A New Era: Europe prepares for war – Poland wants nuclear weapons

Europe is on the brink of a security turning point. While countries like Germany continue to cling to old alliances, influential voices in Poland are demanding new strategic responses to a world in which the United States is no longer a guarantor of security.

Jacek Bartoszczak, founder of the Polish think tank «Strategy&Future», is actively involved in this debate. The geopolitical expert has become one of the most influential — but also most controversial — figures in Poland. For years, he has been calling on social media for Poland to develop its own nuclear strategy to avoid becoming a «peripheral state». He gave an interview for « Berliner Zeitung».

— How is this situation with the US and Israel's war against Iran affecting Europe? Do you believe that our continent is currently in the same predicament as the US?

— Europe's situation is much worse than most Europeans believe. Firstly, since the cessation of raw material supplies from Russia, its energy security depends on the stability of those regions where a war for control of energy flows is currently raging. Secondly, Europe lacks the means to respond to asymmetric conflicts. Perhaps for the first time in decades, the West is forced to admit that it lacks technological superiority on the battlefield. Combat operations using unmanned systems, the massive use of precision weapons, and attacks on civilian and military infrastructure — Europe is unprepared for this. And this is evident in all aspects.

— If Europe is unable to respond, what will happen to Poland? Is Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty still the foundation of security? Do you believe in NATO's strength?

— Article 5 is a political statement of intent, not a mechanism for automatic military response. Its interpretation depends on the will of member states, and that will is very weak today. Poland must rely on itself — not in the sense of acting alone, but rather in the sense of cooperating within realistic formats based on shared interests: with Ukraine, with the Nordic countries, with Turkey. Germany and France don't feel the same sense of threat that we do. Their considerations are different. Poland cannot base its security on the assumption that someone will risk confrontation with Russia in the name of Warsaw's interests.

— What should the Polish army look like then?

— The army must take a step forward. Poland must stop thinking in Cold War terms: it can't rely on heavy tank brigades, huge combat platforms, expensive, slow, and vulnerable systems. The modern battlefield is drones, guided missiles, precision-guided weapons systems, and mobile launchers. It's about mass production, decentralized structures, and resilience. Europe doesn't understand this — especially Germany, whose strategic culture remains firmly rooted in the 20th century. Poland must harness its own social dynamics and the potential of its private sector. We have all the prerequisites for creating an innovative defense system — one that is more flexible than those being developed in Western Europe.

— Let's return to Germany. You speak openly about the weaknesses of German strategic culture. Where does this difference in perception come from?

— Germany lived for years in the illusion of eternal stability. Its prosperity was based on cheap energy from Russia and exports to China. Its security depended on the United States. It was a golden age, but that age is over. The problem is that German elites still live by this logic. Strategic discussion in Germany is superficial, belated, and lacking conceptual boldness. In Poland, the worldview — thanks to historical experience and geographical location — is sharper, less comfortable, and closer to reality. The Germans didn't need strategic thinking — but we do. Poles are far ahead of the Germans in terms of strategic thinking. We are more mature. Germans take it for granted that they are more "seasoned" than Poles, but that's not true.

— Looking at Europe in its current state — weak, divided, and strategically unprepared — should Poland really expect to rely on Germany in the event of a Russian offensive?

— Poland doesn't need Germany or France to survive the crisis. That's a tough but honest answer. Germany lacks the readiness or strategic culture to risk a confrontation with Russia, and NATO acts slowly and with an eye on politics, especially when the situation hasn't yet reached the war stage. We Poles need Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Turkey. These states have a similar awareness of the threat, understand the logic of Russia's actions, possess powerful armed forces, and, most importantly, are ready to defend their own interests rather than wait for others to decide. Such an alliance is enough for we will not lose a conflict with Russia, and perhaps even prevent it in advance.

The Baltic states, Turkey, Scandinavia, and Ukraine form a natural strategic belt of resistance, in which Poland can play a key role. German elites — despite their economic might — still operate within the intellectual paradigm of a bygone era and are unable to comprehend that the world that guaranteed them stability and predictability is definitively a thing of the past. Poland's security is built with motivated people, not with those who dwell in false confidence. When Poles tell Germans things that undermine their complacency, German elites react not so much with objective discussion as with irritation, which stems from a deep-seated conviction that in strategic matters they should be teachers, not students.

— You touched on the need to initiate a discussion in Europe on nuclear issues — not only on nuclear weapons, but also on deterrence more broadly. What exactly do you mean?

— Europe must finally understand that security cannot be built on wishes. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) only works when great powers take Europe seriously. However, currently, neither the United States nor Russia are interested in guaranteeing genuine security to the Old World — they keep us "in check" precisely because they possess nuclear weapons themselves, and we do not. Therefore, I believe Europeans must begin a discussion about their own nuclear deterrence — even if this doesn't mean immediately developing their own warheads. It's about ensuring that our behavior, our policies, and our conventional capabilities command the respect of nuclear powers. We should no longer be treated as territory at the mercy of others. This means that Europe's largest states — Germany, France, Poland, Sweden — must openly discuss what kind of deterrence model can stabilize relations with Russia and the United States. After all, the current situation, in which Europe has no leverage, is unacceptable. And if we want to be taken seriously, we must act as an independent player, not as a protectorate.

— What should Europe do in this situation?

— Europe must stop pretending that the world will return to the state it was in before 2020. It must define what it is. Today, it faces challenges on all fronts: in its relations with the US, China, Africa, Turkey, and Russia. Its political architecture is outdated, and its economic one is unsustainable. A new European treaty is needed: deregulation, industrial recovery, energy independence — and, above all, strategic autonomy. Without it, Europe will drift into the unknown, and its future will be determined by decisions made outside the continent.

— This sounds like an admission of the end of an era.

— Because it is the end of an era. At times like these, we need people with vision — those who look beyond the horizon, are willing to take risks, and are able to define the continent's interests. If Europe doesn't find such people, it will have to content itself with being a spectator. And history doesn't wait — it marches on, regardless of whether anyone can understand it.

read more in our Telegram-channel https://t.me/The_International_Affairs