Incivility in Diplomacy as a Reflection of the Crisis in Foreign Policy Culture

The American response is all but a model of diplomatic manners compared to NATO’s document. NATO sent us such an ideologically motivated answer, it is so permeated with its exceptional role and special mission, that I even felt a bit embarrassed for whoever wrote these texts.1

Sergey Lavrov

THE 2020s have been characterized by a profound crisis of confidence in international relations and world politics manifested in the use of political, psychological, and rhetorical methods and techniques that are atypical of traditional diplomatic practices and do not correspond to generally recognized norms of diplomatic protocol. Such manifestations include, for example, the use of unverified information and disinformation, the dissemination of deliberately false information (“fake news”), the unilateral disclosure of confidential face-to-face or telephone conversations to the media, and the publication of diplomatic correspondence not only as an unoficial translation but also as direct copies of informational documents (notes, letters, telegrams, and attachments to them). We also see the use of undiplomatic expressions (accusations, insults, name-calling, threats, blackmail, jokes) against counterpart or senior foreign or international oficials, albeit primarily behind their backs, as well personal correspondence between such individuals on publicly available electronic mail services, instant messengers, and social networks.

The following incidents can be cited as specific examples of actions that were unfriendly toward Russia.

The year 2020, initially marked by an unprecedented level of cooperation and mutual assistance between states in combating the spread of the novel coronavirus infection, was darkened by biased political assessments uttered by most Western leaders following the results of the national vote to approve amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation held in the summer of the same year. By the end of the year, the destructive tone of our foreign “partners” reached its emotional peak due to the investigation into the so-called “Navalny case” regarding his alleged poisoning.2 At that point, conventional rather than national organizations (the UN Human Rights Council and the OPCW Technical Secretariat) published their confidential communications with the Russian Foreign Ministry on this matter – a first in diplomatic practice.3 In response, the Russian Foreign Ministry published its entire dossier on the case, including the correspondence with the aforementioned multilateral bodies and requests from the Prosecutor General’s Ofice of the Russian Federation addressed to law-enforcement agencies in Germany, France, and Sweden.4 In early 2021, after the voluntary return of the person in question and

his expected arrest on numerous criminal charges in Russia, US President Joe Biden, in his bumbling response to a provocative question from a journalist, made it clear that he was accusing Russian President Vladimir Putin of an assassination attempt against Navalny.5 In March 2022, the American leader called his Russian colleague a war criminal6 – a statement that he later repeated.

Throughout 2021, Russia’s position, its role in intra-Ukrainian reconciliation, and its approach to the advisability of continuing this work in the Normandy Format were deliberately distorted. To put an end to these speculations, the Russian Foreign Ministry decided to open primary sources to public scrutiny and publish the diplomatic correspondence between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his German and French counterparts, Heiko Maas and Jean-Yves Le Drian.7 Simultaneously, the Russian foreign minister asserted his belief that his European counterparts would recognize the necessity of such an unconventional move. He stressed that this was about conveying the reality to the global community about who truly abides by international legal obligations, and how these obligations, agreed upon at the highest levels, are fulfilled.

At the very end of 2021, draft agreements between Russia and the US on measures to ensure the security of Russia and NATO member states8 were submitted to the American side. The Russian Foreign Ministry then provided the necessary explanations of the logic behind the Russian approach, repeatedly and in detail. Russia presented the appropriate arguments with the expectation that, based on these proposals, the US and NATO would engage in serious negotiations with Moscow on this issue of critical importance for maintaining peace and stability. However, as we now know, the Geneva consultations between the Russian and American interdepartmental delegations on security guarantees, which began with cautious optimism on both sides, produced no results. The relevant documents were also made public.9

In early 2022, Lavrov publicly announced that he had acterized by a profound crisis implementation of the principle of confidence in international of equal and indivisible relations and world politics, security by Western countries, manifested in the use of politi-foreign lministers sof d37 states cal, psychological, and rhetor-of Europe and North America.10 that are atypical of traditional emphasized that Moscow diplomatic practices and do was expecting a detailed not correspond to generally response from them in their recognized norms of diplo-national capacity. However, the received responses contained no substantive reaction to the directly posed question. Meanwhile, the correspondence was signed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, despite not being the addressees of Russia’s message and despite their status of being bureaucrats rather than political figures. Such a move can only be described as a manifestation of diplomatic discourtesy and disrespect for the sovereign request. After all, the Russia-NATO international legal documents codifying the principle of the indivisibility of security bear the signatures of the heads of state and the heads of government of the respective countries.

