, in these national military formations, the proportion of ethnic Russians was large or predominant.

However, these phenomena themselves would have been impossible without the authorities' pronounced and pervasive propaganda activity aimed at consolidating the Soviet peoples into a single fraternal family and at orienting the country's many nationalities toward the struggle against the invaders.

Generally speaking, the leadership of the USSR met the objective of strengthening national unity, and the Great Victory gave it the right to speak of the success of the course pursued.

Myths and Truth About Turkey's Policy in World War II

Keywords: Germany-Turkey relations in the 1930s, intelligence centers in Turkey, England's provocative activities in Turkey, Turkey as a buffer

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OFFICIAL Turkish historiography interprets Turkey's position in World War II as allegedly neutral, portraying it as a kind of victim both of Germany and of the USSR. Turkish historians believe that Turkey did not in any way step beyond the boundaries of international law when it declared neutrality in 1939 and concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1941. Meanwhile, the signed Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Germany contradicted the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925.

Historical facts, Soviet and German archival materials, and especially recently published declassified documents of the SVR [Foreign Intelligence Service] bring to official public attention the unvarnished truth about Turkish "neutrality."

From the first days of Germany's attack on the USSR, a number of prominent Turkish political figures, as well as representatives of the general staff, actively supported extremely nationalist and semi-fascist organizations opposed to the USSR.

The German Foreign Ministry, for its part, encouraged the propaganda of Pan-Turkist ideas among Soviet prisoners of war of Turkic origin. Turkish military personnel repeatedly traveled to the Eastern Front.

The SS created its own Eastern Muslim formation, which included the North Caucasus combat group. Abwehr military intelligence likewise kept pace in this area: In its system, in the autumn of 1941, the Bergmann (Mountaineer) formation was established, with a special detachment for operations in the North Caucasus called Shamil.

Conflicting views regarding Turkey's "neutrality" persist in Turkish historiography and in the issue of the concentration of troops on the Soviet-Turkish border. As is known from official sources, by the summer of 1942, Turkey had deployed 26 divisions in the border zone. In response, the USSR was forced to keep four armies there. From documents of the German Foreign Ministry, it follows that the Germans demanded that the Turkish leadership "ensure indirect support for the forthcoming operations in the Caucasus."

In its foreign policy, Turkey made efforts not to enter the war on anyone's side. This position, for example, was actively defended by Turkey's President İsmet İnönü during the meeting with Churchill in Adana in January 1943. However, only in December 1943, at another meeting with him in Cairo, did the Turkish leader finally agree to consider the question of declaring war on Germany.

Reasoning from today's perspective, one can partly agree with the view of some Russian colleagues that at that moment, with the USSR at the peak of victory in the Great Patriotic War and with a new alignment of international priorities, it

sought not only to consolidate its military-political gains in Eastern Europe, but also to extend them to the zone of the Black Sea Straits and the bordering Transcaucasus region. In this situation, as is well known, Great Britain and the US acted as a united front against the USSR in defense of Turkey, assigning it the role of a kind of buffer in the confrontation with Moscow.

80 Years Since the Victory Over Fascism:

The Politics of Historical Disorientation in the Transcaucasus Republics

Keywords: 80th anniversary of the Great Victory, Great Patriotic War, Transcaucasus, falsification of history

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THE year 2025 marks the 80th anniversary of the Victory over fascism. It is extremely important to remember the true history of World War II, which for all Soviet people was the Great Patriotic War (GPW). History has a habit of repeating itself where it is forgotten. Therefore, by preserving the memory of the heroic pages of the joint struggle of the peoples of the former USSR against German fascism, we not only protect ourselves from new similar threats, but also rally together our peoples, who share common roots of friendship, brotherhood, and mutual assistance that go back centuries.

As early as July 1942, fascist troops had advanced deep into the territory of the USSR and reached the North Caucasus. From July 1942 to January 1943, Soviet forces fought defensive battles throughout the North Caucasus, from the Black Sea regions to the autonomous republics of the North Caucasus, from the Don River to the foothills of the Greater Caucasus.

