View from Asia: The ‘quiet development’ shaking America’s power

With the stunning comeback of Donald Trump as president, America’s allies are scrambling, writes at ‘The New York Times’ Sarang Shidore, the director of the Global South program at the Quincy Institute.

Behind their sober messages of congratulation is a palpable anxiety that Washington will soon treat them as mere pawns on the global chessboard. It would be quite a change. Under President Biden’s leadership, the United States — sharpening its rivalry with China and seeking to counter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — put great store in strengthening its alliances and partnerships.

There’s lots to suggest it was successful. NATO, led by the United States, has rallied vigorously against Russia. Europe now echoes America’s weaponization of trade against China. Japan, by ramping up its military spending, joining sanctions against Russia and fashioning stronger ties with South Korea, has drawn closer. The Philippines, after a period of alienation, has begun to forge a common front against China. And India has remained a close partner. “We’re stronger than ever,” Mr. Biden could plausibly boast at the 75th anniversary of NATO this summer.

But look closer, and another trend quietly emerges. American allies and partners have also been hedging their bets, increasingly seeking out alternative arrangements with countries not in the West’s orbit. This development, strongest in the global south, is driven less by individual leaders than by the structure of the international system. In a world ever more marked by multi-alignment and transactionalism, America can no longer depend on the loyalty of its friends. This is already happening, and it has very little to do with Mr. Trump.

For some years now, two American allies in the developing world — Turkey and Thailand — have pulled away from America, triangulating between it and its rivals. Turkey, a longstanding NATO member on the opposite side of Russia in the Syrian civil war, vigorously condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But it did not join U.S.-led sanctions, instead deepening its trade and energy ties with Moscow and engaging both Russia and Ukraine to forge a grain export deal for global markets that stood until last summer.

In Thailand, efforts to seek much greater engagement with China have accelerated. Having no territorial disputes with Beijing and the need to manage the spillovers from neighboring Myanmar’s civil war, Thailand has strengthened its economic ties, enhanced military exercises and now buys more than 40 percent of its arms from China. This year, as if to underline their detachment from America, Turkey and Thailand joined the non-Western BRICS group — led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — as partner states.

For India, the BRICS summit last month served as a safe space for Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping to hold their first serious meeting in five years. By moving to disengage troops at two border flash points, India may be forging the beginnings of a détente with China — giving it more leverage with the United States. Relations with America remain strong, to be sure. But they are facing a degree of discord over India’s continuing relationship with Russia and the coming to power of a pro-Washington government in Bangladesh that is at odds with India.

Even at the core of the U.S. alliance system, there are signs that hedging is growing. In Japan, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s ideas of an “Asian NATO” to counter China suggest commitment to Pax Americana. But he also favors ending the asymmetry in the alliance, giving Tokyo an equal say and including China in regional collaborations such as disaster relief. What’s more, a recent setback to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in parliamentary elections is likely to complicate the government’s ambitious goals for military spending and make it harder to focus — as America would want — on excluding China.

In Europe, meanwhile, anti-establishment parties have surged to new levels of support across the continent. Broadly, these voices question American policy toward Ukraine and are skeptical of the mainstream U.S. view of NATO as a sacred obligation. Italy under Giorgia Meloni shows that the coming to power of such forces need not weaken the alliance. Yet the net effect of the new politics is to put increasing pressure on Europe’s mirroring of America’s priorities on Russia and potentially China. Hungary under Viktor Orban and Slovakia under Robert Fico already play all sides. In time, their lead could spread to other European countries.

What explains the growing attractions of hedging? The mostly nonaligned global south has been its pioneer, with its middle and weaker powers leveraging multiple partnerships to rise in a hostile international system. But the tactic is becoming more attractive for two newer reasons. One is the uncertainty of the future world order. The second is the intuition that the unipolar world, where America bestrode the globe for three decades, is disappearing.

read more in our Telegram-channel https://t.me/The_International_Affairs