In the OSCE, states also participate in their national capacity, and it is in this status that they committed not to strengthen their security at the expense of the security of others. Therefore, the Russian side did not accept a “collective disclaimer,” reminiscent of a “mutual cover-up,”11 and interpreted the lack of a direct response as the West’s unwillingness to acknowledge its previously assumed commitments. Likewise, at the same time, Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, and President Emmanuel Macron of France proposed to Vladimir Putin to essentially open a new round of inevitable but not legally binding discussions on this matter, disclosing the details of many personal conversations conducted off the record.

However, there was nothing left to discuss there. The same applied to the Minsk Package of Measures for Ukraine. Here, futile attempts to achieve its comprehensive and unconditional implementation culminated in the decision to launch the Special Military Operation, which the president of Russia announced live on the air.

* * *

IN THIS regard, the political directness and psychological openness of the aforementioned texts representing Russia’s message on the indivisibility of security,12 sent in January 2022 to the heads of the foreign affairs departments of the US, Canada, and a number of European countries, and the reaction received from the West in February of the same year,13 are of particular research interest.

At that time, Russia was seriously concerned about the increase in military and political tension in the immediate vicinity of its western borders. To prevent further escalation, in December 2021, Moscow presented its drafts of two interrelated international legal documents: the Treaty between Russia and the United States on Security Guarantees14 and the Agreement on Security Measures between Russia and the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see Fig. 1).15

The responses to these proposals (a separate one from the US and collective responses from NATO and the EU) testify to significant differences in the understanding of the principle of equal and indivisible security, which is fundamental to the entire Euro-Atlantic security architecture.16

For example, the Charter for European Security, signed at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999,17 formulates the basic rights and obligations of the organization’s member states regarding the indivisibility of security. It emphasizes the right of each state to freely choose or change the way of ensuring its security, including union treaties, as they evolve, as well as the right to neutrality.18 This is directly linked to the obligation of each state not to strengthen its security at the expense of the security of others. Additionally, it states19 that no state, group of states, or organization can be vested with primary responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE region or consider any part of it as its sphere of influence. At the OSCE summit in Astana in December 2010, a declaration confirming this comprehensive package of interrelated commitments20 was approved at the highest level.

However, Western countries continue to pick and choose from it only the elements they need, as if it was a restaurant menu – namely, the right of states to freely choose alliances to ensure their security exclusively. The clause “as they evolve” is deliberately omitted, since this assumption also constitutes an integral part of the definition of the “indivisibility of security” and, specifically, the natural, evolutionary departure of military alliances from their original deterrence function and their integration into the pan-European architecture on a collective rather than narrow group basis.21

Tellingly, in their statements asserting their readiness to develop dialogue on Europe’s security contours, representatives of the West carefully avoid references to the Istanbul Charter and the Astana Declaration. They cite only earlier OSCE documents, most often the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe,22 which does not contain the now-“inconvenient” obligation not to strengthen the security of one’s own state at the expense of others. The Western capitals are also trying to ignore yet another key OSCE document – the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security – which explicitly states that, when choosing ways to ensure security, such as joining alliances, states will “bear in mind the legitimate security concerns of other States.”23

The essence of the indivisible security guarantees lies in the fact that security exists for either everybody or nobody at all.24 And, as stipulated in the Istanbul Charter, every OSCE state has an equal right to security – not just NATO and EU members, who interpret this right as a privilege reserved exclusively for them.

Also evident are other positions and actions of the North Atlantic Alliance characterized by the desire of this supposedly “defensive” bloc for military superiority and the use of force circumventing UN Security Council prerogatives. Such actions run counter to universal peacekeeping formulas, including agreements to maintain military capabilities “commensurate with legitimate individual or collective security needs taking into account obligations under international law as well as the legitimate security interests of other states.”25

Speaking about the current situation in Europe, the US and NATO constantly call for “de-escalation” and urge Russia to “choose the path of diplomacy.” However, the most important acts – the documents of the summits in Istanbul and Astana – are the literal result of diplomatic work. The fact that the West is now openly trying to unilaterally revise these diplomatic achievements of all OSCE countries in its favor is deeply alarming.

