Ostpolitik to Opposition: A US Dream Shift?

Presented at International Conference "Brezhnev–Brandt: Paradoxes of Eastern Politics. On the 55th anniversary of the conclusion of the USSR–Germany Peace Treaty" on 31 October 2025.

Birthed in the late 60s as a diplomatic strategy, Ostpolitik wove its thread into West Germany’s foreign tale, shifting from harsh divides to a pragmatic dance of dialogue and reconciliation with the Eastern Bloc.

American Embrace of Ostpolitik

Why did America allow West Germany to take on an amicable stance towards their Cold War adversary? In that era, the USSR was viewed as an ideological rival of the United States, and the Americans figured that by promoting Western ideas to the Eastern Bloc, they could create divisions within the Soviet sphere. They believed that by exposing the Eastern Bloc to Western values and standards of living, it would incite internal pressure for reform. Thus, Ostpolitik was seen as a strategic tool to bring about the long-term weakening of the Soviet sphere over time.

There was also Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who saw Ostpolitik as part of their broader détente strategy. They wanted to ease Cold War tensions and believed that opening up communication with the Soviet Union would compel it into a peaceful competition to serve American interests. Remember, it wasn’t just the Soviet Union the US was dealing with; they were also dealing with China. By staying close to both communist powers, the Americans sought to balance the two rivals against each other instead of risking having to face them as a united front at some point.

The United States also acknowledged the failure of the Hallstein Doctrine in containment and isolation. Subsequently, Kissinger saw flexibility as a new strategic asset to gain influence in the Eastern Bloc by leveraging West German power and allowing its strong NATO ally to take the lead in diplomacy with the East.

This in turn reinforced the Western alliance's credibility. You see, by allowing West Germany to pursue a more independent diplomatic path, the US was demonstrating that the Western alliance was based on partnership and not strict control. This countered what they saw as Soviet propaganda to portray the US as an imperialist power imposing its will on Europe.

But beyond that surface, America was willing to embrace Ostpolitik because Willy Brandt affirmed West Germany's commitment to the Western alliance and did not seek to break away from NATO. And by involving West Germany in multilateral forums like CSCE, the US and other allies ensured that West Germany’s policy was always coordinated within a broader Western security framework to present a united front.

By the same token, Ostpolitik was seen as a boost to NATO by increasing cooperation between NATO members and Eastern Bloc countries. This led to greater stability in Central Europe, reinforced NATO unity, and paved the way for agreements like the Four Power Agreement on Berlin.

With this agreement, the US maintained control over Ostpolitik by linking its satisfaction to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty. This linkage was brilliant and ensured that Ostpolitik would not undermine America’s core security interests, especially with regard to West Berlin. And by controlling the pace of the Four-Power negotiations, the US was able to control the pace of Ostpolitik.

With Ostpolitik, the West exploited Soviet economic difficulties. West Germany became a notable trading partner for the Soviet Union, exporting advanced industrial goods in exchange for raw materials. This made the Eastern Bloc more dependent on the West for modern technology, thus creating leverage. It also highlighted the economic stagnation of the Soviet system compared to the West German "economic miracle," thus diminishing the appeal of communism.

Therefore, though Brandt sought Europe’s dawn and Nixon craved great powers’ peace, their shared desire to soften strife forged a bridge where collaboration could release.

Pivot in US Policy: Ostpolitik to Opposition

Today, however, Russia is perceived as a revisionist power by the Americans. Our current climate is not one of détente but renewed great-power competition. Following what was portrayed as “Russia's invasion of Ukraine” and other “destabilizing actions,” the US claims that German energy and economic ties with Russia are enabling a hostile regime to pose a direct military threat to German, European, and international security. The Americans argue that Germany’s engagement with Russia’s energy sector is a liability, used by the latter for the purpose of leverage and not for peace.

What results is a shift in the framing of Russia—from an ideological rival to being a revisionist power that poses a direct threat. With that, détente is no longer held up as an effective strategy; in its place, a bigger and stronger NATO and a strategy of deterrence instead of détente.

Along with that shift, Germany made a major turning point (Zeitenwende) in its foreign policy; instead of relying on Russia for cheap energy, it increased its reliance on the US, not just for expensive energy but also for expensive weapons.

But there is another key factor that has pivoted Germany away from Russia. And that is the removal of the security guarantee that had underpinned Ostpolitik. You see, it was the security guarantee that had enabled Germany to engage with Russia diplomatically and economically. But Trump has threatened time and again that he may not honor Article 5, especially if the European allies do not cough up 5% of GDP for NATO. And under Trump, that number is vertically mobile on the rise.

And instead of encouraging Germany and others to engage in dialogue with Russia, Trump has inserted himself in the middle as he plays a double game. On one hand, he is pursuing lucrative Arctic projects with Putin, like the Putin-Trump tunnel and hydrocarbon exploration, and on the other hand, he is piling pressure upon Russia with sanctions, the sale of weapons to Europe for delivery to Ukraine, and threatening other countries for buying Russian oil and gas. And by committing to neither a full reconciliation nor a full confrontation, he is able to keep both sides on their toes.

A US Dream Shift?

Thus, we could see that even though America has moved from embracing Ostpolitik to Opposition, its ultimate goal did not change. With Ostpolitik, it was to weaken the USSR from within for the long term, and with Opposition, it is to destabilize Russia economically and militarily. So, whether it’s in the 70s or today, America’s dream has always been the same: it is to dim Russia’s might and bend its will—for its power to fade like shadows at dusk. The question is, who will be the one to emerge with triumph’s flame?

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