Islamic Caliphate is dead, but its dangerous and infectious ideology is alive

10:32 15.03.2019 • Vladimir Sazhin , PhD in Historical Sciences, senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

The year 2019 witnessed the rout of the Islamic Caliphate - the pseudo-state entity created on the territories of Iraq and Syria by the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, a.k.a. the Islamic State or IG, ISIL, Daesh (Arabic), a terrorist group outlawed in the Russian Federation. [i]

On March 1, 2019, just three or four years after the Islamic Caliphate terrorized the entire world, Kurdish units of the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria launched an offensive to flush out 500 jihadist fighters holed up in the city of Baguz, ISIL’s last stronghold in the country.

Does this mean that Islamist terrorism is now done for?

During the first decade of the 21st century, ISIL emerged as the biggest threat to international security and world order. On June 29, 2014 ISIL terrorists announced the creation of an Islamic Caliphate with claims to global domination.

As seen on the map [ii], the Islamic Caliphate, comprising numerous provinces, was to extend from China to the Atlantic Ocean, and from Central Europe and Siberia all the way down to equatorial Africa. The Caliphate encompasses all Muslim states without exception, including Iran and non-Muslim Israel, the territories "occupied by infidels," as well as the whole of the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, the Caliphate lays claims to Western Asia and Europe, including Spain, the Balkans, Romania and Austria.

The Islamic Caliphate went on to make the Syrian city of Raqqa its de-facto capital in 2014.

Although still far from achieving global dominion, the jihadists started building the basis of their future Islamic Caliphate by enslaving between 8 million and 10 million people in the occupied territories of Iraq and Syria, and virtually annihilating Syrian and Iraqi Christians, Yezidis, Shiites and Kurds.

In addition to Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State and its affiliates controlled parts of Afghanistan, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

ISIL also used its substantial financial resources to increase the number of “sleeper” terrorist cells in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Indonesia, the Philippines, the North Caucasus and various European countries.

During its criminal heyday in 2014-2017, ISIL was one of the most numerous and well-armed terrorist groups in the Middle East, boasting over 100,000 fighters active mainly in Syria and Iraq.

Add to these 27,000 to 31,000 mercenaries from 86 countries who, according to the Soufan Group analytical center [iii], fought in the ranks of this terrorist organization.

Equally noteworthy is the distribution of foreign ISIL militants by region and country (2016 – 2017) [iv]:

Former Soviet republics

8,717

Near and Middle East

7,054

Western Europe

5,778

Maghreb countries (North Africa)

5,356

South and Southeast Asia

1,568

Balkans

845

North America

444

 

Countries –main suppliers of fighters for ISIL:

Russia

3,417

Saudi Arabia

3,244

Jordan

3,000

Tunisia

2,926

Turkey

1,910

 

Equally noteworthy is data pertaining to the number of ISIL mercenaries from former Soviet republics (2015) [v]

Azerbaijan

216

Georgia

50

Kazakhstan

300

Kyrgyzstan

500

Moldova

1

Tajikistan

386

Turkmenistan

360

Uzbekistan

500

 

ISIL owes its temporary success in Iraq and Syria to these countries’ weak militaries, the seizure of their arsenals of advanced US-supplied weapons, and to the considerable financial resources looted from Iraqi banks. [vi]

And also to its militants’ religious fanaticism, the professional skills of former Iraqi and Syrian military officers who joined ISIL, to foreign mercenaries, the cruel and fear-instilling daily activities of this quasi-state, the ideological brainwashing of jihadist fighters and to professionally organized advocacy work.

ISIL’s bloody and ruthless way of dealing with opponents and the medieval laws it imposed on its subjects shocked the world. Even the ill-famed al-Qaeda that ISIL spun off from has come out against its “daughter,” with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri officially announcing in February 2014 that he did not recognize ISIL as a member of his group.

In their effort to secure the locals’ support, ISIL members tried, within the framework of their quasi-state, to restore the cities’ economic life by rebuilding their war-ravaged infrastructure. Imitating state authority, they paid salaries and benefits to the unemployed, collected taxes and paid monthly salaries of $700 to their militants. At the same time, in their brutal imposition of Islamist medieval order, they surpassed even the Afghan Taliban.

