РУССКИЙ
9:18 05.09.2025 •
On August 27, US President Trump imposed additional secondary import duties against India, citing New Delhi’s large-scale oil purchases from Russia. Combined with existing 25 percent tariffs, the total duty has climbed to 50 percent - one of the highest rates in US trade relations. India quickly retaliated by ramping up ties with China. Is this an attempt to pressure an unyielding trade partner, or a significant geopolitical blunder by Washington?
Washington’s new tariffs affect a hefty 55 percent of India's exports to the United States, with experts predicting a potential decrease in Indian exports to the US exceeding 40 percent, or nearly $37 billion, by March 2026, slowing India's economic growth and jeopardizing its role in global supply chains. The immediate impact isn't catastrophic though, since crucial sectors like electronics and pharmaceuticals are currently exempt. Besides, India is less export-dependent than most Asian countries, with exports accounting for just about 11 percent of its GDP.
The White House's publicly stated motives are twofold. Trump's announcement came in the form of aggressive geopolitical terms, labeling India's cooperation with Moscow as "money laundering" and "profiteering." Earlier, President Trump’s trade advisor Peter Navarro wrote in The Financial Times, "If India wants to be treated by the US as a strategic partner; it should start acting like one." Simultaneously, the US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the new tariffs as "punishment" for India's intransigence in trade negotiations. He said that he believed the countries would be among the first to reach a trade deal, as early as May or June, “but [the Indians] were dragging their feet.” Bessent still believes that the US and India “will eventually reach a trade agreement.”
That said, in New Delhi, optimism regarding US-India relations is waning. Having exhausted the potential of non-alignment, India opted for pragmatic engagement with the West. Until recently, India's rapprochement with the US was prompted by shared concerns about China's rise. New Delhi joined groups like the QUAD, increased the number of military exercises, and demonstrated its willingness for shared responsibility in the Indo-Pacific region. During Trump's first term, he and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi developed a strong personal and working relationship. Trump's re-election in 2024 seemed to promise a stronger partnership. However, wary of the Trump administration’s erratic statements and actions of the past six months, India began to question the value of this strategic partnership.
Washington has been busy developing relations with Pakistan, which is viewed by India as a major security threat. In late July, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met in Washington with Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. In June, Trump invited Pakistan’s military chief of staff, General Asim Munir, (described by Western media as the country’s "de facto ruler"), to lunch at the White House. Trump announced plans to help Pakistan develop its oil and mineral reserves and even gleefully hinted that India might "one day" have to buy energy from its neighbor. When India and Pakistan clashed in early May, US Vice President J.D. Vance said that it was none of America’s business. Trump then offered himself as a "mediator," a move perceived in India as an infringement on its sovereignty, and later claimed credit for peacemaking. Reports suggest that in an additional irritant, Trump persistently lobbied Modi for a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. Many in New Delhi now question the true reasons behind Washington's erratic moves, especially after decades of cultivating the India-US relationship.
Trump's attacks on India contrast with his China policy. Previously, US foreign policy towards China and India differed based on geopolitical interests, economic interdependence, and perceptions of strategic threats. Sanctions against China were systemic and strategic, reflecting the concept of "great power competition." China is explicitly identified in the US National Security Strategy as "the only competitor possessing both the intent and growing capacity to reshape the international order."
Trump's April escalation of sanctions against China was seen as a continuation of "strategic deterrence." However, in early summer, Washington and Beijing reached a truce in their trade war, agreeing 30 percent and 10 percent tariff reduction respectively. On August 11, Trump ordered a three-month extension of reduced tariffs on Chinese goods until November 10, as a means of paving the way for bilateral trade negotiations and a summit. India may accuse the White House of double standards, as the US introduces no secondary sanctions on China ("negotiations are ongoing"), but is slapping new sanctions on India, even though talks between the two countries are also in progress.
Although large-scale sanctions against India are obviously harming Washington’s strategic plans, it looks like it is going overboard, viewing India as the weakest link in the China-Russia-India geopolitical triangle formed at the SCO summit. Washington is aggressively and demonstrably “punishing” a former partner, and has even urged Europe to impose similar sanctions against India.
