Rosatom offers Armenia a nuclear energy pathway

On September 29, Alexey Likhachev, head of the Russian state corporation Rosatom, was in Yerevan meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The meeting coincided with the 5^th session of the Joint Coordinating Committee for the implementation of the program to further extend the operational lifespan of the second power unit of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Armenia, which accounts for almost 30 percent of the electricity generated in the country.

Upgraded by Rosatom, the plant’s service life is now extended until 2036. According to experts, the facility could technically remain operational until 2046. Likhachev noted, however, that this would require hundreds of millions of dollars in investments in the plant’s safety and automation systems, the re-annealing of the reactor pressure vessel, and the expansion of spent fuel storage facilities, which could potentially double the cost of electricity for consumers. [1]

An alternative and increasingly likely option is to cancel any further extension of the ageing plant’s life beyond 2036 and build a new one instead. During a news conference at Yerevan’s Zvartnots airport, Alexey Likhachev officially proposed that Armenia build a new NPP with a capacity of 1 GW.

Rosatom has already submitted a formal proposal to the Armenian side for the construction of a VVER-1000 unit (with a capacity of at least 1,000 MW). The idea is not only to build a new facility, but also ensure technological continuity by employing already existing infrastructure and the expertise of Armenian nuclear specialists. The new NPP is to use well-established reactors already in use in Russia, India, and Iran. According to Likhachev, "they combine very high economic efficiency - specifically, a low cost of electricity - with all the required 'Generation 3+' safety systems. In our view, this offering is the best one currently available on the global market." [2]

If Yerevan goes along, Rosatom plans to implement this project through an integrated international consortium, involving in the construction manufacturers from France, South Korea, and China. As an example of such cooperation, Likhachev cited a project in Kazakhstan where, after assessing the reactor technologies and other proposals submitted by potential vendors, including NPP safety, technical and financial aspects, international experience, personnel training, and the level of localization, an interdepartmental commission on the development of the nuclear industry selected Rosatom to lead an international consortium, also involving French, South Korean, and Chinese manufacturers, for the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant. [3]

Likhachev noted that international projects in Egypt, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan make use of the best practices from around the world, naturally in coordination with the respective national client.

Explaining the rationale for a capacity of at least 1 GW, Sergey Likhachev pointed out that Armenia’s current supply of electricity at affordable prices is "barely sufficient." Last year, the country’s electricity consumption was up by seven percent. Experts forecast that with an annual consumption growth of around four percent, Armenia will require this particular level of baseload generation capacity by 2036 to compensate for the projected shortfall. Furthermore, Rosatom is prepared to apply [4] its technologies to the disposal of chemical waste at the Nairit plant in Yerevan, a former rubber production facility. In 2023, responding to a request by the Armenian partners, a company working as part of the Rosatom group conducted at its own expense an assessment of the site and an inventory of the accumulated waste. The findings, along with proposals for subsequent steps, were later presented to the Armenian side.

The head of Rosatom said he was hopeful that the Armenian government would reach a final decision in the coming months regarding the technical specifications and the choice of a partner for the construction of a new nuclear power plant.

Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has publicly acknowledged, for the first time, that the project of a single modular nuclear power plant that he had previously agreed [5] to pursue with the United States would not be sufficient for the country’s needs. According to him, while just over a year ago, Armenia had a surplus of power generation capacity, the situation has since changed dramatically due to the volume of approved investment programs, which will require a major uptick in energy consumption. Pashinyan explained that companies working in the field of artificial intelligence are already contacting the Armenian authorities inquiring about the necessary electricity supply. [6] Nikol Pashinyan’s admission comes amid repeated warnings from experts, who argue that Yerevan’s heavy tilt toward EU-backed solar power, combined with plans for a modular nuclear plant built in partnership with the US, poses serious risks to the national energy system. In 2025, the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant generated 2.9 billion kWh of electricity (accounting for approximately 30 percent of total generation), whereas solar power plants produced only 1.3 billion kWh (14 percent). [7]

Replacing a high-capacity nuclear power unit with a small modular reactor (SMR) with a capacity of up to 150 MW would endanger Armenia’s electricity exports because the SMR’s generated power would not be enough even to meet domestic demand. Therefore, Rosatom’s proposal to construct a new 1 GW nuclear power unit by a consortium bringing together technologies, companies, and capital from France, Russia, South Korea, China, and the United States appears to be the most viable option for Armenia.

