View from Washington: “European defense companies are inefficient, slow and rarely support the hardware that comes out of their factories”

Europe is almost totally unprepared to act as a collective force. Big talk, low performance, writes Stephen Bryen, a former US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

Ursula Von Der Leyen, the President of the European Commission has proposed that Europe increase its defense spending by 1.5% GDP over the average 2.0% GDP European countries are currently spending on defense. She fears that Europe has to defend itself and she understands that the United States probably will not act as a savior if Europe gets into trouble. President Trump's administration is already signaling a big change in NATO. In future, according to reports circulating in Washington, NATO should be headed by either a British or French general (supposing Germany does not have any generals!). Over the years, the top NATO general always was an American. Washington wants to change that.

On the whole, the European Commission proposal would amount to € 843 billion. To help member states navigate the proposed increase in spending, the EU would float loans of around €150 billion, raised on capital markets. Who would get these loans, what would be the terms and conditions, and what economies can support servicing them, is unclear.

European defense stocks surged on the news. But there is a huge gap between expectation and realization. European countries these days face serious economic problems compounded by the huge rise in energy prices in most of Europe. Germany is already in a recession and it is quietly moving some of its industry abroad, particularly to the United States.

The bigger problem, however, lies beneath the surface of Europe's defense companies themselves. Most of them are hardly competitive and the cost of defense hardware is unrealistically high, as a report by the respected European think tank Kiel Institute for the World Economy says. The Von Der Leyen proposal follows exactly the Kiel proposed increase in spending needed in Europe.

A singular problem is that more tanks and guns presupposes more troops, probably between 300,000 to 500,000 boots on the ground. Such a force simply does not exist in Europe and there's almost no prospect for building up such a force. Having warehouses full of equipment without any operators is a non-starter. Building an army requires raising and paying one. There is zero momentum in that direction in Europe.

As a former President of the North American division of Italy's largest defense company, I know that European defense companies are inefficient, slow and rarely support the hardware that comes out of their factories.

Moreover, European defense companies typically fight with each other over the doling out of production shares, further delaying manufacturing and deployment. Stuffing these companies with lots of money is likely to put them in a tailspin of greed, instead of an outflow of hardware.

Obviously there also are questions about what kind of hardware, how much, and who will make it. Not all European equipment has proven as good as advertised. One of the obvious disappointments was the Leopard tank that was not the game changer in Ukraine everyone expected. Another deficit is air defense. Europe is behind in modern air defenses, especially defenses against long range ballistic missiles. Oreshnik proved they have reason to be concerned.

In the end, proposals to significantly increase defense spending in Europe are unlikely to happen. The last 50 years of leaving the real job to Uncle Sam is over, but Europe is almost totally unprepared to act as a collective force. Some countries, Poland comes to mind, are spending on defense because they realize they must do so. Others, not so much. Big talk, low performance.