Istanbul-2: Second round

Just like the first round of Istanbul-2 talks, the second one came in a place set by Russia on the appointed dates. There was a lot of fussing about made by the Ukrainian and Western sides, just like before the first round, when President Zelensky’s chief negotiator consulted with the EU leaders and the British. When, knowing that the negotiations would be held in Istanbul, the Ukrainian delegation still flew to Ankara, and Zelensky "waited for the Russian President for negotiations in Turkey." Ahead of the second round, the sides discussed where the talks were going to be held, in Geneva or the Vatican, and the Europeans, as they did before the first round, said that they should join the negotiations.

The provocation that was expected after the first meeting did happen, but this time it came not in the form of "Bucha-2," but as a special operation to strike deep into Russia, at strategic aviation airfields in the Murmansk and Irkutsk regions.

The very choice of targets shed light on those who had actually ordered that operation. At first, Ukrainian sources reported that the US had been informed about the operation to strike Russian airfields. The Americans denied this. Then, CNN cited some unnamed officials in the US administration as saying that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had been regularly informed about the progress of Ukraine's sabotage operation on Russian territory, but had not contacted Kyiv's representatives on this matter. At the same time, the unnamed official interviewed by CNN emphasized that Washington had not been notified in advance of Kyiv's intention to strike into Russian territory. There was no official reaction from the White House and the Pentagon to these events. [i] Thus, Kyiv and its allies have been trying hard to make it look as if the Trump administration was involved in the operation against Russia's strategic air bases.

Later, Volodymyr Zelensky went on record with what looked as a self-exposing statement. Even though he talks about an "independent result" of the SBU, it is perfectly clear that this is not the result of something done by Ukraine’s security service, which at best was a contractor in this provocation made right before the negotiations. Indeed, judging by what London is doing and saying, Britain’s role in this operation is front and center. In a word, Zelensky was ordered to create a smokescreen to hide the real minds behind Operation Spider’s Web, allegedly devised and implemented by the SBU. The main purpose of all this was to force Russia to refuse to negotiate and "take offense" at Trump, so that everything would then go according to the scenario jointly worked out by Europe and Ukraine. None of this happened though - Moscow did not make any rash moves and so the results of this provocation were left hanging, once again confirming the aggressiveness of Kyiv, always doing its European curators bidding.

Even before the talks actually kicked off, the Ukrainian side tried to arrange a "duel of memoranda." Just ahead of the parley in Istanbul, Kyiv released its memorandum via Reuters, which was distributed by Ukrainian media. There is no point in quoting it in full, but here is the main thing that contradicts the Russian position:

Ukraine's membership in NATO depends on consensus within the North Atlantic Alliance. No restrictions can be imposed on the number, deployment or other parameters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, or on the deployment of troops of friendly foreign states on the country’s territory.
Territorial issues: the territorial gains made by Russia since February 2014 are not recognized by the international community. The current location of the front is the starting point for negotiations. Territorial issues are discussed only after a complete and unconditional ceasefire.
Sanctions: Some sanctions can be lifted from Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a snapback mechanism for resuming sanctions if necessary. Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction or remain frozen until reparations are paid.
A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the air, on land and at sea for at least 30 days (with the possibility of extension every 30 days) as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.”[ii]

This Ukrainian memorandum, executed in Ukrainian and English, was handed over to the Russian side before the negotiations. Russia did not hand over its own memorandum to the Ukrainian side before the negotiations, knowing that it would be immediately leaked to the media, allowing Kyiv to launch an information campaign about Russia wanting to continue the war. It did not work out though.

Kyiv’s memorandum is completely out of touch with reality. Judging by its content, the Zelensky regime is unaware of the situation on the battlefield and the socio-economic problems in the country, and is deaf to the statements made by the Russian leadership.

The Russian document presented to Ukraine at the negotiations contained positions that had long been stated by President Vladimir Putin and his senior representatives.

Earlier, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov outlined the points that Russia would raise in its dialogue with Ukraine. These are: Ukraine’s neutral, non-aligned and non-nuclear status, as well as the abolition of discriminatory laws regarding the use of the Russian language. There were other demands, which had been voiced earlier, such as the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the territory of the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporozhe regions; recognition of these regions, as well as Crimea and Sevastopol, as Russian at the international level; lifting of sanctions; demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. Moscow also described as “theft” the freeze of Russian assets in the West. Vladimir Putin outlined these conditions back in the summer of 2024.

