«The road to Great Victory Japan’s Surrender: Atomic Bomb or Soviet blitzkrieg?»
With the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II approaching, the attention of historians and political scientists is focused not only on the end of the military conflict in Europe, but also on the events that took place in the Far East after the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. Anatoly Koshkin, a Russian orientalist, a professor at the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow and a member of the Russian Writers’ Union, is a leading expert on that conflict and on Russian-Japanese relations from the first half of the 20th century to the present day. The results of the many years of research are presented in his new book, The Surrender of Japan: Atomic Bomb or Soviet Blitzkrieg?
In his book, Anatoly Koshkin writes that Moscow and Tokyo still differ in their interpretation of a number of diplomatic and military events of the past century. Tokyo’s specific view of these events alienates it not only from Moscow, but also from some other centers of world politics. Standing out among these events are the US atomic bombings of Japanese cities on August 6 and 9, 1945. In Japan, it is commonly believed now that these actions contributed to the quicker end of the war in the Pacific. Anatoly Koshkin disagrees, however, arguing that in reality, the Soviet offensive in Manchuria that began on August 9, 1945, leading to the liberation of Japanese-occupied territories in China and Korea, as well as the landing on the Kuril Islands, contributed to Tokyo's exit from the war.
Anatoly Koshkin’s new book delves into the problems of Soviet-Japanese and Russian-Japanese relations in the context of the history of World War II and its legacy. When speaking at the presentation of his work in Moscow, Koshkin said, “American and later Japanese propaganda spared no effort making the overwhelming majority of people abroad and, to my regret, many in Russia, believe that Japan surrendered allegedly as a result of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This is not true, of course. After the bombings, the Japanese command did not intend to surrender and was preparing the army and the people for a decisive battle with the “American devils” for the “sacred Yamato nation”… In my book, I devoted a whole chapter to prove that Japan was not going to surrender after those bombings. In schoolyards, women, the elderly, and children continued training in combat techniques in case of a US landing. Bases for guerrilla warfare were set up in the mountains. In Nagano Prefecture, Korean workers were forced to dig a huge grotto to accommodate the imperial family, the General Staff, and communications facilities in case of Tokyo falling to the enemy. The country was preparing to fight “to the last Japanese.” It is safe to assume that without the Soviet Union entering the war, it would have continued for at least another year and a half, as was acknowledged by the Americans themselves. The US losses would have been significantly higher too. Small wonder that Washington was interested in the Soviet Union's speedy entry into the war against Japan.”
During the press conference, the author recalled that it was not until August 15, 1945 that Emperor Hirohito, when addressing his subjects in a hard-to-understand archaic language, announced that Japan had been forced to withdraw from the war. In his address, he mentioned for the first time that the enemy had obtained a “bomb of unusual power.” Indeed, many in Japan still believe that the use of atomic bombs by the Americans was "tenyu" – the will of Providence, allowing the nation to exit the war “with honor, without losing face.”
What is much less known, however, is that two days later, on August 17, the Emperor issued another address – this time “To the Soldiers and Sailors.” He made no mention of the atomic bomb or the destruction of Japanese cities, but noted that it was the USSR’s entry into the war that had forced Japan to lay down its arms, because otherwise, the country’s very existence would be in jeopardy.
Finally, Washington was particularly interested in the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan. Moscow reiterated its decision – first at the Yalta Conference and later in Potsdam. On July 17, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin confirmed his commitment to declare war on Japan no later than three months after Germany's capitulation. The Allies signed the Potsdam Declaration, demanding unconditional surrender from Japan.
US President Harry Truman, who had no kind feelings towards the Soviet Union, wrote in his diary, "Stalin will enter the war with Japan by August 15. When that happens, it's all over for the Japanese." The Soviet offensive began on August 9, 1945.
Anatoly Koshkin also recalled that after learning about the bombing of Hiroshima, Japanese generals demanded the immediate creation of Japan’s own "retaliatory weapon," which was technically impossible as the Japanese nuclear project "Ni" was still far from completion.
During the postwar years, it became generally accepted in Japan that the atomic bombing had speeded up the end of the war, thus preventing even greater casualties. According to the latest sociological surveys, about 14 percent of the Japanese think so. In turn, the US is convinced about the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons, with about 60 percent of Americans believing that the August 6 and 9 bombings were necessary for ensuring victory and saving the lives of US soldiers. Meanwhile, Koshkin noted, in Japan, they avoid mentioning the United States as the country that used nuclear weapons.
He emphasized that by joining the war with Japan, Stalin not only demonstrated commitment to his duty as an ally, but also pursued his own geopolitical goals aimed at ensuring the security of the Soviet borders.
“Back in November 1943, at the Cairo Conference of Great Britain, the USA, and China, US President Franklin Roosevelt, in a private conversation with Chiang Kai-shek, proposed that the Chinese leader sign a post-war military alliance with Washington, which would allow the United States to set up its military bases throughout China, including near the Soviet borders. Chiang Kai-shek enthusiastically welcomed the proposal… The idea was to have US and Chinese troops occupy the Korean Peninsula and keep it under their control. The unilateral introduction of US forces into China meant the formation of a regime unfriendly to Moscow,” Anatoly Koshkin explained.
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