Main Foreign Policy Results In 2024.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 27 December 2024.
In the outgoing year, Russian diplomacy made energetic efforts to implement the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by President Vladimir Putin in March 2023.
While the collective West made attempts to preserve the rudiments of its global dominance and impose a “rules-based international order,” Russia proposed a constructive alternative by advocating for the unconditional adherence to the principles of the UN Charter in all their completeness and interconnectedness, including in relation to settling the crisis in Ukraine and other conflicts where the sovereign equality of states, the right of nations to self-determination, human rights, and the closely related indivisibility of security must be ensured.
By putting forth new initiatives for Eurasian security and against neocolonialism, Russia provided a new ideological framework for its policy course to enhance its standing on the international arena as one of the leading centres in a multipolar world.
The implementation of the strategic initiative for creating an architecture of indivisible security in Eurasia, presented by the President of Russia in June, has begun. Ways to adapt the existing system of interaction to new conditions are outlined in the Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the CIS Member States on the Principles of Cooperation in Ensuring Security in Eurasia (issued in October). The unity of approaches to assessing the military and political situation within the Union State is reflected in the Joint Statement on the Shared Vision of the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century, signed by the Foreign Ministers of Russia and Belarus in November.
Bilateral agreements on security guarantees were signed with Belarus and the DPRK, regulating the response in the event of armed aggression against either party. Moscow and Minsk also took practical steps in the field of nuclear weapons as a measure to deter a potential aggressor. The Security Concept of the Union State was approved, which forms a common vision of threats and challenges, as well as ways to neutralise them.
The economic potential of Greater Eurasia was strengthened this year through the promotion of the project to develop the North-South International Transport Corridor (NSITC). Strategic decisions were agreed upon to increase the efficiency of the Rasht-Astara section and develop the railway network within Iran. An agreement was reached on the supply of Belarusian potash fertilisers to India. New special economic zones were created jointly with Iran, India, and Kazakhstan. The International Union of NSITC Special Economic Zones was established. A Caspian cluster was formed in the Astrakhan Region, uniting the Lotus special economic zone and the Olya seaport. Documents were signed with Bahrain and Iran on expedited development of logistics services.
Russia launched the implementation of the foreign policy initiative on international cooperation in countering neocolonialism. The United Russia national political party held an international inter-party forum of supporters of the fight against modern practices of neocolonialism. Participants supported the idea of creating a worldwide movement for the freedom of nations (February). More than 50 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Europe, and the CIS joined the movement.
Russia has taken a leading role in asserting the anti-neocolonial agenda during the UN General Assembly and, in cooperation with like-minded members of the Group of Friends of the UN Charter, ensured the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution on Eradication of Colonialism in All Its Forms and Manifestations (December), which designated December 14 as International Day for the Elimination of Colonialism in All Its Forms and Manifestations.
The relations with countries and associations of the Global Majority have received a serious impetus for development.
Important agreements were reached on the development of Russia-Belarus integration within the Union State, primarily in finance and the economy, industrial production, and trade. Industry-based information exchange systems were introduced, with transport restrictions lifted, and tax policies optimised.
President Vladimir Putin’s state visits to Uzbekistan (in May) and Kazakhstan (in November) confirmed the proximity of our foreign policy approaches, and consolidated promising areas of cooperation, including joint production and logistics projects, in the bilateral agenda.
President Vladimir Putin’s first-ever state visit to Azerbaijan in August served as evidence of the intensive development of Russia-Azerbaijan bilateral relations.
The overarching partnership and strategic interaction with China reached a new level following the state visit by President Vladimir Putin to China in May. The People’s Republic of China consolidated its role as Russia’s largest foreign trade partner, as mutual trade reached the equivalent of $240 billion, with 95 percent of payments made in national currencies.
The special privileged strategic partnership with India received a serious boost thanks to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to Russia in July, which paved the way for expanding cooperation in finance, investment, transport, energy, science and technology.
President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Pyongyang in June opened a new chapter in the cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, during which the parties signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that set guidelines for deepening mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries on a broad range of issues.
President Vladimir Putin’s official visits to Vietnam (in June) and Mongolia (in September) improved the dynamics of the relations with these countries, mainly in energy, transport and industrial production, as well as in large investment projects.
