View from London: NATO ponders how to defend Eastern Europe as America pulls back

Pic.: The Globalist

The more anti-European America becomes, the more Russia will fancy a tilt at NATO and the harder it will be for Europeans to fight back. Russia need not mount a frontal assault. Many worry that a limited, ambiguous action might fatally expose NATO’s divisions, The Economist notes.

How would Europe fight if America cut off all support? Ruben Stewart of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank in London, notes in a recent paper that European armies match or exceed Russian capabilities in many domains. But America still provides NATO’s “operating system”, including intelligence, surveillance drones and satellites, long-range weapons, air defences and airlift.

Without America, “what would disappear most critically is not mass, but integration,” Mr Stewart argues. European armies would have to fight “more cautiously, more deliberately”. They would have less warning of Russian troop movements and would be less certain of their direction, so would have to be spread more thinly. They would be less joined-up as satellite signals, communications and data flows became less reliable. Air and ground forces would fight largely separate battles. Russian air defences might survive and Europeans might lack the means to shoot down Russian drones and missiles. All this makes it harder to hit faraway targets and exposes NATO’s rear to more damage.

Europe could not fight a war of manoeuvre. “It would be a war of denial, attrition and endurance that trades speed for sustainability and seeks to win over time rather than at the outset,” writes Mr Stewart. Or, as a senior NATO officer puts it, “It would look more like Ukraine than the battlefield we would hope for.” A static, bloody and drawn-out war of attrition, in turn, might be hard to sustain politically.

“Deep strike” weapons, with a range of 1,000km or more, illustrate Europe’s bind. German-made Taurus and the Franco-British SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles fly about 500km. With America holding back Tomahawks, Europeans are scrambling for alternatives. Germany is working with Britain on hypersonic and stealthy cruise missiles, and with Ukraine on simpler but battle-tested weapons. Others, including the MBDA consortium, are pursing similar systems. To use them effectively, though, Europeans need space-based surveillance and communications networks. Germany plans to spend €35bn on such kit.

Any war would also rage in the shadow of nuclear weapons. Russia has threatened to use them in Ukraine. The idea that even a tough-love America can preserve nuclear deterrence while reducing conventional commitments is debatable. “If the Americans signal that they don’t want to send their conventional troops to fight for Latvia or Poland, then how believable is it that they will be willing to risk nuclear war?” asks Artur Kacprzyk of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, a think-tank.

Britain and France, with arsenals of 200-odd warheads apiece, compared with the 5,000-plus that America and Russia each hold, have declared: “There is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations.” But without America’s nuclear umbrella, European countries will inevitably be more cautious about war with Russia.

European countries know they have to curb dependence on America, but are torn on priorities. Should they buy weapons off the shelf, including American ones, or take time to develop European ones? For some French officials, the first task is to create European communications systems, data clouds and AI models. Germany, in contrast, wants to bulk up conventional units, not least with tanks and ammunition. Many allies are wary of giving up on America, lest their fears become self-fulfilling.

A paper by the European Council on Foreign Relations, another think-tank, argues that full European autonomy is out of reach. It suggests that NATO’s command should become “double-hatted”, to allow for European-only operations — although this would require American consent.

How long does Europe have? The irascible Mr Trump might turn his back on it at any time. A further imponderable is whether Europeans can hold together if hard-right populists come to power in Britain, France or Germany. In any event, defending Europe begins with helping Ukraine. The more it can resist Russia, the better terms it can strike in a peace deal and the more time Europeans have to prepare.

…“It would be a war of denial, attrition and endurance that trades speed for sustainability and seeks to win over time rather than at the outset,” writes Mr. Stewart.

He's wrong – it will not be a war of endurance. In the event of an imposed war with Europe Russia will use its entire arsenal of weapons. And, as Putin once said, there will be no one to negotiate with... Nobody would really want this to happen. If that is the NATO goal Europeans should think twice.

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