At the same time, Russia has not yet received a clear answer to the question of how the West understands its commitment not to strengthen its security at the expense of the security of other states based on adherence to the principle of indivisibility of security. Specifically, how do Western governments intend to fulfill this commitment in practice under modern conditions? Or are they renouncing this commitment altogether?

Without full clarity on this key issue concerning the interplay of rights and obligations approved at the highest level, a balance of interests is impossible to achieve. Answering it would help us better understand the extent of the West’s ability to negotiate, as well as the possibility of collaborative progress in reducing tension and strengthening common European security.

We are talking primarily about stopping the further expansion of NATO, revoking the so-called “Bucharest formula” (which states that “Ukraine and Georgia will certainly become NATO members”26), as well as foregoing the creation of military bases on the territory of states that were previously part of the USSR and are not members of the alliance or the use of their infrastructure for conducting any military activity. The strike potentials and all NATO facilities must be returned to the state of 1997, when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed. These provisions are clearly of fundamental importance to the Russian Federation.

The current disregard for the comprehensive nature of Russian proposals, coupled with the selective focus on “convenient” topics that are then “twisted” to the advantage of the US and its allies27 and the accompanying oficial rhetoric only amplifies valid concerns about the Euro-Atlanticists’ true commitment to resolving the critical situation in European security. The escalating military activity of the US and NATO at Russia’s borders undeniably warrants concern. Furthermore, Russia’s “red lines,” its fundamental security interests, as well as its sovereign right to protect them, continue to be overlooked.

In the absence of the West’s readiness to negotiate firm, legally binding security guarantees, Russia is forced to respond. This response encompasses the implementation of military-technical measures, such as the Special Military Operation in Ukraine.

On Ukraine

THE allegations of “Russia’s responsibility for the escalation” and the “collective guilt of all Russians” cannot be regarded as anything but an attempt to exert psychological pressure and devalue Russia’s security guarantee proposals.28 References to the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 in the context of the “Russian invasion of Ukraine” do not relate to the intra-Ukrainian conflict and do not apply to the circumstances resulting from the action of domestic factors in Ukraine. The loss of territorial integrity by the Ukrainian state is a result of the illegitimate political processes that have taken place within the country.

The accusations contained in the American response that Russia “has occupied Crimea” also do not stand up to scrutiny. It is well known that in 2014, a coup d’etat took place in Kiev. Its initiators intended to create a nationalist state that infringes on the rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population as well as other “non-titular” ethnic groups.29 Unsurprisingly, in such a situation, Crimeans and Sevastopol residents voluntarily voted for reunification with Russia. The decision of the peoples of the Crimean Peninsula to return to the Russian Federation was made of their own free will by exercising their right to self-determination, enshrined in the UN Charter. Moscow used no force or threat of force – and this is also an indisputable historical fact.

If Ukraine is admitted to NATO, there will be a real threat that the regime in Kiev will try to “return” Crimea and Novorossiya by force, drawing the US and its allies under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty into a direct armed conflict with Russia, with all ensuing consequences.

The notion repeated in the US response that Russia allegedly ignited the conflict in the Donbass is untenable – the conflict’s reasons are, once again, purely domestic. Reconciliation could only be achieved through the enforcement of the Minsk agreements and the Package of Measures. The prioritization of these measures and the responsibility for implementing them are explicitly defined and unanimously endorsed in UN Security Council Resolution 2202,30 including by the US, France, and Great Britain. The second clause of the Package of Measures ratified by this resolution explicitly identified Kiev, Donetsk, and Lugansk as the parties involved.31 None of these documents mentions Russia’s responsibility for the conflict in Donbass. Moscow, together with the OSCE, played the role of a mediator in the main negotiating format (the Contact Group) and together with Berlin and Paris – in the Normandy Format, which formulated recommendations to the parties to the conflict and monitored their implementation.