The Kazan summit of the BRICS group became the flagship international event, which, under Russia’s chairmanship, convened for the first time in an expanded format and definitively dispelled the myth of Russia’s international isolation. The summit events were attended by leaders of 36 states and representatives of the executive bodies of six multilateral organisations. Joint steps were agreed upon on reforming the global monetary and financial architecture, and creating mechanisms for mutual cross-border transactions that are resistant to external risks. A contact group on climate and sustainable development, a working group on nuclear medicine, and a transport dialogue were launched. Work began on promoting the Cross-Border Payment Initiative, the BRICS Clear settlement and depository infrastructure, and a joint reinsurance company, the establishment of a grain exchange, geological, investment, and technology platforms. A new category of BRICS partner countries was created, and a list of potential candidates for the group was agreed upon.
Under Russia’s chairmanship in the CIS, the development of cooperation in energy, chemical industry, and several other sectors was given a serious boost. The Agreement on Free Trade in Services, Establishment, Operation, and Investment in the CIS entered into effect. An initiative was launched to grant the SCO the status of a CIS observer or partner organisation. Seven joint statements at the level of heads of state and foreign ministers were adopted on current international issues.
With Russia’s active support, the Republic of Belarus became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation this year. The heads of state and government of the SCO adopted the Astana Declaration and the SCO Initiative On Global Unity for a Just Peace and Harmony in July, as well as decisions on creating a Universal Centre for Countering Challenges and Threats to Security in Tashkent, a Centre for Countering International Organised Crime in Bishkek, and an Anti-Drug Centre in Dushanbe. A mechanism for implementing joint research and innovation projects was approved.
As part of efforts to expand the Eurasian Economic Union’s partner network, negotiations were completed on establishing preferential trade regimes with the UAE and Indonesia. Iran was granted observer status with the EAEU. The Eurasian Economic Commission signed a memorandum of cooperation with the government of Nicaragua.
This year, the CSTO has strengthened its mechanisms for countering drug trafficking, illegal migration, international terrorism, and cybercrime. The partners expanded their cooperation to several new domains, including biological and information security. Relying on the experience gained during the CSTO peacekeeping operation in Kazakhstan in 2022, they legislated new crisis response procedures to ensure rapid adoption of necessary decisions, including on the use of forces and resources. A set of measures was approved to ensure the security of the CSTO’s southern borders with Afghanistan.
Russia’s interaction with the states of Africa, Southwest and Southeast Asia, and Latin America became more intensive and substantive. In 2024, Russia expanded its network of trade missions in the Global Majority countries, and posted more personnel there. The introduction of state-of-the-art technologies increased the anti-sanctions resilience of the national infrastructure for exports, insurance and financial support of transactions.
In pursuance of the decision of the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit in St Petersburg, the first ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum was held in November, where the participating countries detailed plans for the implementation of agreements on advancing Russia’s cooperation with African states across the board, specifically focusing on food security, personnel training, mineral exploration, digital transition, healthcare, education and youth policy.
In 2024, Russia’s ties with the Islamic world became even closer. UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s official visit to Russia in October confirmed the strategic nature of relations between Moscow and Abu Dhabi, which span a wide range of areas from energy and trade to space exploration and humanitarian cooperation.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s participation in the 7th Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Ministerial Meeting for Strategic Dialogue, his visits to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, as well as interaction with the League of Arab States (LAS) made a significant contribution to the expansion of relations with Arab countries and helped advance the search for ways to comprehensively stabilise various hot spots, including the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Yemen, Sudan and Syria. The meeting of the Russia-Islamic World Strategic Vision Group at KazanForum 2024 in May confirmed that Russia and Arab-Muslim countries hold similar or overlapping views and approaches on the international situation.
The talks between the presidents of Russia and Türkiye on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan reinforced the strong dynamics of the bilateral relations and spurred on the implementation of strategic projects in the gas and nuclear industries. In October, during the 3rd ministerial meeting of “3+3” Regional Cooperation Platform (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia plus Russia, Iran and Türkiye), Russia joined the initiative to transform that dialogue platform into a fully-fledged international organisation.
