Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions at a joint news conference following talks with Foreign Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan Jeyhun Bayramov

Photo: MFA

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions at a joint news conference following talks with Foreign Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan Jeyhun Bayramov.

Moscow, July 17,

Colleagues,

My counterpart, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan Jeyhun Bayramov, and I have held constructive, substantive, and candid talks.

We reaffirmed steady progress in our relations in the spirit of friendship and neighbourliness in line with the Declaration on Allied Interaction between Russia and Azerbaijan signed by President Vladimir Putin and President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev in Moscow on February 22, 2022.

We highlighted the continued Moscow-Baku dialogue at the top and high levels. On March 11, the presidents of the two countries held a telephone conversation during which the Russian leader expressed his appreciation to the Azerbaijani side for providing effective and friendly help in evacuating our citizens from Iran this spring, when the United States and Israel launched aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Our Azerbaijani friends and neighbours also lent Russia a helping hand in ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Iranian people via Azerbaijan.

We took note of President Ilham Aliyev stating at the Shusha Forum on July 13 that Russian-Azerbaijani relations had been “fully normalised” and previous difficulties were behind us. Both sides acknowledged this reality and agreed that we would work to make up for a hiatus in our relations over the past few months.

We welcomed the dynamic course of intergovernmental ties at the level of our respective prime ministers, as well as robust interparliamentary dialogue. Senior officials from the Federation Council and the Milli Majlis met in April and May. The Russian-Azerbaijani Interparliamentary Commission met most recently on June 18. Its 25th anniversary meeting will be held in Moscow in December.

Foreign policy dialogue is under way at all levels. Deputy ministers and heads of departments remain in regular contact. Today we signed the 2026-2027 Consultations Plan between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan which will help move this dialogue forward.

We discussed trade and economic interaction keeping mindful of the fact that the latest meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation was held in April. We noted that both sides have a stake in further increasing trade. In 2025, bilateral trade stood at nearly $5 billion. Russia remains one of Azerbaijan’s leading trade partners. There is considerable potential for growing mutual trade and expanding direct investment flows. The accumulated Russian direct investment in Azerbaijan stands at around $10.7 billion. More than 1,400 commercial entities with Russian capital operate in the republic.

We also touched upon the efforts of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran to tap into the logistics potential of the western branch of the International North-South Transport Corridor, noting that the Russian-Azerbaijani intergovernmental agreement on expanding transit freight traffic along this route signed in Moscow in December 2024 is being implemented.

With regard to cross-border cooperation, the 29th meeting of the Russian-Azerbaijani Joint Commission on the Allocation of Water Resources of the Transboundary Samur River was held on July 9. We are satisfied with the progress of this project and the fulfilment of the agreements.

We placed great emphasis on resuming full-scale cooperation in the cultural, humanitarian, and educational spheres. We believe the project to establish a Russian-Azerbaijani university in Azerbaijan in partnership with St Petersburg State University holds a lot of promise. As of today, around 9,000 Azerbaijani students are studying in Russia. We discussed establishing schools at the respective embassies of our two countries.

We held an in-depth discussion of urgent international and regional priorities highlighting Moscow-Baku interaction as an important factor contributing to stability in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region.

Russia has consistently supported the efforts of Azerbaijan and Armenia to achieve fully and comprehensively normalised relations relying on the package of trilateral agreements that were signed at the top level in 2020-2022. As always, we stand ready to assist Baku and Yerevan in unblocking transport routes and economic ties and resolving humanitarian issues, noting that the Trilateral Working Group at the level of deputy prime ministers did much in the economic sphere back in the day. We believe these accomplishments remain valid today.

We briefly discussed attempts by the collective West to turn the South Caucasus into an arena of geopolitical confrontation. In this regard, we see significant potential of the “3+3” Regional Cooperation Platform, which brings together the three South Caucasus countries, namely, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, and their neighbours - Russia, Iran, and Türkiye. This mechanism (the importance of which was once again highlighted by President Ilham Aliyev on July 13) is designed to help address all kinds of regional challenges through the efforts of the countries of the region and their neighbours without destructive external interference.