To de-escalate the situation around Ukraine, it was vital to ensure Kiev’s fulfillment of the Package of Measures, halt the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine, withdraw all Western advisers and instructors from Ukraine, ensure that NATO countries refrain from any joint exercises with the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), and remove all foreign weaponry previously supplied to Kiev from Ukrainian territory. And yet, none of that has happened.

At the same time, we should draw attention to the fact that President Putin, at a press conference following the results of negotiations in Moscow with President Macron of France in February 2022, stressed that he was still open to dialogue and called for “thinking about creating stable security conditions for everyone, equal for all participants in international affairs.”32

The Configuration of Forces

IN ITS response to Russia’s proposals, the US insists that progress in improving the European security situation “can be achieved only if there is a de-escalation in Russia’s threatening actions against Ukraine.”33 At the same time, they are ready to talk only about “mutual obligations . . . to refrain from deploying permanently based forces with combat missions on the territory of Ukraine” and “to consider the possibility of discussing the problem of conventional armed forces.”34 However, the American side remains silent on the proposals contained in Article 4 Paragraph 2 and Article5 Paragraph1 of the draft bilateral treaty, and states that “the current configuration of US and NATO forces is limited, proportionate, and fully consistent with the obligations under the Russia-NATO Founding Act.”35

The deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on its own territory does not and cannot affect the fundamental interests of the US. On the contrary, they and their allies are actively advancing their military infrastructure to the East, deploying contingents on the territories of new members, bypassing the restrictions of the former Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and liberally interpreting the provisions of the Russia-NATO Founding Act on the foregoing “additional permanent deployment of substantial combat forces.”36 The situation that has arisen as a result of these actions is unacceptable: Moscow continues to insist on the withdrawal of all US Armed Forces and weaponry deployed in Central/Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe, and the Baltic states (national capabilities in these zones are quite suficient) and is ready to discuss this matter based on Articles 4 and 5 of the Russian draft treaty.

The Indivisible Security Principle

THIS principle is enshrined in the preamble to the 2011 Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [New START], which the parties agreed to extend for five years without any exceptions in February 2021.37 It is also found in a number of basic documents adopted at the highest level by the CSCE/OSCE and Russia-NATO, including the preamble to the Helsinki Final Act 1975, the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the 2002 NATO-Russia Rome Declaration.

The US response contained no confirmation that the American side was fully committed to observing the immutable principle of indivisible security (see Fig. 2). General statements about the respect of this postulate by the American side directly contradict Washington’s unwillingness to abandon its counterproductive and destabilizing course of creating advantages for itself and its allies at the expense of Russia’s security interests.38 This is exactly what is happening as a result of the unrestrained implementation by the North Atlantic Alliance, led by the US, of a policy of unrestricted geostrategic and military development of the post-Soviet space, including the territory of Ukraine, which of course is a particularly sensitive topic.

Washington touches upon the indivisible security concept only in passing, reducing it to the right of states “to freely choose or change the means of ensuring their security, including treaties of alliance.”39 However, this freedom is not absolute and is only half of the conceptual formula enshrined in the Charter for European Security. Its second part requires not “strengthening one’s security at the expense of the security of other states” in the exercise of this right.40

In this regard, in his Message to the Federal Assembly in February 2023, Vladimir Putin noted that “now, they are using NATO to give us signals, which, in fact, is an ultimatum whereby Russia should, no questions asked, implement everything that it agreed to, including the New START Treaty, whereas they will do as they please.”41 The president also stated that Moscow is suspending (not withdrawing but suspending) its participation in this agreement.

* * *

THESE examples of foreign relations and strategic dialogue, unexpectedly turned inside out, show how low the culture of Western diplomacy has sunk in recent years. A simple unscheduled call, an impromptu meeting “on the sidelines,” “on the fly,” or “in the fields,” which used to be a common occurrence, now prompts speculation about whether it is a breakthrough or a failure, and whether there is any hope for the restoration of communication between the parties.42 Such groundless excitement and unhealthy reaction to basic contact indicate that Russian diplomacy faces major challenges in its efforts to counter the overtly unfriendly course aimed at suppressing any foreign policy dissent, which the West has taken and shows no intention of abandoning.

