Sergey Lavrov: “For our part, we are ready for any scenario. In the event that new missile threats are created, our opponents will be given a strong rebuff in the form of military and technical countermeasures”

Photo: MFA

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Rossiya Segodnya, December 29, 2024.

Question: Will Russia withdraw from the New START before it expires considering the aggressive Western policy? Or maybe Moscow will be willing to comply with the quantitative limits as set forth in the New START even after the February 2026 deadline?

Sergey Lavrov: There is an objective reality in which the destructive policy by the United States has undermined strategic stability at its core. In some cases, its very foundations were destroyed. Moreover, anti-Russian sentiment within the incumbent administration in the US has gone through the roof, making the strategic stability dialogue impossible against this backdrop. Russia will not have any arms control talks with the United States as long as it sticks with its current anti-Russian policy.

However, this does not mean that Russia will not do anything voluntarily to maintain an acceptable level of predictability in the military and nuclear spheres. In fact, this is precisely what we are doing. In particular, we continue to abide by the quantitative limits regarding the corresponding weapons as per the New START. In addition to this, Russia upholds its unilateral moratorium on the deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF). There have been other steps we took too.

However, as we have repeatedly said, the relevance of these measures hinges upon whether they meet our interests. When making our assessments, we tend to focus on the efforts by the United States and NATO to upend strategic stability, and, accordingly, take into consideration the way the resulting threats evolve. Today, for example, it is clear that our moratorium on deploying intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has all but lost its relevance, which means that we would have to terminate it. The United States has arrogantly ignored Russia’s and China’s warnings and started to deploy these weapons in various regions across the world. President Vladimir Putin has made it clear that Russia will respond to these developments accordingly. Recently, we tested the Oreshnik hypersonic intermediate-range missile in combat conditions, which served as a convincing demonstration of our capabilities and resolve in terms of the actions we can take in response.

As for the New START, let me remind you that at the time of suspending this agreement, we said that Russia intended to comply with its main limits throughout the treaty’s life cycle and warned the United States against taking any steps which would make these efforts on our behalf irrelevant. We have been consistent in following this vision by making sure that the process of upgrading Russia’s strategic nuclear forces complies with the limits as set forth in the New START, while also keeping a close eye on Washington’s actions.

We do not see any reason for trying to guess what will happen after February 2026 when the New START ceases to exist. Many things can happen in 2025. This makes announcing the possible steps Russia could make in this sensitive domain premature, as well as unreasonable. Save tomorrow for tomorrow, as the saying goes.

Question: Some experts think that the new US administration has sufficient leverage to start talks on Ukraine. Do you agree? What is the probability of such talks being launched in 2025?

Sergey Lavrov: Of course, both the new and the outgoing administrations have such leverage, but they should apply it to themselves and their Kiev wards. It Washington really wanted to put an end to the conflict, it would have stopped arms supplies to Kiev, ordered their satellites to follow suit and its Kiev puppets to cease fire and resume talks without any preconditions after lifting Zelensky’s ban on talks with the Russian leadership.

Our stance on a settlement is well known and remains unchanged. We are ready for talks, provided they are aimed at eliminating the root causes of the Ukraine crisis and take the situation on the ground into account.

President Putin has unequivocally outlined our position of principle in the December 19 news conference on the results of the year, namely the demilitarisation and denazification of Ukraine, which should adopt a neutral, non-aligned and nuclear-free status, as well as the elimination of long-term security threats posed to Russia by the West, including NATO’s enlargement. Kiev must assume concrete obligations to guarantee the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian-speaking citizens and, of course, recognise the territorial realities sealed in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The implementation of the concrete proposals our president has outlined will help bring the conflict to an end and coordinate comprehensive, long-term, fair and legally binding agreements. This is the only path to a lasting peace.

However, everything we have seen and read so far shows that Kiev and the West have started discussing the possibility of a ceasefire and a truce to get breathing room to reinforce the combat ability of the Ukrainian armed forces before renewing efforts to impose a “strategic defeat” on Russia. This is a dead-end, a road to nowhere. There is no doubt about this.