The question is, however, whether a decision to build a new nuclear power plant in Armenia would be dictated by economic considerations alone. Does Armenia possess the necessary political and diplomatic autonomy for such a complex, multi-vector model?

The Armenian Premier’s foreign policy moves often defy economic rationale, aligning instead with the directives coming from Western geopolitical actors. The United States and the European Union are pursuing a consistent policy aimed at ousting Russia from Armenia’s energy sector.

It is worth noting here that during his visit to Armenia in February 2026, US Vice President J.D. Vance oversaw the signing of the 123 Agreement - a pact allowing the import of US civil nuclear technology. The agreement imposes a series of stringent requirements on the signatory. Essentially, it is a mechanism to compel countries opting for "peaceful nuclear energy" to adopt American nuclear technology. This effectively allows the United States to sell reactors, related equipment, fuel, and other components on a non-competitive basis.

According to the independent Turkish online site Medya Gunlugu, in the abovementioned agreement Armenia commits to purchase from the US small modular reactors (SMRs) intended to replace the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant. Medya Gunlugu notes that the 123 Agreement effectively binds Armenia to Western technologies for the next 50 years. [8]

Once signed, the 123 deal gives the US specialists the right to conduct inspections, including unannounced ones, at nuclear power plants in partner countries; they must also be granted access to all storage sites for nuclear materials. Consequently, Armenia will be required to set up on its own territory with high seismic activity (!!!) [9] a geological repository for all the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated by the reactor.

Such a geological repository must be located at least 500 meters deep under the ground covering an area of several hectares. Individual units must be isolated from one another, forming an underground network of corridors five to ten kilometers long. Furthermore, the facility must be designed to remain operational for 300,000 years, during which time “minor actinides," produced while nuclear fuel is in the reactor core, remain extremely radioactive.

None of this would be necessary if Armenia were to continue its long-term cooperation with Rosatom. For instance, the VVER-440 reactor at the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant is expected to generate approximately 900 tons of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) over the course of 60 years. Under a separate, paid agreement, the Russian corporation provides SNF reprocessing services. The resulting minor actinides are returned, sealed inside specialized glass matrices. Furthermore, all reactor-grade uranium and plutonium remain in Russia; Rosatom possesses the technology to utilize these materials in mixed uranium-plutonium fuel, which is used in fast-neutron reactors currently operating exclusively inside Russia.

Rosatom’s CEO Alexey Likhachev said that while Armenia is free to go for US technology, this would not only mean additional costs of building SNF disposal facilities, but would also necessitate a complete overhaul of the country’s personnel training systems and operational expertise. [10]

It is no secret, that the G7 nations - the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Canada, and Japan - have agreed to join forces with an eye to phasing Russia out of the international nuclear energy market. A statement to this effect appeared on the British government’s website on April 16, 2023. [11] The parties planned to collaborate on developing unified nuclear fuel supply chains, with the stated goal of isolating Russia from these supply chains "as quickly as possible." However, these efforts have fallen flat due to the limited uranium-processing capabilities in the United States and Europe. Meanwhile, while the United Kingdom has imposed sanctions on individual executives at Rosatom, the corporation itself remains unsanctioned. The European Union tried and failed to do this, in part due to the stance taken by Hungary and Bulgaria. As a result, the West has failed to completely break off ties with Rosatom and its subsidiaries.

"The general consensus is that imposing sanctions on Rosatom is unrealistic and impractical. It would bring the nuclear industries of many countries to a standstill," said Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in an interview with Reuters. [12]

According to the Czech media outlet iDnes [13], there are 18 reactors of Russian or Soviet design currently at work in five EU member countries. Several other nations remain dependent on imports of Russian nuclear fuel. Russia operates four major uranium enrichment facilities, which, prior to the start of the "special military operation," accounted for nearly 40 percent of the world's enriched uranium production.