Propaganda and PR feature prominently in the ISIL leaders’ activity.

ISIL has “revolutionized” the field of online promotion of jihadist ideology by creating a powerful social movement and recruiting thousands of fighters from around the world, Russia included, through a web of social networks alone.

According to Yekaterina Sokiryanskaya, director of the Center for Analysis and Conflict Prevention, a leading expert on the North Caucasus, [vii] ISIL created a highly professional and ramified propaganda machine for recruiting online, consisting of “central” media organizations, such as Al-Furqan and al-Hayat, and “regional" ones. In addition, the AMAQ News agency provides coverage for the Caliphate’s military operations and its everyday life even without having the status of its “official” media outlet.

Propagandists enjoy a privileged status in ISIL. According to the propaganda researcher IG Charles Winter, during the organization’s halcyon days (2014–2015), spin doctors were paid seven times as much as regular fighters.

Since its outset, ISIL has put out over 41,000 media releases, with an additional 2.3 billion releases made by its supporters (The New York Times).

“The loss of territory, resources, the retreat and evacuation of fighters, compounded by problems with the Internet has significantly reduced the flow of jihadist propaganda,” Yekaterina Sokiryanskaya writes.

“Daesh will not be able to maintain the previous level and quality of its propaganda materials any time soon. Realizing that with the loss of its ideological machine the whole project of the Islamic Caliphate will eventually be doomed, the ISIL leadership is adapting to new realities with affected references to a high mission now making way for more down-to-earth calls for one-off attacks with knives and axes on unarmed people. This change of tactic began in late-2015, after security agencies of various countries had seriously complicated the process of bringing in new fighters to Syria. ISIL initially advised its supporters to look for workarounds, and later - to move to other "provinces" of the Caliphate. Finally, last year, ISIL said that those who could not reach the Caliphate proper should stage attacks back at home,” she continues.

This is an extremely important trend. Just as the Caliphate ceases to exist as a quasi-state, its subjects, who have survived the antiterrorist battles, remain. Islamist terrorism is taking a new shape.

The Islamic Caliphate created by ISIL is perhaps the highest organizational quasi-state form of modern-day Islamist terrorism. Terror (“Fear,” “horror” in Latin) was used by ISIL as a primary method of warfare. Therefore, it could be compared (in function, if not in scale) with Nazi Germany or militaristic Japan, where international terrorism was part of official state policy.

Even though chances of a complete reincarnation of either ISIL or the Islamic Caliphate are pretty slim, dangerous options thereof can’t be ruled out.

That terrorism is often used by non-state actors - whether left-wing, right-wing or nationalist - and religious groups, is well known. In the 19th and 20th centuries, hundreds of political parties and groups were known to have used terror in their work. [viii] Their activities covered virtually the whole world: from small settlements and countries to continents, and were often supervised and financed by individual states to achieve geostrategic ends.

It is highly probable that the routed ISIL will still be trying to preserve its remaining terrorist groups, rebrand old ones, and recruit new fighters. Moreover, what has remained of the Daesh forces will spread throughout the world.

As BBC columnist Frank Gardner writes, “At the recent Munich Security Conference, Alex Younger, the chief of Britain's secret intelligence service (MI6) said this: "The military defeat of the 'caliphate' does not represent the end of the terrorist threat. We see it therefore morphing, spreading out... within Syria but also externally... This is the traditional shape of a terrorist organization."

Speaking at the same event, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen said that ISIL was going deeper underground and building networks with other terrorist groups.

General Joseph Votel, who runs US Central Command, also said that even though the ISIL network is dispersed, pressure must be maintained or its components will have "the capability of coming back together if we don't." [ix]

Indeed, much of the ISIL militant force has not been destroyed and is now breaking up into small terrorist groups, which is only natural since ISIL is a plethora of jihadist groups fully capable of acting autonomously. .