We welcomed a meeting of experts from the countries participating in this format, which took place on June 5 as part of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum and was attended by representatives from all six countries. We hope that our Azerbaijani and Armenian colleagues will soon come to terms on the schedule of ministerial meetings of the Platform, and we will determine the venue, Baku or Yerevan, with the understanding that the next meeting will take place in the other capital.

We reaffirmed the importance of multilateral cooperation within the “Caspian Five.” We share responsibility for maintaining sound environmental and economic balance of this unique body of water and preserving it as a zone of peace and stability.

We will continue joint work in other formats, including the CIS, the OSCE, and the UN. As is customary, we will support each other’s initiatives on international forums.

We are satisfied with the outcomes of the talks. I believe they will further strengthen Russia-Azerbaijan cooperation, friendship, and partnership, and promote peace, stability, and security in the South Caucasus.

Question: The International North-South Transport Corridor remains one of the principal transport connectivity projects. During recent contacts with the Iranian side, issues related to the implementation of the Rasht-Astara railway section, a missing link in the corridor, were discussed. What issues remain unresolved, and how do you assess the prospects for stepping up the implementation of the project and its full launch?

Sergey Lavrov: We addressed this matter today. It is, indeed, of considerable significance, particularly given the protracted crisis in the Strait of Hormuz – which, evidently, persists – and the consequent adverse impact on the global economy and international transport routes.

The situation regarding our trilateral initiative is encouraging, as our Iranian counterparts recently apprised us that the allocation of land for the Rasht-Astara segment has been completed. The absence of this allocation over the years has hindered the commencement of the relevant works. Recently, in this very location, the heads of the three railway administrations – Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran – convened. The focus of their discussions was on practical aspects: how to initiate practical operations now that the land allocation is secured.

I am confident that we will witness tangible progress. All three parties have demonstrated a clear interest.

Question: President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev recently stated that Russian-Azerbaijani relations have been fully normalised. How do you assess the current stage of bilateral dialogue and which areas of cooperation do you consider priorities for the near future? What practical agreements were secured following today’s talks?

Sergey Lavrov: In my view, we have just discussed this matter. However, if the editorial brief insists upon repetition, we are prepared to reiterate our position.

In essence, we have signed a Consultation Plan that will facilitate intensified interaction between our respective foreign ministries. These contacts have never ceased; yet, our engagement will now be conducted in a more systematic fashion, identifying those items on the international agenda that are most pertinent for the foreseeable future.

Secondly, we have reviewed the measures required from our respective foreign policy agencies regarding the economic sphere, in support of the decisions adopted in April of this year at the regular session of the Intergovernmental Trade and Economic Commission at the level of deputy prime ministers.

Thirdly, we discussed deepening cultural and educational exchanges, including concert tours and the expedited establishment of a joint Russian-Azerbaijani university. The lead institution on the Russian side is St Petersburg State University.

Another significant agreement concerns enhanced media coverage of our bilateral relations across all spheres. Dedicated contacts will be maintained via the information departments of our foreign ministries as well as through additional channels. We are keen to ensure that direct engagement between representatives of the mass media assists in dispelling certain misconceptions and securing more objective coverage of our relations. Regrettably, there remain those on both sides who seek to portray these relations in an unfavourable manner.

Among our principal practical topics were matters pertaining to the Caspian region. Aside from the aforementioned Rasht-Astara section and the North-South International Transport Corridor, the Caspian region faces challenges such as ecological concerns and the phenomenon of shrinking waters. The President of Azerbaijan was among the first to underscore the necessity of measures to address this shallowing. A five-party meeting on this subject, as well as on other questions pertaining to the utilisation of our shared Caspian Sea, is expected to be convened.

Finally, we discussed the advancement of the 3+3 platform for the South Caucasus. We welcome the fact that the President of Azerbaijan recently highlighted the importance of this endeavour. We have agreed to resolve, at the earliest opportunity, matters related to the venue for the next meeting of foreign ministers. I am hopeful that we will succeed in organising such a gathering this year.

Question: The issue of cooperation in the Caspian Sea traditionally holds an important place in the cooperation agenda of the littoral states. At the same time, the environmental state of the increasingly shrinking Caspian Sea evokes additional concern. What joint measures can Russia and other Caspian states take to further strengthen regional cooperation, preserve the unique ecosystem of the Caspian Sea and minimise negative environmental and socio-economic consequences?

