Caspian Post: What the hijab dispute reveals about relations between Baku and Ankara

9:25 26.10.2026 •

The current tension between Baku and Ankara over the issue of the hijab in Azerbaijani schools has become more than a dispute over dress or educational regulations. It has clearly exposed the limits of the well-known formula: “one nation, two states,” Caspian Post writes.

That formula still reflects the profound historical, linguistic and cultural affinity between Azerbaijan and Türkiye. Yet it does not alter an obvious fact: under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the two countries have developed on the basis of fundamentally different political and state models. They are united by ethnic kinship, strategic interests and shared historical memory, but they have different views on the role of religion in society, the limits of state intervention and the very logic of national development.

An issue of particular domestic significance

For Azerbaijan, secularism is a foundation of statehood. Secular nationalism and the separation of religion from the state are not simply a legacy of the Soviet period, as is sometimes claimed. These principles were established during the years of the First Azerbaijan Republic, from 1918 to 1920. It was then that Azerbaijan developed one of the most progressive models of statehood in the Muslim world for its time, including in the sphere of women’s political and social rights.

This issue also carries particular domestic significance for Azerbaijan. The country is home not only to Shiites but also to Sunnis-both ethnic Azerbaijanis and representatives of North Caucasian peoples, including Lezgins and Avars. It also has a sizeable Orthodox Russian community and an active Jewish community. In such an environment, turning religion into an instrument of state-building would inevitably create dangerous fault lines between Shiites and Sunnis, as well as among different ethnic and religious groups.

This is precisely why Azerbaijan’s political elite has deliberately chosen a model in which the state maintains a distance from religion. This course was laid down during the First Republic and remains strategically important today. It is particularly relevant given the Iranian factor and Tehran’s efforts to expand its religious and political influence in Azerbaijan.

Türkiye under Erdoğan, by contrast, has moved towards a marked strengthening of religion’s role in public and political life. In the Turkish political context, the hijab carries a particular symbolic weight. For many conservative segments of society, it is seen as a symbol of overcoming the restrictions that existed during the era of strict Kemalist secularism.

But the issue is, of course, not limited to the hijab. Erdoğan’s political project has been built on a combination of Turkish nationalism and Islamic identity. The formula “one nation, two states” primarily reflects the ethnic and national affinity between Azerbaijan and Türkiye. Yet the current Turkish leadership views the country not only as a centre of the Turkic world, but also as an influential part of the Islamic world. Religious solidarity often serves as an important component of both domestic and foreign policy.

Why Türkiye and Azerbaijan need each other

Within this framework, there is also a growing desire among parts of Türkiye’s conservative society to see Islamic norms promoted more actively beyond Türkiye itself-in states perceived as close allies or as part of a common cultural space.

The current incident has therefore once again brought to light a latent tension that has long existed between two fundamentally different models of statehood: the Azerbaijani and the Turkish. The formula “one nation, two states” reflects historical, linguistic and cultural proximity. But it does not eliminate differences in political priorities, social organisation and perceptions of religion’s role.

The ethnic dimension of this discussion usually remains in the background. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly spoken of family roots connected to the Black Sea region. More important, however, is the fact that his political identity and worldview were shaped primarily within a conservative Islamic environment. For the current Turkish leadership, Islamic solidarity is therefore often no less important-and on certain issues, perhaps more important-than Turkic integration itself.

Türkiye cannot build a comprehensive Turkic policy without Azerbaijan’s participation and consent. In this sense, Baku is not merely Ankara’s ally but an independent centre of influence. This, too, may generate latent rivalry, particularly over which ideological model should shape the future of the Turkic space: a secular, nationally oriented one or a more religiously political one.

The Israeli factor

A separate factor is Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel. For Baku, this relationship is not limited to military-technical cooperation. Its ties with Israel are an important element of foreign-policy diversification, security, technology and defence cooperation. Azerbaijan consciously does not want to depend on any single centre of power, including its closest ally.

This logic is entirely understandable. A state that depends completely on one supplier of weapons, technology or political support inevitably becomes more vulnerable. Cooperation with Israel enables Azerbaijan to preserve room for independent manoeuvre in its relations with Ankara, Moscow, Tehran and other external actors.

For parts of Türkiye’s conservative camp, Baku’s close ties with Israel may be a source of irritation-particularly amid the emotionally charged political agenda surrounding the Middle East.

There are likely other, less visible economic and political contradictions as well. Azerbaijan has substantial investments in Türkiye and maintains extensive ties with Turkish elites, business circles and media outlets. Baku has long learned to develop its own channels of influence abroad, including in Türkiye. This makes bilateral relations more complex than they are usually portrayed in public rhetoric.

Behind the outward image of brotherhood lies real politics-competing interests, elite influence, struggles over the information agenda and differing views of regional leadership.

Both sides understand the value of their strategic alliance

Judging by the statements made by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Baku, both sides understand the value of their strategic alliance and have no interest in undermining it. Azerbaijan seeks to preserve the current formula of relations: a close alliance with Türkiye, without political subordination. A serious escalation with Baku would also be highly disadvantageous for Ankara, weakening Türkiye’s position in the South Caucasus, Central Asia and the broader Turkic space.

Most likely, the current tension will gradually subside. But its underlying causes will not disappear. The differences between the two state models, competition for influence in the Turkic world, the religious factor, Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel and Baku’s drive for strategic independence will continue to create potential points of friction.

That is why the striking aspect of the current crisis is not that it has emerged, but that such deep and objective contradictions remained largely unspoken for so long. The history of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations shows that the alliance between the two countries has never been entirely free of complications: the interests of Ankara and Baku have not always coincided, including during critical periods of the twentieth century and in the 1990s.

Yet both capitals have so far managed not to allow such disagreements to undermine their strategic partnership. That will be the central test today as well.

Erdoğan’s message and the upcoming Turkic states summit

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan published a message on social media marking Azerbaijan’s Restoration of Independence Day. The gesture was welcomed by some observers amid the growing public controversy surrounding the two countries.

Others have suggested that the significance of the message, and the broader state of bilateral relations, will become clearer following the upcoming summit of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS).

Turkey is scheduled to host the organisation’s 13th Summit of Heads of State and Government in Ankara on 29-30 October 2026. The meeting is expected to bring together leaders of member states, including Aliyev.

Whether Aliyev attends the summit, and the nature of any public statements or bilateral meetings held during the event, may offer an indication of how Baku and Ankara intend to navigate the current tensions.

 

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