View from London: “It is now clear that the Kursk gambit has been a monumental military error and might yet turn into a disaster”

11:29 25.10.2024 •

A dose of magical thinking, and a certain distance between the real and the ideal, have always been at play in this conflict, on the West’s side. That’s manageable as long as the broad thrust of policy – i.e., fund and arm Ukraine to at least match, if not overmatch Russia’s military in the field, as a basis for any talks – stays firm. But now, that hard substance of policy is eroding fast, not just because Western efforts are inadequate but also because Russia is outperforming expectations.

Therefore, the relative dosage of magical thinking in the bloodstream of the West’s Ukraine “strategy” is increasing rapidly to dangerous levels. Hence the increased hallucinations, writes Gabriel Elefteriu, a deputy director at the Council on Geostrategy in London and a fellow at Yorktown Institute in Washington, D.C.

It is now clear that the Kursk gambit has been a monumental military error on par with the costly defence of Bakhmut. It might yet turn into a disaster.

It failed in drawing enough Russian units away from Donbas and thus slowing their progress there; but (at the very least) it has so far consumed precious Ukrainian resources. Indeed, the Russian army is advancing on multiple axes throughout the Donbas; it has effectively cracked Ukraine’s hardest defensive nut. Now it’s a question of exploiting the situation, which is not easy – but many of the most difficult obstacles which have secured the Donbas since 2014 have now been overcome by Putin’s forces.

Russia has also expanded its defence production, having very successfully switched to a war economy that is actually creating growth, and thus wealth.

In the field, the Russians have overcome many of their initial inadequacies and have learned and adapted well.

It is undeniable that it is Russia that now holds the initiative, and that the war trends strongly in its favour. Even some of Ukraine’s most loyal supporters admit the scale of the problem, i.e. the combination of Ukrainian failures and the West’s insufficient level of assistance. There is hardly any serious expectation of another US aid package next year anywhere similar to the $60 billion one passed by the US Congress in April. In addition, the need to supply Israel’s own existential fight, especially with air defence munitions, will be increasingly cutting into what the US can give to Ukraine even if it wanted to. As for European help, Germany is halving its Ukraine aid in 2025, while in general European nations have hardly made any serious efforts to build up their forces and defence industry anywhere near commensurate with the threat, let alone what Ukraine needs.

In these conditions, it is truly mystifying to see the Western mainstream commentariat still debating the question of potential “peace negotiations” with Russia in the same terms from back in 2022-23 when Ukraine was, comparatively, at its strongest – as if nothing has happened in the meantime.

It is time for all responsible leaders and policymakers to face the hard questions, and actually start providing some answers grounded in reality, not fantasy. Such as, how exactly do you stop Russia from continuing to advance and grind down Ukraine, on current trends? With the country now transformed into an armed camp, with an economy now dependent on military production, with a growing army Russia can continue the war of attrition for years.

If Russia is to be stopped by military force, where is the required manpower, equipment and finance going to come from? (Not to mention the competent generalship.) It should be noted here that the Russian military machine is bigger and more capable now than at the start of the war – another abject failure of Western “foresight”. Or, perhaps, the solution might be Western escalation in the form of NATO troops in Ukraine, or at the “very least” giving Ukraine free reign (and assistance) in using top-end NATO weapons to attack Russia itself?

The problem there – apart from the risk of nuclear holocaust, and political crisis among Western nations – is that Russia can also respond in its own ways, from attacks in space to “mayhem” across European cities.

Alternatively, if it is proposed to stop the Russians by real negotiations, why would they agree when they are winning? What could Ukraine offer? Putin’s most recent public statement on conditions for peace, from June this year, leaves zero room for actual negotiations. It is a demand for capitulation, in which the full evacuation of all four oblasts by Ukraine – from Kharkiv to Kherson – would be merely a pre-condition for a ceasefire. Then would come the so-called “negotiations”, where “demilitarisation and de-nazification” are still on the list.

As for the idea that Russia would accept any deal involving NATO membership for Ukraine (even partial), and the prospect of NATO troops based in the country, it is even more absurd, after all this sacrifice (as Russians see it).

But if Russia can’t be stopped either by force or by negotiations, what is the end-game? Does the present trajectory lead to the collapse of the Ukrainian defence, and therefore the state, with Russia occupying most of the country – horrible as that prospect might be? This could happen within the next 2-5 years, regardless who wins the US election. In the meantime, Europe has all but wasted this critical time-window since 2022 – bought with so much Ukrainian blood – for full-scale rearmament.

The blame-game has already started, with fingers pointed variously at Western allies (with emphasis on Germany), or at Trump (in an odd “pre-trial” of someone who is not even in office yet, and he may never be again). But even the purveyors of such moral judgements, in their assignation of blame, do not imagine the failure of Ukraine as going beyond what they would consider to be a “bad peace”, with some cessation of territory…

 

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