View from Delhi: Time for Primakov’s triangle of global influence

Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping
Photo: Xinhua

There are signs that the Russia-India-China platform is becoming ‘kinetic’ after a lapse of a few years. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to Moscow last month placed a great store in symbolism. The visit coincided with NATO’S summit in Washington, which most certainly called attention to the global character of the Russian-Indian relationship in the transformative regional environment in current history, stresses M.K. Bhadrakumar, Indian Ambassador and prominent international observer.

Yevgeny Primakov’s idea of India, Russia and China playing a balancing role in the post-Cold War era was ahead of its time. But as recent moves show, it’s worth revisiting now.

There were other signposts, too. Principally, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s address at the 10th Primakov Readings forum in Moscow on June 26 — hardly 10 days before Modi’s visit — was of significance in this connection. The Primakov Readings forum is a prestigious event. Yevgeny Primakov has a unique place in the pantheon of Soviet heroes — he combined his remarkable versatility to play a crucial role in bridging the post-Soviet transition after the failure of Russia’s search for habitation in a common European home.

Primakov’s visionary mind came to the conclusion that a Russia-India-China (RIC) ‘collegium’ could be of pivotal importance in the emerging post-Cold War world order. Without doubt, Primakov was thinking ahead of his times. In all fairness, neither New Delhi, which was obsessed with its ‘unipolar predicament’ at that point and yearned to be a ‘natural ally’ of the US, nor Beijing, which was  intrigued by the hypothetical G2 grouping made up of the US and China (being the two most important world economies), was prepared for such an epochal leap of faith.

The heart of the matter is that neither India nor China fully shared Primakov’s revolutionary concept of multipolarity, which was borne out of Russia’s disillusionment with the West. China was somewhat ahead of India in progressive thinking and probably could visualise the raison d’être in Primakov’s forecast of the main global development trends for decades ahead. The 1997 Russian-Chinese document titled the Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order hinted at it. But India was a hopeless laggard, entrapped in the Washington Consensus.

Now, 25 years later, things have phenomenally changed. The Russian move in February 2022 to create new facts on the ground in Ukraine following the volcanic eruption of tensions with the West over NATO expansion, the emergence of new centres of power and development outside of the Western world, the pervasive desire to build international relations on broad and equal cooperation, the shift in focus from globalisation to regional cooperation — these have become dominant trends. Suffice to say, the time has come for Primakov’s idea that the RIC triangle should become the symbol of the multipolar world and its core.

Lavrov said at the Primakov forum meeting, “About a year ago, we proposed creating an RIC trilateral format. Recently, we revisited the idea again. But so far, our Indian friends believe the border situation (vis-a-vis China) has to be fully resolved first. We understand. Anyway, both Beijing and New Delhi are showing a clear interest in preserving the trilateral cooperation format. I am sure that each of the three will benefit from working out shared approaches and taking aligned stances on key issues on the Eurasian and global agenda.”

Of course, the West abhors any signs of RIC strengthening its solidarity and negotiating from a shared position. The US’s disruptive attempt in the context of Modi’s visit to Moscow is self-evident — to take advantage of the faultlines in India-China relations, to create insecurity in the Indian mind regarding Russia’s intentions, and above all, to stymie the current momentum of Russian-Indian partnership, especially on the economic side.

Indeed, there are contradictions in the RIC format that the US will continue to exploit. The Quad is a typical example. Besides, neither China nor India is willing to question the globalisation foundations and mechanisms laid down by the Americans, or share Russia’s obsessive drive to accelerate the de-dollarisation process. Russia has nothing to lose, since it has been shut out of the Western banking system, whereas India and China do not face any problem to rely on the use of the dollar. Equally, China and India are deeply involved in the Western system of globalisation in terms of their volume of financial, investment and trade agreements, supply chains and the technology transfer they provide.

Meanwhile, India faces an acute problem lately as the net FDI inflow into the country dropped 62.17 percent year-on-year to $10.58 billion in 2023-24, which is a 17-year-low, according to a report. Simply put, India is hopeful that Chinese investment can bring funds to India and promote the upgrading of Indian industries and the optimisation of its economic structure. Being India’s leading trade partner, China has a significant role indeed in driving the Indian economy and creating high-quality manufacturing jobs, which is of course a sensitive political issue as well for the Modi government, as evident in the general elections. Interestingly, Chinese analysts have taken note of a recent shift in the Indian policy to attract more Chinese investment.

A commentary in the Chinese communist party newspaper Global Times concluded, “The establishment of political mutual trust is a long and complex process, but it can be facilitated by economic and trade cooperation. Through economic collaboration, India and China can foster understanding and trust based on mutual benefit, gradually resolving political differences and uncertainties. This partnership will benefit the economic growth of both nations and contribute to regional and global peace.”

This is a positive signal. It is in Russia’s interests to be a facilitator in the India-China relationship. The BRICS summit in Kazan in October under President Vladimir Putin’s chairmanship may witness  a meeting between Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Possibly, Modi and Putin shared views in this regard during their informal talks in Moscow last month. The fact remains that Moscow regards the Greater Eurasian Partnership as the flagship project of its foreign policy. Foreign economic strategy and international identity are inherently linked in the Russian calculus.

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