With the rout of the Caliphate now a hard fact, ISIL is desperately looking for a way out of the situation. There are several such “exists” to speak of.

The first is the dispersal of jihadist fighters among the local population in Syria and Iraq, and the creation of “sleeper cells” waiting for an order to resume the fight.

A second option would be to redeploy militants to remote areas of Syria and Iraq, and the formation of guerilla units there.

Thirdly, this could be gradual infiltration into other countries where ISIL already has a base, or at least has supporters necessary for the organization to function further, perhaps under a different name, but with similar ideology and military-political doctrine. Primarily into Libya, where ISIL controls the cities of Derna, Nofalia, Sirt, and the Al-Mabrouk oil field. Moreover, in Libya, ISIL could become a third party in the ongoing confrontation between Tripoli and Tobruk.

In Afghanistan, ISIL has already become a third party in the long-running standoff between Kabul and the Taliban. However, the ongoing negotiations between the international community, primarily Russia and the US, with the Afghan Taliban (though in a separate format) could eventually ease tensions in that country which, in turn, would seriously undercut ISIL’s ability to influence the situation there.

In Egypt, local jihadists, taking orders from ISIL, control parts of the Sinai Peninsula.

Also, the Boko Haram group, which controls the north-east of Nigeria and is making inroads into neighboring Chad, Cameroon and Niger, has recently subordinated itself to ISIL.

There are certain opportunities now opening for ISIL also in Yemen, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Another “exit” option could be the return of the remaining jihadist fighters to their home countries, either individually or as part of small but closely-knit groups.

In the wake of the Islamic Caliphate’s downfall, many militants have recently returned home. About 30 percent of the 5,000 ISIL fighters (1,500) happen to be EU citizens. Of these, 300 have returned to France, about 900 people - to the former Soviet republics (including 400 to Russia), 800 - to Tunisia, 760 – to Saudi Arabia, and 250 - to Jordan. [x]

This process is characteristic of all 86 countries Islamist volunteers once set out from to defend the ideas of radical Islam.

Clearly, the presence of experienced and battle-hardened ISIL terrorists, sometimes even armed, in the countries of their current residence is dangerous, even disastrous for these and other countries’ security. Small wonder, therefore, that the world is getting increasingly aware of the real threat posed by this jihadist-terrorist contagion.

Religious leaders are united in their denunciation of Islamist terror.

Saudi Arabia’s Supreme Mufti Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh has branded the al-Qaeda and Islamic State jihadists the main enemies of Islam. He also quoted a verse from the Koran, which calls to kill the perpetrators of acts that "have a disastrous effect on Islam." [xi] Any compromises with bloodthirsty fanatics are simply out of the question. They must be eliminated once and for all.

Pope Francis has approved the use of force against Islamist radicals. The Pontiff believes that coercive methods should be used to protect religious minorities from militants. [xii]

The World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the Russian Jewish Congress (RJC) has urged the entire world community to stand together against the “disgusting wave of violence” against Christians in the Middle East. [Xiii]

In Iraq, the Shiite leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has reiterated his call for the Iraqi people to resist ISIL militants. [xiv]

Important as religious leaders’ rejection of terrorism and its perpetrators is, however, the same can hardly be said about the world community. Indeed, even in the midst of the fight against ISIL in Syria, the antiterrorist forces failed to present a shared understanding of the danger posed by their common enemy.

It is really unforgivable that a universally accepted definition of international terrorism has not yet been worked out. The term is often used as an instrument of political struggle, because each country actually decides for itself whether a certain group is "terrorists" or "freedom fighters." In Russia, 21 Islamist organizations are recognized as terrorist, and 33 in the United States [xv]. Moreover, actual definitions of “terrorism” often vary.

Coordinated fight is the only possible and effective way of ridding the planet of the scourge of terrorism. Unfortunately, there is no international legal basis for a collective solution of the problem. The experience of the past few years shows that a slow-moving and bureaucratic UN is not capable of providing quick and effective response to the threat posed by international terrorism. The world needs a fundamentally new and mobile international mechanism, structured to counter the terrorists’ extensive and diverse criminal activities.