In August-December 1942, elite German mountain infantry units were already fighting in the mountains of the Caucasus Range, on mountain passes, and seemed to be very close to victory on this sector of the front. The heroic defensive battles in the Caucasus denied the enemy the opportunity to redeploy its forces to the area of the Battle of Stalingrad and thereby further weaken the defenses of the Soviet troops. The victory at Stalingrad had a fateful significance for the Transcaucasus as part of the Soviet Union as well: The troops of the Southern Front of the Red Army gained the opportunity to begin an offensive toward Rostov and Krasnodar as early as January 1943. Turkish troops, seeing the [Soviet] victories on the Stalingrad and Caucasus fronts, did not dare to invade the territory of Armenia and Georgia and abandoned the idea of war with the Soviet Union.

The Final Victory of 1945 was for all the peoples of the Soviet Union, for all of Europe, for the entire world! In the post-Soviet space, this moment of unity began to be hushed up; virtually all former union republics emphasize their nationalist mythologemes, as if the war of 1941- 1945 had been a war of individual peoples against an abstract enemy. In many republics, the use of Soviet symbols is prohibited – the very symbols that are directly connected with the history of the Victory over Nazism.

In recent years, throughout the world, and particularly in post-Soviet countries, numerous cases of distortion of the history of the GPW have been observed, and the Transcaucasus republics are no exception. Publications appear in the media and programs are broadcast in which calls are made to revise the results of the GPW, even though within the CIS many documents have been signed prohibiting the glorification of Nazi and fascist heroes and the distortion of history.

The Russian leadership's increased attention to the Great Patriotic War as a kind of integration ideology in the post-Soviet space contains only positive motives. Russia does not claim credit for the achievements of other nations, despite the fact

that objectively, the lion's share of the victory over fascism belongs to the Russian people, as Joseph Stalin emphasized. This approach on the part of modern Russia is convincing enough to understand that Moscow does not seek to dominate the former Soviet republics, but rather proposes to preserve a historical community in which each entity occupies its place of honor.

The Great Patriotic War Through the Eyes of Young People:
Preserving Historical Truth

Keywords: Great Patriotic War, Motherland, Victory, young people, patriotism

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LOVE for the Motherland begins with respect for people and one's country, with an awareness of the value of the surrounding world and those around you, with proper family values, a sense of duty, and the desire to protect this world – this is where it begins. These are the fundamental messages instilled in a person from childhood. Today, an important task of the Union State of Belarus and Russia is the preservation of historical memory and historical truth about the Great Patriotic War, and this is especially relevant for the younger generation.

Today, it can be confidently stated that the mental space has become a field for civilizational battles. We see how historical truth about the Great Patriotic War is being deliberately distorted, how the role of our Motherland in the Victory over fascism is being diminished, how the number of articles justifying collaborationism and accomplices of Nazi occupiers is growing, how formerly fraternal peoples have instantly forgotten Russia's role in the development and formation of their republics, how, for the handouts of the collective West, they are ready to betray everything that

was created over centuries, and how false images and symbols based on a distorted historical and cultural code are being implanted into the consciousness of young people.

As experience shows, a threat to life and the destruction of the habitual way of existence catalyze national identity, which launches the process of mobilizing society – this is patriotism in action. It is critically important that this mobilization fully reveals the meaning and necessity of defending our value orientations. Today, the Victory should be presented not as some military event that occurred 80 years ago, but as the starting point of virtually all the achievements of society and of our countries, Russia and Belarus – the first flight into space, the satellite, the space station, the Baikal-Amur Mainline, the development of the North, new cities, robot couriers. All of this became possible thanks to the incredible, joint achievements of that period. There are some who would rather forget those events and thereby have condemned themselves to darkness. Well, that is their choice.

Only through awareness of the achievements of our forebears, interactive emotional immersion in what occurred, and its preservation in memory will it be possible to educate young people at the proper patriotic level, which is especially important today, during the Special Military Operation, when thousands of young people at the front are once again confronting the revanchist ideas of resurgent fascism and defending with weapons in their hands the rights and freedoms of humankind on Earth.