Sergey Lavrov: Today, we principally discussed the need to motivate our Iranian neighbours to ratify the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. All other littoral countries have already done this. It is important for completely resolving issues of regulating the legal regime of the Caspian Sea. Even though the littoral states honour principled obligations contained in this Convention, it nevertheless needs to be ratified.

Second, speaking of ecology, we mentioned the Caspian Sea shrinking process. I would like to recall that President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev was among the first to mention this issue. At this stage, there are plans to hold a series of pentalateral activities, including those on the problem of shrinking. Azerbaijani colleagues promised to support this proposal of the Russian side. It appears that others are ready to participate.

I would like to discuss one more issue. Russia regularly organises trips for the concerned experts aboard a hydrographic vessel, so that they can assess the local environmental situation. We will actively support all this and any other initiatives aiming to preserve this unique sea-lake. We have reached clear consensus on this issue.

As for the impact on the Ukrainian crisis, the Kiev regime is concerned that the current situation is diverting attention away from the support it is increasingly seeking from the West. It is also diverting the attention of the United States, which Europe is eager to draw into providing unequivocal backing for the Kiev regime.

Following the G7 Summit, other meetings held in Europe over the past two months, and the NATO Summit, President of France Emmanuel Macron openly and proudly declared that Europe had succeeded in pulling the United States away from the Anchorage position – which has now ceased to exist – and toward unconditional and unequivocal support for Ukraine as a “defender of European values.” They continue to make such claims despite the fact that, as we recalled today, Ukraine is the only country in the world where the Russian language has been banned by law in virtually every sphere of public life. Armenian is not banned in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani is not banned in Armenia, Arabic and Persian may be spoken in Israel, and Hebrew may be spoken in Iran and throughout the Arab world. But in Ukraine, speaking Russian has been prohibited by law.

Returning to the question of how the situation surrounding Iran may affect efforts to settle the conflict in Ukraine. First, I repeat that the main concern in Kiev is that the United States has been “distracted” and is therefore unable to join more actively those who are focused exclusively on increasing pressure on the Russian Federation. There have once again been speculations that US President’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – key negotiators across virtually every area of American foreign policy – are unable to break free and cast off this burden.

For our part, I believe we have demonstrated our goodwill repeatedly since 2014. We supported every agreement concluded between the Ukrainian authorities (regardless of who was in power) and the opposition. We also backed the initiatives undertaken by the European Union, represented by Germany and France. This was the case with the agreements reached in 2014, 2015, and 2019, and also those negotiated with the participation of Vladimir Zelensky in Paris in 2019. We were satisfied with all the agreements reached there. We supported them. Yet not a single one of them was implemented, neither by Vladimir Zelensky’s government, nor by Petr Poroshenko’s before it.

And, of course, the Anchorage agreements are an obvious thing. Just for your own interest – I don’t want to take up your time now – read what US President Donald Trump said about the Alaska agreements on the day of his joint news conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as one, two, and three days after the Alaska summit. Read it. It was stated quite clearly that these agreements constitute the basis for a settlement and that the Russians accepted the US proposal.

In this regard, let me make one observation. Yesterday, or perhaps the day before, The Washington Times wrote that Moscow was choosing to forego or risk lucrative opportunities to obtain sanctions relief and expand economic cooperation with the United States, previously offered by Donald Trump on the condition of good-faith participation in negotiations on Ukraine. This could improve the Russian economy, but authoritarian regimes care about their own survival, not the wellbeing of their citizens. Please note the words “on the condition of good-faith participation in negotiations on Ukraine.”

Frankly, some journalists have no conscience. I hope those present here do have conscience. So let me repeat once again – perhaps The Washington Times will learn from you that we do, in fact, read their newspaper: we accepted Donald Trump’s proposal in Alaska.

It is Donald Trump’s European allies – and, naturally, Mr Zelensky himself – who are trying to pull him away from those proposals. Let the American all-round negotiators deal with the tasks assigned to them by their President. As for us, we will continue addressing our own.

President Vladimir Putin has made it absolutely clear that this work – which we undertook only after every attempt to resolve the situation peacefully had failed, after all who had signed the previous agreements had deceived us and later openly admitted they had never intended to implement them – will be fulfilled.

read more in our Telegram-channel https://t.me/The_International_Affairs