Question: In light of the developments in Syria, are there any plans to adjust the updated Agreement on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and Iran, more precisely, the chapter on mutual military assistance? Is the departure of Bashar al-Assad a reason for closer defence cooperation with Tehran?

Sergey Lavrov: The new major treaty, which has long been drafted and coordinated by the parties, is a comprehensive, long-term and versatile document, so there is no need for any adjustments.

It is aimed at formalising unprecedented progress we have reached in bilateral relations over the past years and their advance to the level of strategic partnership.

It is logical that this comprehensive document has an international aspect, which is focused, in part, on promoting relations in the interests of regional and global peace and security, as well as on formalising Moscow and Tehran’s intention to strengthen security and defence cooperation and efforts against terrorism, extremism and many other common challenges and threats. In principle, this is already being done, to one extent or another, but the signing of the agreement, which we hope to do during the next meeting at the highest level soon, will create additional opportunities for the further strengthening of Russian-Iranian partnership in focus areas.

Question: In early December, Denmark delivered a second batch of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. Earlier, you said that Moscow would consider supplying these aircraft to Kiev as a “deliberate signal from NATO in the nuclear sphere.” What measures will Russia take with regard to Denmark and other countries that supply these weapons to Ukraine and continue to provide maintenance for them?

Sergey Lavrov: The Danish authorities announced plans to send 19 F-16 fighter jets to Kiev as far back as August 2023. In August and December of this year, according to reports, the first two batches of these aircraft were transferred to Ukraine. Copenhagen is one of the largest donors of weapons to Kiev. Denmark is also involved in the training of Ukrainian militants. In addition, the country sends mercenaries to the war theatre and finances the production of military equipment at Ukrainian defence factories, using the income from the frozen Russian assets.

We have repeatedly warned that by providing massive military assistance to the Ukrainian Nazis, Denmark, along with its sponsors and allies, is provoking an escalation of the conflict, forcing Russia to take adequate measures to ensure its national security, including of a military and technical nature.

Any types of weapons supplied by Western countries to the Kiev regime represent legitimate targets and are being effectively destroyed by the Russian military.

Question: Is the Russian side in talks with the armed opposition in Syria regarding the future of the Russian Federation’s military bases in that country? Have you received any guarantees of their continued presence?

Sergey Lavrov: The deployment of Russian military bases in Syria is regulated by relevant interstate treaties concluded in accordance with international law. Each of them stipulates the terms of these facilities’ operation and contains certain obligations on both sides.

Syria is a sovereign country that has the right to conclude and terminate any agreements with its foreign partners. The country has signed numerous acts of this kind over the decades since the establishment of the modern Syrian state. However, we are not aware of any steps being taken by the new Syrian authorities to inventory or revise any of them. The Russian side has not received any notifications in this regard. This makes perfect sense because Syria has declared a period of transition until March 1, 2025, and the current government has the status of an interim authority, which implies certain constitutional restrictions and institutional limitations on its policies.

Undoubtedly, the change of power and the changes on the ground will make certain adjustments to Russia’s military presence in Syria. This includes not only the continued deployment of our bases or strongholds, but also the terms for their operation, maintenance and support, and interaction with the local authorities. These issues could be the subject of negotiations with the new Syrian leadership.

Question: Do you think it possible in the current circumstances to replicate the NATO Double-Track Decision to resolve the intermediate- and shorter-range missile crisis? Under what conditions would Russia be ready to discuss eliminating such systems with the United States and NATO?

Sergey Lavrov: We do not consider it appropriate to speculate about what can or cannot happen in the minds of those who make decisions at NATO. Moreover, their decisions often seem irrational, to put it mildly, and misguided to say the least.

For our part, we are ready for any scenario. In the event that new missile threats are created, our opponents will be given a strong rebuff in the form of military and technical countermeasures. On the other hand, any hypothetical steps to create acceptable conditions for an equal dialogue will certainly be considered.

We have repeatedly pointed out that we can only be interested in a comprehensive effort to reduce the potential for conflict, specifically to eliminate the root causes of the fundamental disagreements concerning security. These primarily include NATO’s long eastward expansion, something that has largely provoked the Ukraine crisis and continues to pose a threat to Russia’s security. Hypothetically, arms control issues could also be discussed, but only as one component of a broader agenda.

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