This year, Russia took steps to support stability in Afghanistan. About 200 tonnes of humanitarian aid were delivered to Kabul. Russia chaired the 6th meeting of the Moscow Format of Consultations on Afghanistan in October, which included China, Iran, India, Pakistan and all Central Asian states.
Russia turned a new page in relations with Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country and a regional leader. President Prabowo Subianto paid a visit to Russia in July to meet with President of Russia Vladimir Putin before he officially took office.
In July, the foreign ministers of Russia and ASEAN adopted a statement marking the 20th anniversary of Russia’s accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The EAEU and ASEAN launched dialogue on digitalisation and held a series of major business forums. A regular meeting of foreign ministers was held in the format that includes Russia, China and the country holding the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN (Laos in 2024).
The political dialogue with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean intensified this year. Several regional heads of state visited the Russian Federation, including President of Cuba Miguel Diaz-Canel (in May), President of Bolivia Luis Arce (in June) and President of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro (in October). The Declaration by the Russian Federation and the Republic of Nicaragua on the Ways and Means to Counter, Mitigate and Redress the Adverse Impacts of Unilateral Coercive Measures was adopted in April; an interdepartmental memorandum of cooperation in countering unilateral coercive measures was signed with Venezuela in June.
Russia made a considerable intellectual and practical contribution to keeping the discussion at international platforms in a pragmatic and practice-oriented vein, neutralising attempts to make one-sided politicised approaches prevail. To revive the debate on the principles of interaction between states in a multipolar world, in July, we held a special meeting of the UN Security Council on multilateral cooperation in the interest of a more just, democratic and sustainable world order as part of Russia’s presidency. In December, the 79th session of the UN General Assembly approved the traditional Russia-sponsored resolution on combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
The G20 supported the Brazilian presidency’s decision to focus on addressing the problems of the Global Majority, reforming the global governance institutions and eliminating inequality. Russia supported Brasilia’s initiative to establish the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty.
Russia successfully implemented several flagship projects in cultural and humanitarian cooperation, including the inaugural Games of the Future international phygital sports tournament in February and March, which brought together 260 teams and more than 2,000 participants from across the globe, and the BRICS Games in June, a tournament that included more than 4,000 athletes from 82 countries.
The 10th St Petersburg International United Cultures Forum in September elicited a wide response. The participating delegates from 80 countries spoke in favour of zero tolerance for politicising the cultural and humanitarian domain of international cooperation.
The 2nd Congress of the International Russophile Movement in February, as well as the Multipolarity Forum that preceded it, confirmed that Russia has a wide range of like-minded people in all countries. In March, more than 20,000 participants from 188 countries visited Sochi to attend the World Youth Festival.
The outgoing year saw a noticeable increase in interest in Russian discussion platforms, primarily the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, the Eastern Economic Forum, the St Petersburg International Legal Forum, and the Valdai International Discussion Club, where President Vladimir Putin delivered an address explicating Russia’s views on the formation of a new international system in November.
A pilot project was launched this year to create partner Russian Houses in the countries and regions where there are no Russian centres of science and culture. To this end, the first 17 agreements were signed with public organisations from Algeria, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Iraq, Mali, Niger, the Netherlands, the United Arab Emirates, Thailand, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, Chad and Equatorial Guinea.
Russia expanded the list of countries whose nationals can obtain electronic visas to enter the country. To facilitate communication between the residents of Russia and Georgia, to intensify business ties and humanitarian exchanges, Russia granted Georgian citizens the right to visa-free entry for work, study and residence for a period extending beyond 90 days.
On the Western track, in the context of continued escalation of forceful, economic, informational and ideological aggression on the part of unfriendly states, Russian diplomacy this year neutralised repeated attempts to give us political ultimatums, and ensured that the majority of states acknowledged that the Ukraine crisis can only be resolved by eliminating its root causes – threats to Russia’s security that arise from NATO’s eastward expansion, and violations of the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking citizens. There is no alternative to this. Our stance was conveyed to the leaders of several NATO and EU countries, including Austria, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia, the United States, Türkiye, Germany, as well as the Vatican and Switzerland during direct contacts with representatives of those states at the highest and high levels.
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