View from Washington: Seizing the Panama canal would be both dumb and difficult

A military operation against a tiny neighbor would destroy US credibility in Latin America and provide a boost for China and Russia. Plus, the Panamanians would likely put up a good fight, writes James Stavridis, a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO.

When I first sailed on a Navy warship through the Panama Canal, in 1984, it was jointly run by the United States Canal Authority and the Panamanian government. As agreed in the 1977 treaty negotiated by President Jimmy Carter’s administration, the joint control would last until the end of 1999. So I saw the canal during a period of transition between the two nations. It was an amicable arrangement, very professionally run.

In the decades since, I’ve been through the canal several times, all since Panama took full control. In my experience, the Panamanians have continued to operate the complex waterway in a highly capable fashion. The canal, which is a major source of income for the small Central American nation, remains strategically critical, conveying about 6% of global maritime trade.

Carter’s decision to turn over control was highly controversial. And now the canal has again become a flashpoint, because of President Donald Trump’s assertion in his inaugural address that he is intent on “taking it back.” He has refused to rule out using military force.

Is he serious? What would taking possession of the canal entail? And is it a good idea?

In his speech, and in public comments leading up to it, Trump warned about Chinese influence in the canal zone. Yes, some Chinese companies are involved in port operations, although the canal is firmly run by the sovereign state of Panama. He has also groused, with some justification, about the costs of individual transits — especially for American ships, given that the US footed the cost of building the canal early in the 20th century.

Certainly, going back to the pre-1977 arrangement — of the US essentially leasing the canal in perpetuity from the Panamanians and having full control — has advantages for Washington.

The problem is that the Panamanians, having now operated the canal for decades, are adamant about not relinquishing it. President José Raúl Mulino said last month, “I want to express precisely that every square meter of the Panama Canal and adjacent area belong to Panama and will continue to.”

In addition to sailing the canal, I have been deeply involved in ensuring its security. From 2006 to 2009, I was the commander of Southcom; every year we conducted a large, multinational exercise, dubbed PANAMAX, to practice defending the canal. Last year’s version included 1,500 US service personnel and 500 participants from 18 partner countries.

The Panamanians are very invested in the military defense of the waterway. The potential threats we defended against in the exercises included an attempt by a great power — perhaps China — to seize the canal. We also prepared for potential terrorist incidents and natural disasters. But of course none of the study or drills was directed against the contingency of a US attack on Panama.

Back then, the idea of taking the canal by force would have seemed absurd. And despite Trump’s rhetoric, it still sounds highly implausible, right?

Except that to Latin Americans, it sounds kind of familiar. Since its founding, the US has invaded countries in Latin America or the Caribbean around 70 times. (This is invasion defined as the imposition of armed troops with a political purpose on the soil of a sovereign nation without that country’s consent.) In 1989, we invaded Panama and overthrew dictator Manuel Noriega. We tend to forget the many times we’ve imposed our will on countries to our south, but I assure you the people there remember.

On top of all this, the idea of the military reclaiming the canal fails in three key ways.

Politically and diplomatically, it would be disastrous for our relations throughout the Americas. The US would instantly lose all credibility in the region, its influence in the Organization of American States, and its leverage to gain assistance with other pressing issues: narcotics, migration, territorial claims (such as Venezuela’s claim of two-thirds of oil-rich Guyana, its almost defenseless neighbor). Domestically, such a move would not be popular in the Latino community.

Strategically, taking the canal by force would play incredibly well into the hands of America’s opponents… Finally, militarily, we would be wise to hit pause and ask ourselves the degree to which the Panamanians would defend themselves. My guess — based on experience and discussing it with well-informed friends in the region — is that they would fight. They would receive a great deal of political and possibly military support from other nations in Latin America.

It would also close the canal to shipping, and might well lead to attacks against merchant vessels throughout the Caribbean in retaliation (much as the Yemeni Houthis are effectively shutting down the Suez Canal).

Are we looking for a major combat deployment and probable long-term counterinsurgency operations in our backyard?

An actual attack to seize the canal would be a significant mistake in every dimension, and lead to a host of dangerous consequences both in the Americas and around the world.

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