**“Together With Our Chinese Friends,
We Have Managed to Depoliticize APEC”**

M. Berdyev

Keywords: APEC, Asia-Pacific region, World Majority, Greater Eurasian Space, Global South and East

APEC is the leading platform for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, with broad geographic coverage and a balanced composition of participants. The APEC economies account for 60% of global GDP, and 40% of the world’s population lives within its territory. In 2025, GDP growth in APEC amounted to 3.1%. Essentially, this is the most dynamic part of the global economic system.

Russia attaches great importance to cooperation within this format with all constructive partners in the Asia-Pacific. Together with our Chinese friends, last year we were able to completely depoliticize this platform and also to de-Ukrainize it, despite the frenzied position of a handful of Russophobes who persistently defend the Nazi project in Kiev. Among them are Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, whose anti-Russian zeal has become a major burden for constructive work within APEC.

APEC events in China will undoubtedly become landmark occasions that impart tangible momentum and substantive content to regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

The Asia-Pacific region, like the entire world, is facing fundamental geopolitical challenges rooted in economic competition and rivalry. Western countries accustomed to ruling and dominating are intent on preserving this role at any cost. Their behavior, including the politicization of the work of multilateral platforms like APEC, exacerbates differences instead of moving toward constructive solutions in the interests of all.

At the same time, the stability and sustainability of the global system can rest only on the time-tested goals and principles of the UN Charter and the provisions of international law that regulate interstate relations, including in economics. Global governance mechanisms must reflect the interests of developing countries of the Global South and East, whose voices must be clearly heard in all multilateral formats.

Russia categorically opposes any coercive measures, as well as manifestations of colonial practices aimed at obtaining unilateral advantages in the spirit of zero-sum games. Today, we are obliged to combat these destructive tendencies effectively. The global economy has become genuinely multipolar. New economic engines – Russia, China, India, and ASEAN countries – are occupying leading positions in technological development, industrial production, and agriculture. One example is the area of digital transformation, where these economies hold leading positions.

This constructive mindset constitutes a solid foundation for productive work, including on the APEC platform, where we see significant creative potential. We are confident that it will make it possible to achieve truly important and tangible results during China's stint as host of the forum.

“BRICS Peoples Choosing Life”: Brazil

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Keywords: Brazil, BRICS, Russian-Brazilian ties, Langsdorf Expedition, cultural centers, youth diplomacy

LAST year, in 2025, Brazil chaired BRICS. Thus, the Brazilian stage of the program “BRICS Peoples Choosing Life” for five days in October transformed the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro into a space of culture, history, and shared values. The 2025 program was dedicated to the 200th anniversary of Grigory Langsdorf’s first Russian scientific expedition to Brazil, the 180th birth anniversary of the diplomat-humanist Baron of Rio Branco [José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior], the 100th anniversary of Russia’s public diplomacy, the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory, and the 10th anniversary of the “Great Teachers of BRICS” project. Academic discussions, art exhibitions, and youth festivals – catalysts of mutual understanding – once again demonstrated that the strongest ties are forged not in offices but in a space of mutual interest and sincere heartfelt engagement.

The program, created by the regional public organization “BRICS. World of Traditions” in 2022 and implemented this year in partnership with ANO “Iskra” with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Rossotrudnichestvo [Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation], and the Presidential Grants Foundation, began on October 13 at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). At the Russian-Brazilian Center Innopraktika, a roundtable was held where diplomats, scholars, and public figures met to discuss how official diplomacy could expand its capacities by joining forces with public diplomacy.

A landmark event was the signing of a cooperation agreement between the V.G. Timiryasov Kazan Innovative University and the Foundation School of Sociology and Political Science in São Paulo (FESPSP). This event also included the presentation of the project and books.

A key practical outcome of this stage was the signing of agreements to open two new “Great Teachers of BRICS” centers in Brazil hosted by FESPSP and the Federal University of São Paulo. These centers will become focal points for young people, where, through the study of the legacy of great humanists – Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Confucius, Nelson Mandela, Baron José Paranhos, the Baron of Rio Branco, and other teachers – the new generation will immerse itself in a system of eternal moral values and learn critical thinking, self-improvement, and peacefulness.

