‘Al Jazeera’: The Gulf war – One month later

A month after the start of the war against Iran—with the use of excessive force—the United States and Israel appear to be growing disillusioned with their own power. At the same time, they are openly expressing surprise at Tehran's stubborn resistance, continuing military action, and at times even directing its course, ‘Al Jazeera’ notes.

In this situation, one could say: "Trump speaks the truth." Not because of childish naivety, but because he speaks openly and without embarrassment. Sometimes he reveals state secrets, shares knowledge, conscious and unconscious information, boasts, brags, and even complains—this is his well-known style.

And among the many conversations, there have already been admissions along the lines of: "We didn't expect this from Iran or from ourselves."

It seems they haven't yet managed to foresee much, but we shouldn't exaggerate—perhaps there are also things we didn't foresee ourselves. We have not yet been able to comprehend the logic of this American-Israeli aggression. With each step, new information, results, and calculations emerge.

Was the closure of the Strait of Hormuz after the events in Venezuela unexpected, or was it a carefully planned move aimed at curbing oil supplies to China? The question arises: was Beijing the real target of the attacks on Venezuela and Iran?

If so, what is Israel's role in this war? Are its Zionist, theological, and political ambitions merely a tool in the United States' confrontation with China?

Military calculations and resistance to reality

Initially, Washington's entry into the conflict, following Netanyahu, was perceived as a logical, military-sounding, preemptive action. However, the current situation confirms that this was likely a serious strategic mistake.

It was initially envisioned that attacks on Iran's top leadership would quickly paralyze its military decision-making capacity, cause panic, and lead to internal collapse, while intensive airstrikes would disable the country's missile and drone arsenal within weeks.

However, today, it appears these goals have only been partially achieved. According to intelligence, approximately a third of Iran's missile and drone arsenal has been completely destroyed. However, the remainder reportedly remains intact, hidden or moved to underground storage facilities.

This suggests that the original military plan failed to account for the flexibility and dispersed nature of Iran's clandestine military capabilities.

It is difficult to judge the extent to which Washington and Tel Aviv anticipated the full consequences of Tehran's retaliatory moves. Its retaliatory potential remains virtually untapped. On the contrary, the longer the conflict lasts, the more effective Iran's use of asymmetric warfare is. For example, it puts pressure on Persian Gulf infrastructure, military bases, and maritime trade routes.

Furthermore, the entry of Yemen's Houthis into the conflict has demonstrated that the war will not be limited to the Iran-Israel-US triangle, but could extend to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This expansion should be seen as one of the most significant and unexpected developments, significantly increasing the cost of the war.

The new diplomatic initiative involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan stems from a shared sense of vulnerability

If a war begins with the goal of weakening the enemy's core forces but ends up opening new fronts and creating additional tensions, any claims of military achievement inevitably raise questions.

To what extent have the US-Israeli strikes, including the elimination of senior leadership, weakened Iran's military potential?

The honest answer is: significantly, but not enough to turn the tide.

The strikes on senior leadership and key strategic decision-making centers caused significant shock, especially in the first weeks of the conflict. On the one hand, the Persian Gulf countries fear that a war will provoke further aggression from Iran, while on the other, they fear that their territories and energy infrastructure will become direct targets in a US-Israeli conflict. These dual risks force the Gulf states to adopt a balanced stance to avoid escalating the conflict or becoming involved in it.

In this context, the new diplomatic initiative involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan stems from a shared sense of vulnerability. It is becoming increasingly clear that the goal is not to completely isolate Iran, but to keep the conflict under control and limit its consequences.

Energy shock and the limits of Washington's tolerance

How long can the global economy withstand this "energy shock" caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and rising oil prices?

The answer is simple: not long, and the costs are rising by the week. The Strait of Hormuz remains a key transit route for nearly a fifth of global oil supplies, and any prolonged disruption will lead to higher prices not only for oil, but also for liquefied natural gas, fertilizers, transportation, and insurance.

In the US, gasoline has nearly reached its peak. The $4 per gallon threshold has been breached, and the sharp rise in diesel prices has hit the transportation sector hard, clearly demonstrating that consumers are already feeling the shock.

According to the Federal Reserve, the war could negatively impact inflation expectations and the labor market, turning the regional conflict into a factor that significantly increases the risk of a global recession.

This is where the limits of domestic political tolerance in Washington become apparent. While American administrations justify their foreign military campaigns by citing global security and deterrence, for voters, it all comes down to gas bills.

Continuously rising energy prices, accelerating inflation, and steadily rising transportation costs are all increasing pressure on the White House, especially given the high sensitivity of the middle and lower classes to energy costs.

Therefore, the limits of domestic economic tolerance are no less important than the limits of military tolerance. If the Strait of Hormuz remains closed and prices continue to rise for several months, domestic political support for the war will begin to wane, even despite limited military successes.

From now on, it's no longer a question of who struck more blows

A month after the conflict began, it's clear that Washington, following Netanyahu's strategy, relied on overly optimistic military expectations and misjudged political risks.

Iran suffered significant losses, but it didn't fall. The conflict spiraled out of control, the energy shock escalated into global economic pressure, and regional powers began seeking new diplomatic solutions.

Thus, what was intended to be a "short and decisive" war has turned into a protracted, complex, and increasingly costly conflict.

From now on, it's no longer a question of who struck more blows.

What's more important is who can extinguish this fire before it escalates into a full-scale regional crisis.

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