At the same time, extremely aggressive expressions, statements, and actions are being used against Russia. They are primarily expressed as so-called “cancel culture,” unilateral restrictions, and unprecedented sanctions, and demonstrate that the “golden billion” has truly decided that an undeclared, hybrid war is being waged, and it is a life-and-death struggle.43

Thus, the use of nonstandard diplomatic methods has a distinctive dual effect. On one hand, the fundamental principles of international public law are being replaced by a certain “rules-based world order”; on the other hand, the political rhetoric of heads of state, government heads, leaders and spokespersons of diplomatic missions, and other diplomats and negotiators authorized to make oficial statements has become much more straightforward, simplifying the “content analysis” of the national and bloc interests of the key players in modern international relations. Undoubtedly, the “psychological theater” of foreign policy actions and traditional diplomacy remain the key and effective conduits of global communication. However, they are currently undergoing a profound transformation in their essential character.

NOTES

1 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Sputnik, Echo of Moscow, Govorit Moskva and Komsomolskaya Pravda radio stations, Moscow, January 28, 2022, https:// mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1796330/?lang=en

2 Chronology of the situation around Alexey Navalny October 8, 2021, https://mid.ru/ ru/foreign_policy/international_organizations/organizacia-po-zapreseniu-himiceskogo-oruzia/1777081/?lang=en

3 Statement by the Director General of the OPCW regarding allegations of the use of chemical weapons against Alexei Navalny, September 3, 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/ sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Executions/AL_RUS_2020_11.pdf

4 The situation around the A.A. Navalny case, December 20, 2021. https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1791018

5 “Joe Biden says Russian President Vladimir Putin will ‘pay a price’ for meddling in US election.” ABC, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-18/biden-vows-putin-will-pay-a-price-for-election-meddling/100015608

6 Remarks by President Biden on the Assistance the United States is Providing to Ukraine. South Court Auditorium Eisenhower Executive Ofice Building, March 16, 2022, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-assistance-the-united-states-is-providing-to-ukraine

7 On the publication of the diplomatic correspondence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Lavrov with the heads of the foreign affairs departments of Germany and France, H. Maas and J.-Y. Le Drian, November 17, 2021, https://archive.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/ content/id/4946118

8 Chumakov V.A. “Potentsial i perspektivy yuridicheski obyazyvayushchikh garantiy obespecheniya bezopasnosti v otnosheniyakh Rossii s SSHA i NATO,” Mezhdunarodnoye publichnoye i chastnoye pravo, No. 2 (2022), pp. 2-6.

9 On Russian draft documents to ensure legal security guarantees from the US and NATO, December 17, 2021, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790809

10 Response of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to a question from the media, January 27, 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/minister_ speeches/1796041/

11 Response of MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova to a media question in connection with the written response of NATO and the EU regarding the understanding and implementation in practice of the indivisible security principle, February 11, 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/ foreign_policy/rso/nato/1798086

12 Text of the message of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov on the subject of the indivisibility of security, sent to the heads of the foreign affairs Departments of the United States, Canada and a number of European countries. February 1, 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/maps/us/1796679

13 On the conveyance of a written response to the response of the American side on security guarantees, February 17, 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/maps/us/1799157

14 Draft Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Security Guarantees, December 17, 2021, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818

15 Draft Agreement on Security Measures for the Russian Federation and the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 17, 2021, https://mid.ru/ru/ foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803

16 US and NATO publish response to Russia’s security proposals, February 2, 2022, https:// lenta.ru/brief/2022/02/02/answer

17 OSCE Istanbul Document 1999, January 2000, https://www.osce.org/files/f/ documents/7/f/125811.pdf

18 “Tak delo ne poydet.” Full text of Sergey Lavrov’s message to foreign colleagues. January 2, 2022, https://rg.ru/2022/02/01/tak-delo-ne-pojdet-polnyj-tekst-poslaniia-sergeia-lavrova-inostrannym-kollegam.html

19 Chernenko Ye. “My nikomu ne ugrozhayem. My predosteregayem (zamestitel glavy MID RF Aleksandr Grushko o rossiyskoy initsiative po garantiyam bezopasnosti),” Kommersant. No. 7, January 18, 2022, p. 1.