The Brazilian stage of the program “BRICS Peoples Choosing Life” stood as vivid confirmation that the strength of BRICS unity stems from its human, cultural, and moral dimensions. It demonstrated that beyond political declarations and economic calculations, there exists a profound layer of shared values, historical parallels, and creative aspirations capable of uniting peoples.

The program demonstrated the effectiveness of public diplomacy as a tool that builds bridges at the level of hearts and minds, creating a durable social fabric for a multipolar world. The next chapter of this story will be written in 2027 in Iran, where, as usual, events will be held under the slogan “From the ecology of soul and body to the ecology of the world.”

**Whoever Does Not Want to Write Their Own
History Will Become Part of Someone Else's**

A. Shchipkov

Keywords: Great Patriotic War, Nazism, modernism, history

LOOKING back at the Great Patriotic War, in which we achieved unconditional victory, we learn new lessons each time. The main conclusion: We Russians, victims of a “racial war” declared against us, who defeated the main enemy of that time in 1945, have the right to analyze its origins without any allowance for tolerance.

Nazism could not disappear in 1945, when Hitler’s Germany capitulated, because it is not only a German phenomenon but also a broader European and American one. It is the unified vector of development of that secular civilization that we still vaguely and cautiously call “the West” or “the Western world.” But today, on the threshold of another round of this historical confrontation, we can no longer, as we did in Soviet times, ignore the religious and philosophical roots of Nazism. An analysis of these roots points to the historical connection between Nazism and related ideologies and radical forms of Protestant teachings such as Calvinism, Puritanism, and Dispensationalism. At the same time, supremacist ideologies, from Hitlerism to Pan-Atlanticism, are linked to Enlightenment thought, which also has Protestant origins.

Today, we stand at the threshold of this era. Therefore, the current crisis of Protestant modernism could be accurately defined as a meta-conflict of our time. Its outcome will determine the resolution of many socio-cultural issues, in particular the future of Nazi-racist ideologies: whether they will survive or disappear.

Today’s global crisis reveals the true roots of the Enlightenment project as technocratic, as opposed to its presentation of itself as humanistic. By separating

man from God, Enlightenment secularism did not “liberate” him but rather subordinated him to the “god of technology.” Seeking to master the Universe as a “complex machine,” feeling himself its sole master, the modern superman created a situation of permanent global war for resources, the outcome of which ultimately was colonialism, Hitlerism, and pan-Atlanticism.

The existence of a traditionalist, fundamentally Christian Russia undermines the West’s convenient worldview based on a dichotomy of West and East, which supposedly cannot come together. The existing trinitarian model of “West-Russia-East” disrupts the mechanism for reproducing European racist identity.

This conflict has a profound existential and religious nature. Russia and Russianness are an eternal reminder to Europe of its apostasy from the faith of its fathers, from Christianity.

To sum it up, let us say frankly that we Russians have the exclusive right to the historical interpretation of the Great Patriotic War – by right of political sovereignty, as the victim of the attack, and as the side that won the war: only we, and no one else.

The Destruction of a People Is the Destruction of Memory:
The Ongoing Genocide of Galician Rus

**On the Issue of Moral, Political and Legal Assessments
of the First Genocide in the History of Modern Europe**

E. Popov

Keywords: genocide of Galician Rus, Thalerhof, the concept of “genocide,” death camps, “Nazism before Nazism,” Ukrainian nationalism.

THE genocide of Galician Rus and other Russian regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during World War I remains unknown to the general public and even to a significant portion, if not the majority, of the academic community. Meanwhile, the events of 1914-1918 marked the first act of genocide in the history of modern Europe. An analysis of the actions of the Austro-Hungarian authorities and their accomplices – Ukrainian nationalists – against the Russian (Rusyn) population of the Habsburg Empire suggests their genocidal nature, even though the concept of genocide itself was introduced into international law only in 1948. The statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on May 23, 2025, could change the situation regarding the silence about or inattention to the tragedy of Galician Rus.

