NI: No easy solutions to Europe’s Geopolitical Trilemma

In seeking defense, economic and energy autonomy, Europe must diversify its partnerships and hedge against Russia, China, and an increasingly unpredictable United States, ‘The National Interest’ notes.

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, said back in the 1950s, NATO’s purpose was to “Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” But times have changed. President Donald Trump’s efforts to take Greenland from Denmark may have culminated in a dramatic climbdown at Davos, but the episode underscored the incredible pressures Europe faces — not just from Russia, but from the United States and China as well. Europe’s geostrategic position is now under threat in ways the European Union (EU) has never faced since coming into being in late 1993, and these concerns were at the center of discussions at the Munich Security Conference this past weekend.

Breaking free from Russia but becoming dependent on America

Europe reduced its dependence on Russian energy significantly over the past three years and it is difficult to imagine Europe returning to its prior state of dependence on Russian energy. The EU currently intends to phase out all Russian gas imports by the end of 2027.

Surging liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States to Europe to avoid energy shortfalls and widespread societal disruption was a close-run thing, aided in part by back-to-back mild winters, but the curtailment of Russian energy exports to Europe seemed beneficial to both sides of the Atlantic. However, with Donald Trump back in power, Europe now faces growing pressure from the United States as well — not only to surrender Danish sovereignty, but also to increase its defense spending and forgo its clean energy commitments. This combination of pressures puts Europe in a terrible bind.

However, much of what remains of Europe’s industrial sector, many of its home heating systems, its auto sector, and its military capabilities all still rely on fossil fuels. LNG imports from the United States now constitute 57 percent of European needs, and the EU has pledged to import $250 billion in natural gas and nuclear technology as part of the trade deal it signed with the United States last year. Will Washington abide by that agreement, or will it look to energy supplies and additional tariffs as a way to apply renewed pressure on Europe, whether over Greenland or some new grievance?

The political machinations within the transatlantic relationship are now more uncertain than ever, but what is clear is that the strategic challenge for Europe is to determine how it can keep its medium-term conversion to a more self-reliant, renewable-based energy mix on track even as it depends on energy imports from an increasingly bullying United States in the short term.

Developing European “strategic autonomy”

To navigate this geopolitical moment and begin inching towards a greater sense of “strategic autonomy,” Europe will need to pursue multiple objectives at once.

Given Washington’s wobbling commitment to collective defense as embodied in Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty, Europe is rightly taking steps to develop its own defense industrial base, but these efforts will take time to bear fruit, particularly with respect to the “enabling capabilities” such as strategic airlift and air-to-air refueling for which NATO still largely relies on the United States.

Europe will also want to show Washington that it has other options, geopolitically speaking, which seemed to be the central message of the recent trade deals between Europe and India, as well as the pending agreement with the South American trading bloc (MERCOSUR). The EU, like Canada, is also exploring closer ties to China.

Europe’s china hedge

Of course, increasing ties with China poses risks of its own. Europe already relies on Chinese imports of solar panels and other technologies to support its clean energy transition, and China’s manufacturing dominance bears the potential to undermine the European auto sector and its wider industrial capacity.

Europe should be very careful about how deeply it engages with China, as the economic impact from that decision could ultimately destroy the very foundations of national-level political support for the entire European project.

How Europe might push back against Washington

In the search for some kind of leverage over mercurial US decision-making, some European analysts have suggested that Europe could make it harder or more expensive for the United States to keep its military bases in Europe. However, that likely would only give President Trump an excuse to withdraw US troops from Europe, potentially making its security vulnerability to Russia even more acute. Others have suggested that Europeans could refuse American aircraft the ability to refuel in Europe or restrict US military over-flight of European airspace. However, these are extraordinary measures that Europeans should only contemplate if faced with an imminent US military threat, in Greenland or elsewhere.

For now, the jury is still out on whether Europe can do what is required to face down this emerging geopolitical trilemma and preserve both its prosperity and its territorial integrity in these turbulent times.

...The favorite gesture of European politicians nowadays is clenched fists. Merz, Callas, Frederiksen – all are enraged by the European helplessness. And it’s not Russia to blame for this. By severing ties with it Europe itself achieved this sad and humiliating result. Truly, when God wants to punish someone He takes away their mind.

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