20 OSCE Astana Anniversary Declaration “Towards a Security Community.” The second day of the Astana Summit. SUM (10) Journal #2, Agenda Item 2, SUM. DOC/1/10. December 3, 2010, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/8/74990. pdf

21 Text of a message on the indivisibility of security, sent to the heads of the foreign ministries of the United States, Canada and a number of European countries, February 2, 2022, https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/comments/tekst-poslaniya-ministra-inostrannykh- del-rossiyskoy-federatsii-sv-lavrova-po-tematike-nedelimosti-/

22 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. November 21, 1990, https://www.osce.org/files/f/ documents/3/4/39520.pdf

23 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. December 3, 1994 (Adopted at the 91st Plenary Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation in Budapest on December 3, 1994 (FSC/Journal No. 94). https://www.osce.org/ files/f/documents/d/f/41359.pdf

24 “Rossiya zhdet bystroy reaktsii stran, korotym peredano poslaniye o nedelimosti bezopasnosti,” February 1, 2022, TASS. https://tass.ru/politika/13589277

25 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations (adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 42/22 of November 18, 1987). https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/ declarations/useofforce_refraining.shtml

26 Bucharest Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/oficial_texts_8443.htm

27 Comment by Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson M.V. Zakharova on misrepresenting the Russian approach to the issue of security guarantees, December 25, 2021, https://mid. ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1792082

28 “MID Rossii opublikoval otvet Mosvky po garantiyam bezopasnosti,” https:// rg.ru/2022/02/17/rossiia-opublikovala-na-otvet-ssha-po-garantiiam-bezopasnosti-polnyj-tekst.html

29 Marxsen Ch. “The Crimea Crisis from an International Law Perspective. Public Law Digest.” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Issue 3 (2014), No. 2, pp. 201-230.

30 Resolution 2202 (2015) adopted by the UN Security Council at its 7384th meeting on February 17, 2015, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/043/74/PDF/ N1504374.pdf?OpenElement

31 A set of measures to implement the Minsk agreements, February 12, 2015, http:// kremlin.ru/supplement/4804

32 Press conference following Russian-French talks, February 8, 2022, http://en.kremlin. ru/catalog/persons/518/events/67735

33 Arbide Aza H., González A. “Los documentos confidentiales sobre Ucrania: EE UU y la OTAN ofrecieron a Putin acuerdos de desarme.” EL PAIS. https://elpais.com/ internacional/2022-02-02/ee-uu-ofrece-acuerdos-de-desarme-a-cambio-de-desescalar-en-ucrania.html

34 see [27].

35 Yuridicheskiye garantii bezopasnosti Rossii. Motivatsiya i diplomatiya. Istoriya diplomatii i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy, https://diphis.ru/juridicheskie-garantii-bezopasnosti-rossii.html

36 V maye 2023 g. Rossiyskaya Federatsiya denonsirovala Dogovor ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Yevrope, https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/355868-8

37 Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, January 26, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/26/readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-call-with-president-vladimir-putin-of-russia

38 Kirsanov D. “Viktoriya Nuland: My vse verim v nedelimost bezopasnosti,” February 4, 2022, TASS, https://tass.ru/interviews/13610699

39 “Reaktsiya Rossii na otvet SSHA po garantiyam bezopasnosti,” TASS, February 17, 2022, https://tass.ru/politika/13744013

40 Bulkina E. “MID opublikoval reaktsiyu na otvet SSHA po garantiyam bezopasnosti,” Vzglyad. February 17, 2022, https://vz.ru/news/2022/2/17/1144217.html

41 Message of the President to the Federal Assembly, February 21, 202l, http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/news/70565

42 “Intervyu ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova programme ‘Bolshaya igra’ na ‘Pervom kanale,’ ” March 10, 2023, https://www.1tv.ru/shows/big-game/vypuski/ bolshaya-igra-chast-3-vypusk-ot-10-03-2023

43 “Lavrov: Zapad reshil, chto gibridnaya voyna protiv RF dolzhna idti ne na zhizn, a na smert,” TASS. March 10, 2023, https://tass.ru/politika/17236471

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