Against the backcloth of Washington’s inconsistence and growing unpredictability, India’s response is multifaceted. Without resorting to retaliatory tariffs, New Delhi signals that it won't back down from its "red lines." Simultaneously, Modi has prioritized improving relations with China. Relations between the Asian giants remained frozen since the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. The year 2022 saw further military clashes in Arunachal Pradesh, but political will and compromise can overcome even long-standing conflicts as both neighboring countries understand that renewed escalation is the most realistic alternative to normalization.
In 2024, Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping met for the first time in five years at the BRICS summit in Kazan. According to a Bloomberg report, amidst Trump's trade war escalation, Xi Jinping sent a personal message to the Indian President advocating for closer Sino-Indian ties. The rapid warming of Sino-Indian relations began last summer as US-India trade talks stalled. In July, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited Beijing for the first time since 2020. In mid-August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited New Delhi and met with Modi.
On September 1, Modi visited China in the first such visit in seven years. Following talks with Xi Jinping at the SCO summit, Modi voiced his wish to build bilateral ties "based on mutual respect, trust, and consideration of each other's interests." (i) Both sides aim to "set aside differences stemming from the long-standing border dispute," and the border situation is currently described as "peaceful and stable." They agreed on a set of measures to resolve disagreements, although details remain unknown. Xi Jinping stated that border issues should not hinder bilateral relations.
Both leaders signaled a joint message to the West regarding the unacceptability of pressure and sanctions. The international context is shifting, prompting pragmatic Sino-Indian cooperation. However, the "two mountains of Asia" (a term used by Nehru and Mao) need to find a new balance. India is worried about its trade deficit with China, the construction of a Chinese dam in Tibet, and Beijing's ties with Islamabad. While India doesn't officially recognize Taiwan, it maintains trade and humanitarian contacts with the local authorities. Differences remain also on the succession to the 90-year-old Dalai Lama and on the existence of the “Tibetan government-in-exile.”
However, the economic and geopolitical benefits of rapprochement are clear: Chinese investment and technology could boost India’s industry, fostering its advanced technology sector and reducing the country’s dependence on imports. While realizing this, the Indian government still hesitates to loosen restrictions on foreign investment while trade talks with Trump continue. However, with those talks stalled, a more liberal stance towards China is becoming increasingly likely. China sees the potential for significantly increasing the export of its electric vehicles to India. Besides, Beijing has no illusions about Trump's demonstrative "peacefulness" in trade relations.
With all that said, India isn't ready to completely abandon the US as an important economic and geopolitical partner and cannot afford to alienate Washington permanently. However, Trump's aggressive approach and economic coercion are unacceptable. In the long term, India will adjust its economic strategy, "not as Trump hopes." The escalation of the tariff war against India currently appears a "tactical error by Trump that could become strategic," strengthening the geopolitical axis of the Global South.
All major modern conflicts have been about control over Eurasia, with warring coalitions vying for dominance. Since the 20th century, keeping Eurasia divided has been a key geopolitical goal for the US. India's rapprochement with China has alarming potential for Washington and the West. The addition of Russia creates a partnership across the world's largest landmass, developing trade and transport networks beyond Western reach. Commenting on the SCO summit in Tianjin, The Wall Street Journal described the Russian, Chinese and Indian leaders’ solidarity as a serious challenge to US foreign policy. The summit launched a "coalition of the unwilling" against the West and its historical dominance, and this is a hard fact.
If US tariff restrictions persist, India-US trade could fall by a third. This means that India's trade with the US, Russia, and China would become roughly equal. New Delhi could freeze its US foreign policy vector for at least three years, until the next US administration. The New York Times reports that Trump cancelled plans to visit India, and his relationship with Modi is "officially damaged."
Given the inconsistent and chaotic nature of current US policy, Beijing appears a more predictable and sensible partner for New Delhi. However, India will strive to maintain its role as a crucial swing state – a country whose geographical position and influence allow it to play its own game.
The views of the author are his own and may differ from the position of the Editorial Board.
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[i] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/india-committed-improving-ties-with-china-modi-tells-xi-2025-08-31/
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