The highlights of the Russian memorandum handed over to the Ukrainian side during the negotiations in Istanbul:

The Russian Memorandum on the settlement of the conflict consists of three parts with two ceasefire options and 31 points:

The first ceasefire option is a complete withdrawal of Ukrainian Armed Forces from the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporozhe regions;
A complete withdrawal of Ukrainian Armed Forces from Russian territory, including Donbass and Novorossiya, implemented during the period of a 30-day ceasefire;
International recognition of Crimea, Donbass and Novorossiya as parts of Russia;
Ukraine’s neutral status;
The Russian Federation's proposals for resolving the Ukrainian crisis involve holding elections in Ukraine, and only then signing a peace treaty. Kyiv must announce the date of the presidential and parliamentary elections, which must be held no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;
A ceasefire implies a ban on the redeployment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with the exception of movements to withdraw troops to an agreed distance;
A ban on the delivery to and deployment of nuclear weapons in Ukraine;
An effective ceasefire rules out any supplies of Western weapons to Ukraine. This also applies to the provision of intelligence;
A peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine must be approved by a legally binding UN Security Council resolution;
To cease fire, Ukraine must amnesty "political prisoners" and release detained military and civilians;
A final settlement in Ukraine requires ensuring the full rights, freedoms and interests of Russian speakers;
Waiver of mutual claims for damages incurred during hostilities. [iii]

The Russian document is fully in line with the goals of the Special Military Operation, which are designed to ensure the country’s national interests and security.

The Ukrainian memorandum is aimed at bargaining for the position of the undefeated and at the same time injured party, which requires Western assistance, entry into international economic and Western military institutions, and demands for reparations from Russia. At the same time, it openly lays the foundations for future conflicts through international non-recognition of the territories regained by Russia.

Comments from the parties [iv] after the negotiations:

The head of the Russian delegation, presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky stated that Russia had handed over a two-part memorandum to the Ukrainian side. According to him, the second part suggests a number of ways to cease fire. Medinsky described the Russian memorandum as detailed and well-thought-out.

He also noted that Russia will unilaterally hand over 6,000 bodies of dead Ukrainians. They will be handed over next week.

Medinsky said that Russia and Ukraine had agreed a large-scale exchange of gravely wounded and young soldiers (under 25), at least 1,000 people from each side, using the "all for all" formula. The parties will organize medical commissions and hold regular exchanges.

The exchange of prisoners of war between Russia and Ukraine will be done on an equal basis, he added.

Medinsky said that the Russian side had made a specific proposal for a two- or three-day ceasefire at certain parts of the frontline. According to him, this would allow the bodies of the dead to be collected. He noted that there were more Ukrainian casualties on the battlefield.

Medinsky said that the parties had discussed the issue of children. He showed a list of 339 names, not thousands, as previously claimed by Ukraine.

According to Medinsky, Russia will consider each and every situation on the Ukrainian list of children who have lost contact with their parents. He said that the Russian side had recently returned 101 children, and the Ukrainian side - about 20. Medinsky said that Ukraine is making a PR stunt out of the issue of lost children, aimed at compassionate Europeans. He noted that Russian servicemen treat minors in a humane way, just as Soviet soldiers did, pulling them out of the combat zone, risking their lives.

Statements by the Ukrainian side

The head of the Ukrainian delegation, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, said that Kyiv had proposed holding a new meeting from June 20 to 30. According to him, the parties agreed to exchange the bodies of the dead.

During the talks in Istanbul, Russia and Ukraine exchanged memorandums on the settlement of the conflict, and are preparing a new prisoner swaps, Volodymyr Zelensky said at a news briefing, following a NATO event in Vilnius.

Foreign Ministry representative Georgy Tikhyi said that Kyiv will study the Russian memorandum on the settlement and respond to its provisions. Umerov clarified that Kyiv will have a week to familiarize itself with the document.

The Ukrainian delegation handed over to the Russian side a list of children it wants back, said President Zelensky's chief of staff Andriy Yermak.

After a May 19 telephone linkup with US President Donald Trump, Zelensky said that Ukraine is not going to withdraw its forces from the territories of the DPR, Kherson and Zaporozhe regions under its control: “No one will withdraw our troops from our territories. (…) If Russia sets conditions for withdrawing our troops <...>, it means they do not want a ceasefire.”[v] A tired old line. This is the position Kyiv reiterated in its memorandum, a position that essentially blocks the road to a ceasefire, which the Ukrainian side insists on. Zelensky’s position is clear – the withdrawal of troops means the collapse of his regime.

The Russian memorandum remained consistent and fully reflects Moscow’s previous statements, expanded only by the part about the exchange of prisoners of war, the return of the bodies of the dead, as a gesture of goodwill and an invitation to humanitarian cooperation, even against the backdrop of hostilities.

The clause in the Russian memorandum on holding elections in Ukraine responds to the clause in the Ukrainian memorandum on the need for a meeting between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, the clause about elections is written in keeping with the Constitution of Ukraine. A meeting of heads of state requires legitimate representation from the Ukrainian side.

Judging by the Ukrainian document, the military-political factor remains the most effective one, since only a military defeat at the front can change the mindset of the Ukrainian leadership.

Russia's negotiating position does not change; it is the situation on the battlefield that is changing.

The views of the author are his own and may differ from the position of the Editorial Board.

[i] https://ria.ru/20250602/ssha-2020476188.html

[ii] https://ctrana.one/news/485939-smi-opublikovali-proekt-dokumenta-ukrainy-dlja-perehovorov-s-rf-v-stambule.html

[iii] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/02/06/2025/683dd2699a7947107d937d7b

[iv] https://tass.ru/politika/24115599

[v] https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23986513

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