The genocide of Galician Rus, as well as other Russian regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during World War I, is gradually gaining recognition – first in Russia and then, perhaps, in the international community. In this article, we examine the moral, political, and legal aspects of the problem stated in the title.

Russian historical scholarship and the education system are undoubtedly to blame for the lack of public awareness of the tragedy of Galician Rus and Carpathian Rus. This silence about the genocide of the Russian (Rusyn) people in the Austro-Hungarian Empire speaks volumes and has a flip side: The lack of moral and legal

condemnation of the executioners of Thalerhof and Terezin became an integral policy of the Hungarian authorities and their henchmen – nascent Ukrainian nationalists. For the latter, complicity in the genocide of their own brothers marked their debut on the political stage. It paved the way for the creation of the infamous Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (1929), one of the bloodiest forms of minor Nazism.

The genocide of Galician Rus and Carpathian Rus will remain an ongoing process until a moral, political, and legal assessment of the events of 1914-1918 is given and these events themselves are included in the educational process and public discourse in Russia and other countries. This framing of the problem does not promise quick results. But the first step toward breaking this unfortunate silence has already been taken.

From Ethnocide to Genocide:
Galician Rus and Rusyns
in the 14th-20th Centuries

K. Shevchenko

Keywords: Galician Rus, Rusyns, the Great War, Orthodoxy, Ukrainian nationalism, Nazism

IN CONTEMPORARY public consciousness, Western Ukraine, and especially Galicia, is rightly perceived as a bastion of radical Ukrainian nationalism, symbolized by the Nazi criminals [Stepan] Bandera and [Roman] Shukhevich. However, until the early 20th century, the indigenous East Slavic population of historical Galician Rus called themselves “Rusyns” [Ruthenians], unaware of their identity as “Ukrainians,” who at that time did not exist as a stable ethnocultural community, while the local Galician-Russian intelligentsia espoused ideas of pan-Russian unity.

Slavic history scholars note that Ukrainian self-awareness was absent among the broad masses of Galicia’s population at the beginning of the 20th century, and the ethnonym “Ukrainian” only began to spread after World War I. Many Galician-Russian public figures in the early 20th century noted widespread “Moscophile” sentiments among Galicians, emphasizing that they surpassed the Little Russian and Great Russian common people in Russia itself “in the development of a sense of national identity and in their deep attachment to the Russian rite and the church.”

By the end of the 19th century, Ukrainian nationalism began to acquire increasingly pronounced racial motifs. To more convincingly justify their separateness from Russia, the ideologists of the Ukrainian movement adopted the pseudoscientific theories of Polish ideologists, in particular Franciszek Duchński’s “Turanian theory” of the non-Slavic origins of the “Moskals”.

Russian contemporaries, closely observing the developments in Galicia in the second half of the 19th century, regretfully noted a schism among the enlightened Galician-Russian community. In their view, alongside the “old Russian party,” which advocated the unity of the Russian people and language based on rapprochement with Russia, a new party of “Ukrainophiles” emerged, striving for “separation from Russia, the formation of a free, independent Ukraine, and the recognition of its own language, separate from Russian.”

As the confrontation between the Ukrainian and Galician-Russian movements intensified in Galicia, Austrian policy against Russian Galicians noticeably radicalized. In the 1880s, Vienna shifted from administrative restrictions to outright criminal prosecution of the leaders of the Galician-Russian movement.

Ukrainian Nazism fully revealed its misanthropic nature during World War I, when Ukrainian activists in Galicia shamefully acted as informers on Galician-Russian activists and guards in concentration camps created by the Austrian authorities specifically for Galician Rusyns. For example, according to an eyewitness of the tragic events of World War I, in the infamous Austrian concentration camp of Thalerhof, “the greatest executioner of the Thalerhof martyrs was a Ukrainian, the Austrian officer Chirovsky, who surpassed all the Germans in his cruelty.”