Meanwhile, on October 12, the press bureau of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service reported [14] that a smear campaign had once again been unleashed in Europe against Rosatom, prompted by the European manufacturers’ inability to compete fairly with the Russian company in the nuclear energy market. Ukraine too is now demanding that the EU reconsider its cooperation with Rosatom. [15] The leadership of the European Commission, including its President Ursula von der Leyen, has explicitly tasked their staff with prioritizing efforts to compel the government of Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar to roll up peaceful nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, specifically regarding the construction of the Paks II Nuclear Power Plant in the country.

A similar scenario once led to the closure of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania. Even though the NPP had undergone modernization, Vilnius was handed an ultimatum: either close the Ignalina plant, or see its EU membership bid deferred. The Lithuanian government opted for EU membership. The Hungarian authorities will face a difficult choice: either to succumb to the media frenzy stirred up by Brussels and lose a reliable source of power generation capable of ensuring national energy security for decades to come, or to stand firm on their principles and defend the interests of their citizens.

The EU leadership will hardly miss the opportunity to throw a spanner in the wheels of nuclear energy cooperation between Russia and Armenia. Chances are that Armenia’s neighbors - Turkey and Azerbaijan – might want to join this information campaign. For years, they have been calling, even despite the findings by IAEA inspectors, for the closure of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, citing environmental risks and nuclear safety concerns. They propose shutting down the Armenian reactor and replacing it with a joint energy system that would rely on electricity imports from Azerbaijan, which would in turn require its own nuclear power plant to facilitate such an arrangement. [16] Meanwhile, Turkey is already collaborating with Russia’s Rosatom in the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, a project valued at approximately $20 billion. The facility will have four VVER-1200 reactor units with a combined capacity of 4,800 MW. Once fully operational, they are projected to meet about ten percent of Turkey’s electricity demand.

Curiously enough, Ankara is using Russian nuclear technology to develop its own energy sector – something also being eyed by Baku - while simultaneously opposing the continued use of nuclear power in Armenia.

The Armenian government’s position regarding plans for developing nuclear energy has shifted repeatedly over the past year. On February 9, Nikol Pashinyan signed the 123 Agreement on nuclear cooperation with the United States, which envisions the use of small modular reactor (SMR) technology, which is still in the design stage in the US itself. On February 11, he announced in parliament that Armenia was extending the operation of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant until 2036, with plans for a further 10-year extension until 2046. Back in May, the Prime Minister said that Armenia was looking into proposals from Russia, the United States, France, and South Korea, to choose a project based on economic efficiency and technical specifications.

It looks like Armenia’s strategy regarding nuclear energy has yet to be finalized, or perhaps Pashinyan is trying to link the construction of a new nuclear power plant with the transfer of the South Caucasus Railway concession to a third party. It is no sheer coincidence that, following Alexei Likhachev’s visit to Yerevan, the head of the management board of Russian Railways (RZD), Oleg Belozyorov, also arrived there for talks.

Whether the current Armenian administration, which has chosen a path of political maneuvering in economic matters, will be able to make a sovereign decision to develop the country’s nuclear energy sector any time soon remains to be seen.

The views of the author are his own and may differ from the position of the Editorial Board.

[1] https://meo.ru/news/likhachev-pribyl-v-erevan-press-konferentsiya-2026-09-29

[2] https://am.sputniknews.ru/20260929/rosatom-sdelal-pravitelstvu-armenii-predlozhenie-o-vozvedenii-novogo-bloka-aes-v-1-gvt-107442609.html

[3] https://www.gov.kz/org/atom-energiyasy/press/news/details/1017485?lang=ru

[4] https://rosatom.ru/press_center/news/rosatom-zaymetsya-likvidatsiey-otkhodov-zakrytogo-khimicheskogo-zavoda-nairit-v-erevane/

[5] https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/54886

[6] https://www.atomic-energy.ru/statements/2026/10/02/168913

[7] https://am.sputniknews.ru/20260506/nelzya-protivopostavlyat-vidy-energetiki-ekspert-o-solnechnoy-politike-vlastey-armenii-101813840.html?ysclid=mv8mll0m2327797259

[8] https://medyagunlugu.com/abdnin-kafkasyada-beton-ve-teknoloji-odakli-yeni-oyun-plani/

[9] https://itek.ru/analytics/amerikanskoe-obremenenie-dlya-armyanskoj-aes/

[10] https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8691551

[11] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-nuclear-fuel-agreement-alongside-g7-seeks-to-isolate-putins-russia