The proposed idea of creating a supranational system uniting antiterrorist forces that would include administrative, information, analytical, intelligence, financial, counter-propaganda and power structures - well-equipped counter-terrorist units ready for quick deployment to troubled regions looks pretty viable. However, this international antiterrorist system must be established under the auspices of the United Nations, with its blessing, and rest on a solid legal foundation.

 

The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the position of the Editorial Board.

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[i] Created in 2006 as a result of the merger of 11 radical Sunni formations led by the al-Qaeda unit in Iraq. Simultaneously, a draft “constitution” was adopted, entitled “Notification of mankind about the birth of an Islamic state”. Until 2013, the group was called "Islamic State of Iraq." On April 9, 2013, the merger of the two "branches" of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria led to the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra group under the common name of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. (Levant - from the French “lever,” “to rise,” as in sunrise) - a historical region in the eastern Mediterranean, includes the territories of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Turkey and Cyprus. The Arabs call this territory “ash-Sham”). The group’s current name is "Islamic State." The goal is to create an Islamic emirate in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, with the prospect of capturing the entire Levant.

ISIL is banned virtually everywhere in the world, including Russia.

[ii] MilitaryArms.Ru homepage. Military review // URL: https://militaryarms.ru/armii-mira/islamskoe-gosudarstvo/ (22.02.2019)

[iii] The Soufan Group homepage // URL: www.soufangroup.com (02.03.2019)

[iv] Barrett R. Beyond the caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees. October 2017// URL: https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017-v3.pdf (20.02.2019)

[v] Eurasia Daily (EADaily) news agency homepage  // URL: https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2016/03/26/skolko-terroristov-i-iz-kakih-stran-voyuet-v-ryadah-daish-otchet-the-soufan-group (23.02.2019)

[vi] The group is funded from revenues from robberies, ransoms received after taking hostages, trading in the world black market with oil, antiques, weapons, human organs, drug smuggling. For example, in June 2014, ISIL militants robbed a branch of the Central Bank of Iraq in Mosul, taking away an estimated $900 million to $2 billion. In addition, ISIL is likely to receive money from private investors of the Persian Gulf, mainly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The organization’s current budget is estimated at around $7 billion.

[vii] Ye. Sokiryanskaya, The Gospel of the Knife and Axe. Novaya Gazeta, 11.11.2017. // URL: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/11/11/74515-propoved-nozha-i-topora (26.02.2018)

[viii] What is terrorism? // URL: http://on-infantry.narod.ru/teror/terrorizm.htm; Types of terrorism// URL: https://studbooks.net/574226/politologiya/raznovidnosti_terrorizma; Notion, types of terrorism and terrorist acts // URL: https://studfiles.net/preview/5715088/page:7/; Top 10 terrorist organizations. // URL: https://bugaga.ru/interesting/1146745638-top-10-samyh-izvestnyh-terroristicheskih-organizaciy-v-mire.html#ixzz5hNLSjHjd; The world’s best-known terrorist organizations. // URL: https://xotab-81.livejournal.com/278716.html.

[ix] Frank Gardner. Islamic State group: Could it rebound from caliphate defeat? // URL:  https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-47309445 (23.02.2019)

[x] Barrett R. Beyond the caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees. October 2017 // URL: https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017-v3.pdf(20.02.2019)

[xi] TASS homepage // URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1388435 (03.03.2019)

[xii] Gazeta.Ru homepage // URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2014/08/18/n_6405661.shtml (01.03.2019)

[xiii] STMEGI.COM homepage // URL: https://stmegi.com/posts/18325/vsemirnyy_evreyskiy_kongress_i_rek_prizyvayut_zashchitit_gonimykh_khristian_10335/ (10.02.2019)

[xiv] Voice of America homepage // URL: https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/iraq-unrest-shia-vs-sunnis/1936826.html (21.02.2019)

[xv] StudBooks.Net homepage // URL:  https://studbooks.net/571755/politologiya/organizatsii_priznannye_terroristicheskimi_rossii (07.03.2019)


 

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