Thus, the blame for the little-known genocide of Galician Rusyns during the Great War lies not only with the Austrian authorities but also with activists of the Ukrainian movement. With the formation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Vienna in 1929 and Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933, Ukrainian Nazism immediately entered the service of Nazi Germany, leaving a bloody mark on the modern history of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Byrnes Factor, or Truman's Attempts to Reach an Agreement With Moscow

A. Fomenko

Keywords: postwar period, Stalin, Truman, Byrnes pact, disarmament and demilitarization of Germany

HARRY Truman became the first American president to find himself in a position previously unfamiliar to Americans – that of leader of a universally recognized economic, military, and consequently political superpower.

Initially, he was willing to continue his predecessor's foreign policy and attempted to do so, not even changing the foreign policy staff he inherited from Franklin Roosevelt.

Truman's opinion of Stalin wasn't initially negative, as is evident from his diaries and letters declassified in the 1980s. There were no serious reasons (or even pretexts) for hostility between the two countries other than purely ideological ones. But the US's relations with both the USSR in the 1930s and communist (mainland) China in recent decades demonstrate that it is not inclined to pay excessive attention to the ideological peculiarities of its economic and geopolitical partners.

In 1945, the decolonization of the European empires, including the British Empire, desired by America, was about to enter a decisive phase. Geopolitical changes of this nature and magnitude were naturally fraught with economic and military upheaval: All colonial empires were expected to resist the inevitable – openly and covertly, armed and unarmed. The US, the sole economic superpower of the time, was least likely to be distracted from its global foreign policy by what seemed then to be minor tensions with the USSR. The possibility of relations between the two powers reaching a level of partnership and cooperation certainly existed.

The Plan for a Joint India Campaign by Emperor Paul I and Napoleon Bonaparte: Historical Fact or Fiction?

P. Multatuli

Keywords: Paul I, Napoleon Bonaparte, India campaign

THE notion of a supposed plan by Emperor Paul I and First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte to launch a joint campaign to India in 1801 with the goal of expelling the British has become firmly entrenched in historical literature. However, by that time, not only had no peace agreement been signed between France and Russia, but the parties had not even reached a common agreement on any of the issues under discussion, except for a shared desire to oppose England. Thus, officially, the Russian Empire and the French Republic remained in a state of war.

The most authoritative information on the project for the Russo-French campaign is presented in the preface by Field Marshal Count Magnus Björnstjerna to the memoirs of Field Marshal Count Curt von Stedingk, Swedish envoy to St. Petersburg (1790-1808). The memoirs themselves contain no mention of the campaign. Björnstjerna discovered an untitled document in the field marshal's papers, which he titled "Outline of a plan for a campaign against the English settlements in India, as it was developed by Bonaparte and Emperor Paul I."

According to Björnstjerna, this project was delivered to St. Petersburg in the spring of 1801 by Bonaparte's adjutant, General Géraud Duroc, on Bonaparte's instructions. Indeed, on April 24, 1801, Bonaparte instructed Duroc to take his letter to St. Petersburg and deliver it "personally to the Emperor of Russia." However, Bonaparte wrote this letter not to Paul I, who had been assassinated by conspirators on March 11 (24), 1801, but to his successor, Emperor Alexander I. In the letter, Bonaparte's letter contained no mention of a campaign to India.

On January 12, 1801, Paul I ordered General of the Cavalry Vasily Orlov, Ataman of the Don Cossack Host, to organize a military expedition to India with the goal of expelling British commercial “establishments” from the country. The necessity of the expedition was determined by Paul I based on England’s naval preparations for an attack on Russia. Paul I ordered an attack on the British “where the blow would be most painful and where they least expect it” – that is, in India. The expedition was to begin in Orenburg, pass through Bukhara and Khiva, reach the Indus River, proceed to the Ganges, and then to British-controlled territories.

The “outline” found in Stedingk’s papers bears neither a date nor a year of composition. According to it, the campaign was to last approximately 130 days. Moreover, overall command of the expeditionary force was allegedly entrusted to the French General André Masséna, “at the special request of Emperor Paul.” This fact alone casts serious doubt on the document’s authenticity. It is unlikely that Paul I, with his heightened sense of dignity, would have agreed to place the Russian Army under the command of a French general, especially one responsible for the bloody defeat of Alexander Rimsky-Korsakov’s corps in the Battle of Zurich in 1799. Furthermore, it is striking that the Russian side in Stedingk’s document is presented as serving the French, from the supply of forage, ammunition, and horses to the subordination of Russian troops to the French general.

