РУССКИЙ
11:39 27.03.2026 •
With parliamentary elections in Hungary slated for April 12, not since the regime change in the late 1980s have the preparations for the elections and the election campaign reached such a fever pitch and attracted such intense attention from the entire world.
And with very good reason too, since a possible shift in the country's foreign policy that a victory by the opposition Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar, could bring about. Curiously, the parliamentary elections in one relatively small European country lay bare the dividing lines in global politics, and above all, the emerging rift between the political elites of the United States and Europe.
US President Donald Trump has unequivocally and decisively sided with Hungary’s current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, whom many in Europe call the White House's "European eye." During his visit to Budapest, which came hard on the heels of the Munich Security Conference, Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly promised Orbán every possible help from the Republican Party to ensure his victory in the upcoming elections. US Vice President J.D. Vance plans to visit Hungary soon, reportedly to support "Trump's friend," i.e., the head of the Hungarian government.
This is despite the fact that the White House is certainly well aware of Viktor Orbán's spats with EU structures, his unique position on EU foreign policy, his particular approach to the crisis in Ukraine, and other issues. Victor Orbán de facto blocked the EU's decision to provide a €90 billion aid package for the Zelenskyy regime, and demanded (along with his Slovak colleague Robert Fico) that Kyiv immediately restore energy transit to Europe via the Druzhba pipeline, through which Hungary received cheap Russian oil.
With relations between Budapest and Brussels having hit the depths, European institutions are being forced to change their rules of decision-making, replacing the previous consensus rule - that is, the unanimity of all EU members - with a shift to a qualified majority voting system where decisions are implemented only by the member states voting in their favor. Unfazed by the EU’s changing tactic, Victor Orbán speaks openly about the contradictions within the Union and its inevitable collapse unless Brussels abandons its delusional idea of preparing for war with Russia. He does not want to fight Russia because everyone in Hungary remembers well the 130,000 of its soldiers who died during the battle at the Don River (the Don Bend disaster) in January 1943 – an irreparable loss for such a relatively small country that no one wants to happen again.
Many in Europe, including in the EU’s largest member states, France and Germany, share the Hungarian leader's view. For Macron and Merz, Orbán's victory on April 12 would precipitate their own defeat in the near future, that is why they are doubling down on their efforts to support the Hungarian opposition, while simultaneously inciting the Zelenskyy regime to continue its fight against Russia "to the last Ukrainian soldier."
Besides, many in Europe now share the Hungarian prime minister's position. This is an influential minority across the continent, and in some countries, a conservative majority that one could call a "Trumpist International." Hence the White House's unconditional and very significant support for Viktor Orbán and his party.
However, the support of European institutions and the UK for Péter Magyar's opposition party appears no less significant. It is no secret that EU countries have provided him with financial assistance and, according to information recently leaked to the media, even direct support, including from European intelligence agencies. Some say that if Orbán wins, Hungary will face a new large-scale "color" revolution similar to the infamous Maidan. Small wonder that the Kyiv regime has also actively joined this campaign.
One way to influence the outcome of the election campaign is to publish biased forecasts that clearly favor the opposition. However, anyone familiar with the Hungarian political mentality, these forecasts are either meaningless or reveal just the opposite. Just as during the János Kádár era of "salami socialism," people in Budapest preferred to watch movies vilified by official critics, so now Hungarian voters can favor the party and leader who will be most harshly criticized by European institutions. Moreover, voters view the economic situation at home, which is better than in many other European countries, as the result of the multi-vector policies of the experienced Victor Orbán, who is now Hungary’s longest-serving premier. Thanks to his energetic, sometimes almost violent, economic and financial policies, the country still enjoys cheaper electricity, gasoline, and diesel fuel than citizens of many other European countries. Whether young Péter Magyar will preserve these gains is a big question.
Where does Russia come in in this global geopolitical landscape centered in Budapest? First, a Russophile government can hardly come to power in Hungary, and Orbán's government, should it win, is no exception here. Historically, both of Hungary's main national holidays coincide with the dates of the Soviet invasion. In school history classes, children are told the heartbreaking story of how the genius of the Hungarian people, poet Sándor Petőfi, died heroically fighting Russian Cossacks in a cornfield. Stories like this are a dime a dozen.
There is another angle to the issue, though. The modern-day Hungarian citizen is accustomed to thinking independently and rationally. He knows full well just what a small country can and cannot do on a European and global scale. What he values the most is freedom and an independent foreign policy that the country has acquired on Viktor Orbán’s watch.
Twice in history, against the will of its people and its leaders, the country was drawn into devastating, bloody world wars, suffering huge losses, and losing two-thirds of its former territory. Now, thanks to its equidistance from the centers of the emerging multipolar world, Hungary has finally regained freedom of choice largely ensured by the "Soviet legacy" – access to cheap energy, a nuclear power plant, the capital's subway, and much more. In fact, the thirty-three-year period (1956-1989) of so-called Kádár* socialism was by no means the worst period in Hungarian history. It was a time when Hungary was getting cheap energy from the Soviet Union and exporting high-tech products (like Ikarus buses) to many countries around the world, while simultaneously being able to secure cheap Western loans, knowing that if its hard-currency debt suddenly went through the roof, it could always appeal to the Kremlin, and someone in the Politburo would invariably say "We must help" - a phrase that was sacred to our bilateral relations during that period.
This is why Fidesz's policy is not a personal whim on Viktor Orbán’s part, but a reflection of the real state of things now existing in Hungary and elsewhere in Europe. Following the Hungarians, millions of Europeans now begin to realize that breaking up economic ties and cooperation with Russia, so beneficial for European countries, is causing colossal damage to their own economies and doing much lesser harm to the Russian economy. Moreover, this disruption makes Europe a submissive vassal of the United States.
When introducing sanctions against Russia, some European leaders believed that Moscow would not survive even six months without exporting its energy resources to Europe and importing European consumer goods and technology. No longer. Russia has found new markets for its goods in the East and the Global South, and replacement of imported products from Europe with competitive domestically produced analogues has contributed to strengthening Russia’s technological sovereignty.
Due to these objective circumstances, the number of Eurosceptics and Trumpists is high in Germany and France; in Italy, they largely determine the country's foreign policy, while Spain combines its Euroscepticism with anti-Trumpism and rejection of US aggression against Iran. These factors give Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party relatively high chances for victory in the upcoming elections. That said, Tisza's party leader, Péter Magyar, would also have to take these factors into account if he wins, which cannot be ruled out either.
* First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (1912 - 1989)
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