View from Delhi: Have U.S. and Iran already gone past the point of 'negotiation'?

Ambassador Kanval Sibal
Photo: Statesman News Service

Hardliners are now in power in Tehran. Iran can legitimately ask itself about the value and durability of any agreement with the US, writes Kanval Sibal, a former Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia.

The US has reportedly proposed a 15-point plan to Iran for ending the US-Iran war. Iran has made its own conditions for an agreement known. It is evident that these are maximalist positions on both sides, and any eventual agreement would involve compromises.

But if one side or the other lays out its positions in public through background briefings or in reaction to the proposals aired through the media, it raises suspicions about the seriousness of the negotiation exercise.

Serious negotiations need to be held behind the scenes with as much confidentiality as possible. If the maximalist positions are publicised for whatever reason in advance, then the text of the final agreement will be assessed by the public on the basis of how much either side was forced to make concessions on core issues of difference. The governments concerned will then have to offer explanations. This public diplomacy only complicates the search for a balanced negotiating outcome in actual negotiations.

The US wants to ensure that Iran's nuclear programme is not revived, and for that, it would want to have oversight over it beyond that of the IAEA. It wants to carve out a role for itself in Iran's peaceful nuclear programme, as we have seen. One cannot see Iran giving any supervisory role to the US or agreeing to its participation in its nuclear programme in any form. Or agreeing to shut down its nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow or Isfahan, as sought by the US.

A gradual breakdown

In the JCPOA, Iran had made a clear and firm commitment that it would not acquire nuclear weapons. In the talks mediated by Oman in Geneva, Iran seemed to have made major concessions on the nuclear front that it had not made before, but Trump chose to attack Iran nevertheless. It is most unlikely that Iran will go beyond what it was willing to concede in the talks at Geneva. So, when Trump keeps saying that the US would not allow Iran to become nuclear, it is not clear what exactly the terms are that he thinks he can force Iran to accept.

Seeking curbs on Iran's missile programme, which has shown its potency in the ongoing conflict, is an old US demand. Iran has rejected this demand before and will no doubt oppose it even more forcefully today. Without a nuclear shield and also a missile shield that provides it some deterrence capability, Iran would render itself defenceless. Iran has no worthwhile air force or a robust air defence system. It is unlikely to accept any binding limits to the range of its missiles, as missiles and drones give it a credible retaliatory capability.

Iran has developed its missile capability independent of the G-7-initiated Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which has 35 members today. Iran is not a member. Pakistan, too, is not. A sovereign country may have self-imposed limits on the range of its missiles, keeping in mind the source of threats to it or to avoid creating misgivings in other countries about its strategic intentions. It is most unlikely that Iran will accept any binding limits on the range or the technical capabilities of its missiles after the two US-Israeli attacks against it and the assassination of its top leadership.

The question of proxies

On Iran's regional role, which means its anti-Israel policies and concomitant support for Hezbollah, Hamas or the Houthis, Iran, again, is unlikely to bind itself to any understandings with the US. It is a fact that Iran's support for its so-called proxies in the region has been diminished. That this Iranian regional role is linked to perceived US-backed Israel's expansionist policies in the region should not be ignored. So long as Israel's policies against the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, its rejection of a two-state solution, its policies in Lebanon, occupation of territory in Syria, and the Greater Israel project of the country's extremists are not revised, the region will remain unstable and conflict-ridden.

On the other hand, Iran's demands would be humiliating for the US to accept. Iran wants the US to remove all its bases from the region, agree to reparations for the destruction caused, lift all sanctions, and commit itself to not reimposing sanctions. Iran would want international guarantees against any future aggression. Iran would also exercise control over the Strait of Hormuz.

The dilemma of the Gulf nations

Even if the Gulf countries feel that their security alliance with the US -allowing American bases on their territory and buying arms from the US - has not given them the protection they expected, and that the US has given priority to Israel's security, the fact remains that they will become more vulnerable to Iran's power if the US withdrew from the region. All this is apart from the US suffering a major geopolitical defeat if it were to quit this region, as the power vacuum will be filled by China and Russia. The Gulf states will also be looking for some kind of guarantees from Iran through a non-aggression pact.

Who gets Hormuz?

As for the Strait of Hormuz, no country will give Iran the right to legally control an international waterway. This will be in violation of Article 38 of UNCLOS and the principle of freedom of navigation and unimpeded passage in international waters, which is also invoked in the case of the South China Sea.

Finally, there is the central question of how much Iran can trust Trump. Despite years of differences over the nuclear issues and Iran's problematic regional role, he is the first US president to attack Iran and assassinate its top political leadership, and that too conjointly with Israel. He is the one who repudiated the JCPOA. He has walked out of many major international agreements and institutions, which shows that he considers nothing sacrosanct. He has bullied the close allies of the US and alienated them. He continually makes statements on Iran that are insulting, demeaning, frivolous, whimsical, contradictory and untruthful. There is a strong belief that he plays with market sentiments with his tailored statements. Even as he is seeking a negotiated solution, US Marines are being deployed for a land operation to take control of Kharg Island.

Iran believes it is facing an existential threat. Hardliners are now in power in Tehran. Iran can legitimately ask itself about the value and durability of any agreement with the US.

…The respected Indian author ignores the central issue: Iran has become the victim of a vile attack by Israel and the United States.

Iran is waging a defensive war. And if any agreement is reached with the United States, Iran has every right to act as it sees fit in the Strait of Hormuz. Currently, the former legal norms no longer apply here – they have been trampled upon by Trump and Netanyahu.

Therefore, Iran can act as it deems right in its own interests, and not in the interests of those who trampled upon this “international law” on February 28, 2026, and threw it into the trash.

This is what needs to be added to the Ambassador Kanval Sibal comment.

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