Clerks of the Posolsky Prikaz:
Service to the Fatherland and to God

M. Yakushev

Keywords: Moscow Kremlin, clerks [dyaki] of the Posolsky Prikaz, дума clerk [dumny dyak], Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius, Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery

THROUGHOUT Russia's history, the monasteries of the First See and other Russian cities have been and remain important spiritual, moral, and cultural-educational centers of our state, and their fate has been closely intertwined with the history of the Russian state, its foreign policy, and diplomacy. One such place is the Holy Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius, a bastion of Christian Orthodoxy and Russian statehood.

The significance of the Holy Trinity Sergius Monastery is underscored by the fact that a number of prominent heads of the Posolsky Prikaz, who guided Russia's foreign policy, are buried in its necropolis. Other distinguished diplomats, including heads of the Posolsky Prikaz, repose in Moscow monasteries as well as in monasteries of provincial towns, to which some of them withdrew in the final years of their lives for spiritual service, having taken monastic vows.

The Trinity Monastery near Moscow was one of the principal pilgrimage destinations of Russian tsars, who were accompanied by prominent statesmen, including those serving in the foreign policy department.

It should be noted that virtually all ambassadorial clerks of the Russian state had prior diplomatic experience before their appointment, having served as podyachy in the Posolsky Prikaz. Some of them, at the end of their lives, became members of monastic communities, took monastic vows or the great schema, and were buried in monasteries.

The long-serving diplomats profiled in this article made a significant contribution not only to the development of state administration and the strengthening of the foreign policy relations of the Tsardom of Russia with foreign states, but also left a notable mark on Russia's cultural heritage and rendered memorable service to the Russian Church.

“I Explain Myself in the Style of Ben-Yehuda in Ancient Hebrew”

F. Georgi

Keywords: Russian Palestine, A.S. Solomyak, the Bilu movement, dragoman, ROPiT, post office

PRESERVING the memory of distinguished predecessors who devoted their lives to strengthening the Russian presence (and at times gave their lives) in the Middle East seems to play an important role in sustaining the traditions of Russian diplomatic Oriental studies and ensuring continuity among generations of Foreign Ministry officials. The staff of the Russian Embassy in Israel, like their colleagues around the world, carefully preserve, study in depth, and draw upon their historical legacy in order to take it into account in their work under contemporary conditions.

On February 10, 2025, a reception marking Diplomatic Worker’s Day was held at the residence of the Russian Ambassador to Israel, Anatoly Viktorov. The event was attended by representatives of the office of the president and the prime minister’s office of Israel, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and municipal authorities of Israeli cities, the diplomatic corps of friendly countries, UN officials, clergy of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem, numerous compatriots, and journalists. Guests at the reception were presented with the photo exhibition “I Explain Myself in the Style of Ben-Yehuda in Ancient Hebrew,” dedicated to Abram Samoylovich Solomyak (1863-1943), a figure of Russian Palestine, an outstanding and highly professional specialist who at the turn of the 20th century became the first practical Hebraist to serve as a Hebrew-language translator in the Russian diplomatic service.

In preparing the exhibition, a comprehensive study of Solomyak’s life was undertaken; unique photographs and archival documents, previously unknown to the general public, were painstakingly assembled from several Russian and Israeli state

and private collections (in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem), and the location of his burial was established.

The exhibition is displayed at the Russian House in the St. Sergius Compound in Jerusalem. Its electronic version may be viewed in a new section of the website “The Russian Imperial General Consulate in Jerusalem in Faces. On the 165th Anniversary of Its Establishment.”² The project was prepared as part of efforts to restore the chronicle of Russia’s foreign policy presence in the Holy Land; its aim is to draw attention to hitherto time-obscured shared pages in the history of Russia and Israel.